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EUROPE ON THE MOVE

Europe on the Move

WAR AND POPULATION CHANGES, 1917-47

By EUGENE M. KULISCHER

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PREFACE

THE PRESENT STUDY was really started sixty years ago. In 1887 my father, Michael Kulischer (1847-1919), a Russian ethnologist and historian, published in *Vestnik Evropy* two articles under the heading "The Mechanical Foundations of History." His approach had been determined by the role the great shifts of population had played in Russian history. From this he derived the general idea that migratory movements are interrelated and that war and migration are intimately connected. Michael Kulischer published no other material on this subject, although all his life he continued to study this question and to apply his theories to various periods of world history.

The work of the father was resumed by his sons Alexander Kulischer (1890-1942) and the author, with the help of more copious historical material and more precise demographic methods. In our book published in German in 1932 under the title *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge, Weltgeschichte als Völkerbewegung* (*War and Migration; World History as Peoples' Movements*), (Berlin-Leipzig, Walter de Gruyter, 1932), an attempt was made to formulate a theory of migratory currents and to apply this method to three historical periods: seventh to tenth centuries, sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, and nineteenth to twentieth centuries up to the first World War.

In 1937, in collaboration with Alexander Kulischer, I started to collect material for the period after the first World War. Part of this material was shaped into a preliminary French draft of a few chapters. An introduction written early in 1940 (i.e., shortly after the German invasion of Poland and the subsequent Russian advance to the Baltic coast and other western territories) contained the following paragraph:

This was the cardinal question on the eve of the second World War: could the eastern territories still furnish a broad outlet for European Russia? Or would demographic and economic obstacles set up a serious barrier to migration from European Russia, forcing the mass of the Russian people to search for an outlet in another direction? The events gave an immediate answer to this fateful question. The Germans them-

selves, in their attempt to expand towards the East, pierced the immense dam [separating Soviet Russia from the Occident], and the inundation has begun. And let us not be mistaken: *it is only the beginning* [italics in the original]. . . . New conflicts will arise because of the German plans for expansion towards the East, and they will finally precipitate the fatal Russian advance towards the West. Then the problem of living space will indeed rise in terrible and fatal fashion between Slavs and Germans, but in the opposite sense to that planned by the Nazi adventurers. . . . There is and there will be no room for the German colonists *on* the Russian earth, at best there will be room for them *in* the Russian earth. A policy which aims to reverse the peoples' movements may reinforce its violence and even pile up corpses and ruins, yet the current will pass.

The introduction and a few other sections were sent on the eve of the collapse of France from Paris to England. These papers have been kept in the files of the Society for Promotion of Science and Learning, Cambridge, England. A full copy of the preliminary draft with preparatory materials safely reached southern France. Then, to avoid the Vichy censorship, it was forwarded to the French West Indian island of Martinique. In 1941 I crossed clandestinely the demarcation line between the occupied and the unoccupied parts of France, and from there went to the United States. Subsequently, the manuscript was got from Martinique, due to the help of Alvin Johnson and the American Consulate at Fort de France.

My brother, when crossing the demarcation line, was arrested by Pétain's gendarmes and died in a concentration camp. It would be impossible to overemphasize the value of his contribution to this book.

I resumed the book under entirely changed conditions, when what had been a forecast became reality. This obviously influenced the approach to the interwar period. The chapters covering this period were written by making use of materials brought from Europe and collected in America. The scope of the book was widened to include the war and postwar movements, presenting a preliminary conclusion of a development which had started some thirty years ago.

A grant of the Social Science Research Council provided me with the necessary technical help. I am deeply indebted to my assistant, Miss Laure Metzger, for her faithful cooperation. I also wish to express my gratitude to Joseph P. Chamberlain, Carter Goodrich, My-

ron K. Gordon, A. J. Jaffe, Arnold D. Margolin, N. R. Rodionoff, Irene B. Taeuber, George L. Warren, and Donald Young. My wife, Olga Kulischer, collaborated in the Russian aspects of the research work and in the laborious compiling of the bibliography. The maps (with the exception of Map 5) have been carefully drawn by Miss Kay Goldman.

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Washington, D. C.
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Eugene M. Kulischer

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EUROPE ON THE MOVE

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

WAR IS a mass phenomenon. To penetrate the basic causes of war, we must discern the factors which have made millions of people abandon their habitual modes of life, their occupations, and their moral concepts to participate in murder and destruction. We should therefore put greater stress upon the simple conscious and subconscious impulses which rule the behavior of the masses.

This study does not attempt to attribute to one exclusive factor the general phenomenon of war or the outbreak of the second World War, in particular. However, the often-neglected part which migration (that is, movements of human masses in search of food and security) has played in world history and its intimate although complicated connection with warfare are here emphasized (Chapter II). This is not to say that the stoppage of peaceful migration is necessarily followed by war. Even less can it be asserted that war is an explosion caused by an overflowing population. But when peaceful migratory currents are barred the economic organism becomes "mal-functioning." Then appears "the conqueror, the armed wanderer," to use Goethe's expression; his bloody and destructive march sets human masses in desperate motion.

This study is confined to Europe and the Soviet Union during the past thirty years. The consequences of the Russian defeat and the German invasion in 1917 are shown as leading to evacuation, revolution, civil war, and the great famine of 1922, each accompanied by the displacement of huge masses of the population. The number of these migrants surpassed fifteen millions. Approximately ten million persons were destroyed (Chapter III). There followed the Soviet effort to build up a new life, which was connected with the removal of some twenty-five million inhabitants to urban centers and the eastern territories and the destruction of five million more human lives (Chapter IV).

Outside the Soviet Union the situation in Europe was greatly influenced by the loss of migration outlets and export markets. Before 1914 the population pressure in Europe was eased by a net trans-

oceanic emigration of nearly a million yearly. After 1924 it was reduced to one tenth of its previous volume. Europe attempted to adjust to changed conditions partly by means of birth control, but obviously a decrease in the birth rate could have no real effect on the labor force until some two decades later. The situation was aggravated by the erection of barriers slowing the free movement of people and goods among the European nations. The solution was found in the expansion of "living space," first at the expense of fellow-citizens and then of other countries (Chapters V-VIII).

In its own peculiar way, war lifted the barriers against mass movements. In the second World War the march of millions of German soldiers was accompanied by the displacement of more than thirty million evacuees, fugitives, deportees, workers, war prisoners, transferred minorities, and others. German retreat and Allied advance called forth new movements, when millions of Germans and their adherents fled, and millions of others stepped into the places they had abandoned (Chapter IX).

In spite of the great destruction of lives, war brought about no decline in Europe's population. But it changed the demographic map of Europe by effecting a drastic redistribution of the population, which involved 28 millions, and the expansion of the Slavonic settlement area at the cost of the Germanic (Chapter X).

It is *one* demographic process which reveals itself in the gradual alteration of fertility and mortality, in the millions of deaths from starvation, epidemics, and wars, and in the steady infiltration of migrants and the sudden floods of conquerors and refugees. This study emphasizes this close interdependence of all kinds of population movements in time and in space.

Today's demographers tacitly assume that populations grow in accordance with "normal" birth and death rates, barely touched by the "normal"—that is legally restricted—migrations. The role of cataclysms is minimized. They are considered casual irruptions of extraneous forces into the normal evolution of population, which is presented as a quiet process affecting successive generations.

Most scholars are rooted in their environment. They differ in their ability to outgrow it. The Malthusian theory was an ingenious formulation of the substance of the demographic course which in the time of Malthus was common to almost all peoples of the globe, but had become particularly manifest in the first stages of the industrial

revolution. Malthus was impressed by the fact that the greatly increased means of subsistence caused a growth of the population of England rather than any improvement in the living conditions of her working masses. Reasoning and observation enabled him to generalize so broadly concerning the relation between means of subsistence and population growth that it was possible for Darwin to use his thesis as an explanation of the evolution of all living beings.

The modern approach to demographic problems, finding its expression in the population projections, is an inadequate generalization based on the temporary situation of a few nations which for several decades were able to eliminate both the pressure on means of subsistence and the impact of migration and war: Up to the second World War no economic barriers seemed to impede the natural increase of population in various western countries. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand they have been, indeed, practically removed. Simultaneously, immigration has been sharply restricted. Wars—merely transoceanic expeditions—left the size and the composition of populations nearly unaffected. Thus, population changes appeared to be self-regulating processes. Hence arose the belief that the size of the coming population could be foretold either with the help of a “logistic curve” or by projecting past and present trends into the future. Proud of their scientific autonomy and equipped with data on age distribution and birth and death rates, demographers began to project and to predict for all parts of the world the growth of masses already pressing up on the limits of their means of subsistence. Fantastic figures have been calculated, but their compilers have not questioned whether conditions would permit the accumulation of the expected hundreds of millions. Formulas and hyperbolas have overshadowed the main problem of demography: the relation between the changes of populations and their economic bases.

This is not to imply that population projections based on the assumption of the continuation of “normal” fertility and mortality trends are of no value or validity. On the contrary, such projections are often useful as a tool for conducting research on past demographic changes (for instance, war losses). If combined with economic and political prospects, impending social changes, and probable migratory trends, such projections may also help to visualize the vague contours of future populations. A projected popu-

lation is not a picture of the future population, but a hypothetical concept, because in sad reality population changes are determined not only by "normal" fertility and mortality but also by wars, epidemics, and other forms of excess mortality, as well as by the uprooting of peoples by the might of a conqueror.

The role of these catastrophic events is not one of a *deus ex machina*. They are elements inherent in the demographico-economic evolution, and they and the growth of the population are interdependent. In the nineteenth century Europe's unprecedented growth could proceed unchecked, because of a direct and indirect enlargement of the economic sphere through the colonization of new land areas, the introduction of more efficient means of agricultural and industrial production, and the opening of new markets. Obviously, the population could not have grown on the same scale if the living space had remained unchanged. Strangely enough, the pattern of nineteenth-century Europe has been applied (in default of direct data for projections) to Asia's teeming masses. It has been predicted that they will be doubled or even tripled. The analogy disregards this fundamental difference: the Asiatic nations lack similar means of existence and earning opportunities and are deprived of outlets for people and products. For the near future the outlook for Asia's demographic process seems to be a series of repressive checks by famine and civil war. More remote changes depend upon hardly discernible constellations of human masses on the world scale.

In Europe, too, few nations have yet succeeded in eliminating famines. In the whole history of Europe only one forty-year period was almost unaffected by war. The part played by migration was in this period greater than ever. Since 1914 war has again appeared periodically as a factor in population changes. War-induced migrations became the main form of population movements.

Discussing various solutions for the agricultural overpopulation in eastern and southern Europe, a study made by the Princeton Office of Population Research, concluded in July, 1945, apodictically declared: "Viewed abstractly, migration might provide a measure for equalizing economic opportunity; viewed in terms of past experience, present circumstances, and probable future conditions the movement of peoples on a scale necessary for appreciable results is rather improbable."¹ When the quoted words were being written, the "im-

¹ Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 121.

probable" migration had already started; in the next year it involved some 15 million people. "Viewed in terms of past experience," these movements represented but another instance when a stubbornly impeded migratory current forced its way past all barriers.

Things may again take the same course; providing for migratory outlets is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the preservation of peace. The resettlement of "nonrepatriable" refugees should be the initial step. It is the first concrete problem to be solved by the United Nations. Success or failure of the International Refugee Organization will be a test case of international co-operation.

Chapter II
THE PERPETUAL GREAT
MIGRATION

MAN'S HISTORY is the story of his wanderings. Some epochs of the remote past have frequently been called "periods of great migrations." This terminology presumes that at other times migratory movements were at a standstill, especially in the case of a so-called "sedentary" people. In fact, no population is ever at rest. Every epoch is a period of "great migrations."

By A.D. 900 the traditional chapter on "great migrations" had been closed. The various tribes had settled in their respective places, and Europe had entered the "sedentary" era. Yet at that time not one German was in Berlin; not one Russian in Moscow; not one Hungarian in Budapest. There may have been a Slav village on the site of Berlin, a Finnish settlement where Moscow now is, but the emergence of these capitals was a result of subsequent population shifts, which radically changed the national and ethnic character of large territories. Constantinople existed, indeed, in 900, an important capital with a historic past, but the only Turks there were a few slaves and mercenaries. Madrid was then a Moorish settlement. True, London stood out as an Anglo-Saxon town, and there was the "Eternal City." But the British and the Italian nations were formed much later and only as the result of migrations and invasions which took place after 900.

The displacement of an entire people or of a group which existed prior to the migration has been the exception. The "transhumance" of whole tribes is as much of a myth as the immobility of sedentary peoples. The perpetual whirl which sweeps through human history does not uproot ethnic entities. It is the process of migration itself which constantly breaks up existing unities and causes the formation of new groups.

Said Vidal de la Blache: "When the hive is too full, some swarms take off. This is the history of every age." It even applies to an organized and government-sponsored exodus, as in the case of the

Greek colonies or the migration which symbolically persisted in the Roman *ver sacrum*. The average migratory group is characterized by its heterogeneous make-up. Emigrants founded states and gave birth to nations, but they themselves constitute a most diversified mixture. Elite or scum of the earth, they have broken away from or have been rejected by various groups. They were the adventurers who in former times surrounded great warriors and conquering monarchs—"armed servants" and founders of military aristocracies. Russian folk-songs about Prince St. Vladimir, Russia's King Arthur, praise his followers the brothers "Sbrodovichi." The term has two meanings: "brothers from everywhere" and also "scoundrels"; both interpretations are adequate. These brothers are among the killers and the fighters who came from the French coast, from Brittany to Flanders, to follow William the Conqueror. They were to be found among the Cossacks, who formed the vanguard of Russian expansion everywhere, and we meet them again in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, piled up in Ellis Island, ready for the American melting pot.

The migratory movement is at once perpetual, partial, and universal. It never ceases, it affects every people, but at a given moment it sets in motion only a small number of each population; hence the illusion of immobility. In fact, there is never a moment of immobility for any people, because no migration remains isolated.¹

The Migratory Current

Migrations constitute great networks of movements. Ordinary peaceful migration, wartime invasion, political emigration, and colonization contribute to the formation of the migratory current which sweeps across land and sea, and gives its peculiar shape and content to each historical period. The "dynamics" of world history are expressed in the great migratory currents, created by people on the march who are crowding each other. Political history is merely the colored surface of the stream of events; the undercurrent has been imposed by elementary necessity and stems from the very nature of people's movements.

Thucydides pointed out the role played by Athens, which at first

¹ The theory of migratory currents briefly sketched in this chapter was presented in the book of Alexander and Eugene M. Kulischer, *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge -Weltgeschichte als Völkerbewegung*.

absorbed immigrants from Hellas and later directed them towards more remote destinations. In Greece, he said,

the richest districts were most constantly changing their inhabitants; for example the countries which are now called Thessaly and Boetia, the greater part of the Peloponnesus with the exception of Arcadia and all the best parts of Hellas. For the productiveness of the land increased the power of individuals; this in turn was a source of quarrels by which communities were ruined, while at the same time they were exposed to attacks from without. Certainly Attica, of which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long freedom from civil strife, and therefore retained its original inhabitants. And a striking confirmation of my arguments is afforded by the fact that Attica through immigration increased in population more than any other region. For the leading men of Hellas, when driven out of their own country by war or revolution, sought an asylum at Athens; and from the very earliest times, being admitted to rights of citizenship, so greatly increased the number of inhabitants that Attica became incapable of containing them, and was at last obliged to send out colonies to Ionia.²

Earlier, Herodotus had spoken of a series of peoples, who in moving pushed against one another. A similar remark is also found in Pliny the Elder. But Thucydides' observation stands out, because he grasped the unity of the migratory process, which involves the most diverse elements. Invasions, which mainly hit the richest lands, were followed by emigration from these lands to peaceful Attica; immigration into the latter territory increased its population; and eventually overpopulation caused the colonization of regions beyond the sea.

Every migratory movement is the result of "differential population pressure," to use Warren S. Thompson's terminology. The relative positions of two regions creates a push on one side and an attraction on the other. According to Franz Oppenheimer: "Men go from the place of highest social and economic pressure to the place of lowest social and economic pressure by following the line of least resistance."³ Of course, the direction of the main migratory current for a given period can only be ascertained by the law of great numbers. Attempts at migration are continually being made and in many directions. Wanderers grope for new outlets, and numerous are the victims of unsuccessful efforts. But these movements are of unequal

² Thucydides I.2, transl. by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1900, I, 3.

³ Franz Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, Jena, Fischer, 1924, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 216.

intensity. The prevailing direction of the population displacement is shown by the resultant of these various forces, which pull off in various directions.

Migratory movements, both peaceful and violent, are expressions of a trend towards equalization of economic density, which is the ratio between the number of inhabitants and the resources at their disposal. At the same time, the changes produced by migratory shifts become new sources of differential population pressure, and therefore of migratory drives. As stated by Friedrich Ratzel, the founder of the science of anthropogeography, "In case of two adjacent nations, a movement in the one betokens a movement in the other. Active movements are responded to by passive, and vice versa."⁴ The same observation has been made by Flinders Petrie: "It is obvious that a displacement of one people is likely to cause another movement, either in front or in rear, or both. Hence the general direction of migrations may be expected to be similar in any one age."⁵

The migrants may push out another group, or they may attract other immigrants, who will follow in their wake. Furthermore, a migratory influx closes the area of immigration to other migrants, who may be thus forcibly diverted elsewhere. The influence of the migratory movement on conditions in both the area of immigration and that of emigration may be favorable or harmful. Whatever the case may be, the relative economic density of these areas with regard to other territories has been changed. New centers of attraction and repulsion have been created. Once more the forces of leveling resume their Danaidean task.

In the nineteenth century the movement of migrants and colonists at first resulted in vast agricultural expansion in the southern and the southeastern parts of European Russia; subsequently it led to agrarian overpopulation. As a result, these regions in turn became a reservoir of out-migrants, whom Siberia eventually absorbed. Let us now consider the opposite case. In North America population growth resulted in an unprecedented increase in natural wealth. In terms of resources, every wave of immigrants created more space for additional newcomers. As a result, new millions from remoter regions were drawn into the current: the attractive force of America operated

⁴ Friedrich Ratzel, "Man as a Life Phenomenon on the Earth," in H. F. Helmolt, ed., *The World's History* [English translation], London, Heinemann, 1901, I, 68.

⁵ W. M. Flinders Petrie, "Migrations," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XXXVI (1906), 216.

more and more deeply within the European continent. The English and the Irish were soon followed by Germans and Scandinavians, and the latter were eventually followed by immigrants from eastern and southern Europe. This is the picture for the United States as a whole. But in fact the new wave of European immigration into the eastern states was merely an extension of the westward drive of the American people. This movement, a genuine colonizing migration carried out mainly, not by Europeans, but by American-born pioneers, was at the source of the economic expansion which attracted new masses of European immigrants. If we therefore consider the East and the West of the United States as being, respectively, regions of out-migration and of in-migration, we discover that the migratory movement benefited both regions and encouraged a further influx from the outside—in this case Europe—into the eastern territories, which were themselves an area of out-migration. This argument can easily be turned around: the huge masses of European laborers who flowed into the cities of the eastern seaboard were responsible for the development of industry, a prerequisite for the rapid and successful colonization of the American continent.

In short, in the case of nineteenth-century Russia a new migratory current was induced by the disturbing effects of migration upon the reception area. In the case of the United States, the favorable results of immigration called forth a subsequent wave in the same direction. As a final example, let us take a case in which the sequence was determined by the detrimental influence of the migratory movement, not upon the reception area, but upon the country of emigration. The expulsion of the Spanish Moriscos in 1610 may well have been the most fatal factor in the decline of Spain. The country thereby lost its best farmers and craftsmen. Later in the century the impoverished rural population flocked into the towns of the seaboard and took the place of the expelled Moriscos. But commerce and industry declined in turn, and as a result numerous destitute Spaniards left the peninsula. Finally Spain was both depopulated and impoverished. Thus the expulsion of the Moriscos, because of its detrimental effect upon the economy of the country, produced a current consisting of an internal migration and a secondary and voluntary outward migration.

Both peaceful and warlike movements enter into the composition of the same migratory current. In the last analysis both are attribut-

able to differential population pressures. But in the course of history freedom to migrate was the exception rather than the rule. A wholly peaceful mass migration presupposes a number of conditions: in the first place, security for the migrants must have been guaranteed. The group must also be free to leave its homeland and to enter the country of immigration. Furthermore, the newcomers must have a chance to make a living in the new country. Before the nineteenth century those conditions were seldom found simultaneously, not even within the boundaries of one state. Then a change occurred. Permanent internal peace and freedom of movement coincided with the opening up of tremendous outlets in all parts of the world. Excess populations were absorbed by colonizing activities and emigration to new industrial centers. A similar interconnection had existed in the past: both *pax romana* and the peace of the Caliph lasted as long as those empires had outlets due to continuous expansion.

Internal Population Shifts

As a rule population changes are not the result of a sudden mass influx, but of slow and gradual displacements. Each migrant covers only a relatively short distance. Ratzel gave a striking analogy when he said:

History takes a too narrow view in considering only the migrations of nations (*Völkerwanderungen*), looking upon them as great and rare events, historical storms as it were, exceptional in the monotonous quiet of the life of Man. This conception of historical movements is very similar to the discarded cataclysmic theory of geology. In the history of nations, as in the history of the earth, a great effect does not always involve a presupposition of its being the immediate result of a mighty cause. The constant action of small forces that finally results in a large aggregate of effect must be taken into account in history as in geology.⁶

This phenomenon has been observed especially with regard to interior migrations. They are (1) generally short-distance movements, but (2) their combined action tends to produce great shifts of population.

(1) Short-distance migrations are the rule. This has been stated by the British geographer Ravenstein in a paper presented on March 17, 1885, to the Royal Statistical Society. "Long-journey migrants are

⁶ Ratzel, *op. cit.*

the exception, not the rule, and do not probably constitute 25 per cent of all migrants.”⁷

Ravenstein used the British census records on the birth places of the inhabitants. A comparison of actual places of residence with the birth places gives only a rough picture of migratory trends. More illuminating is a confrontation of the actual and past residences at a fixed date. In the United States data on past residences were collected for the first time by the census of 1940. The date of comparison selected for this purpose was April 1, 1935. It turned out that in this five-year interval one out of every eight persons had migrated from one county or city of more than 100,000 inhabitants to another. But of these 15.7 million migrants more than 9.2 million moved only within the boundaries of the same state. Of the remaining 6.7 million migrants, 3.1 million, that is, almost one half, went to a contiguous state. Thus, only about one fifth of all the migrants covered any considerable distance.

A similar survey, conducted in Germany, in conjunction with the 1925 census, on changes of residence since 1914 likewise showed the predominance of short-distance moves. Nine million inhabitants, that is, one fifth of those who could answer this question, had made a change of residence in those eleven years. But two thirds of those migrants had moved within the same German province, and only one third of all the migrants had come from another province or from foreign countries. Nevertheless, the latter category constitutes an adequate basis for the establishment of definite migratory trends.

(2) The combined effect of short-distance migrations results in great population shifts. Ravenstein, in the above quoted paper, revealed this fundamental “law of migrations,” as he called it. Because migrations usually cover only a short distance,

there takes place a universal shifting or displacement of the population which produces “currents of migration” setting in the direction of the great centres of commerce and industry which absorb the migrants. . . . The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth, flock into it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are filled up

⁷E. G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, XLVIII (1885), 183, 198-99. A valuable addition was recently made by Samuel A. Stauffer, who showed how the distance covered by the migrant is influenced by opportunities which he meets on the way. “A basic concept in handling movement and distance is the ratio of opportunities in the promised land to the intervening opportunities” (“Intervening Opportunities; a theory relating mobility and distance,” *American Sociological Review*, V (December, 1940), 847.

by migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of one of our rapidly growing cities makes its influence felt, step by step, to the most remote corner of the kingdom.

Such population shifts nowadays ensure approximate uniformity of wages and other working conditions throughout the country. The equalizing function of interior migrations is often overlooked, precisely because its continuity prevents the accumulation of regional discrepancies. Alfred Marshall wrote on this subject:⁸

Movements of population within a country, are generally by small stage. . . . Districts in which employment is offered on favourable terms draw labour from neighboring districts; and they in turn replenish their supplies of labour from districts on the other sides of them; and so on. Thus a very small force will effect a gradual movement of labour sufficient to obliterate any disturbance in the relative wages in different districts. . . . The case is similar to that of a number of tanks of water connected by pipes. If, when the water is at rest at the same level throughout, a little additional water is poured into one of them, a readjustment of level will be made quickly throughout the whole system, though the impellent force is small and no water passes from any tank, except to its immediate neighbor.

The gradual transmission of the migratory impetus accounts for the fact that there is a time lag—in Great Britain of six to eighteen months—before fluctuations in the labor market are reflected in the volume of migration, a phenomenon pointed out by English statisticians.

In spite of the various centers which attract the migrants, an internal current which prevails over a fairly long period of time in a given direction may bring about important changes in the distribution of the population. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century there was in England a continuous population displacement from the south and the east to the north and the northwest. A special study⁹ showed the way in which this shift came about. People from the southeastern part of England seldom went to Manchester or to Newcastle. The displacement was caused by a series of short-distance centripetal migratory movements, which originated in the countryside and in small towns and step by step

⁸ Alfred Marshall, *Money, Credit and Commerce*, London, Macmillan, 1923, pp. 7-8.

⁹ Arthur Redford, *Labor Migration in England 1800-1850*, Manchester, University Press, 1926.

finally converged on the large centers. In the southeast, London was the natural terminal. But after the development of the large and alluring industrial centers, mostly in the north and the northwest, the population of England gradually shifted in their direction.

This phenomenon recurred in the interwar period, but in a different direction. This time the current went southeastward. Again mainly "by means of short successive movements of many migrants, gaps originating in the south travel up the migration stream and eventually reach areas which draw migrants from South Wales, the North-east Coast, and South-west Scotland."¹⁰

Unless they go beyond national boundaries, internal migrations are finally absorbed by the large cities. For migrants a metropolis usually has a large entrance gate, but no exit. It seldom restores what it has once absorbed. A mass return of city dwellers to the countryside occurs only under very exceptional conditions, such as general scarcity. But the migratory current finds outlets in the growth of the city itself: in the successive shifts of the urban population within its walls. A survey conducted at the time of the French census of 1911 revealed that country folk tend to settle in Paris near the station through which they entered when they first arrived from their respective provinces; people from Brittany resided in the Montparnasse district, and so forth. But another movement was recorded as well: genuine Parisians left the older neighborhoods, near the main railroad stations, for newer and more luxurious districts. In Paris this process may be even less obvious than elsewhere, because the stations are located in several neighborhoods. The city has expanded simultaneously in various directions. In London, the East End, a wretched neighborhood, is near the harbor and is an immigrant district par excellence. In Whitechapel, Jews from eastern Europe dominate. All the "better" people, including second-generation Jews, move to the remote West End, as far away as possible from this abject neighborhood. Likewise, the Lower East Side of New York City has long been the abode of newcomers and first-generation Americans, while the second generation has moved "uptown."

This freedom of internal migration, last vestige of a short period of general freedom of migration, is an important factor in the preservation of internal peace. It also brings about a rapid adaptation to

¹⁰ R. S. Walshaw, "The Time Lag in the Recent Migration Movements within Great Britain," *The Sociological Review*, July, 1938, p. 285.

changed economic and demographic conditions in the least expensive and harmful way. Improvement in local conditions almost automatically benefits the whole country, and unfavorable consequences of internal migration are met fatalistically and attributed to a general economic depression.

The favorable results of freedom of internal migration were stressed shortly before the outbreak of the second World War.

It is a commonplace that the postwar years have seen a great deal of internal migration into the home counties and South of England generally in response of new demand of labor arising out of industrial developments, which themselves are the product of recent scientific discovery and manufacturing invention. Would that development, with all its attendant benefits to the standard of life of the population of this country, have been allowed to proceed so quickly if Southern England had been a separate "nation" with its own autonomous legislature? Would not Southern Ministry of Labor have been bombarded by demands to conserve all employment for Southern-born nationals? Local labor shortage would have led to higher wage-rates and labor-costs, which would have placed a lower limit on industrial expansion and on employment capacity in the developing regions of South. Could an unemployed Welsh miner or Northern industrial worker expect to be granted a labor permit in the face of accusations that immigrant labor was depressing money wages? Can we doubt that the condition of the inhabitants of this island would have been far less prosperous, if local authorities had power to restrict immigration into their localities?¹¹

However, we must not paint in wholly rosy colors a peaceful and unperturbed process of internal migration. A chorus of accusations has been leveled against immigrant workers, and they have been accused of having a depressive effect on wages. But similar complaints are sometimes made about one's fellowcountrymen. In southeastern Russia the conflict between Cossacks and Russian "immigrants" was never quelled, yet, here we have not only political but also ethnic and lingual unity. Even in the United States, similar feelings may run strong. They came to the surface a few years ago, when thousands of ruined farmers from the Great Plains streamed westward. John Steinbeck has given a stirring picture of the hostility with which they were received by everybody in California—landowners, officials, and workers. They were considered "outlanders" and foreign-

¹¹ Arnold Plant, in Marshall and others, *The Population Problem, the Experts and the Public*, London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1938, pp. 129-30.

ers, "although they talk the same language." Complaints of welfare officials, as reported in McWilliams *Factories in the Field* and *Ill Fares the Land*, about the "habits of primitive people from the Southern and Middle Western States" are reminiscent of similar statements frequently uttered by experts in immigration committees. Border patrols were established to circumvent the entry of Okies and Texicans into California if they looked unemployable and might become a burden for the state. Applicants for relief were to be expelled without further delay. There was even not lacking the usual suggestion—which recurs so frequently in discussions on immigration policy—that the eastern states should "put their own house in order" before California should be expected to admit more transients within its borders. Yet by "transients" they meant native white Americans.

Freedom of internal migration is salutary, but it is not a panacea. In the long run, when no outlets are available internal conflicts might degenerate into revolution or civil war. We see this today in China; let us hope that India will not follow suit.

War and Population Movements

Warlike migration has become more and more exceptional within the boundaries of consolidated states, but internationally it is still a recurring phenomenon.

War is a violent movement of masses of people which stems from differential population pressures. Certainly it would be an oversimplification to pretend that if thwarted a peaceful movement will at once assume a belligerent character. The connection between war and migration is complex, and to grasp it fully, one should remember the fundamental fact about migratory movements—their far-reaching ramifications.

A warlike migration can always be traced, in the last analysis, to a frustrated peaceful migration. But it would be wrong to assume that obstacles to migration or a disparity in the economic conditions of two specific countries will make war imminent. Forecasts that a given "overpopulated" country will invade a neighbor and that a certain nation with a declining population will be "swallowed up" by poorer and more prolific neighbors have failed to come true ever so often. Not the immediate relationships of individual countries, but the course of the migratory current is the decisive factor. If its peace-

ful flow is barred, migratory behavior becomes warlike. But the outbreak may not take place at the barrier, and the groups involved in the two movements may not be the same.

A number of difficulties usually arise when the migratory current goes beyond national boundaries and comes into contact with a new environment. The change of medium greatly hampers its penetration and subsequent flow. The trend toward equalization of economic density persists, regardless of political frontiers, but the latter impede it. Striking dissimilarities between countries are the rule, even between territories which practice the open-door policy. Differences in prevailing customs, working conditions, and, in particular, language have serious consequences for immigrants. Their employment opportunities are limited to the most elementary tasks—the unskilled back-breaking jobs, which the native workers avoid. Ethnic contrasts and racial prejudices greatly increase the difficulties of the entire adaptation process.

Conflicts between the interests of immigrants and local inhabitants are common. They can be mostly traced back to a discrepancy between the broad prospects which immigration opens and the immediate inconveniences which it engenders. History shows that conflicts arose even in countries which were truly underpopulated and where immigration was indispensable for the efficient utilization of natural resources and optimum per capita returns. In general, pioneers in underpopulated countries had a low standard of living, even when the potential wealth of these countries was considerable, and they might therefore be reluctant to admit additional consumers, whose productivity would be felt only later. But conflicting interests are especially acute in countries whose resources are being broadly utilized. A rich country is particularly attractive to immigrants, and it could easily accommodate additional consumers and continue to develop its resources with the help of additional producers, were the local population not afraid of weakening their own competitive position. The hostility of organized labor to immigration was understandable in the days when the introduction of immigrant labor forced down wages and hampered unionization. However, after labor had become strong—it was an ironical comment on the theory of “proletarian solidarity” indeed that immigration was indiscriminately opposed at various times and in various countries by all classes of the population under the battle cries “Save jobs for

our own children,” and “Every immigrant frustrates the birth of a native child.” The doors were thus bolted at the very moment when the push against them was strongest.

Obstacles to peaceful migration may lie within the migrants themselves; some may be incapable of becoming peaceful members in a new society. Nomads can only penetrate a sedentary-type economy by despoliation. The invaders either superimpose themselves on the local population and live off their contributions, or else, having plundered and depopulated the country, turn fields and towns into pastures. This happened in the eleventh century, during the Bedouin conquest of Tunisia and Algeria, recorded so comprehensively by the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun.

But even among sedentary peoples, certain individuals are not cut out for peaceful migration. As shown above, an incidental feature of migration is the agglomeration of various unstable elements, who cluster particularly in regions called “marches” by Arnold J. Toynbee. Here are fostered many creative accomplishments, favored by abundant resources and the clash of civilizations. But here also are all kinds of adventurers who are incapable of orderly settlement. Numerous examples could be quoted. The case of the Russian Cossacks is very characteristic. In their free association, all agricultural activities were prohibited. A Cossack had to subsist on the products of hunting and plunder. In a Cossack folksong the tsar gives the people the River Terek and its tributaries, but he also gives them “two poles with a bar between them.”

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the introduction of compulsory military service, armies were composed of outcasts, of men who had not found their places in society. These rough and tough elements, assembled in military barracks, formed the backbone of future violent emigration. It would seem that this no longer holds true in modern society. Nowadays the best elements of the nation are called to arms. But the selection of antisocial elements through military service still operates to a certain extent. During the first World War congenial minds found each other in the ranks of the immense armies. New groups were organized, made up of outcasts, political freebooters, conquistadores of their own homelands, and instigators of civil war. They were the first communist followers, as well as the professional “white guards” in Russia, the initial Fascists and the *alte Kämpfer* of the Nazi party. The selective process did not

stop there. The "militant" youth enlisted in private armies and paramilitary organizations. Movements based on such elements necessarily become warlike; they turn into looting expeditions. The Fascists and the Nazis did not want outlets for peaceful migration; they wanted "living space" where they could organize the exploitation of one people by another and keep for themselves the best part of the booty.

War is an outbreak of compressed forces; war is also a powerful agent in forming migratory streams. The relationship between war and migration, as well as the transmission of migratory currents through wars, can be observed at every stage of human evolution. The more advanced a civilization, the more complicated the process. The movement has to break through a thicker layer of social, economic, and political phenomena. The difference can be illustrated by comparing a water mill with a hydroelectric installation. In the first case, the waterfall directly sets in motion the wheels, which in turn start the millstones, all these motions being purely mechanical. In the second case, the mechanical force of the water is transformed into energy, transmitted over a certain distance, and again becomes a mechanical force in the action of a motor.

The more primitive a society, the more immediate the transition from migration to war, and vice versa. In primitive societies the food instinct subjected people to uninterrupted displacements. Their search for an outlet became especially acute when the food supply dwindled and when the tribe increased. When local resources became insufficient, the tribe moved on. But a casual contact with another tribe automatically induced conflict. Both the primitive mind and the primitive economic process excluded the formation of larger units or of symbiosis. Shock meant conflict and the exodus of the loser. This was only the start, however, for one tribe exerted pressure upon another, and a general movement was launched.

The direct transmission of currents can be observed at later stages of human evolution as well. No longer was the whole population of a conquered area expelled, but it remained exposed to massacre, subjection, and especially looting, which was long the primary aim of any campaign, for the soldier as well as the prince. Therefore conquest always causes the flight of people who want to save their lives, their freedom, and their belongings. These refugees overrun other countries and in turn supply their quota of brigands and soldiers for

new bloodshed and sometimes the media for a colonizing movement. For example, as a consequence of the flight of the Russians before the nomads in southern Russia, which began in the eleventh century, immense tracts in central Russia were cleared and colonized; there, three centuries later, Moscow's power was to arise.

In our time there are again migratory movements released directly by war and changes in sovereignty. This kind of migration is undoubtedly in many cases temporary. But, as has been established on the basis of statistics for the French departments invaded during the first World War, a definite displacement of population always occurs.

To find the true connection between war and migration we must examine the effects of war upon economic conditions. The panegyrists of war pretend that it generally alleviates conditions caused by overpopulation of the belligerent countries. Nothing could be more remote from the truth, for loss of population is usually counterbalanced by the volume of economic destruction. The economic density is, therefore, rarely improved, especially if we look at the over-all picture. But the situation is entirely different with regard to the individual participants. Over and over again, conquest has opened the road for immigration into conquered areas and for despoliation, which means that the economic density of one country has been lowered at the expense of another. More than the actual flight before invaders, the deterioration of conditions in the conquered areas causes displacement of the defeated people in a number of ways: actual emigration, enlistment in the armies of the conqueror, and so forth. But sooner or later a devastated country will enter a period of reconstruction. Such a country is often depopulated and in need of manpower; immigrants may be provided by the conqueror, especially when political boundaries have been revised. Thus, conquest usually produces migration, both by push and by pull.

Victory and conquest, however, do not necessarily assure the direction of subsequent migration. The military and political results of an armed conflict correspond frequently but not always to the prevailing migratory current. The fortune of war and the diplomatic solution of territorial conflicts depend also on other factors. Nonetheless the current will follow its initial direction eventually. When the French under Louis XIV invaded The Netherlands, the movement followed the general eastward direction of the current of Dutch emigration, which went then mainly to Germany, Poland, and even Rus-

sia. But the French invasion, while in the "right" direction, was repelled. What happened, however, was that the devastation of The Netherlands was so great as to open the door to foreign emigrants. The French had lost the war, but subsequently a peaceful infiltration of Frenchmen into Holland took place. The immigrants were French Huguenots who fled during the French religious persecutions. Likewise, the German invasion of France in 1914 was in the general westward direction of the migratory current which originated in eastern Europe. The German armies failed; yet, somewhat later, as a result of war and devastation, a flow of eastern immigrants penetrated into France. Polish workers came, first from western Germany (Westphalia) and later from Poland. The lack of manpower in France made them necessary.

Conquest may even open the road to a migratory current which flows in the direction opposite that of conquest. After Poland in 1921, had conquered large Belorussian and Ukrainian territories, a migratory movement from the Soviet Union to these areas set in. Political considerations may account for this emigration. Polish attempts to colonize the newly acquired eastern areas proved futile; indeed, numerous inhabitants of these territories who were of Polish stock left the annexed territories for Poland proper. The trend of the Poles was westward. Their demographic policies failed in the east, while they succeeded very well in the west, where they displaced large numbers of Germans in Pomerania, Silesia, and Poznan.

Finally the larger migratory current breaks through. It influences the effect upon populations of conquest and political changes and in large measure determines the demographic success or failure of attempts at nationalistic expansion.

Economic Progress and Migration

Population statistics with some claim to reliability exist only since the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, on the basis of available indications, it appears that a stationary population was the norm. The arrest in the growth of population during many centuries can only be accounted for by high mortality, since formerly birth rates were certainly higher than they were in many countries in the nineteenth century, when there was, nevertheless, a large natural increase. High mortality caused by widespread disease was not sufficient to bring about this stabilization; it was achieved only at the price of mass

destruction brought about by war, and its corollaries, epidemics, and starvation. Periods of re peopling were followed by new disasters. "Superfluous" populations were periodically accumulated, then destroyed. Such a situation can be explained by the small proportion of the natural resources which could be utilized, because of the primitive nature of the equipment. To quote Kautsky, "on the basis of the same production technique, means of subsistence can only be enlarged by an increase in the cultivated area." But both expansion of the cultivated area and technological progress, as well as social and political improvements, which are frequently prerequisite, were impeded by permanent warfare. Instead of increasing the cultivated area or its returns, men exhausted themselves in a struggle for the already developed but limited resources. Migration meant conflict; conflict meant migration of the defeated; and so forth ad infinitum.

The significance of this vicious circle reveals itself when we realize that a group was often unable to enlarge its economic basis because of the lack of manpower. Large human forces were needed in the struggle against hostile natural environment. Up to the eleventh century the only habitable and cultivable areas consisted of some scattered glades in an immense forest, of a few dry places surrounded by deep marshes. According to P. Boissonade: "Over half of the territory of France, over two-thirds of The Netherlands and Germany, and four-fifths of England were untilled." The vast areas of wasteland offered nothing to men, not even to the hunter, for the density of the forests rendered animal life impossible. There was no possibility of winning in a struggle against the forests; on the contrary, man was in this respect on the defensive. Again and again, to quote Shakespeare's striking figure used by the Russian historian Jégorov, "Great Birnam Wood advanced against the Castle of Dunsinane."

But because men decimated each other in continuous warfare, they could not muster the necessary forces for the conquest of nature. Therefore, in terms of developed resources, Europe at the time of the Carolingians, with only ten or twelve million inhabitants, was really overpopulated, paradoxical as it may seem. Inversely, being too weak in the struggle against woods and water, men then sought to expand at the expense of their neighbors. Large groups lived on the products of war and plunder. It was said of the great warriors of those early times that they were driven by personal ambition and

lust for adventure, but their role as permanent anarchists was conditioned by the absence of any other field of activity. Invaders from Asia and Africa had forestalled unhampered expansion outside Europe. On the undeveloped continent of Europe, in the midst of a hostile and unsubdued natural environment, men fought for the patches of life-supporting land with the passion of beasts locked in a narrow cage.

In the course of history the impact of this perpetual self-destruction by war is so terrific that it seems almost miraculous that there has ever been any progress, any accumulation of wealth, any civilization. Every bit of advancement meant a temporary breaking away from this vicious circle, which continues even now to spin humanity in a whirlwind of misery-breeding war and of war-breeding misery.

There were times when the destruction of means of subsistence was much more serious than the population loss suffered through war. This is what an anonymous pamphleteer had to say at the time of the reign of Ivan the Terrible in Russia: "Men diminish in numbers, and the country becomes more and more spacious; yet the remaining men will not find it possible to live on this spacious land." Yes, the population decreases, but economic density increases, and a new bloodletting becomes necessary. Such was the condition during the Thirty Years' War, when ruined populations constantly supplied new quotas of lansquenets, until slaughter, epidemics, and starvation resulted in the adaptation of a decimated population to ruined territories.

The Thirty Years' War was an extreme case, because the population had not been able to escape mass slaughter by emigration. In other cases, a mass exodus saved lives, but the depopulation and ruin of the country exhausted by war were all the more final. The Ukraine, despite exceptionally good soil, became several times in the course of history a genuine desert because of the mass flight of the residents. Ancient Mesopotamia, a land of exceptional fecundity, which had given birth to one of the most ancient of civilizations, was ruined for many centuries.

On the other hand, there are periods of progress. They are characterized by simultaneous population growth and increase in the means of subsistence over large areas. Within the limits of our observations a very definite conclusion is imperative, to wit, the decisive factor is the migratory current. A period of progress is charac-

terized by the availability of large outlets for the surplus population and by a continuous enlargement of the economic basis as a result of these migrations. Consequently, conflicts which might lead to war are reduced in volume or else are channeled into colonial wars, which take place at a safe distance from the metropolis and whose cost is rapidly compensated by riches from colonization and the opening of new commercial routes.

We have seen the seemingly hopeless situation of Europe in the early Middle Ages, the pitiful struggle for the limited space left by nature. Nevertheless, in the eleventh century the situation began to be less serious, and up to the fourteenth century population increased and the cultivated area was considerably expanded. Changes in the direction of migratory currents from Asia and Africa had for a time freed Europe from invasion. Moreover, she had been able to take the offensive, as was shown in the Crusades. These distant conquests were of a temporary character, but they engaged the adventurous and belligerent elements of various countries. Feudal anarchy could be slowly checked. Under these conditions, a steady growth of the population became possible, and the labor force needed for economic development became available. Once great areas had been cleared, a further stimulus to the growth of the population was given. Famines became rarer; this meant a decline in mortality, while the birth rate probably remained stable. In this way there was provided the necessary human material for the great colonizing migrations—migrations which did not proceed without bloodshed, but which greatly augmented general wealth. Besides this main current, a trend towards concentration led part of the rural excess population to the cities. Because of these immigrants, whom an ever improving economic condition attracted, cities were on the increase despite a continuous surplus of deaths over births.

But pressure from Asia was soon to impede European expansion. Its manifestations were the conquest of the Russian steppes by nomads, the Turko-Kurdish invasion of the Near East, which put a stop to the Latin colonization of the Levant, and finally the Ottoman conquest. Thus the European current was gradually halted. The Black Death was a consequence of the ensuing congestion. The arrest of German colonization, the Hussite wars, the gradual expulsion of the British from France during the Hundred Years' War—all these events reflect the reversal of the movement. The first period of

progress is over. In Europe, decimated by the Black Death, population growth starts again, and new migratory currents are in formation. They will eventuate in a new period of prosperity only when new outlets and new sources of riches are found beyond the seas.

Before the nineteenth century the primary function of outward migration was to eliminate the superfluous and unstable elements. In the eighteenth century the colonization of overseas countries was not yet a decisive factor in the British economy, but it was important to have an outlet for Bob Clive and lads of the same caliber—those boys who “would go a long way, if they were not hanged first.” Navigation and emigration to the colonies offered alternatives to a military or a criminal career: the sailor, the pirate, the pioneer, the merchant of spices, and the slave trader, potential “builders of empire,” were more or less useful to their homeland in any of these activities, but primarily they served their country by their absence.

Vast outlets and new wealth acquired by “progressive” countries were characteristic of the nineteenth century, as they had been of earlier periods of progress. These riches supplied the basis for a tremendous increase in the size of the population. But this time the evolution was altogether different. While eliminating the “superfluous” elements from the population, migration also means colonization and supplies new resources—especially for industry and the subsequent development of urban centers, which are constantly on the increase. Migration no longer consisted of expeditions of a few adventurers, but was a mass movement. Gradually all western, central Europe, eastern Europe (including the western marches of the Russian Empire), southern Europe, and the Near East were engulfed in the current which rolled over all Europe and the Americas. Its vanguard consisted of the internal westward migration in North America, which opened still further territories and created new resources and new markets for the industrial capitals of Europe. The central column was crossing the ocean. The mighty rearguard was flocking to Europe’s restlessly growing industrial centers. These dual currents of expansion and concentration were even more accelerated when industry itself started to migrate, creating new centers nearer the areas of colonization. By its young industry the New World exerted an even stronger attraction upon the migratory stream. The decisive factor was that the process of colonization was in progress. Territorial expansion meant expanding economy.

Another current penetrated into Asia, where the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad had opened vast tracts of virgin soil for agricultural exploitation, leaving a trail of Russian migrants and laying the foundation for the growth of Russian industry. In certain regions of the Russian Empire emigration trends were split. Thus, from Lithuania and Belorussia migrants participated in both the colonization of Siberia and the emigration to the United States. The same holds true for a large strip of land between the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea. West of this zone Polish emigrants and others went to America or else obtained work in Germany. They thus joined the migratory current which was in the making in central and western Europe. East of this zone Russia proper and the Ukraine sent their surplus population beyond the Urals or to the industrial centers of Russia. The dividing line of migratory currents can be compared to what in geography is called a watershed, a ridge from which rivers flow in opposite directions to different seas. It is of paramount importance to stress the fact that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the population of Europe had two simultaneous issues; they assured the continuous and peaceful progress of this migration.

In terms of absolute statistics all the so-called great migrations of past epochs are trifling in comparison to what happened in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the historical impact of the changes caused by a net migration of forty million persons from Europe to overseas countries (this figure does not include the great movement of Russian colonization) was no less decisive.

Instead of draining off Europe's population, the steady stream of emigrants promoted its unprecedented growth. The removal of the excess population prevented catastrophes such as those which had formerly destroyed peoples and economies. Thus, the continuity of population growth was secured. Then the improvement of economic and hygienic conditions, starting first in the cities, led to a decrease in the "normal" death rate, that is, chronic mortality. It was followed by a decrease in the birth rate. As more children survived, procreation became more limited. Formerly "slaughter-house mortality" was nature's way of adapting population to means of subsistence. Birth control was man's new way of maintaining the same adaptation. Urbanization, that is, mass migration to the cities, favored this transition from the traditional to the rational approach to childbearing. The migratory stream, which carried masses of rude peasants to the

city and its factories, tenement houses, and new pleasures, also brought them nearer the sources of knowledge which furthered health improvement as well as smaller families. One European nation after another entered the new stage of demographic evolution characterized by decreasing death and birth rates. But as birth control considerably lagged behind reduced mortality, the interval was sufficient to allow an increase in the population unique in the history of mankind.

Later this process spread over the globe. Prevention of famines and epidemics has lowered the mortality among the populations of Asia and Africa, whereas the reduction of natality has hardly started. It is a dubious benefit, for these masses ever grow in congested areas, without outlets for their manpower and its production. It should be emphasized that the demographic evolution started in northwestern Europe under quite different and favorable conditions, in intimate connection with the great migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was an exceptional epoch, the only one in which free world-wide migration existed. To be sure, this freedom of migration was the exclusive privilege of the white race. It meant that members of the white race monopolized all the unexplored riches of the earth. They repelled the natives and kept other races off the coveted grounds. Since new colonial areas were always open, capitalists imported the cheapest manpower from remote regions as long as it was profitable to do so and as long as the labor force was of the white race. For awhile human beings circulated even more freely than merchandise.

This was also the period when for the first time in world history peace became the normal state of humanity. There can be no doubt that freedom of migration and freedom of exchange largely contributed to the prevention of armed conflicts and saved the lives of millions, as well as tremendous material values. Yet this epoch terminates with a war which brought about destruction on a scale never witnessed before. The greatest areas of colonization—in the Western Hemisphere and in Siberia—were simultaneously occupied. At the same time, the limits of further expansion of markets could be perceived. On this expansion rested the possibility of the growth of population in industrial countries. Suddenly the channels of migration, which had been accessible to increasing populations, again became clogged, and the resulting eruption was World War I.

Chapter III

RUSSIA, 1915-23

A PERSPICACIOUS OBSERVER noted, Moscow, Sept. 30, 1921:¹

One of the strangest features of Russian life today is the wanderers—wandering children, wandering soldiers, wandering families, wandering villages, wandering tribes—driven from their homes by the war or revolution to move interminably across the vast Russian plains.

And then, meditating about the source of this phenomenon, he wrote:

This migration was first started by the German advance in 1915, when millions of the inhabitants of Poland swept eastward with the Tsar's retreating army. The German advance into the Ukraine and up through the Baltic provinces in 1917 and 1918 set moving a wave of humanity. Wholesale abandonment of the front by the soldiers in the same period sent countless streams trickling across Russia. Each flow and ebb of counter-revolutionary fighting uprooted thousands more until it seemed the whole nation was on the move.

We shall see that the counterrevolution was rather an attempt to check the hungry and warlike hordes which flowed from the industrial center of Russia to the granaries of the south and the east. Only when they had covered the whole Russian plain did these granaries in turn become areas of famine and send out new millions of wanderers.

But Duranty's fundamental point is correct: the German invasion in 1915-18 was the mainspring of the new Russian migration.

The First World War, the Retreat, and the Revolution

At the beginning of World War I a gigantic wave came from inner Russia and flowed beyond the "watershed."² It was the Russian offensive in Eastern Prussia and Galicia. This onslaught failed, and the Russian army retreated to a line which later, somewhat modified, was to become the new political frontier of Russia. But this retreat did not mean the end of the westward drive of the Russian people.

¹ Duranty Reports Russia, p. 15.

² See p. 28.

Between 1915 and 1917 more men were drafted and sent to the front lines as reinforcements. At the outbreak of hostilities the Russian army numbered 1,423,000 men. Up to May 1, 1917, 14,375,000 men were drafted. Approximately 7,500,000 were on the Austro-German front in 1917.

Under the impact of war, masses of ruined refugees were pushed from western to central Russia. It is significant that the first migrants were groups who had formerly been prohibited from entering central Russia. As alleged conspirators, Jews had at first been evacuated by the military authorities from Russian-occupied Poland, and later from Courland and elsewhere. By the summer of 1915 the number of evacuated Jews had surpassed 600,000.³

Their case is typical of the frustrated migration which suddenly materialized as a result of war. Before the war legal prohibitions had kept the Jews from participating in the great Russian drive toward the east, which culminated in the colonization of Siberia. Hundreds of thousands of Jews from the overpopulated towns and villages of Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine, migrated to the United States, but this outlet proved insufficient. At the same time, the economic position of small Jewish shopkeepers and craftsmen was gradually impaired by competition from big industries, which developed outside the "Jewish Land."

Suddenly, masses of Jews who had dreamed of escaping from the "Pale of Settlement" were forced out of their homes, and removed to inner Russia in "indescribable terror" (an expression used by the Council of Ministers). A large number came to Petrograd and Moscow, while others contributed to the growth of Ukrainian cities more remote from the front.

Soon the military authorities not only deported Jews but also ordered the general removal of the inhabitants from regions which the Russian armies were ready to evacuate. Their scheme of "scorching the earth" did not materialize, but the measures taken to effect it resulted in displacing a considerable part of the population, and voluntary flight increased that number.

³ 190,000 Jews were evacuated from Courland, Kovno, and Grodno. They were all directed to the interior, while part of those evacuated from Poland did not reach their destination, because they were stopped by the German offensive. Among the evacuees the percentage of women, old people, and children was high. Most of the men had been mobilized. But the removal of these families had further repercussions on the displacement of the Jewish population of Russia: the demobilized Jewish soldiers joined their relocated families instead of returning to their former domiciles.

The Soviet statistician Lubny-Gertsyuk pointed out that in two short years the movement of refugees and evacuees was as considerable as it had been during the migration to Siberia over a twenty-five-year period (1885-1909). A total of 2,000,000 refugees were registered as early as December 20, 1915; there were 3,150,000 by May 27, 1916.⁴ Some 26 percent stayed behind the front lines, and 41 percent went to central Russia.⁵ By the middle of 1915 the movement had reached Siberia; more than 170,000 persons had then crossed the Urals. Part of these refugees settled on land allocated to them.⁶

This migratory current maintained its course within Asia. Before the war Russian colonization in western Siberia and in central Asia had largely encroached upon the pastures of the natives. On the eve of the war Russia endeavored to adapt the nomads to a sedentary existence, so as to reduce their needs for space, but meanwhile the progress of Russian colonization had ruined their economy. In 1916 the attempted mobilization of nomads for labor at the front was the last drop which made the cup overflow. A severely suppressed revolt was followed by a large-scale emigration of Kazakhs and Kirghizes to Chinese territory, and of Turkmen to Persia. The exodus from Semirechie was considerable, Kazakh and Kirghiz populations being decreased by some 50,000 families, or one third. By the end of 1916 about 300,000 refugees had gone to the Chinese province of Sinkiang.

Because of the tremendous stream of refugees and evacuees from the battle zone, the population of Russia behind the 1915-17 front line increased despite war losses. The Russian army suffered the loss of 1,800,000 dead⁷ and 3,600,000 prisoners,⁸ including 400,000

⁴ Data of the Committee for Refugees sponsored by Grand-Duchess Tatiana. On Jan. 1, 1917, the number of refugees was 4,900,000, according to Volkov, *Dinamika narodonaseleniia SSSR*, p. 71. These figures do not include nonregistered refugees, whose number has been estimated at 17 percent of those registered.

⁵ Furthermore, 220,000 refugees from the Turkish front were registered as of Jan. 1, 1916, in Transcaucasia; they numbered 367,000 on Jan. 1, 1917.

⁶ Starkov, in *Zhizn Sibiri*, 1926, No. 7-8, p. 30 ff. It is generally asserted that migration to Siberia ceased during the war, but this only holds true for organized migration carried out under special legislation.

⁷ The number of killed in action or dead in field-hospitals from wounds received, was variously given by official statistics from 527,600 to 775,400. In addition, according to Avramov and Pavlovich (quoted by Volkov, in *Dinamika narodonaseleniia SSSR*, p. 52), among those evacuated to the interior 970,300 persons died from wounds received and 155,700 from diseases contracted.

⁸ *Rosstia v mirovoi voine*, pp. 20, 30-31. Volkov, *op. cit.*, p. 63: 3,590,000 including

civilians (interned at the outbreak of the war). Russia held only 2,500,000 enemy prisoners.⁹ Despite all this and despite a declining birth rate due to mobilization, the population of the postwar USSR territory probably increased between 1914 and 1916 by 2,000,000–2,500,000.¹⁰

This increase was associated with a gigantic population displacement. Rural population decreased by 3 million, while the urban population gained 5 million. The cities received the stream of evacuees and refugees, as well as wounded and sick soldiers; 3,500,000 of the latter had been sent from the Austro-German front to inner Russia before the Revolution. But first of all the rural exodus to the cities was accelerated because of the development of war industries, which in 1916 employed more than 2,000,000 workers.

Thus, eastward migration and abrupt industrialization, both results of war, rapidly populated the Russian cities, but the means of subsistence decreased. An illusion of prosperity had been created by the output of paper money and the feverish activity of war industries. In fact, war needs exhausted the stocks of raw materials and food. War had upset the usual economic relationships. The flow of grain supplied by the farmers no longer met a flow of manufactured goods. At the same time, agriculture lost 30 percent of its manpower to the armed forces and the war industries.¹¹ The decline of the sown land began in 1915; in 1916 it had reached 8 or 9 percent. Bread became scarce in the cities, although exports were stopped; to the decline in crops must be added the inadequacy of the railroads, overtaxed by war requirements. Out of the Petrograd breadlines came the spark which was to set the Russian powder mill aflame.

The Revolution of March, 1917, stimulated the west-east movement: the direction of the retreating Russian armies was continued within Russia by troops deserting from the front. According to 182,000 dead in captivity and excluding exchanged invalids and nationals of the border states. Gen. Golovine, *The Russian Army in the World War*, pp. 90 ff., gives 2,400,000. For other computations see Volkov, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁹ Volkov, *op. cit.*, p. 75: 2,467,000, among whom were 155,000 dead and 44,000 exchanged invalids. These figures were obtained by later calculations; official statistics gave only a tentative figure of 1,961,000.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 97: 139,900,000 on Jan. 1, 1914, as against 142,500,000 on Jan. 1, 1917. *Bulleten' Ekonomicheskogo Kabinetu Prof. Prokopovitcha*, No. 80: 139,700,000, as against 141,700,000.

¹¹ According to computations by the section of military statistics of the USSR, mobilization absorbed almost one half of all fit men (474 per thousand).

General Headquarters the number of deserters before the outbreak of the Revolution, over a period of two and one half years, was 195,000. During the first six months following the Revolution, there were as many as 175,000. Kerensky's offensive of 1917, undertaken at the request of the Allies, precipitated the loss of the army. From that time what had been a slow disintegration of the Russian forces turned into dissolution, and the flow of deserters took on the proportions of a flood. Redistribution of large properties was a further stimulus to desertion. Everybody was eager to participate in the free-for-all which destroyed cattle, grain stocks, and agricultural machinery, ruined production, and decreased the cultivated area. The spreading economic disruption prevented the sending of food supplies to the army, and this in turn increased the number of desertions.

The bolshevist Revolution (November, 1917) represents the culminating point in the eastward migratory movement which World War I had prompted. Under the two bolshevist slogans "Down with war" and "Loot the looted" the entire army streamed toward the rear and went in for wholesale plunder. Front lines crumbled. The enemy advanced far beyond the "watershed." Finland, the Baltic provinces, and all Belorussia fell to the Germans. The armistice was merely a formal recognition by the bolshevist government of the irresistible inward push of an army in dissolution.

The armed masses who swept through the towns and villages of Russia, by railroad and on foot, were no longer counted by hundreds of thousands, but by millions.¹² These "emancipated" men did away with the last remnants of public order and normal economic life.

But this orgy was short-lived. More and more, "the armed domination of organized gangs upon a nonorganized population"¹³ came to prevail. The majority of peasant-soldiers were eventually driven to villages. The rural order had survived despite general confusion. Because of its largely autarchic character, the farm economy was able to rely on its own strength. Furthermore, the peasants profited by the distribution of machinery and livestock of large landowners, and they had been freed from burdensome taxes and rent.

The great mass of uprooted people was thus somehow absorbed.

¹² According to Volkov's estimate, 3,314,000 armed men were involved in the inward drive in the last three months of 1917.

¹³ Miliukov, *Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii*, Vol. I, Part 3, p. 286.

But there remained some elements which were eventually crystallized at opposite poles: at one end was the revolutionary soldier; at the other, the unemployed officer. They started the civil war on opposite sides, and both became true professionals in matters of civil war.

The kernel of the revolutionary army was made up of three elements: the debris of the regular wartime army (remnants of the Petrograd garrison, sailors "of firm land," Latvians and Estonians who had enlisted in the Russian army and had been cut off from their homes by the German invasion); the former enemies of the Russian army (German and Hungarian prisoners of war); and the red guards (recruited among factory workers, whose plants were at a standstill, other unemployed, and bums).

In contrast were the officers of the tsarist army who found themselves out of a job. At first they were the favorite victims of the rebellious soldiers, and later of the bolshevist Cheka. They had been the first to flee from the bolshevist scene of triumph, and they now formed the backbone of antibolshevist uprisings.

Thus, the debris of the Russian army and groups of uprooted people had come to constitute the active elements for a new warlike movement of the civil war. But in this new move, more and more men soon became involved. The countryside was able to sustain itself for awhile by doing without the services provided by the cities. But things were different in the towns themselves. They lacked both raw materials and fuel for their industries. Furthermore, the factories were completely disorganized by the flight of management and by the workers' seizure of plants. When they ceased to produce, the cities could no longer feed their inhabitants. And since no more food came into the towns, the people had to search for it outside. "Here in the vast agrarian country, there was a way of escape flight from the town to the village. Millions of people forsook the towns, in which nothing awaited them but death. The large towns were depopulated together with their factories."¹⁴ The destitute migrants were soon joined by armed expeditions for the requisition of foodstuffs. Resistance and clashes followed. Thus, civil war broke out, its pattern determined by factors of economic geography.

¹⁴ Feiler, *The Russian Experiment*, p. 56.

The Civil War

We repeat, the aim of this book is not a monistic explanation of war. It tries but to present in the right light the role of the demographic factor, not so much in the usual ways of static demography operating with the notions of population growth and population density and its immediate effects, but rather along the lines of dynamic demography, showing the results of repressed migratory trends.

These considerations apply also to the approach to the Russian civil war. The civil war was a sequel of the November Revolution. The Reds were its offspring; the Whites embodied the effort to return partly to the social and political structure of prerevolutionary Russia, partly to the situation created by the March Revolution. However, the role played by masses moving in search of bread is in the case of the Russian civil war particularly conspicuous. These mass movements determined the pattern of the civil war and greatly influenced its course.

Economically, Russia was divided into two complementary regions which bore the significant names "grain-producing area" and "grain-consuming area." The latter had a population of 26 million and contained the administrative centers, as well as the intellectual and industrial strongholds, with Moscow in the central industrial region and Petrograd farther north. This area imported 2-2½ million tons of grain yearly, which were supplied by the broad black-soil belt extending from the southwestern Ukraine toward the east and into Siberia. Because the land was not very fertile in the grain-consuming area, the rural population there was forced to supplement its income by seasonal work either in the cities or in the grain-producing area. When this mechanism of exchange had been disrupted, the population had only one alternative: emigration to the rich agrarian districts or else invasion to obtain supplies by force. Both means were applied, and often simultaneously. Unending caravans of starved wanderers crowded the roads to eastern and southern Russia. The Red troops, requisitioning foodstuffs both for themselves and for the country in their rear, took the same path. Such was the civil war of 1918-20.

The two main streams of migrants from the grain-consuming area went eastwards to the Volga lands, the Urals, and Siberia, and south-

wards to the Ukraine and northern Caucasus, respectively. The bolshevist advance followed the same routes. The fortress of bolshevism was in central Russia. The Soviet government recruited its armies, its "agitators," and its administrative agents in this region, and from there the armies departed for the conquest of the remainder of the empire. But the bolshevists were only victorious wherever their advance coincided with the migratory trend. In the west they were repelled. In their eastward and southward drive they were carried by the popular mass movement, which they organized and used to their advantage.

Before the German Occupation of the Ukraine

A migratory movement was launched as early as 1917 on the ancient road of colonizing migration.

During the winter of 1917-1918, people attempted to escape the famine, cold, and bolshevist terror which reigned in Petrograd. They fled to the lands where food supplies were still ample and where the power of Lenin was not expected to penetrate, to the Urals or the Caucasus, to Siberia or the Far East.¹⁵

Besides these migrants, who were mostly officers, members of the middle class, or intellectuals, numerous demobilized soldiers took the road to Siberia to take over the lands which had been allocated to them before the war: 175,000 colonists crossed the Urals in the first four months of 1918, coming largely from the northern provinces.¹⁶ However, those who fled "the power of Lenin" were soon caught by bolshevism, which in turn followed the route of the Trans-Siberian.

In the south the situation was complicated by the formation of numerous local and national governments. The bolshevist government recognized the right of self-determination of all inhabitants of Russia. This included even the right of secession, to be interpreted, however, in accordance with the interests of the proletarian world revolution as represented by the Moscow troops, as far as regions producing important foodstuffs or rich in raw materials were concerned. This applied first of all to the Ukraine. There had been no objection against giving the Ukraine full sovereignty. But as soon as its government showed signs of "counterrevolutionary intentions" by refusing to supply Russia proper with grain except for gold and

¹⁵ Cleinow, *Neu-Sibirien*, p. 135.

¹⁶ Iamzin and Voshchinin, *Uchenie o kolonizatstii i pereseleniakh*, p. 72.

by disarming Russian soldiers and expelling them from its territory, the revolutionary garrison and the Red guards of Petrograd took over. The Revolution was victorious in the Ukraine, and a government was installed, which, according to the commander of the revolutionary troops, "had been brought in from the north at the point of bayonets, and which was maintained by the force of these same bayonets and by the material ascendancy of the revolutionary and socialist army" (January, 1918). A ferocious requisition of grain was carried out without further delay.¹⁷

East of the Ukraine, in the Don region, the Cossacks had after the Revolution set up an autonomous administration. As in all Cossack lands, the antagonisms between the old established Cossacks (well-to-do farmers) and the Russian peasant "immigrants" had torn the country. The latter demanded their share of the public domain, which the Cossacks considered their exclusive property. This antagonism led to the assumption of a counterrevolutionary attitude on the part of the Cossacks and to bolshevist sympathies on the part of the in-migrated Russian peasants. Internal conditions and geographical location—in the Cossack lands of southeastern Russia (the Don and the Kuban regions), where the movements from the north and the west met, destined these territories to become the real birthplace of the White counterrevolutionary movement. "The White movement began without a pre-established plan. Everybody merely went to the Don and to the Kuban."¹⁸ Officers, civil servants, anti-bolshevist politicians from the north swarmed to Rostov, which soon became the center of counterrevolutionary activity. They were lured by the abundance of food in this region, and they hoped that Cossack honor and pride were assurances of protection and security. On the other hand, officers who had fled from the southwestern front were anxious to put many miles between themselves and their soldiers. Therefore they escaped to the Don from the Ukraine, which was filled with soldiers who were either revolutionaries or Ukrainian nationalists. But the Red hordes followed closely on their heels in February, 1918, under the injunction to crush the counterrevolutionary surge and also to profit from the land's riches.

Shortly afterwards the situation was completely changed by a strong blow from the west. The German and Austrian armies, ex-

¹⁷ Order of the Ukrainian Soviet Government of February 24, 1918.

¹⁸ *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, X, 64.

hausted and famished, assaulted the rich Ukrainian pastures and ousted the bolshevists. The latter fled and took along as many foodstuffs and other goods as they could. Because of German occupation, the north-south migration was dammed. After having ousted the bolshevists from Ukraine, the Germans, supported by the local authorities, prohibited as a rule the entrance of all Russians into Ukrainian territory. In fact, there were exceptions, and the relative order maintained by the Germans, together with the favorable food situation, attracted a number of persons into the towns of the Ukraine, in particular members of the aristocracy and the upper middle class. Thousands of Russian officers joined the troops of the German-nominated Hetman of the Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands of Russian refugees came to the Ukraine during the German occupation.¹⁹ But they represent only a small portion of those who wished to go there. Those who saw the crowds which day and night filled the immense Palace place in Petrograd where passports were issued and also the gigantic open camps near the Ukrainian border will bear this out.

The Germans made every effort to exploit the Ukraine, but the yield was poor. Only 113,000 tons of grain could be squeezed out, instead of the expected one million.²⁰ After having seized the agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, the Germans seized the coal of the Donets. They advanced eastward to the Don and helped the Cossacks to oust the bolshevist from the Don area. A new element in this eastward flow was the campaign of the White army of volunteers, led by General Denikin, which took off from the Don estuary, conquered the Kuban and the remainder of the northern Caucasus, and ousted the bolshevists from these regions.

The Eastward Drive

The German occupation of the Ukraine cut deep into the vital parts of Russia, and its consequences were very serious. It not only barred north-south migration but also, and mainly, closed the road for the importation of foodstuffs, fuel, and ore from the south. After the loss of the southern area, the only source of supplies for central Russia

¹⁹ A completely arbitrary figure of 2,000,000 was given by Niedermayer and Semjonow, *Sowjetrussland—eine geopolitische Problemstellung*, p. 30.

²⁰ Czernin, *Im Weltkrieg*, pp. 340-45. "In June and July the Ukraine failed more and more." The 1918 crop could not be utilized, because it was needed for immediate consumption, for the towns as well as for the German troops.

was to be found in the grain-producing regions of unoccupied Russia proper and in remote Siberia. There could be no further prospect of re-establishing exchange on an even somewhat normal basis. The industries of central Russia had received a mortal blow as a result of the sacrifice of its two main sources of fuel, the Donets coal and the Baku oil, the latter being in German and Turkish hands. They were also deprived of ore from the Ukraine and Georgia, also held by the Germans. Later, when Germans and Turks were ousted from Baku and Georgia by the British, the road between Trans-Caucasia and central Russia was still cut off by General Denikin's White army.

Once more the east offered a solution. It could supply raw materials for heavy industry; an old industrial center already existed in the Urals. And there were also potential sources of fuel. The bolshevist government worked out a plan for transferring industry and workers to the east.²¹ These projects did not materialize for a long time; they were again taken up much later and for quite different reasons. At that moment they merely reflected the spontaneous push of men who indeed took the road toward the east, in search of, not industrial foundations, but bread and shelter. The eastward direction was taken by the so-called supply detachments, made up of starved men in search of food for themselves and for the towns, which were unable to pay for these goods. At that time there occurred the transition from looting as practiced at the early stages of the Revolution to the authoritarian communist system.

Transportation difficulties on the Trans-Siberian gave the signal for civil war in the east. A revolt of Czech troops was the initial spark. Before the Revolution the Russian government had recruited numerous Czechs among the prisoners of war to fight Austria for the sake of Czechoslovakia's future independence. More than 50,000 of them were stranded in the Ukraine,²² imperiled by the German advance. They wanted to escape by way of Siberia and to rejoin their fellow countrymen in France. The Czechs clashed with the Soviet authorities over a matter of transportation and subsequently overthrew the bolshevist regime along the Trans-Siberian and took the

²¹ Report by V. P. Miliutin to the Congress of Economic Councils of May 28, 1918 (Miliutin, *Istoriia ekonomicheskogo razvitiia SSSR*, p. 91).

²² According to Masaryk, *The Making of a State*, p. 265, there were altogether 92,000 men in the Czech corps in Russia. Soviet sources speak of 70,000-80,000 men in the Ukraine, but the insurgent Czechs numbered 50,000-55,000; later only 30,000 remained (M. Golubev, *BSE v. Chekhoslovatskii miatezh*; Putna and J. Smirnov, in *Bor'ba za Ural i Sibir*, pp. 7, 306).

initiative in the formation of the anti-bolshevist front in the Volga and the Urals regions. Former war prisoners, Serbs and Rumanians, fought side by side. They were joined by Poles, who had been soldiers in the Russian army. All were headed for the Trans-Siberia, hoping to return to Europe.

Part of the local population supported the antibolshevist uprisings. This was especially true of the Cossacks from Orenburg, the Urals, and elsewhere. They defended their land and privileges against the bolsheviks, but their enthusiasm fell notably when it came to fighting outside their own territory. The outstanding part in the counter-revolutionary activities was played by recent in-migrants. Officers, some of local origin, but most of them refugees, formed the backbone of the White armies. Some of these refugees remained in Siberia only because they were not allowed to continue their voyage to the Far East.²³

The eastward movement which had played an outstanding part in the outbreak of the civil war and had perpetuated itself in the refugees' stream to Siberia, was further augmented by the retreat of the White armies. This retreat itself was a great migration, and it was accompanied by the looting of territories along the Trans-Siberian trail. In addition to the Czechs, for whom participation in the civil war was merely an episode in their evacuation from Russia, the White armies under Kolchak's White government were in final analysis an organization of retreating masses which had to live at the expense of the land through which they passed. Farmers who at first had supported the White government in the hope of safeguarding their property soon opposed it for the same motive, and the ensuing peasant revolt spread over all western Siberia.²⁴

Despite several tentative offensives, the White army consistently lost ground. In the summer of 1919 it was ousted from European Russia. The retreat rapidly turned into mass desertion. Gradually the bulk of the White army was scattered over the immense Siberian lands. Some derelicts, followed by a mob of civilian refugees, continued their march by the *via dolorosa* of the Trans-Siberian. Trains

²³ *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, IX, 261. Akulinin, *Oreburgskoe voisko v bor'be s bol'shevikami*, pp. 36-37, 85-86, 168. Cleinow, *Neu-Sibirien*, p. 144.

²⁴ Guins, *Sibir', soizuzniki i Kolchak*, II, 397. According to a widespread opinion, the failure of the Whites can be largely explained by their refusal to accept as a *fait accompli* the land distribution carried out by the peasants. But this question did not play any part in Siberia, where there was no land nobility. Yet nowhere were relations between the White armies and the Russian peasantry worse than in Siberia.

crawled; typhus patients froze to death; those who could find no space on the trains walked behind them. The numbers were reduced every day by exhaustion, typhus, and the Siberian winter (1919-20). Only a small minority reached Vladivostok (where the Whites, under the protection of the Japanese, held out until 1922); some escaped over the Mongolian and the Chinese borders.

The elements which had joined the White armies to defend their country against the Red invasion participated in the retreat and the subsequent emigration, especially the Cossacks. Western Kazakhstan suffered a population loss of 9.7 percent between 1917 and 1920, or almost a quarter of a million persons. This loss mainly affected the Cossack population "and can probably be explained by a large exodus of Cossacks who left their villages to follow their atamans."²⁵ This emigration proceeded not only by way of Siberia but also by other roads (through the desert of the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea and through the arid steppes of central Asia); the latter were roads of death rather than roads of migration. Small groups took refuge in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) and in Persia. Some hordes of Cossacks, together with deserters from the Red army and Kalmyks, took to the steppes for guerrilla warfare against the Red army and were not annihilated until 1923.

The victorious Red troops formed the vanguard of a new and much more important migration. Soviet historians concede that the first Red guards were recruited in industrial centers of the Urals and were "gangs of *Lumpenproletarier* who distinguished themselves by their cruelty and moral degradation," by violence and all sorts of crimes.²⁶ But the real strength of the Red army can be attributed to the masses who came from afar in search of food. The bulk of the "fifth army" which operated in the Urals "was formed by detachments of workers from Petrograd, Moscow, Briansk, Vladimir, Kursk, Kazan, Minsk, and elsewhere. They were joined by the peasants from famine-stricken provinces such as Belorussia, Orsha, Kaluga etc. . . . Their slogan was 'To the Eastern front'. . . . They passed Smolensk, Viazma, Kaluga and met everywhere dearth until they reached Penza, where the first white bread was found."²⁷

More white bread was found as they proceeded. One of Kolchak's

²⁵ Lubny-Gertsyk, *Dvizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, pp. 59-60.

²⁶ Podshivalov, *Grazhdanskaia bor'ba na Urale*, pp. 183 ff.

²⁷ S. Kanatchikov, and A. Shifres, in *Bor'ba za Ural i Sibir'*, pp. 3, 6.

ministers recognized that "from the summer and fall of 1919 on, the regular Red troops proved more disciplined than the White troops." And he found the clue to this enigma: "as soon as the Red army had consolidated the conquest of a territory, general requisition took place and the Red army received the lion's share."²⁸ The Soviet armies conquered Siberia for themselves and for starved and naked Russia.

The victory of the Red army opened the way for a new in-migration into Asiatic Russia. In July, 1920, a government decree legalized the colonization drive. According to the original plan, 640,000 settlers were to be transplanted. In fact, the colonization which was organized in 1920 absorbed, up to 1922, only some 160,000 persons (see Table 3). Before the war there were already a strong reduction in the number of colonists who could be provided with adequate plots of ground in accordance with established rules. This trend was amplified after the war. But the bolshevist victory brought to Siberia a large number of colonists who had not previously been registered for the allocation of lands. Without increasing the area under cultivation, they merely settled on lands already cultivated by earlier colonists. More than half a million had arrived by the middle of 1920. The revolutionary committee in Siberia was forced to confer upon them a status equal to that of earlier settlers, but it found that these colonists were not similar to the ones which Siberia had known before. "They are not men of peasant stock, such as used to come from the southern provinces, but merely people in search of better living conditions. . . . The motive of this migration is not a lack of land, but a lack of bread."²⁹

We find here once more the distinction between the two great types of migration; migration guided by the potential amount of subsistence means and migration guided by the actual amount of subsistence means.³⁰ Earlier settlers were in quest of new lands. Uncultivated soils were to produce new subsistence means through the work of the colonists. But Siberia's possibilities became more and more limited. New exploitation required heavier capital investments, and capital was not available; even had it been, returns would have

²⁸ Guins, *Sibir', soiuzniki i Kolchak*, II, 420.

²⁹ Bol'shakov, "Dal'nevostochnoe i sibirskoe pereselenie," *Vestnik Zemleustroistva*, 1928, No. 4, p. 485.

³⁰ Alexander Kulischer and Eugene M. Kulischer, *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge*, pp. 4, 18.

been inadequate. The new in-migrants did not attempt to become integrated into the scheme of land allotment, because new land was not their object. The newcomers were attracted by the available quantity of subsistence means, which had been greatly increased by the recent colonization process; they were ready to settle at the expense of the earlier colonists. The bolshevist conquest had made the acceptance of these newcomers mandatory. Soviet authorities in Siberia complained about the unwelcome guests, but they could not oust them, and they had to recognize their presence on lands which they had taken because of the civil war.

The natives of Asia, especially the nomads, were the principal victims of the Red victory. The right of self-determination was at that period a bloody joke. To quote the Soviet jurist Ananov: "The logic of the armed struggle made centralization of Soviet power a necessity. For a long time federalism existed on paper only. Circumstances did not allow the application of federalist concepts which might have shaken the economic front of class struggle."³¹ There could be no question of federalism, since it was necessary freely to export raw materials from eastern territories and to introduce new inhabitants, who had to be accommodated at the expense of the natives. The new conquerors, under the Red banner, formed a common front with earlier Russian colonists, who for a long time had coveted the extensive nomad-owned lands.

Everywhere the indigenous population was pushed out by Russian settlers. A Soviet historian admits that after bolshevism came into power "the obstacles to invasion of Russian kulaks into the border regions were overthrown. The kulaks penetrated more and more deeply into the Kalmyk steppe."³² In central Asia the advance was even more brutal. "From the first days of the Revolution," reported *Pravda*, June 20, 1920, "the Soviet power in Turkestan was identified with domination by the thin stratum of Russian railway workers." The paper stigmatized those who argued that proletarian dictatorship in Turkestan could be represented only by Russians and stated that "socialist decrees, nationalization, requisition, and confiscation have become identical in these regions with pure and simple looting . . . the Soviet authorities expel the Kirghizes from their lands at the re-

³¹ Ananov, *Ocherki federal'nogo upravleniia SSSR*, p. 13.

³² Glukhov, *Ocherki po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Kalmykii*, p. 48.

quest of the kulaks . . . the Kirghiz people have fled to escape persecution, and approximately half a million men have perished in this migration." Although the latter statements are undoubtedly exaggerated, it is certain that there was a violent expansion of the Russian colonization, which precipitated the departure of nomads ousted by the colonization policy of the Soviet agents.³³

The bolshevist victory thus resulted in a further in-migration into Asiatic Russia and consolidated Russian colonization at the expense of the natives. But shifting the Russian center towards the east, which at one time was under consideration, was not carried through. At the price of bitter struggle, the route towards the south was reopened, and in this direction went the strongest current. After a prodigious destruction of human lives and the accumulation of innumerable ruins, central Russia had reconquered the regions which were her sources of food and the foundations of her industries.

The North-South Movement

In November, 1918, the dissolving German-Austrian armies evacuated southern Russia. The barrier which had cut off the south was broken. But its aftereffects were long-lived.

The German occupation had severed the country from its commercial exchanges with the north, and the Central Powers had not supplied southern Russia with the necessary industrial goods. Ukrainian cities, filled with refugees, had lost their distributing function and become parasites. Furthermore, the German military authorities had instituted a systematic ransoming of the countryside, sometimes in conjunction with the claims of former landowners who enjoyed German protection. As a result, numerous guerrilla hordes were formed, and they soon degenerated into outlaws. This system flourished under the innumerable governments which succeeded each other in a crazy merry-go-round. In southern Ukraine there were numerous zones, each dominated by a different gang, and no authority had been able to handle this situation up to the end of the civil war.

While in this unfortunate position, the south was overrun by the

³³ At the congress of Oriental Population, held at Baku in 1920, Zinoviev, when calling upon eastern peoples to revolt against British and other imperialist colonization, admitted that the Soviet agents in Turkestan "oppressed the indigenous peasants, deprived them of their lands, and considered them as inferior races."

north. The German retreat had left the road open, and more than ever before the foodstuffs and the coal of the south had become matters of life or death for the inhabitants of northern Russia. The north no longer had anything to offer in exchange and was compelled to appropriate these goods by sheer force. "The famished north assaulted the satiated south. The south, in a tenacious and bitter effort, defended its well-being."³⁴ It was in these terms that General Denikin, commander of the White army, defined the underlying motive of the struggle. And his great opponent, Lenin, speaking of the offensive which the Red army had started in the south in March, 1919, made the following statement: "We are coming closer to coal and bread, the lack of which had greatly imperiled our lives: without coal, our factories and railroads are stopped, while the lack of bread condemns the workers in the cities and nonagricultural regions to the tortures of hunger."³⁵ The search for food as a goal of the Red army, often stressed by Trotsky, then commander of the Soviet troops, in his proclamations and orders, was in conformity with the mentality of the Red army, recruited in the lands of starvation.

The south was unable to meet this assault by an offensive drive. If the antibolshevist struggle sometimes assumed a popular character, this occurred when it was a matter of putting up a local defense. Such was the vigorous and tenacious effort of the Cossacks in the southeast, in the Don and the Kuban regions. They rose to defend their soil and their exclusive rights to the public domain. And as soon as they succeeded in ousting the Reds from their "house," they hastened to put into practice their own ideal of "democracy à la Cossack": only people of Cossack extraction were citizens, Russian "foreigners" being relegated to an inferior position.³⁶ In the Ukraine neither separatists nor Whites succeeded in enlisting the population in a genuine mass uprising. The Ukrainian peasant courageously defended his property, but by means of scattered resistance groups, against any central authority.³⁷ And a fortiori the idea of a common front of the southern lands "to defend their homes, their families, and

³⁴ Gen. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoi smuty*, V, 128.

³⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XVI, 85 (address of March 13, 1919).

³⁶ Pokrovsky, *Denikinshchina*, pp. 43-44. In the Cossack parliament of Kuban it was even openly proposed to expell all non-Cossacks, which would have meant half the country's population.

³⁷ It is significant that the best organized and most popular of the Ukrainian hordes, led by the ataman Makhno, adhered to the anarchist ideology.

their people,"³⁸ never went beyond the planning stage. The Whites made, indeed, an attempt to bring about this unity through force. They needed to be backed by a strong and united south in their march on Moscow, but they succeeded only in creating a caricature of unity. While General Denikin fought for "Russia one and indivisible," the territory behind his army became chaotic. Everywhere in the antibolshevist south interstate tariffs, trade barriers, export prohibitions, and taxes on transit goods were introduced, and this dealt the final blow to trade.³⁹ The same mentality found its more primitive expression in the conduct of military operations. Whenever it was decided to carry the struggle to the land of a neighbor, it took the form, not of a common struggle against a common enemy, but primarily a looting expedition of the country where the fight took place. In the last analysis it was less of a conflict between the north and the south than a march of the north against a divided south, where everybody fought everybody else.

The fight of Ukrainian hordes, which had started as a revolt against the German occupation, culminated towards the end of the occupation in an uprising to overthrow the Hetman, who was an agent of the Germans and for whom a Ukrainian Republican government was substituted. This civil war was in full swing when the bolsheviks, taking advantage of the German withdrawal, invaded the Ukraine. A mob of supply detachments followed on the heels of the bolshevist invaders. The Ukrainian armies retreated toward the southwest and massacred the Jews in the cities through which they passed.

Shortly afterwards the Cossack land of the Don was invaded, and Kuban's turn was soon to come. This time the Soviets planned for the immediate colonization of the Cossack lands by settlers from the north. A decree of April 24, 1919, opened the productive southern country to immigration and promoted in particular the settlement of the Don area for the "implantation of bolshevism." The first battalions of colonists got under way. The Cossack reaction was not slow to follow. Because of the imminent danger to which their patri-

³⁸ Memorandum presented to the Allies by the delegates from the Don, the Kuban, the Ukraine, and Belorussia on Feb. 5, 1919 (Margolin, *From a Political Diary*, pp. 186-88).

³⁹ The Vladikavkaz railroad, which linked Denikin's army and his so-called bases, passed through eleven "States," each engaged in economic warfare against its neighbors.

mony was exposed, they gave energetic assistance to General Denikin, who not only succeeded in repelling the bolshevist invasion of the Cossack land, but even launched his great offensive in the second half of 1919.⁴⁰ Enthusiasm for this drive was particularly strong because the way to Moscow led through the rich Ukraine.

For it was mainly for a war of plunder that the Cossacks could be incited into crossing the borders of their lands.⁴¹ In addition to the daily looting by Cossack soldiers,⁴² large-scale plunder was organized by their leaders, who took as war booty even the stocks in co-operatives and imposed heavy contributions upon the inhabitants. They went to the extent of transplanting from the "liberated" regions to the Don or the Kuban machinery, race horses, and precious icons.⁴³ But the head of the White army admitted in his book that the lust for booty had also infested his regular units. It seems that in the absence of popular support, the offensive brought about in the army a kind of reverse selection, attracting those elements who saw it only from the profiteering angle.

General Denikin may have had the illusion that he could lead an army in an assault on Moscow. In fact, he was the leader of a razzia in the Ukraine, carried out by elements who had been thrown together in southeastern Russia. The true direction of Denikin's advance was westward rather than northward. He conquered the whole Ukraine, and significantly his conquest was followed by an outward movement in the same direction in the west: emigration from western Russia by the western frontier began even before emigration by way of the sea. First of all, there was in the extreme western sector of the country the Ukrainian army of Petlura, who was also at war with

⁴⁰ Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 454: "Whereas Denikin had failed to persuade the Cossacks to a long marching campaign against the North, he now was helped by our striking at the Cossack nests from the south. After this, the Cossacks could no longer defend themselves on their own land; we had ourselves bound up their fate with that of the Volunteer Army . . . The Cossacks formed a formidable bulwark in Denikin's rear. They seemed to be rooted to their land, and held on with their claws and teeth. Our offensive put the whole Cossack population on their feet. We were . . . managing only to drive all those capable of bearing arms directly into the White army."

⁴¹ Gen. Krasnov, great ataman (president) of the Don Cossacks, in *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, V, 235, speaking of his own Don Cossacks.

⁴² The Jewish pogroms were the most horrible manifestations of Cossack greed. But their mentality was also revealed elsewhere. Thus it was found that the Cossack attacks against the Reds were most violent on the 15th of each month, which was pay day in the Red army (*Margulies, God interventsii*, I, 249).

⁴³ Krasnov, *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, p. 256 (concerning the Kuban Cossacks); Gen. Lukomsky, chief of the civil administration of the White army, in *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, VI, 153; Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoi smuty*, II, 262, and IV, 94.

the Reds, but nevertheless was attacked by Denikin's men and forced to withdraw to territories occupied by Poland and Rumania. Part of his army and of the civilians who had followed it became emigrants.⁴⁴ Later, the conquest of the Ukraine by Denikin gave birth to a mass migration in the same direction. The pogrom of the White army was a horrible blow for the Jewish communities, already hard hit by earlier pogroms carried out by isolated gangs and by Petlura's forces and also seriously affected by the Soviet hostility towards businessmen and artisans. The Jews left the small towns and fled to larger cities, where they were less exposed to killers and robbers. But at the same time there was a veritable emigration fever. The attempted migration to Palestine was not very successful in this period, but the liquidation of Petlura's front opened the way into Poland and Rumania. This emigration was resumed after the reconquest of the Ukraine by the Soviets. The Soviet regime suppressed commercial activities and thereby deprived the ruined Jews of the possibility of starting a new existence along old lines.⁴⁵

In the fall of 1919 the commander of the victorious White army attempted to reach his primary objective. The march on Moscow was undertaken. But the offensive spur of the White army fell off abruptly when the frontier of the starved "grain-consuming" area was reached. The Cossacks were loaded with booty, and they began to go home. The discharge of certain units for purposes of regrouping merely legalized these desertions. The retreat was in a sense self-initiated—it was the retreat of a horde which carried its booty and attempted to further increase it on the way home by still more ruthless lootings. All discipline had disappeared.

At the same time, central Russia knew its hardest winter. Petrograd was in agony—without heat, transportation, or power. Oats were distributed instead of the customary ration of one eighth of a

⁴⁴ Another part of the army was retained by the Poles and participated in the Polish invasion of the Ukraine in 1920. After its failure, the only remnants were groups of emigrants in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Paris.

⁴⁵ At this time emigration was no longer purely Jewish. After the defeat of Denikin, remnants of the White army, civilians who had shared its fate, and various middle class and peasant elements took the same road. But the Jews played an important part in this movement. Among the 570,000 Soviet citizens who were registered on the Polish border up to July 1, 1921, the Jews formed about 30 percent, and their percentage was even higher among refugees who escaped to Rumania (*Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Nov., 1921, pp. 1020 and 1023). The total number of Jewish refugees from Soviet Russia was estimated early in the summer of 1921 at 200,000 (Tartakower and Grossman, *The Jewish Refugee*, p. 23).

pound of bread. In addition to many other waiting lines, a new one made its appearance: the dead awaited their turn at the Soviet office in charge of the distribution of caskets, the production of which had declined, while customers had increased tenfold as a result of typhus and Spanish grippe. It was then that the bolshevists succeeded in galvanizing the populace for a last and energetic effort. The same sermon was preached every day: if you want bread, go and get it in the south. Workers from Petrograd became shock companies on the southern front.⁴⁶

Trotsky then made his famous appeal: "Proletarians, saddle your horses." These new proletarians happened to be a group of Don and Kuban Cossacks,⁴⁷ who found themselves in Soviet Russia, some because they had been tossed there after the World War, others because they had joined the Red army during its invasion of the Cossack lands. Trotsky, in turn, took advantage of their homesickness to form an excellent cavalry on the Red side. In such a case it is obvious that the "white" or "red" coloring of a group was completely subordinated to the migratory current. According to the leader of the White troops, the famed "mounted army" of Budenny showed extraordinary offensive spirit—the fervor of Cossacks inflamed by the desire to return to their native land.

The Red army definitely won the war and conquered the south in a single offensive within a few months. Decimated by typhus, the remnants of the White army were completely disintegrated, and together with all kinds of "White" fugitives, they flocked to the Black Sea ports, where a "spirit of emigration" prevailed.⁴⁸ The pull of the sea frustrated the last efforts of the White leaders to re-establish a front. The psychological moment had been reached when the sea was no longer a barrier inflaming anew the warriors' resistance, but a providential means of escape.⁴⁹ The great evacuations from Odessa and Novorossiisk occurred at that time (March, 1920). Some of the Whites took refuge in the Crimea, where General Wrangel maintained his position until November, 1920, when his army was evacu-

⁴⁶ Alexander Kulischer, *Das Wesen des Sowjetstaates*, pp. 21, 33, 50-51.

⁴⁷ Hadji Murat Muguyev, in *Information Bulletin*, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D. C., Nov. 7, 1943: "Cossack soldiers who joined the Red detachments in the days of the Civil War made up the nucleus of Budenny's world-famous Cavalry Army."

⁴⁸ Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoi smuty*, V, 311-12, 326, 344.

⁴⁹ Cf. Plato *Leges* IV, 2 (as rendered by Arnold J. Toynbee): "There is nothing so demoralizing for infantry in action as a hospitable fleet riding at anchor in their rear."

ated en masse (130,000 persons, including civilian refugees), and established in a camp on the Gallipoli peninsula. From there the last military refugees dispersed after 1921 throughout the Balkans and central and western Europe, where they met large numbers of emigres who had left Russia earlier.

After having tossed most of the Whites into the sea and pushed the remnants into Crimea, the north-south current continued its way alongside the Black Sea and the Caucasian mountains. The Red army seized Baku's oil and in 1920-22 conquered Transcaucasia. In this region the northern wave came into conflict with the Turkish eastward movement, preceded by the Armenian emigration. The total number of Armenians who fled from the Turkish to the Russian territory during and after the first World War has been set at 525,000 by a Nansen report; 400,000 of the latter are said to have remained in Soviet Armenia,⁵⁰ while the rest moved farther north.

The masses who left Russia by way of the sea or the continental borders were soon replaced by new waves to whom the Red victory had opened the floodgates to migration. In 1920 Russian internal migration "mainly went, not to Siberia, but to the south: to the Ukraine and northern Caucasus."⁵¹ Cossack resistance was finally broken, and Cossack emigration, in conjunction with the retreat of the White army, at last made space available.⁵² "The agrarian revolution, having annihilated the land privileges of the Cossacks, facilitated the installation of so-called foreigners"⁵³ (namely, of non-Cossack Russians).

The bolshevist conquest which emanated from central Russia was in itself a wave which surged up from the depths whenever it met an obstacle. At one time it became so gigantic as that it overthrew whatever was in its way and rolled over southern and eastern Russia, rich in bread and raw materials. Within a few years the slow secular achievements of past centuries were in a way reenacted, and Russia's unity was reaffirmed. The Red army, after a series of defeats which

⁵⁰ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 1925, Special Supplement No. 38. It seems that the figures quoted here are exaggerated. The 1926 USSR census gives for Soviet Armenia a total of 744,000 Armenians; only 94,000 of them are reported as foreign-born. It is unlikely that 300,000 migrated farther within Russia up to 1926. Simon Vratzian, *Armenia and the Armenian Question*, Boston, Hairenik Publ. Co., 1943, p. 102 reports 400,000 Armenians from Turkey for the entire USSR territory.

⁵¹ Lubny-Gertsyk, *Dvizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, p. 119.

⁵² It is true that a certain number of White Cossacks returned in 1921. Cf. note 65.

⁵³ Krasil'nikov, "Pereselentsy-obratniki," p. 98. Cf. Gozulov, *Morfologiya naseleniia*, pp. 397, 415 ff.

seemed to doom it (and after it had been decimated by typhus as much as the White army had been), was continually regenerated and grew stronger as time passed. In central Russia⁵⁴ the constantly growing misery strengthened the Red forces instead of weakening them and stimulated new recruits. Denikin's army, the largest of all White outfits, never surpassed 300,000, despite repeated mobilization and a mass enlistment of Cossacks. On the other hand, as early as the spring of 1918 the Soviets obtained more than 100,000 volunteers within two and one half months. In the summer of the same year compulsory military service was re-established, but in fact willingness on the part of the draftees continued to play an outstanding part in recruitment for the Red army.⁵⁵ In the fall of 1918 the Red army was half a million strong, and in the spring of 1919 it numbered one and one half million. Thereafter, this figure was greatly exceeded, despite mass desertions, which were further aggravated after the recruitment area had been enlarged. There were three million Red soldiers on January 1, 1921. And towards the end of the war the victorious army numbered five and one half million men.

Certainly the peasants enrolled in the Red army went into battle in defense of their farm lands, recently taken from the landlords. But the other decisive factor was that the Red army followed the direction of the popular mass movement. It was also responsible for the rapid transformation of this army. The nucleus of the White army was formed by idealistic patriots or by citizens who wanted to defend their homes, and it was organized on the basis of the old rigorous military discipline; these units often terminated as gangs of brigands, incapable of serious fighting. The Red army originated with hordes of "emancipated" soldiers and sailors and a local militia of unemployed workers and loafers, under chosen leaders; these elements eventually became a strong army, forged in the fire of battle.

It was not the idea of an "international revolution" which brought about this miracle.⁵⁶ We have seen that the chiefs of the Red army

⁵⁴ Up to the summer of 1919 "the Red Army was mainly recruited at the expense of the industrial regions of the Center" (*Grazhdanskata voina*, II, 78).

⁵⁵ As lists of draftees were unavailable, mobilization was carried out "by calling up age classes which were to report for induction. Everybody could possibly hide his age . . . Those who reported were therefore mainly volunteers" (S. S. Kamenev, in *Grazhdanskata voina*, II, 26-27). Action against deserters was only taken after June, 1919.

⁵⁶ This idea failed to prompt an offensive drive to help the communists of western Europe. See pp. 124-25.

used a quite different language in explaining to the Russian soldiers the aim of the war, language which their soldiers understood perfectly well. They went to seek bread for themselves and for the starved Russian cities and coal and oil to equip idle factories. In their common quest for these objectives, soldiers and officers found each other and fulfilled their sense of duty.

The Moscow government alone possessed a real human reservoir, and it alone could offer to the officers a chance of taking up again their profession as military instructors and leaders of fighting masses. Since the beginning of 1919 thirty thousand officers of the tsar served under the Red flag, and Trotsky was able to assure Lenin of the faithfulness of the overwhelming majority.⁵⁷ Cases of treason certainly did occur, and hatred and distrust of the communists handicapped even the most conscientious officers in the execution of their duties. Nevertheless, they worked hand-in-hand with communist leaders, who so recently had been their mortal enemies, and led the Red army to final victory.

The Russian Political Emigration

The civil war called forth a mass emigration from Russia. Its nucleus was formed by the remnants of the White army and by civilian refugees who left Russia by the ports of the Black Sea as early as the beginning of 1919. Part of these emigrants, registered when they passed through Constantinople, numbered 190,000. But emigration by the Black Sea harbors was a small portion only, although it took place under very dramatic circumstances and by compact groups. Aside from some groups of lesser importance, such as Miller's and Yudenich's White armies in the north and various refugees who fled by way of Finland and the Baltic States, it consisted mainly of vast emigration across the Polish and the Rumanian borders. According to incomplete Polish statistics, 570,000 Russian nationals had been registered at the Polish border up to July 1, 1921.⁵⁸ The movement

⁵⁷ Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 447. 48,409 former officers entered the Red army up to August 15, 1920 (*Grazhdanskaya voyna*, II, 95). They constituted the great majority of the commanding personnel (*ibid.*, p. 104).

⁵⁸ *League of Nations Official Journal*, No. 9, Nov., 1921. The number of Russians who entered Poland includes "some tens of thousands" of former war prisoners who came from Germany, but on the other hand, the Polish Government stressed the fact that numerous clandestine entries took place. This figure does of course not include those who were repatriated as "Polish nationals" (see p. 56 and pp. 130-31).

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF RUSSIAN REFUGEES IN EUROPE (INCLUDING SOME MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES)

Country	American Red Cross ^a (Nov., 1920)	League of Nations ^b (Aug., 1921)	Russian Archives at Prague ^c (Jan., 1922)
Poland	1,000,000	650,000	150,000-180,000
Germany	560,000	300,000 ^d	230,000-250,000
France	175,000	250,000 ^e	60,000- 68,000
Austria	50,000	...	3,000- 4,000
Turkey	50,000	11,000	30,000- 35,000
Finland	25,000	19,000 ^f	31,000- 32,500
Italy	20,000	...	8,000- 10,000
Yugoslavia	20,000	50,000	33,500
Estonia	17,000	...	14,000- 16,000
Bulgaria	...	30,000	30,000- 32,000
Great Britain	15,000	...	8,000- 10,000
Hungary	5,000	...	3,000- 4,000
Egypt	4,000	3,000	1,000- 1,500
Cyprus	1,500	...	600- 700
Greece	6,000	31,000	3,000- 3,200
Czechoslovakia	1,000	...	5,000- 6,000
Sweden and Norway	2,000	...	1,000- 1,500
Latvia	12,000	...	16,000- 17,000
Rumania	...	100,000	35,000- 40,000
Switzerland	2,000- 3,000
Tunis	5,000- 5,500
Corsica	1,800
Total	1,963,500	1,444,000	635,600-755,200

^a These figures do not include General Wrangel's army. They are very high, in particular for Poland and Germany. Possible reasons: (1) a number of repatriated Poles applied to the American relief agency as alleged Russian refugees; (2) numerous war prisoners were still in Germany; (3) double count in Poland and Germany.

^b Information given to the League of Nations by various European countries in August, 1921 (Official Journal of the League of Nations, No. 9, Nov., 1921). These figures are relatively the most reliable; however, see p. 149 about Rumania.

^c Estimates made by A. Izjumov, based on data from the Russian archives in Prague. It refers to Russian refugees in the narrow sense only (see p. 55).

^d Estimate; the figure 600,000 was given by the League of Nations in 1923, but a large portion of this number have been recorded in other European countries at the 1921 count.

^e Includes refugees in Algeria and Tunis.

^f Does not include 12,000 Karelians and Ingrians.

was then in full swing; it continued on a scale of some thirty thousand a month in the winter and the spring of 1922, under the impact of famine.⁵⁹ In Rumania sixty thousand refugees were counted.⁶⁰

The Red conquest of Asiatic Russia prompted also an important

⁵⁹ According to data from ARA (Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, p. 445).

⁶⁰ According to a report made to the International Committee of the Red Cross (see below, p. 149).

emigration, mainly to the Far East and Sinkiang. It has been estimated that the number of refugees who went to the Far East reached approximately 150,000. While a large number of these refugees were merely transients, there was, on the other hand, an additional influx in 1923-24 and even later. According to information from the Nansen Office, 130,000 Russian refugees were still in the Far East in 1936, 50,000 of them in Manchuria;⁶¹ the remainder were scattered in China (especially Shanghai), Japan, and Korea. The second group of refugees from Asiatic Russia, those who passed through Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), is evaluated at 25,000. These emigrants founded a Russian colony, which has been enlarged by later arrivals. They are said to number 23,000, although a number of refugees continued to travel farther and went to Mongolia and China, and even beyond the Gobi Desert.

Nansen estimated in 1928 that there were one and one half million Russian refugees in Europe, plus those in the Far East. H. von Rimscha put the total at 2,935,000, on the basis of the Red Cross data. This figure is obviously exaggerated; no other author has accepted it. Several Soviet authors, as well as Russian emigrants, have put the total at 2,000,000 to 2,500,000. Sir John Hope Simpson feels that all these figures are exaggerated. He prefers the most recent estimate, given by Dr. Izjumov, and after adding the 145,000 refugees in the Far East he arrives at a total of 863,000 unassimilated Russian refugees in 1922. But this figure does not reflect the true volume of Russian emigration. Izjumov's estimates are sometimes too conservative. But above all, he restricts the scope of this emigration by a purely formal criterion: he excludes hundreds of thousands of Russian residence and citizenship who were born in areas detached from Russia at the end of the war; many of these persons took advantage of their now foreign origin or non-Russian racial classification to facilitate their departure and assure their reception in some other country. These were 100,000 *Deutschstämmige* (including German colonists who had come to Russia since the seventeenth century),

⁶¹ Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 78-80, 495 ff. Guins, in *Russian Review*, 1943, No. 2, p. 183. According to the Japanese authorities and the Russian Emigrant Bureau at Harbin, there were in 1935, 45,000 Russian refugees in Manchukuo, besides 5,000 naturalized persons. Outside of Harbin, the main Russian colony was located in the Three River District. They were the Cossacks of Transbaikalia who came to this country across the Argun. Because of Soviet raids, they fled farther inland (Plaetschke, "Das Grenzgebiet der Mandschurei," *Osteuropa*, Oct. 1935, pp. 12-17; Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 501.

65,000 Letts, 55,000 Greeks, 12,000 Karelians, and an unascertained, but certainly very large number of true or alleged Poles or quasi-Poles, Rumanians (Bessarabians), and Lithuanians. Many of them registered for "repatriation" mainly to obtain a passport, and a great part of them subsequently remained with the emigrants who went farther westward, especially to Germany and France. There were also refugees who declared themselves to be Ukrainians, who in the first years received deferential treatment.⁶² Sixty thousand of them were in Poland, and sixteen thousand to twenty thousand in Austria and Czechoslovakia. There was also an unaccounted group of refugees from Russian Armenia and Georgia.

Taking into consideration all these groups, the volume of emigration (including nonreturned prisoners of war) can be put at 1,500,000. If we add genuine foreigners who left Russia during the Revolution and the civil war,⁶³ we may estimate the migratory loss at 1,750,000. Within the mass of emigres, a group of some 900,000 "stateless refugees" (holders of Nansen passports) constituted the "Russian emigration" in a narrower sense. This number was reduced in the interwar period by some 50 percent⁶⁴ because of naturalization in the countries of adoption, mortality (which exceeded the very low natality), and returns to the USSR (which numbered 181,000 by 1938).⁶⁵ In the spring of 1946 there remained but 150,000 Russian refugees in Europe, according to the United Nations Special Com-

⁶² Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 113-15. Passports issued by the Petlura government were recognized up to 1926.

⁶³ No direct data available. The Russian census of 1897 showed 456,000 European aliens, of whom 144,500 were in the subsequent Soviet territory. Between 1897 and 1915 the net immigration of foreigners across the European frontier amounted to about 500,000. Assuming that the ratio of those settled in the subsequent Soviet territory was the same as among foreigners counted in 1897, we obtain an additional number of 158,000 European aliens. There was no mass naturalization in this period. On the other hand, the natural increase since 1897 was considerable. The 1926 census showed only 77,000 European aliens. In 1924-26 there was a net emigration of 13,000. On the basis of all these data, the number of European aliens who left after the Revolution may be put at 250,000. The Soviet Statistical Office estimated the number of emigrants of German and Austro-Hungarian nationalities at 180,000-200,000. (*Vsesoiuznata perepis' naseleniia 17 dek. 1926. Kratkie svodki*, Moscow, 1928. No. 4, p. ix). In 1897 the Germans and Austrians constituted two thirds of European aliens.

⁶⁴ The Nansen Office put the number of genuine Russian refugees at 445,000 in 1936 (*Documents of the League of Nations*, A 23, 1936, XII, p. 12); Gen. Denikin, in *Dobrovolets* (Paris), Febr., 1937, estimated the "White" emigration to be 700,000-800,000.

⁶⁵ Of them 122,000 are said to have returned in 1921. Most of the repatriated were Cossacks. Cf. M. Alekhin, *BSE* v. "Emigratsiia."

mittee on Refugees and Displaced Persons; including those in the Far East (of whom many returned to Russia after 1945) and elsewhere, we may estimate the total as 200,000.

Dislocation of Population during the Civil War

There are no reliable population data (except for Moscow and Petrograd) between the Imperial census of 1897 and the Soviet census of 1926. The 1920 census was conducted while the Soviet regime was still at war on several fronts; the conditions greatly impeded the work of the enumerators; figures were missing for large areas occupied by anti-Soviet forces. However, this need not prevent a critical use of figures of this census, as well as of the 1917 computation of farms and agricultural population (connected with a partial enumeration of the urban population). In any case, figures taken from these sources reflect the reality more adequately than other calculations, even though based on the most advanced methods.

Therefore it is probable that the figures of 1917 and 1920 indicate a decline in the rural population of certain provinces (but nowhere more than 10 percent) and a rather large increase in some other regions.⁶⁶ The Soviet statistician Lubny-Gertsyk convincingly attributed this rural gain mainly to immigration from urban centers.

The population went from the starved cities to places where food could be found. The city dweller either returned to his native village, to his relatives "back home," or else to provinces famous for their riches in agricultural products, which lured many in-migrants into the German settlement (Volga), into the provinces of Simbirsk, Tambov, Chernigov, Saratov and to Bashkiria, as well as to the Siberian provinces of Omsk, Enisseisk, and Irkutsk.⁶⁷

Hunger pushed city dwellers, as well as peasants, from poor regions, where it was the custom to supplement income by seasonal work, to provinces "famous for their agricultural riches." The majority went as peaceful migrants, often as beggars, for it was very difficult to trade money for foodstuffs. But large numbers entered to obtain by force food and sometimes land. To these factors can be ascribed the noteworthy parallelism between fertility of the various provinces, population displacement, and civil war.

⁶⁶ The comparison tends to show less than the true rural increase, since numerous rural communities had passed into the urban category between 1917 and 1920.

⁶⁷ Lubny-Gertsyk, *Doizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, pp. 45-47.

This correlation has been brought out by a statistical study published in 1920 on the basis of the census.⁶⁸ The author distributed the provinces of Russia proper (RSFSR) according to their status as grain-producing or grain-consuming areas and according to their position during the civil war. The results are surprising indeed. The civil war seems to have had a direct and favorable influence upon population development. Between 1917 and 1920 the grain-producing area showed a population increase. But the more severe the impact of war, the more pronounced the population gain. On the contrary, the population decreased in the grain-consuming area, which was scarcely affected by war operations.

These data refer to the rural population only. There is more detailed information on the towns, and the picture is quite different. All cities suffered a population loss, but the proportions of this loss vary greatly. According to the 1917 enumeration of urban inhabitants and the partial 1920 census, the population of 357 cities and towns situated in the European part of the RSFSR fell from 10,546,000 in 1917 to 7,020,000 in 1920. This represents a decrease of 33.6 percent.

The population loss was greatest in the industrial centers; it was lowest in regions which attracted starved migrants, although the latter regions were the main theater of civil war operations. Of the total decrease of 3.5 millions, some 2.5 can be attributed to the two capitals: Petrograd lost 71 percent, Moscow 45 percent, and the central industrial region 28 percent.⁶⁹ Next comes the northern lake region (19.3 percent)—not very fertile and dependent largely on Petrograd's industries—and the western region (18.6 percent), both secondary theaters of war operations. The population decline was still less pronounced in the central agricultural region (17.1 percent)—in striking contrast to its immediate neighbor, the central industrial region. The loss was lightest in the remote grain-producing areas of the Volga and the Urals (12.0 percent), although they were important theaters of war.

Thus, disintegration of industry, commerce, and transportation resulted in two migratory movements: (1) the city population fled to the countryside, and (2) grain-consuming areas lost inhabitants to

⁶⁸ *Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn'* (Moscow), 1920, No. 250.

⁶⁹ This and the following figures according to Kvitkin, "Naselenie gorodov," *Biulleten Tsentr. Stat. Upr.*, 1923, No. 77. According to different statistics, the Ukrainian cities lost 19 percent of their population.

grain-producing areas. The famine was particularly acute in the two capitals which depended entirely on long-distance-food import and also in other industrial cities. Both suffered, therefore, a disproportionately high population decrease because of out-migration and to a lesser extent by increased mortality. Out-migration was also prevalent in the remainder of the grain-consuming area, even in villages, since the latter depended largely on season work in the cities or in more fertile regions. The primary stream went, however, from the grain-consuming area to the grain-producing area—also in the form of warlike invasion during the civil war. The towns of the grain-producing area were the first targets for looting and massacre. There was in the grain-producing area, too, a short-distance migration from the towns to the countryside. But the urban loss was partly compensated by an influx from the grain-consuming area. The net benefit of the whole migratory movement was felt by the countryside in the grain-producing area. Its population increased despite massacres and devastation; this land attracted both armed invasion and migration.

This interpretation is confirmed by still another set of statistical data, which accounts for the preference of in-migrants and invaders for certain provinces. The same study from which we took the figures on rural displacement gives data on the relative agricultural position of these regions on the eve of the civil war. The 1917 per capita distributions of sown land (in dessiatines), cows, and sheep are taken as indices. The corresponding figures are for the grain-producing area as follows: in provinces later seriously affected by civil war—0.82, 0.24, and 0.83; in those slightly affected—0.69, 0.15, and 0.77; in those unaffected—0.64, 0.16, and 0.60. For the grain-consuming area the indices are: 0.36 to 0.39 dessiatines, 0.21 to 0.28 cows, 0.43 to 0.50 sheep.

This is the clue to the history of the Russian civil war. The great difference in agricultural resources (in proportion to the population) between the grain-producing and the grain-consuming areas is the regulator of both war and migration. In the consuming area, farming could not support the local population including the city peoples, and the invasion of the grain-producing area became unavoidable as soon as a disruption of normal commercial exchange had occurred. We see, furthermore, that war raged more violently in those parts of the producing areas where the villages were richest in soil and live-

stock. There the bolshevist requisition was more severe and the local resistance more desperate.⁷⁰ In other words, the richer a locality in supplies, the stronger its attraction for in-migration and armed invasion.

Population Loss during the Civil War

The displacement of the Russian population was a predominantly destructive process; destructive in terms of lives and destructive in terms of wealth. This is one of the instances which might be called "reverse Malthusianism": the reduction in means of subsistence creates an excess of population which is subsequently destroyed, but the elimination of this excess population is connected with tremendous economic ravages, resulting in a new disproportion. Let us consider Russia's demographic and economic evolution as a whole. The number of inhabitants diminishes, but economic density does not. More men are exposed to destruction until the decrease of population compensates for economic loss. Only after the great famine of 1922 was there a reduction in economic density and opportunity for a larger population and improved economy.

The losses of the World War, far from diminishing Russia's population (as they failed, incidentally, to do in most of the other belligerent countries), did not even counterbalance the reduced natural increase. We have seen that the population of the area which was to become the Soviet territory of 1921-39 had grown considerably before 1917; in-migration plus natural increase more than offset war losses and an unfavorable balance of war prisoners.

On the contrary, in the following years of revolution and civil war there was a sharp decrease in population. The accuracy of the population size calculated on the basis of the enumerations of 1917 and the census of August 28, 1920, may be questioned; however, they give an idea of the changes which took place. The total population, calculated on the basis of the 1920 census, was around 135 million, or 7 million less than the population estimated for 1917.⁷¹ The 1920 figure is probably a result of undercounting, but even a drop of 5 million would be impressive. As we have seen, the migratory loss was less than two million. Surely, there was a very sharp decline of fertility in 1917 as a result of the great mobilization of the preceding

⁷⁰ Besides, the richest provinces were also coveted by the counter-revolutionary forces, which also lived off the land.

⁷¹ Volkov, *Dinamika narodonaseleniia SSSR*, pp. 97 and 184.

year. But in 1917 the soldiers began to return home, so that in 1918 the birth rate probably went up. A new decrease of fertility can be assumed only for 1920, as the large enrollment in the Red army began in 1919. The great excess of deaths over births for the period 1917-20, which must have occurred, indicates that in addition to the normal mortality many millions perished from the civil war and the conditions which it had created.

Who were the victims in this hecatomb? The number of persons who suffered death by violence during the civil war has been put at one million. This is a conspicuous understatement. The Red army alone lost 632,000 men (including losses during the Polish campaign). Adding the casualties of the White army almost brings the number to the one million mark, without taking into account the civilian losses which must be added to this figure. The latter were especially heavy in areas occupied by Whites and Reds in succession.

Most acts of terror occurred in conjunction with the Red and the White military activities, although some ferocious outbursts took place outside any war operations. Such atrocities were frequently acts of legalized greed. Property owners were executed en masse so that their possessions could be confiscated.

Latsis, one of the Cheka leaders, reported 9,641 executions carried out in 1918-19 by this commission. This figure covers twenty provinces only and does not include the number of persons who were just as summarily executed during the same period by authorities other than the Cheka, such as revolutionary and military tribunals and commissions. It also fails to include victims of shootings and drownings carried out without any legal form of process (execution of hostages, shooting of strikers at Astrakhan, executions during the crushing of peasant uprisings, and especially the revenge to which the Whites were subjected after their defeat in the Cossack lands and in Crimea), as well as those who perished during the terror after 1919. On the other hand, the figure of 1,766,000 victims of the Reds for 1918-19 only, at which a commission instituted by General Denikin arrived, is purely a product of the imagination.⁷² A more sensible computation yielded 200,000 victims.⁷³

⁷² A table of the different categories of victims set up by this commission has been published by the London *Times* and reproduced by C. Sarolea, *Impressions of Soviet Russia*, London, 1924. Another estimate, by E. Komnin, in the Russian newspaper *Rusl* (Berlin) of Aug. 3, 1923, even arrives at a yearly figure of 2,500,000.

⁷³ Maximoff, *The Guillotine at Work*, p. 240.

The number of victims of the White Terror is undoubtedly lower. The Whites did not dispose of as wide a territory or cover as long a time span as did the Reds. Nevertheless, the number of their victims runs into many tens of thousands. In the east, especially in Siberia, their actions were mainly directed against the peasants. In the south, too, the suppression of peasant revolts was followed by massacres, but there the majority of civilian victims were Jews, who suffered terribly during White pogroms. According to a careful investigation made by Gergel, more than 31,000 were killed in the communities which he studied, including 16,000 by the Army of Petlura and 5,000 by Denikin's forces, and 10,000 by smaller gangs. On this basis it has been estimated that there were in all 50,000 to 60,000 victims.⁷⁴

Even greater were the ravages caused by epidemics, corollaries of war and migration. They were stimulated by famine and lack of fuel, and their main breeding grounds were places where large masses of human beings assembled under unsanitary conditions, such as trains and railway stations.

An epidemic of exanthematic typhus first broke out on the Galician and Turkish fronts, but the armies themselves did not suffer too much. Their sanitary conditions remained satisfactory up to 1917; there were only 21,000 typhus cases. But as early as 1916, the disease spread to areas behind the front, carried by refugees and war prisoners. During the twenty years which preceded the war the average number of typhus cases was 82,000 a year. In 1916, 155,000 cases were reported. In the winter of 1917-18 Petrograd became a typhus center, and in 1918 the central agricultural region, prime objective of the starved migrants from industrial centers, was affected in turn. By 1919-20, all Russia was involved. The northeast of European Russia, which did not attract immigration, was the least affected. The epidemic continued to spread in central Russia and was disseminated along the two main roads of war and migration: towards the east (Volga, Urals, and Siberia) and the south (Ukraine).

Displaced persons were the most important carriers. It was found that 40 percent of the refugees concentrated at Saratov fell ill within two months (December, 1918-January, 1919). The railroads con-

⁷⁴ Gergel, in *Yiddisches wissenschaftliches Institut, Schriften*, pp. 107, 110. Of course, indirect victims of pogroms must be added to this figure. S. Dimanshtein, *BSE v. "Evreiskie Pogromy,"* puts the total at 180,000-200,000, which appears to be exaggerated.

tributed largely to the spread of the disease: travelers in search of food by barter transactions "brought back from their peregrinations lice and typhus more often than supplies." In 1919-20 the troops became the main carriers. Between 1918-20 the Red army had 522,000 typhus cases. "The Siberian epidemics started at Chelyabinsk in October, 1918, it was spread by the railroads, and in 1918-20 it resulted in higher mortality rates than had ever been known before. The nearer one gets to the front lines, the higher the mortality figures."⁷⁵ The Fifth Soviet army, which fought against Kolchak, "lost more men through typhus than in action. . . . Typhus decimated the Red army."⁷⁶ Nevertheless, it helped the Red army to defeat Kolchak's forces, for the latter were even more severely hit by the disease. Admiral Kolchak reportedly told one of his ministers: "Some of my army corps are ambulant hospitals. . . . In the Orenburg army, 60 percent of the men suffer from exanthematic typhus; there are neither doctors nor drugs."⁷⁷ In some zones of the Ukraine the population utterly capitulated in the face of the disaster. Without stopping, trains passed stations where piles of abandoned patients lay prostrate, together with cadavers in process of decomposition. Denikin's retreating army spread contagion to the Kuban region. In numerous localities of the northern Caucasus the entire population finally became affected.

Only a hypothetical evaluation of the population losses on the basis of available data on typhus incidence is possible. The number of diseased registered by the Soviet authorities (their figures do not comprise the entire affected area) exceeds 5½ million for the period up to and including 1920.⁷⁸ According to other computations, there were 340 patients per 10,000 inhabitants in 1919-20. This estimate represents 9 million cases for the entire USSR territory for those two years. Mortality among the diseased in some cities where somewhat reliable records were kept, was from 10 to 12 percent. But since in those centers medical service was more efficient than elsewhere, it can be assumed that the over-all percentage was higher. We thus

⁷⁵ Tarashevitch, *Epidemics in Russia*, pp. 7, 11-12, 19-21. Hersch, "La Mortalité causée par la guerre mondiale," *Metron*, June, 1925, p. 33.

⁷⁶ Smirnov, in *Bor'ba za Ural*, p. 36.

⁷⁷ Guins, *Sibir', soiznitski i Kolchak*, II, 350.

⁷⁸ Lubny-Gertsyuk, *Doizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, pp. 29-30. In 1918, 130,000 cases were registered in 40 provinces; in 1919 there were 2,134,000 on the same area. With the Soviet conquests, registration was extended in 1920 to the whole inter-war Soviet territory, and 3,303,000 cases were reported.

arrive at a death toll of at least one-and-one-half million persons.⁷⁹

Besides this disease, which was the most murderous, other epidemics, especially recurring fever,⁸⁰ Spanish grippe, and a short wave of cholera, raged during these years. According to official estimates, more than two million persons succumbed to epidemic diseases between 1918 and 1920. In addition, other diseases, which were stimulated by the general misery, also furnished their quota of victims. In 1920 there were even 2,700 registered cases of direct starvation in Petrograd. Only scattered data on general mortality is available. In Petrograd and Moscow it was twice as high as in the period preceding the war. Misery was probably at its worst in these gigantic agglomerations, because of the sudden interruption of the normal supply machinery. On the other hand, medical service was incomparably better there than elsewhere and functioned efficiently despite the general disorganization. Certain towns in the grain-producing area were therefore more severely visited than the two capitals; in Tomsk, in 1920, one tenth of the population perished. The scattered available data on the countryside also show an increase in death rates, which, for instance, had even doubled in the province of Kostroma.

Devastation and Famine

But while the population had been decimated, its economic potential was even more decisively curtailed. Technical bodies of primary importance were severely shaken. It is enough to mention that the railroads were in almost complete collapse at the end of the civil war.

Besides devastation from immediate and direct causes, there was ruin resulting from the violent redistribution of wealth, carried out frequently by plunder and requisitions.

The troops were poorly supplied and lacked money, therefore they showed a tendency to organize an autonomous supply system, and the immediate use of war booty. This booty eventually became for the fighters of the lower ranks the very aim of action and for their leaders a demagogic means to incite inert or hesitating troops. . . . Beyond booty and requisition the abyss of moral destitution was opened; violence and plunder followed. These horrors befell the entire theater of civil war in Russia. Reds, Whites,

⁷⁹ This is also the estimate of Narkomzdrav (Health Commissariat). Other authors go up to 2.5 million.

⁸⁰ There were 781,000 cases in the Red army, as against 75,000 cases in the Russian army during its participation in World War I.

and Greens had their share in these crimes, which added new floods of tears and blood to the overflowing cups of the people's sufferings and obliterated in the popular mind the distinction between the various "colors" engaged in the struggle.⁸¹

With allowance for all demagoguery and outright criminal actions, it should be said that it was impossible to wage this war without supplying the armies on the spot and letting the soldiers do their own requisitioning in direct and brutal fashion. The disastrous state of the railroads excluded even a half-way reliable supply system. The stoppage of industrial production, as well as grave monetary instability, prompted the peasants to refuse all but barter trade. None of the parties engaged in the struggle could possibly supply its armies by other than abnormal means. But the consequences of this situation were very different in the two camps.

In the White army the lack of supplies "demoralized the troops," according to the expression of the Economic Council of Kolchak's government. This demoralization found expression in desertions, and the development "of rapacious instincts." The antibolshevism of the grain-producing area was mainly based upon the desire of the inhabitants to defend their property against the "communist" invaders. The White leaders were therefore unable to resort to the "bolshevist" methods of socialization and expropriation, but the troops spontaneously worked out what has been called the "Wallenstein,"⁸² or "self-supplying," method. It was based on a more and more liberalized concept of "war booty," and it finally became "open looting of the population," as stated in a report of Denikin's general staff. Plunder by front-line troops was followed by the gradual occupation of a territory and the chronic looting of the civilian inhabitants in occupied areas, who were attacked under one pretext or another. In the east, especially in Siberia, these activities primarily took the form of "punitive expeditions" because of alleged peasant uprisings. According to Baron Budberg, chief of supplies of Kolchak's troops, they were carried out by "semi-brigand gangs." In the south the antibolshevist forces attempted to localize these outbursts by limiting them to a specific group of the population, namely, the Jews.

Guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine almost automatically led to anti-

⁸¹ Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoi smuty*, IV, 93-95. The "Greens" were the independent hordes, composed of revolting peasants and deserters from both armies.

⁸² V. Shulg'in (outstanding White propagandist), in *Kievlianin* (Kiev) of Nov. 26, 1919.

Jewish pogroms. Scattered hordes waged war on the cities, and the Jew was the city dweller par excellence. But the outbursts of isolated atamans were greatly surpassed by expeditions undertaken by an alliance of atamans who, supplemented by some lansquenets from Galicia, made up Petlura's Ukrainian army. Pogroms were a speciality of this army, which sustained itself by this method,⁸³ in addition to seizing gold in banks and robbing jewelry stores. It was, however, under Denikin that pogroms became quasi-judicial institutions, by subjecting the Jewish population to the "self-supplying" system, which was accompanied by all kinds of brutalities.⁸⁴ Altogether, more than 500 Jewish communities were ravaged, many of them more than once.⁸⁵ The legalization of the "Wallenstein method" with respect to the Jews made inevitable the disintegration of the White army.

The situation was different in the Red army, which came from a starved region, invaded a rich country, and was not in the least encumbered by phraseology in favor of the defense of private property, but rather was led by slogans against the institution of private property. In contrast to the White army's "Wallenstein method," "war communism" advocated extortion from the local population and elevated it to the rank of an official operation. Thus, "communism" not only served to supply the army, including masses of parasites living on army rations,⁸⁶ but also to rescue the populations of central Russia, then on the verge of starvation.⁸⁷ This more and more cen-

⁸³ Impunity of those guilty of pogroms was not the rule in Petlura's army, as it was in Denikin's. When he took refuge in Poland together with the remnants of his army, Petlura dealt severely with these criminals and did not spare the atamans themselves. At that time Petlura could discipline his armies, since they were supplied by the Polish government.

⁸⁴ During Gen. Denikin's earlier campaign in North Caucasus and the Don area, there were already veritable pogroms, but in these regions there was no Jewish population, and the "foreign" (non-Cossack) peasants were the main victims. During the Ukrainian campaign, severe, if not always efficient, measures were taken to protect the Christian population. But crimes against Jews were not punished in principle. Eventually a sort of "unwritten law" was arrived at (confirmed in some cases by official orders) according to which there was a three-day free-for-all pogrom after the occupation of any locality.

⁸⁵ Gergel, *op. cit.* 531 ravaged communities, 887 pogroms, and 349 "lesser outbursts."

⁸⁶ S. S. Kamenev, commander in chief of the Red army, stated that for each fighter at the front there were ten men on the army ration in the rear (*Grazhdanskaia voina*, II, 17).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 314-15. "When advancing, the front had always the mission of relieving the supply crisis of the center" (*ibid.*, p. 19).

tralized system contributed to greater discipline, reinforced the central authority, did away with "autonomous" looting and anarchism, and replaced them by official requisitions and confiscations.

These systematized expropriations, ruthless and pitiless, provided the fatal stroke for the old economic organism. The Whites had sacked the country of all products and ruined and disrupted distribution. Their army had disintegrated. The Reds reconstructed the army and re-established a certain amount of order, but they dealt a mortal blow to the very sources of production.

The towns, more easily accessible, were the first victims of war communism. Nationalization and other confiscation measures applied in the towns did not aim at communistic redistribution of wealth. No serious attempt was ever made to supply the population with anything more than foodstuffs. A Soviet economist said in 1920: "Up to now, whatever is being produced in our factories only serves the needs of the workers and the peasants who have enlisted in the Red army."⁸⁸ The same could be said about the goods confiscated from stocks, shops, and individuals. But this "communism" killed trade and industrial production. Nationalized heavy industries were hampered by lack of fuel and raw materials, with the exception of a few which produced goods indispensable for the conduct of the war. Small workshops were not deliberately suppressed, but they were ruined as a result of confiscation, which destroyed both their interest in further production and their means of operation. Former trade was in no way replaced by the organized distribution of goods by the authorities, and the ordinary commercial exchanges were killed by confiscating their stocks. Only a miserable barter trade survived, carried out by "flying" merchants or open-air markets, repressed and persecuted by the Soviet authorities.

Elimination of the economic function of the cities indirectly hit the countryside, which suffered above all from an immediate and ruder control on the part of Soviet officials, who systematically confiscated all food supplies. Here, again, appears the real foundation of the communist dictatorship. It followed the channel worn by the migratory stream, flowing from the town to the countryside, from the grain-consuming area to the grain-producing area. Migrants sought bread. The Soviet dictators forcibly seized bread. War communism was a result of the famine which reigned at the point of departure of

⁸⁸ *Ekonomicheskata Zhizn*, 1920, No. 255.

the migration; its outcome was fatally to ruin agriculture and to produce famine in the country where it flourished.

The system of agricultural expropriation was inaugurated in the summer of 1918, when the bolshevists succeeded in organizing a real central power. Because of the lack of industrial products, they could not obtain food from the countryside in exchange for merchandise offered to the peasants. A decree of May 13, 1918, ordered the requisition of all cereals except quantities required for seeds and personal consumption. An attempt was made to carry out the expropriation of all "superfluous" amounts with the assistance of "poor peasants" organized in "committees of the poor" (decree of June 11, 1918). But these committees frequently failed to deliver anything to the starved industrial centers. The task of collecting grain passed more and more to special expeditionary forces. Expeditions were first organized by groups of workers who sought bread for themselves; they were later generalized (decree of August 6 and instruction of August 20, 1918). The nature of this economic operation can be clearly seen from instructions which specified that each detachment was to consist of at least 75 men with two or three machine guns. The report of the Supply Commissariat for 1918-19 declared: "It is clear today that it will be impossible in the future to bring about a monopoly of grain without supply detachments, organized on a strict military basis. . . . This is the logic of life itself, and it would be absurd to contradict it."

This "logic of life" nearly became a logic of death. It was the logic of the civil war. One and eight tenths million tons of grain were requisitioned in 1918-19; 3.5 million in 1919-20; 4.6 million in 1920-21 (not counting the Ukraine, Crimea, Transcaucasia, and Turkestan). The constant increase in the total amount resulted from conquests.

Thus was realized, in the words of Prokopovich, "a regime of nationalization, not of production, but of products. As a matter of course, the farmers were no longer interested in producing more than enough to serve for their personal consumption: they had no interest in producing "superfluous" quantities. As a result, that part of the produce which formerly went to the market was simply suppressed."⁸⁹ There was, furthermore, a sharp decline in the number

⁸⁹ Prokopovich, *Ocherki khoziaistva sovetskoi Rosstii*, p. 103. Cf. V. Bazarov, in *Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie*, Oct., 1927, p. 21.

of horses—by more than 20 percent—during the period of war communism, even before the famine of 1921, as a consequence of the requisition of horses and fodder.

The regime of expropriation in its crudest forms was extended by the victories of the Red army.⁹⁰ Thus, the grave phenomenon of a decline in the sown area which had been noticeable in central Russia, gradually affected all the country.

Agriculture was ruined by anarchy and civil war, but even more by the Soviet order established after their definite triumph.

In the regions where Soviet control was complete, the crop area declined between 1916 and 1921 more than in the regions where civil war had raged longer. The disorder created by the civil war affected peasant agricultural activity less than the strict communist policy of the period of war communism in regions controlled by the Soviet government.⁹¹

The catastrophe which resulted from the decline of peasant economy could be felt as early as the end of 1920. The Soviet government attempted to save agriculture by further extending the system of coercion and issuing Draconian rules on compulsory cultivation.⁹² Subsequently, “to the tune of the rumblings of the Kronstadt rebellion and in an atmosphere of threatening moods in the entire army,”⁹³ a complete overhauling of the system was proclaimed as “the new economic policy.” The NEP considerably lessened the coercion which had choked peasant economy. Expropriation measures, under which “each grain of ‘superfluous’ cereals had been confiscated for the profit of the state,” were replaced by a fixed tax in kind; “once his tax was paid, the farmer could freely dispose of all his reserves.”⁹⁴

But it was too late. In 1920-21 came a disastrously small crop in thirty-three provinces, containing a population of forty million, in addition to a diminution of the cultivated surface. The resulting famine of 1922-23 exceeded in horror the worst catastrophes of the past, including the disaster of 1891. The regions which suffered most were the Volga and the Ural areas, but southern Ukraine, the Don provinces, northern Caucasia, and the Crimea were also fatally

⁹⁰ “In the Ukraine, we are still in the period of committees of the poor,” reported Rakovsky, president of the council of the Ukraine, at the 8th Soviet Congress, Dec., 1920.

⁹¹ Timoshenko, *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem*, p. 159.

⁹² Resolution of the 8th Soviet Congress, Dec., 1920.

⁹³ Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 437.

⁹⁴ Decree of March 6-21, 1921. Lenin, XXVI, 237-48. Resolution of the 10th Congress of the Communist party.

struck. The disorganization of transport facilities worsened the situation; bread imported from other provinces as well as foodstuffs brought in by the American Relief Administration and other foreign relief organizations generally arrived too late. "According to information from local sources, the number of starving persons was 15 million on January 1, 1923. It went up to 20 million by April 1 and exceeded 22 million in July."⁹⁵ Incidents of cannibalism were reported. Epidemics followed on the heels of starvation.

The number of persons who died of hunger and its consequences has been estimated at 3 million in a Russian report to the Genoa conference. The Central Statistical Office evaluated the total loss caused by the famine at 5 million because of abnormally high mortality and a deficit of births. Recurrence of the civil war epidemics alone is said to have claimed an additional million victims. Half of these deaths can be attributed to exanthematic typhus.⁹⁶ These estimates on population losses due to famine are supported by incidental data on the increase of mortality in the various regions affected.⁹⁷ In these provinces the cities where starved peasants came to die offered a startling picture of death triumphant. In 1922 mortality rates in the cities of the Kuban and the Black Sea provinces and in Kazan were three times as high as birth rates. The proportion was 4.5 to 1 in the towns of the Ekaterinburg province, and 6.5 to 1 in the town of Orenburg.

The great famine was the last blow which struck the Russian population in the nine years between 1914 and 1923. The total excess

⁹⁵ Lubny-Gertsyk, *Dvizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, p. 28. According to Nansen, the region struck by famine comprised 33 million inhabitants; 19 million were in peril of starvation.

⁹⁶ According to Narkomzdrav's estimate there were 5,012,000 cases of epidemic in 1921 and 1922; 1,404,000 were incidents of typhus. The number of deaths was 955,000; 501,000 were attributed to typhus.

⁹⁷ In the Tatar Republic the mortality was 31.5 per thousand in 1911-13; it went up to 49.3 in 1922-23. On the other hand, in the Saratov province, just as severely struck by famine, the prewar mortality of 31.7 only went up to 33.7 in 1921-22. This can be explained by low mortality for the rest of the interval in question (Lubny-Gertsyk), or as a result of the mass flight of starved populations; of course, those who escaped eventually might be caught by death in the reception area (see p. 72 on the Kuban province). In the Ekaterinburg province deaths in the countryside surpassed births by 102.9 for 100, in 1921; in 1922 the ratio went up to 145. According to an inquiry about the situation in the Ukraine between May 1, 1922, and May 1, 1923, deaths exceeded births in provinces with poor crops (Ekaterinoslav province: 192.6 deaths for 100 births); there was on the other hand a considerable excess of births in provinces with a tolerable harvest.

mortality of this period appears to have been some 12 million,⁹⁸ roughly distributed as follows: 2 million military losses in the first World War, 1.5 million military and civilians killed in the civil war, 2 million victims of epidemics in the period of the civil war, and 3 million victims of the great famine; the remainder are to be attributed to the increase of general and, especially, infant mortality.

The famine in eastern and southern Russia was the real termination of World War I. The reflux of the Russian armies towards the east had provoked a new movement of war and migration, spreading from the Russian area of consumption to the grain-producing regions of the east and the south. The process of population destruction was thus transferred from the area of former residence of the migrants to the area of their destination. This process started with famine and economic ruin in central Russia and culminated in the starvation brought by warlike immigration and expropriation to the grain-producing area. Only after the destruction of human lives by the great famine was economic density somewhat lessened; then only could a process of repopulation and reconstruction be inaugurated. It was connected with a change in the direction of the main Russian migratory current.

The Reflux

Masses fled from the starving areas. The railroads registered more than 900,000 fugitives. The trains were running very badly at that time; "peasants who had left their homes in panic became marooned [at the railway stations] . . . they waited for trains which never came, or for death which was inevitable."⁹⁹ It has been assumed that

⁹⁸ But not 16 million, as Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union*, p. 40. Lorimer obtained his figure by projecting the 1897 population up to 1926. The 1926 census population proved to be lower by 26 million than expected. Lorimer calculated for Jan. 1, 1914, 140.4 million. The revised Russian estimate is 139 (Sulkevich, *Territoria in naselenie SSSR*, p. 145). Furthermore, Lorimer's method led to an accumulation of population losses. His estimate of the birth deficit, based on projected age groups, was 10 million. For the present rough estimate the population deficits were approximately calculated for short periods between the dates for which population figures are available. The total population deficit appeared as 20 to 23 million. As to the birth deficit, we have more or less well-founded estimates for two main periods: by Kohn ("The Vital Statistics of European Russia," *The Cost of the War to Russia*, pp. 128-29) for the war years (6 million) and by the Central Statistical Office for the famine 1922-23 (2 million). The total birth deficit can be estimated at 9 to 10 million.

⁹⁹ Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, p. 90.

at least an equal number of fugitives fled by road. The flight of the peasants left deserted from 10 to 20 percent of all farms.

Where did these refugees go? Attempts to canalize the torrent failed. "The Soviet authorities tried to stop the wave and were engulfed by it. . . . They seemed no more able to stem the vast tide of human misery than to stem the current of the Volga."¹⁰⁰ In fact, the refugees went anywhere and stayed wherever they could.¹⁰¹ A considerable number long remained in a state of vagabondage, particularly children without shelter, a phenomenon which was one of the lasting consequences of the famine. In 1926, 335,000 "unsheltered" were still recorded, the majority of them between twelve and fifteen years of age. This confirms the hypothesis that they were abandoned in 1921-22.¹⁰²

A large group of starved people from the Volga sought refuge beyond the Urals.¹⁰³ Another group of refugees from starvation vainly hoped for rescue in the Kuban province. Their arrival merely increased mortality in this country, where in 1922 deaths exceeded births more than two and one half times. The local statistical office reported: "In 1922 the Volga came to die on the Kuban."

But the main current took another direction: it went northwest, towards the industrial centers and even towards the countryside of the consuming area.

The period which came to a close in 1920 had been particularly difficult for the cities. Now it was the reverse. The civil war was finished, the economic organism of the country was reanimated, transportation began to function again; the urban population was better and more regularly supplied. On the contrary, the countryside was in an exceptionally serious situation as a result of the bad crop of 1921. The period of the Revolution and of the civil war saw a flight from the cities to the countryside. In 1921-22 the reverse occurred: the population fled from the famine-stricken countryside, and a reflux from the village to urban centers took place. . . .

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁰¹ Compare with the map "Refugee Movements 1921-1922," *ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁰² This is also confirmed by the high percentage among the abandoned children of those of Tatar and Chuvash origin, two peoples who had been particularly hard hit by the famine. An obviously exaggerated figure of the number of abandoned children has been quoted: 7 million (M. Epstein, *BSE* v. "Bezprizornost"; S. Mstislavsky, *BSE* v. "Golod").

¹⁰³ See Table 3. The number of famine refugees registered in 1922 and 1923 at Cheliabinsk as re-migrants returning to European Russia is also indicative of the vastness of the former refugee movement to Asia. The figures are very incomplete (see p. 75).

The city population had increased in the period between 1920 and 1923. But this total growth can be broken down into several stages of large-scale population increase and large-scale decrease.¹⁰⁴

This is shown by the following data on 358 towns of RSFSR (Russia proper). In 1920-23 the population of Moscow increased by 40.7 percent, that of Petrograd by 35.6 percent, and of other towns in the consuming area by 15.2 percent. On the contrary, the urban population of the producing area decreased by 2.6 percent. There was, however, even partly in the producing area, a small increase of the urban population (1.1 percent on the average), namely, where the per capita yield in the famine year was more than 80 kilograms. But where the per capita yield was less than that, the urban population decreased by 6.6 percent. Not less expressive are the figures for population changes when distributed according to geographical location of the towns. In the consuming area the urban population increased between 1920 and 1923: in the central industrial region by 20.1 percent; in the western, by 12.3; in the northern and lake regions by 9.1. In the producing area the urban population decreased: in the central agricultural region, by 0.5 percent; in the Volga and Ural regions by 4.4 percent.

When comparing the two sets of figures, we see that the starved areas, where the population deficit was great, were mainly the Ural and the Volga provinces. The towns of European Russia (excluding the Ukraine) formed several zones from the viewpoint of demographic evolution, zones, or semicircles, going from the east to the west. In the zone farthest east a strong urban decline occurred. Out-migration to other provinces far exceeded in-migration from the starved countryside to the towns, where some relief food was available. These were the truly starved provinces. Farther west, in the semistarved regions, the city population seems to have remained approximately stationary. Out-migration of these cities was largely offset by the natural increase and some in-migration from the neighboring countryside and from the areas of even greater food deficit. Farther west, in the industrial area, the towns, headed by Moscow, showed the greatest population gain. The northern lake region had simply returned to the normal situation: in-migration from the countryside within the same region. The increase was more marked in the west.

¹⁰⁴ Lubny-Certsyk, *Dvizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, p. 49.

Statistics of city developments reveal only one aspect of the process. To detect the source of the movement, we should consult statistics on the countryside. In 1923 no census of the rural population was taken. However, the demographic section of the Central Statistical Office made an estimate, based on local reports and supplemented by the section's own assumptions. A comparison of this estimate with a partial census of 1920 refers to a territory including a great part of European Russia and western Siberia with a population of some 90 million.¹⁰⁵ It shows that the rural population declined: in areas which in 1921 were heavily affected by poor crops, by 12 percent; in other areas afflicted by poor crops, by 3.5 percent; in areas unaffected by bad crops, by 1.8 percent.

These figures reveal the origin of the movement to the towns. A certain percentage of the influx should be attributed to the immediate countryside in the consuming area. This movement is reflected in the small net decline of rural population even in areas not affected by poor crops. In 1917-20, during the years when there was ruin and famine in the towns, workers returned to their native villages. After 1920 they again went to work in the customary city surroundings, and young people took up residence in the cities, as had been customary for many generations. But the main stream into the capitals, as well as into some other towns of central and western Russia, came from the starved countryside in the east, which showed the highest net loss of rural population.

Clearly this was a reflux of the civil war movement. The change in the direction of the migratory current was not limited to the territory of European Russia, where the 1921-22 famine factor predominated. The same reflux took place on the other side of the Urals. Asiatic Russia was also dominated by a westward migratory movement, which went to European Russia and subsequently linked up with the main current.

Systematic requisitioning of grains was introduced into Siberia only after June, 1920. In 1921, under the NEP, requisitioning was replaced by a tax in kind as in all other parts of Russia. But in Siberia, unlike European Russia, the introduction of contributions in kind did not alleviate the economic burden put on the taxpayers, but rather aggravated it. All the reserves which had been accumulated during the foregoing years were absorbed by this heavy tax.

¹⁰⁵ Reproduced *ibid.*, pp. 80 ff.

It has been said that these methods were dictated by the famine which reigned in southeastern Russia. But, while they did not save the Volga peasants, they "took from the peasants of the Siberian steppes their means of subsistence during years of bad crops. . . . In 1922 the peasants were convinced that contributions in kind suppressed all profitable agricultural enterprise in the steppe. A consequence of this belief and of the peasants' ruin was out-migration, which began as early as 1922. In 1923 many peasants no longer had enough grain for seed. A search for places of refuge was their only resource."¹⁰⁶ According to the above estimate of the Central Statistical Office, the rural population of western Siberia suffered between 1920 and 1923 a net loss of 1.8 percent. It was the result of a migration directed mostly to European Russia. Peasants "took their carts and went to European Russia over the Asiatic steppes. . . . Some of them had come into contact with refugees from the Volga and other regions where starvation was rife in 1921. They knew that the population of these areas had been decimated by death and emigration and that there was a vast amount of free land."¹⁰⁷

According to the survey conducted by Rybnikov, there were 220,000 re-emigrants from Siberia into European Russia in 1922-24. In particular a strong reflux of peasants from the Altai province had taken place. The stream came even from more remote areas. The agrarian country of the Siberian steppe, which had sent out-migrants to European Russia, in turn attracted in-migrants from the far north, from the great Siberian woods. If Soviet fiscal measures had ruined agriculture in the steppes, colonists established in the forest found themselves wholly stripped of supplies. Consequently "there was a vast internal migration coming from the northern districts, from the forest country, deprived of its customarily imported foodstuffs. The population of these areas huddled on the fertile steppes of Minusinsk, Altai, Slavgorad."¹⁰⁸

The migration of Siberian colonists was only part of the migratory

¹⁰⁶ Rybnikov, "Kolonizatsionnye problemy Zapadnoi Sibiri," *Severnaya Azia*, 1927, No. 1, p. 72.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Cf. Kotov, "Dekolonizatsiia . . . Sibiri," *Severnaya Azia*, 1926, No. 2, p. 20.—The Agricultural Direction of the Samara Province pointed out that mainly territories emptied by the famine attracted re-migrants from Siberia and Kazakhstan. It was, however, not the only area of re-migration. Settlers (in particular Ukrainians) returned to their native land in the hope of receiving land by virtue of the Soviet agrarian legislation.

¹⁰⁸ Lubny-Gertsyuk, *Dvizhenie naseleniia na territorii SSSR*, p. 122.

movement which went toward the west from Asiatic Russia. Other westward shifts were stimulated by political and national struggles. We have seen that the victory of the Reds in the civil war accelerated the penetration of Russian colonists into the Eurasian steppe at the expense of the indigenous populations. Later these natives took their revenge on the Russians. A deliberate policy of "decolonization" was advocated by the local governments and tolerated by Moscow. The expropriation of "kulaks" was everywhere a pretext to expropriate Russians.¹⁰⁹ Such a process could be observed from the Pacific to the Caucasus wherever there was conflict between natives and Russians, autochtones and immigrants. The Far Eastern Republic, a buffer state which was suppressed on November 10, 1922, gave proof of existence during its short life only by keeping its borders closed to all immigration coming from Russia. Throughout the string of native republics, from Buriat-Mongolia in Transbaikalia to the mountain republics of the Caucasus, an effort was made to repel the Russians. In the Buriat area the Russian colonies were "liquidated"; at the other end, in the Caucasus, Russians were simply massacred. The decolonization in central Asia took place in a less bloody fashion, but was no less thorough. "In Turkestan, in the first six months of 1921, more than 6,000 Russian and Mennonite exploitations were suppressed; they contained more than 30,000 inhabitants. This operation was further continued. The same policy, somewhat less violent, prevailed in Kazakhstan."¹¹⁰

In the latter country the decolonization of the Russians, together with the famine, caused a vast exodus to European Russia. In 1920-23 the number of agricultural exploitations had diminished by 23 percent; the rural population had decreased by 31 percent. L. I. Lubny-Gertsyk describes this as "a more terrible catastrophe than those caused by famine and epidemics in the Middle Ages." It is possible to explain the population decline not only in terms of the famine mortality but also by out-migration, especially the out-migration of Russian elements. The decline was therefore noticeably less pronounced in districts having a Kazakh majority than it was in predominantly Russian areas. The total sown area had diminished

¹⁰⁹ Ryskulov, *Kazakhstan*, p. 161, admits that also "in-migrant peasants of small wealth" were repelled.

¹¹⁰ Lubny-Gertsyk, *op. cit.*, p. 122. For Turkestan see also A. Zorin, *BSE v. "Kirgizskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika."* In 1921 land was taken away from Russian "kulaks" and "restituted to poor Kirghizes."

by 23 percent in 1920-23 in the Kazakh areas and by 58 percent in the Russian areas.

Kazakhstan out-migrants, like those from Siberia, went to the "emptied" Volga lands. This area attracted vast numbers, not only of ousted Russians but of indigenous Asiatics as well. "In the territory of the Volga Germans, especially in the vicinity of large cities, settlements of spontaneous colonists from central Asia, and in particular of Sarts, sprang up."¹¹¹

Here, also, the influx from Asia to Europe is connected with an internal Asiatic drive, namely, with the return of emigrants who had gone to China and Persia after the 1916 uprisings. The Kirghizes as well as Kazakhs, who had left for China, came back without their livestock and in poor shape. This may have been a more or less indirect cause of the expulsion of Russians from the Kirghiz and the Kazakh areas.

We thus witness a unique current born in the north of Siberia, in the almost uncultivated land of the Buriats of Transbaikalia, the arid steppes of central Asia. This current goes through the immense plains of "black earth" on both sides of the Urals and finally reaches the industrial area of central Russia and the new western frontier. Caravans of fugitives from the Volga went as far as the provinces of Smolensk and Minsk and approached the Polish border.¹¹² But in general the movement was carried out gradually: the majority of the migrants covered only a short distance in the territory involved in the migratory movement. Among the migrants were Russians ousted by the xenophobia of Asiatic natives; others left because communist administration had ruined them; still others fled because the land had not yielded any crops; other groups went to lands emptied by famine; some people merely returned home to their native villages; others left the countryside for towns which were being reborn. But this huge crowd advanced as if pushed by an unknown force, following a current which was fed by numerous tributaries and separated into many branches, but nevertheless maintained a strange unity of direction.

This was the reflux of the great wave which had gone eastwards beginning in 1915 and from which had spread a southbound segment. The immense flood of the Russian people was now in full recession.

¹¹¹ Cleinow, *Neu-Sibirien*, p. 268.

¹¹² Polish report to the League of Nations (*Official Journal*, No. 9, Nov., 1921).

Each movement at the source of a new stream appeared to have its individual cause. The Russian colonists in Asia fled before the pressure of the local populations. Emigrants from the starved Volga lands sought refuge in the towns and also sometimes in the villages of the consuming area, where under the NEP industry began to recover and rural economy to be improved.

But why did the Moscow government, which so recently had crushed with heavy blows any "counterrevolutionary resistance" to its authoritarian centralism, suddenly show an almost timid respect for the autonomy of Caucasian mountain tribes, for Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and Mongolo-Buriats? Only yesterday, the government had confiscated all grains in the name of communist ideology. Why did it then encourage the re-establishment of peasant exploitation by authorizing free sale in the markets? Why did the Soviets content themselves with a limited contribution in kind and attempt otherwise to fill their needs in the open market by selling in exchange industrial products to the rural areas? How could a government which had only recently sought to confiscate the goods and plants of industrial capitalism now devote itself to re-establishing and expanding industrial production including that of a certain private capitalism?

To all these questions there is one answer, and this unity accounts for the fundamental unity of the migratory reflux. Exterior and internal pressures which had caused the violent migration had stopped. The period of "reversed Malthusianism," corollary of the civil war, was over. After the great famine, the population was finally within its subsistence means. The relationship between the two factors of the economic-demographic equation was improved. Space was now available, space for economic rebirth and space for re peopling, which no outside pressure, peaceful or warlike, obstructed any longer. Beyond the Soviet borders the migratory movement proceeded in a different direction, turning its back to the Soviet area. Rehabilitation and repopulation started where economic decline and depopulation had originated—in the industrial areas which had sent to the east and to the south the successive waves of warlike migration between 1917 and 1920. This economic rebirth subsequently affected the entire country. In the end the population increased far beyond earlier numbers, leading eventually to a new disruption of the equilibrium. New migratory currents were called forth. They were followed by the passage from NEP to another economic and social regime.

Chapter IV

RUSSIA, 1924-41

THE END of the civil war and the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921-28), which implied a certain return to free economy, brought economic recovery and an increase in the population. The following period (1929-41) was one of radical change in the economic system. It was the period of thorough industrialization and collectivization, and also preparation for war.

Recovery of Population

Between 1917 and 1922-23 the population had declined by some 7 million, reaching a low point of approximately 135 million. By December 17, 1926, it had arisen to 147 million and thereby exceeded not only the prewar level but even the 1917 figure.

In the years 1924-28 the natural population growth was more rapid than ever (see Table 2). Compared with the prewar rate, mortality declined by one third. Birth rates declined as well, but up to 1928 this decrease was still very slight. The general decline in mortality can be ascribed partly to the elimination of the weak, the sick, and the marginal elements by civil war and famine, which to a certain extent operated as a selection of the fittest. But the main reason was the improvement in social, hygienic, and medical conditions and as a result the survival of more infants.

This population increase was paralleled by a slow improvement of agricultural economy. The acreage in grains—which in 1922 had diminished by 30 percent as compared to the prewar period—had by 1927 regained its former size. The crop, which had fallen off by more than one third, recovered approximately 90 percent of its prewar record.

But this improvement was insufficient for the rural population, which expanded far beyond the gain in means of subsistence. In fact, between 1924 and 1927 the excess of births over deaths among the rural population was between 2 and 2.4 percent, so that at the end of 1926 the rural areas had a population gain of 3 million over

TABLE 2
NATURAL MOVEMENT OF POPULATION IN THE SOVIET UNION
(PER 1,000 INHABITANTS)

Year	Territory	Births	Deaths	Excess of Births
1911-13	European part of the USSR	45.5	28.6	16.9
1920-22 ^a	20 provinces	33.0	33.2	-0.2
1923 ^b	European part of the USSR	42.2	22.9	19.3
1924 ^c		43.1	22.0	21.1
1925 ^c		44.7	23.2	21.5
1926 ^c		43.6	20.0	23.6
1927 ^c		42.7	21.0	21.9
1928 ^d		42.1	18.1	24.0
1930 ^e	USSR	39.2	20.4	18.8
1935 ^f		28.6 ^g	16.3 ^h	12.3
1936 ^f		32.3 ^h	18.4 ^m	13.9
1937 ^f		38.6 ⁱ	17.9	20.7 ^o
1938 ^f		38.3 ^k	17.8 ⁿ	20.5

^a USSR, Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR; Statisticheskii Spravochnik za 1924 god.* Data very unreliable.

^b Ditto for 1925.

^c USSR, Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Statisticheskii Spravochnik za 1928 god.*

^d Gosplan, *Sdvigi v sel'skom khoziaistve SSSR mezdu XV i XVI partiinymi s'ezdami*, Moscow, 1930.

^e *SSSR za 15 let.*, Moscow, 1932, p. 218, quoted by Prokopovich, *Biulleten' Ekonomicheskogo Kabinetu Prof. S. N. Prokopovicha*, No. 139, Jan.-Feb., 1938.

^f Calculated on the basis of information listed in the following notes.

^g *Izvestiia*, June 27, 1939: 33.7 percent higher in 1938 than in 1935.

^h I. Sautin, *Pravda*, June 27, 1939: 12.8 percent higher than in 1935.

ⁱ *Ibid.*: 19.7 percent higher than in 1936.

^k *Ibid.*

^l Kraval', I. A., "Vsesoiuznaia perepis 1937 goda," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1936, No. 12.

^m *Pravda*, March 2, 1938: 2.6 percent lower in 1937 than in 1936.

ⁿ Bozin and Dubrovitsky. "Pervye itogi perepisi," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1936, No. 6: births 115.7 percent higher than deaths.

^o I. Pisarev, in *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1939: 20.5-21.0.

the prewar period. The peasants, it is true, had become the owners of 97 percent of all arable soils as a result of the Revolution; almost all the lands of the state, the church, and the big landowners were now theirs. The Soviet government kept only 3 percent of the land for *sovkhoses* (large state-operated farms). But the redistribution of land in favor of the peasants did not do away with the primary problem—insufficient land. On the eve of the Revolution the peasants had owned 70 percent of all tilled lands and held through lease some 40 percent of the cultivable lands belonging to the state and the

large landowners.¹ On the other hand, the land thus redistributed to farmers was in notably smaller parcels because of competition by a large portion of the 8 million city dwellers who invaded the countryside in 1917-19. They took advantage of their formal ties with the village and demanded and obtained a patch of land. Altogether, the distribution of immense areas among several million peasants yielded very poor results. A survey conducted by the Central Office of Agriculture revealed that the gain "per mouth" represented a negligible amount, indeed, somewhere it has been expressed in terms of tenths or even hundredths of a dessiatine. In most provinces, the supplementary acreage thus obtained did not exceed half a dessiatine (1.3 acre).²

The problem of lack of land once more predominated, and in a much more acute form than twenty years earlier.³ Very small farms, too poor for efficient exploitation, were even more numerous than before.⁴ Besides the redistribution of land among peasants (which was also a result of the Revolution), the increase in the number of peasant homesteads (from 12 million in 1905 to approximately 20 million in 1924-25) were mainly responsible for this state of affairs. In 1923-26 the Soviet Research Institute for Colonization made an inquiry on agrarian overpopulation in four regions of Russia. On the basis of these and other data the number of excess persons in agriculture was variously estimated at 9-20 millions. A considerable portion of the latter migrated to the cities, where industry was on the road to recovery. By 1921 production in the heavy industries scarcely

¹ The agrarian reserve fund which in extent almost equaled the cultivated area, mainly consisted of former lands of public domain, which could only be made usable after long preparatory work, calling for very great capital investment.

² Knipovich, *Ocherki deiatel'nosti narodnogo kommissariata zemledel'ia*, p. 9.

³ The Soviet economists tend to demonstrate that overpopulation is not a demographical, but exclusively a political and social notion. In the first period they tried to prove that agrarian overpopulation in Russia was caused by the extensive land-ownership, which did not allow the peasantry to apply efficiently its forces to agricultural production. With the change in Soviet policy, this parceling of land property was regarded as an obstacle to appropriate utilization of the peasants' energies; now collectivization was the only way to avoid agrarian overpopulation.

⁴ According to The Colonization Institute (*Trudy Goskolonita*, III), between 1905 and 1924 the percentage of farms with cultivable areas of less than 6 dessiatines (1 dessiatine = 2.7 acres) increased in the central black-soil region from 35 to 51, in the western region and Belorussia from 46 to 70. On the contrary, the percentage of farms between 6 and 10 dessiatines decreased from 41 to 35, respectively from 46 to 25, and of those over 10 dessiatines—from 24 to 14, respectively from 8 to 5. For other regions see Timoshenko, *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem*, pp. 62-68.

reached 1/5 of the prewar output. In 1927 it exceeded prewar production by 25 percent (see Table 5). The number of workers, which in 1920-21 had been about half the 1916 force, increased accordingly. In 1914 the urban population was about 25 million (USSR area of Sept., 1939). During the war years it increased by some 7 million; it fell to 21 million in 1921 and went up again afterwards. In 1927 it regained its prewar level and even went slightly above it.

Of course, the growth of cities is not a result of excess births, but rather of population shifts. "The 1926 Census reveals a tremendous migration of rural manpower to the towns. In the preceding years, the cities of the USSR absorbed 1 million persons yearly."⁶ This represents 40 percent of the natural increase of all rural areas.

But in this same period unemployment was felt in the towns as well. In 1925 the employment exchanges registered 800,000 unemployed, besides agricultural laborers; in 1927 there were more than 1,300,000 jobless, one fourth of whom were out of work for the first time, while half had no trade. This was evidently a direct repercussion of agrarian overpopulation.

The urban centers attracted, however, mainly peasants from the nearby countryside. Purely agricultural regions scarcely participated in this movement.⁶ Here the only outlet was colonizing migration.

Resumption of Colonization

After the strong, but temporary, reflux caused by the great famine, the eastward movement was resumed. The period of the NEP inaugurated in 1921 was then in full swing. It implied a return to the ideas of the tsarist minister Stolypin, who wanted to promote strong peasant farmers and to eliminate inefficient agricultural undertakings by colonizing migration. Colonization in its traditional form was re-established. It remained largely a movement of peasants who liquidated their farms and went off, together with their families, mainly to lands beyond the Urals, to devote themselves anew to agriculture. Smaller groups still sought to establish themselves in the Volga region, which had been emptied by the 1921-22 famine.

According to incomplete and unprecise data, the yearly quota of

⁶ Rabinovich, "Problema truda v SSSR," *Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie*, Oct., 1927, p. 153. The 1929-30 statistics of the RSFSR (Russia proper) indicated for 1923-26 an average yearly urban increase of 600,000 persons.

⁶ Mende, *Studien zur Kolonisation in der Sowjetunion*, p. 47. See Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union*, Plate VI C.

TABLE 3

 AGRICULTURAL MIGRATION TO EASTERN REGIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION
 (IN THOUSANDS)^a

Year	Number of Migrants	Number Returned	DESTINATION					Volga and North Caucasus
			Siberia	Far East	Kazakh- stan	Central Asia	Urals	
1920 ^b	85 ^f	35 ^h	60	..	25
1921 ^b	70 ^g	32 ⁱ	53	..	17
1922 ^b	7	27 ^k	5	..	2
1924/25 ^c	104	10	65	5	23	3	5	3
1925/26 ^c	109	23	60	11	9	3	6	20
1926/27 ^c	143	30	51	41	10	..	20	21
1927/28 ^c	174	36	78	51	8	1	17	19
1928/29 ^d	321	61	202	38	23	10	34	13
1929/30 ^e	72

^a All figures are substantially below the actual volume of migration. Many left without waiting until land in the colonization area could be allotted them and therefore sought to avoid registration. Others were not counted because they traveled, not in collective transports, but in regular trains.

^b Latsis, director of colonization administration, in his report of October 11, 1927.

^c USSR, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Statisticheskii Spravochnik za 1928 god.*

^d Krasil'nikov, M. "Agrarnoe pereselenie v 1928/29 g.," *Statisticheskoe Obozrenie*, 1930, No. 5.

^e *Ekonomicheskaja Zhizn*, May 15, 1931.

^f Total of migrants registered and not registered estimated at more than 500,000 (M. A. Bol'shakov. "Dal'nevostochnoe i sibirskoe pereselenie," *Vestnik Zemleustroistva*, 1928, No. 4), probably including 170,000 World War refugees.

^g Total of registered and not registered—more than 175,000, including 112,000 famine refugees (Starkov, in *Zhizn' Sibiri*, 1926, No. 7-8.)

^h Including 29,000 famine refugees. All these figures of registered returned migrants are "considerably below the true numbers" (*ibid.*). See also above, p. 75.

ⁱ Including 20,000 famine refugees.

^k Including 9,000 famine refugees.

peasant migrants amounted in 1925 and 1926 to approximately 100,000. It exceeded 150,000 in the following year. In 1928 some 200,000 emigrated, and in 1929 the high mark of 300,000 was reached. Almost 4/5 of the 900,000 persons transplanted in the years 1925-29 came from the following parts of European Russia: 22 percent from the Ukraine, 16 percent from the central blacksoil region, 15 percent from the middle Volga lands, 15 percent from Belorussia, and 11 percent from the western regions. With the exception of the Ukraine (considered as an entity), none of these regions had sufficiently important industries to absorb rural surplus population. In the Ukraine, just as before 1914, its western part—Polesie and the right bank of

Dnieper—supplied the largest quotas of out-migrants, whereas the industry was located in the eastern part. A table compiled by a Soviet economist (on the basis of a survey made by the Central Statistical Office) ⁷ showed that the lowest average peasant earnings were in the regions which constituted the main out-migration areas.

Migration in 1925-28 was but a resumption of prewar trends. Origin, form, and direction are identical. Once more, most of the migrants (two thirds) were bound for Siberia, which by decree of June 6, 1925, was officially designated as an area of colonization. Lesser currents flowed to the Russian Far East (Dalni Vostok), where settlement had been authorized by the same decree, and to Kazakhstan, although up to 1929 this region remained officially closed for settlement.

Along this ancient route migrants met the same obstacles which had handicapped earlier wanderers. No new lands in Siberia were ready for immediate occupancy and cultivation. The best spots, grasslands and regions with moderate forests along the Trans-Siberian, were almost entirely colonized. In the taiga (the northern jungle) new lands were available, but enormous labor was needed to clear them. Lack of local markets and high transportation costs made this an unproductive investment. Colonists stopped at the southern border of the taiga.⁸ As a result, newcomers settled mainly in regions already populated and managed to obtain part of the land of the resident population.⁹ Thus, colonization did not bring about an enlargement of the agricultural area; rather, it extended to Siberia the system of land redistribution.


Certain hopes were pinned on Dalni Vostok. As early as 1910 the tsarist minister Stolypin strove to direct migration toward the Russian Far East, and the Soviet government in turn adopted these views. As one time it seemed that the rich resources of this virgin soil would attract colonists despite all obstacles.¹⁰ But in 1929 these prospects were shattered. Russian colonists had to face two evils. One was Manchuria's agricultural competition; a good crop there

⁷ Avilov, "K voprosu ob agrarnom perenaselenii," *Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie*, 1929, No. 2, pp. 81 ff.

⁸ Bolshakov, in *Ekonomicheskaja Zhizn'*, May 4, 1927, and "Znachenie transporta v kolonizatsionnom dele," *Severnaia Azia*, 1930, No. 3-4, p. 145.

⁹ Rubinsky, "Pereselenie," *Severnaia Azia*, 1928, No. 1, p. 17.

¹⁰ Bolshakov, "Dal'nevostochnoe i sibirskoe pereselenie," *Vestnik Zemleustroistva*, 1928, No. 4, pp. 7 ff.



I. Population Movements in the Interwar Period

caused a decline in the prices at Dalni Vostok (which is a grain-importing country); the other, even more serious, was competition from immigrants of the yellow race, whose living standards were lower than those of the Russians and who adjusted much better to local conditions. The influx of Koreans started before 1914. It was largely due to the activities of the Japanese Society for Eastern Colonization, which transformed great areas in Korea into rice fields and forced the native Koreans to emigrate; in 1915 90,000 of them were reported to have entered Russia. The number increased after the Revolution, and the 1926 census listed 168,000 Koreans; 85,000 of them were Soviet citizens. These figures are said to be too low, since the yearly influx of Koreans was about 30,000, and their natural increase was considerable (2.9 per 1,000). The total number of Koreans in Russia by 1927-28 can be put at 250,000. Furthermore, Chinese workers and merchants and Japanese fishermen must be added. The total proportion of persons of the yellow race in the Soviet Far East was about one fifth. Their competition crushed the Russian colonists. As a result, not even 1/10 of the migrating Russian peasants selected Dalni Vostok. "Spontaneous" migrants completely neglected this outlet. The latter were more likely to choose another region of Asiatic Russia, which officially was not yet even open for colonization, namely, Kazakhstan. The true volume of this migration is not revealed in the official figures.

Kazakhstan had a reserve of uncultivated land suitable for farming which was even larger than that of Siberia. The indigenous population was composed of Kazakh (Kirghiz-Kaisak) nomads. Before 1914 the Russian government had directed colonists to these regions and restricted the space reserved for nomads.¹¹

The Revolution awoke among the local Kazakh population hopes of recovering the soil they had once occupied. In 1920 the local authorities took steps to deprive of their lands those who had immigrated before and during the war and to leave to them only a "worker's share." Plots made available in this way were to be distributed among Kazakh communities and Kazakhs who had fled to China after a revolt in 1916 and had since returned. We have seen that these projects were partly carried out after the civil war, when

¹¹ The expedition of Shcherbina in 1896 set the norm at 150 to 500 dessiatines per *kibitka* (nomad family). Kuznetsov's expedition in 1907-11 reduced the norm to 50-350 dessiatines.

a temporary east-west reflux took place and numerous Russian colonists were forced to return to European Russia. Kazakhstan was officially closed to colonization. But during the NEP, when there was a strong revival of the current going beyond the Urals, large numbers of spontaneous migrants appeared once more in Kazakhstan. This in-migration and the occupation of nomad pastures by newcomers met with strong resistance on the part of the local population and authorities, the latter being then mainly composed of Kazakhs. In 1926 the executive committee of the Soviets of Kazakhstan promulgated a regulation according to which all Russians who had settled without authorization after August 31, 1925, were denied the right of receiving land by allocation. They were either to leave, or else they had to lease their plots. Between 40,000 and 50,000 families fell into this category. The secretary of the Communist party in Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin rescued these people, according to his own story, by the following ingenious argument: "Comrades, this will not do. Do you have armed forces to expel 200,000 Russians? Do you have the means to pay for their return journey?"

Under the circumstances Kazakhstan obviously was no solution for Russia's agrarian problem. The crying need was for a radical change in the entire Russian colonization policy. As early as December, 1927, Rykov, president of the Council of the RSFSR Peoples' Commissars declared at the 15th congress of the Communist party: "Colonization must be accelerated, for an increase in agricultural production will result from it, overpopulation will be defeated, and the situation of poor and middle peasants will be improved."

A series of decrees published in 1928-30 mark a turn in migratory policies. Some of them were merely declaratory; others were more technical. In the future the interests of the Union were to predominate over local interests. These decrees legalized an eastward push, even at the expense of local inhabitants. A law of December 15, 1928, stated that all land on USSR territory belonged to the Union, not to individual republics. As of March 6, 1929, the regions of primary importance in terms of colonization, including Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Far East (*Dalni Vostok*), were declared colonization areas of the Soviet Union. The Agrarian Commissariat of the USSR was created on December 11, 1929, and on February 1, 1930, the Office of Colonization was subordinated to this agency.

This new governmental attitude reflected a deep change of policy

with respect to the native peoples of Asiatic Russia, particularly those in Kazakhstan, which in 1929 was officially opened to settlement. But these colonization projects were worked out and applied under the system of collectivization first inaugurated in 1929 of which colonization in a new form was an intrinsic part.

Collectivization

Setting aside all communist ideology, the problem which had matured by 1928-29 was as follows: the population was 12 percent larger than it had been in the pre-1914 period; the acreage in grains amounted to some 90 percent of the prewar area. Partly because of further land parcellation, productivity could not be increased and as a result per capita production was only some 80 percent of the prewar output. Allowance must be made for the fact that on the eve of the first World War 13 percent of the grain was exported. But it turned out that ten years after the Revolution the Soviet population did not have even as much as the minimum of bread which the tsarist regime had provided. On the other hand, because of the catastrophic curtailment of foreign commerce and the disorganization of industrial life, there was a dearth of industrial goods—goods for which the peasants would have traded the foodstuffs badly needed by the expanding urban population. The constant increase in land parcellation (there were 24,500,000 peasant homesteads by 1928) and the government policy which sought to reduce the price of farm products compared to industrial goods further reduced the amount of agricultural produce made commercially available. Their quantity became definitely insufficient as the urban population kept growing. Agriculture could no longer supply urban and army needs.

The policy of the Soviet government can be trimmed down to the following three principles: (1) to increase the amount of cultivated land and its yield; (2) to seize the largest possible share of farm products for the use of the army and the growing urban population; (3) to intensify industrial production.

The first five-year plan (*piatiletka*) and collectivization were applied in 1928-32. The primary aim of the plan was the development of industry. But it also provided for the creation of large state-run farms (*sovkhozes*)—"grain-factories," as they were called—and especially for the incorporation of peasant farms into collective units

(*kolkhozes*).¹² Vast unified cultivated areas and the introduction of modern machinery were to foment agricultural progress. On the other hand, the subordination of the *kolkhozes* (collective farms) to the state was to alleviate the food problem in the cities. Collectivization was to be a means of achieving a system of great mechanized exploitation, but this aim was only attained some time later, largely through industrial progress. Meanwhile, collectivization as applied at first became mainly an instrument for expropriation of the best farmers. They were delivered to the rapacious fellow villagers and various urban elements who covered the countryside like a swarm of grasshoppers.

According to the plan, only 20 percent of the peasant farms were to enter the collectives in 1933, but in fact collectivization progressed much more rapidly than that. In 1930 the *kolkhozes* absorbed nearly one fourth of all peasant homesteads, and during the following year more than one half were involved.

These developments of 1929-30 can be attributed to the hostile measures to which individual peasants were subjected, especially to the terrorizing of the kulaks. Theoretically, the unfortunate kulak who had to be "liquidated" was a farmer employing a number of hired hands and therefore an "exploiter." But in fact, because of the prevailing poverty in Russian villages, it was sufficient for one inhabitant to rise ever so slightly above the low level for him to be termed a kulak.¹³ The persecution of the kulaks started with fiscal measures; they were unable to meet the imposed assessments. Later a decree of February 1, 1930, gave full power to the executive committees of local soviets to "take all necessary measures in view of the struggle against the kulaks, including the confiscation of their belongings and their expulsion from the region." Fiscal terror was thus augmented by physical terror. The kulaks anticipated their fate and hastened to liquidate their belongings. They left to search for new lands where they would not be persecuted as enemies of society. Those who

¹² Usually the peasant upon entering a *kolkhoz* keeps a small plot of land, while the remainder is exploited by the *kolkhoz*. In the beginning all livestock was given over to the *kolkhoz*, sometimes including poultry. According to the 1935 statute draft animals were the exclusive property of the *kolkhoz*. With regard to any other property, the law set limitations within which individual ownership was permitted. Cf. below, note 47.

¹³ Hoover, *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, p. 76. Zinoviev admitted that "sometimes we call kulak any peasant who has something to eat."

failed to escape in time underwent "dekulakization." The kulak's land, his house, his tools, his livestock, his grain, and even his food reserves and clothes were confiscated. Several thousand were shot for sabotaging the work of collectivization. Numerous cases of suicide were reported. Other kulaks, stripped of all they owned, fled without aim. The remainder were ousted or deported.

The peasants retaliated this administrative terror. They murdered communists and started sporadic revolts in all parts of the USSR. During the winter of 1929-30 a veritable civil war raged in the Russian countryside. The pace of collectivization was temporarily slowed down after the appearance in *Pravda* (March 2, 1930) of an article by Stalin entitled "Giddiness from Success." But the end of 1931 saw a return to the terror system. Peasants were forced to enter collectives. A new wave of kulak persecution motivated by the "sabotage" of grain deliveries to the government in 1932 was released in areas not yet wholly collectivized. By 1933 the victory of the new system was complete. In 1934 almost three fourths of all peasant homesteads were collectivized, and in 1938 and 1940 the proportion reached 94 and 96.9 percent, respectively.

The different phases of this new revolution, "greater and more difficult than that of November"¹⁴ (this refers to the 1917 Revolution), are reflected in tremendous population displacements.

1) The first waves reflect the very process of destructive collectivization. There was an influx of urban dwellers eager to obtain food and to partake in the looting of settled peasants. The latter were largely forced to leave their native villages. This wave was the flight and the deportation of the kulaks.

2) The second phase comprises migrations caused by the immediate economic consequences of the new system. The destruction of agrarian economy by forced collectivization and the deterioration of values were aggravated by a bad harvest. Escaping the famine, masses of peasants, collectivized and not collectivized, fled from the countryside towards the east, particularly to the large industrial centers.

3) The third phase covers the constructive period. It is characterized by two movements in opposite directions: thousands of skilled workers left the towns for the countryside, where they were to introduce mechanization to the collectives, while millions of peasants,

¹⁴ Sir John Maynard, *The Russian Peasant*, p. 149.

who had become superfluous as a result of this mechanization, left the land and were enrolled in the growing industries.

Let us examine these phases in succession. Since the winter of 1929-30 "landless" peasants and those who owned only small plots and had made a living in the towns, while their families remained in the country, hastened to return. Before mechanization curtailed the need for manpower in agriculture there had been a moment when collectivization of land and the means of production seemed to provide the opportunity for an unlimited number of persons to be supported by the *kolkhoz*. Peasants refused to leave the collective farm even for the purpose of seasonal work. Finally industry experienced a certain manpower shortage. Accordingly in 1931 the migration of peasants to the cities was even officially encouraged. This was done through the device of guaranteeing to the families of the migrants the right to purchase *kolkhoz* products at minimum prices.

Aside from this spontaneous return to the soil there was the influx of those sent to the country by the government and the party. In 1930 and 1931 more than 20,000 communists were delegated to the villages as *kolkhoz* leaders.¹⁵ Thousands were also sent in the course of the following years, for the system of appointing city communists for the administration of collectives only gradually slackened.¹⁶ Even more numerous were those allegedly sent as laborers who in reality knew nothing about farm work and merely had to be fed at the expense of the villages. As late as 1933, 241,000 members of the communist youth movement were sent to the *kolkhozes*, according to a statement by P. P. Postyshev, undersecretary of the Communist party in the Ukraine.

This new migration was caused by the lack of food in the towns, whereas the collectives seemed capable of supporting everybody. In addition, collectivization offered a still further attraction, namely, the possibility of participating in the despoliation of the wealthier farmers.

While attracting one group, collectivization ousted another. As

¹⁵ Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, pp. 452-53. Zombe, "Dvadtsatipiatitsiachniki," *Voprosy Istorii*, 1947, No. 5.

¹⁶ In 1932 several thousand workers were sent to serve in the political departments of Machine Tractor Stations, i.e., to direct the *kolkhozes*. In the Ukraine, in 1933, 10,000 communists were sent to rural areas as *kolkhoz* administrators. Appointment of city workers as chairmen and members of managing boards continued until 1938. According to official figures, more than 250,000 were appointed to permanent posts between 1928 and 1938.

we have seen, the largest number of rural migrants since the war of 1914-17 was recorded in 1929. More than 300,000 persons were registered as going beyond the Urals. We are led to believe that among these migrants were numerous refugees from collectivization. Indeed, during this year the collectivization measures were particularly stringent in the central part of the USSR, but did not affect the areas of colonization to the same extent. In 1930, the last year carried in the statistics of the Commissariat of Agriculture, the figures were quite different; only 72,000 persons were registered as having been transplanted in collective units. It is not surprising that the new type of colonization which had by that time been introduced into the remoter part of the USSR hardly tempted the middle-class peasant, habituated to the independent farming of small plots. These peasants desired to migrate in order to escape collectivization. The poor peasants, on the other hand, did not at this time see any advantage in moving away, for they expected to make a living in the local collectives.

The decline in colonizing migration did not imply a drop in the volume of migratory turnover. The paradoxical result of collectivization was firmly to root the elements who had been eager to leave the soil, while ousting those who through hard labor had created the best farm lands. Mass migration occurred in two forms: flight and deportation.

In the beginning and the spring of 1930 the Soviet newspapers were filled with reports and complaints about kulaks who had not waited to be despoiled and had fled, having either sold their belongings or else taken them along. Others left their native soil after undergoing "dekulakization." Desperate kulaks, chased and persecuted wherever they went, tried to find jobs in factories, public works, or mines. They sometimes went to the neighboring towns, but were also to be found a thousand or more miles from their native villages.¹⁷ Those who managed to save part of their belongings tried to make a living in those sectors of economic life where socialist methods had not yet been introduced, and became itinerant teamsters, etc. Inside Siberia they went even farther east, trying to reach still deserted lands.¹⁸

¹⁷ Thus, kulaks from the province of Tambov went to work on the Turksib, the railway which led from Turkestan to Siberia, then under construction.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1930. A. Pavlov, in *Ezhegodnik Sovetskogo Stroitel'stva*, Moscow, 1931, p. 460. Hoover, *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, pp. 100-105.

Hundreds of thousands of kulaks were ousted and deported. Deportation was the most dreadful instrument of terror during the entire period of forced collectivization between 1929 and 1933. Especially in the winter of 1929-30 many kulaks were deported from all parts of European Russia. Auhagen, who during this time was attached to the German embassy in Moscow as agricultural expert, estimated the number of deportees to be "at least 500,000 peasants in addition to 50,000 German colonists."¹⁹ In 1932 new mass deportations took place, particularly in northern Caucasus, in the Ukraine, and in the lower Volga lands; 45,600 were deported from the Cossack lands of the Kuban.²⁰

Most of the kulak deportees were directed to regions which free migrants had avoided, namely, to the forests of northern European Russia, to the Siberian taiga, and to the deserts of central Asia. Common-law convicts and political prisoners were sent with the kulaks. But the majority of the deported were peasants whose only crime was a certain degree of opulence. The GPU (political police) had organized, especially in the northern part of European Russia, a veritable system of slave economy. Low productivity and technical shortcomings were compensated for by the low cost of labor and by a pitiless expenditure of human material. Enormous mortality resulted, an unavoidable corollary of this type of economy. The surviving workers supplied the manpower needed for the clearing of forests, construction of large canals, etc. Other deported peasants, especially in Siberia, were installed according to the ancient system of forced colonization. Compelled to take up specific jobs assigned by the authorities, these deportees settled as peasants, fishermen, and so forth, in the villages they built. Such colonies of convicts were started along the Ob River in the years 1930-33, between Tomsk and Alexandrovsk.²¹

The total number of kulaks who had to leave their homes (deportees, ousted and fugitives) may have run into millions.²² The number of deportees alone was very high. Although it would be impossible to verify estimates referring to millions of deportees, it is

¹⁹ Auhagen, "Agriculture," in Dobbert, ed., *Soviet Economics*, p. 133.

²⁰ *Za Mir i Trud* (Rostov-Don), quoted in *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, Jan. 27, 1933.

²¹ According to private information received by the author.

²² The estimates vary from 1 million according to H. Schroeder, in *Osteuropa*, July, 1932, pp. 595-96, and *Duranty Reports Russia*, p. 310, to "at least 5 million," according to Souvarine, *Staline*, p. 480.

certain that hundreds of thousands of persons were involved in these population shifts.²³

Famine in 1932-33

Together with forced collectivization went a terrific wastage of economical values. The confiscated property of kulaks had to be turned over to the *kolkhozes*; indeed, 15 percent of all *kolkhoz* capital was derived from this source. But this represented only a small portion of what was taken from the kulaks. Ever so often confiscation degenerated into an orgy of looting which annihilated all marketable grains. These losses were further aggravated by the voluntary destruction of livestock. Kulaks and non-kulaks alike slaughtered their cattle to convert them into cash or at least to eat them rather than to see them become collective property. Below is a description by a famous Russian novelist.²⁴

Hardly had darkness fallen when the brief and stifled bleating of a sheep, the mortal scream of a pig, or the bellowing of a calf would be heard piercing the silence. Not only those who had joined the collective farm but individual farmers also slaughtered. They killed oxen, sheeps, pigs, even cows; they slaughtered animals kept for breeding. . . . The dogs began to drag entrails and guts about the village, the cellars and granries were filled with meat. In two days the cooperative shop sold some two hundred *poads* [poad = 36 lbs.] of salt which had been lying in the ware-

²³ N. J. Kiselev-Gromov, a former labor camp official, gave the number of prisoners in all camps in 1930 as 662,257 (Dalín and Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, p. 52). A figure of 2 million is given by V. Chernavin, in *Slavonic and East European Review*, Jan., 1934, p. 388, and Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 157. Numerous deported kulaks were subsequently returned. However, the number of persons in concentration camps greatly increased, since later the same measure was largely applied to other groups for various political reasons. By 1940, it ran into millions. Figures of 7 to 20 million and more have been given, on the basis of rumors circulating in Russia and abroad. They appear to be exaggerated. Accepting the reasonable reports that there were not more than 10 percent women, Dalín and Nicolaevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 11, a number of 20 million inmates would mean that no adult male civilian was left at liberty, when other 20 million were mobilized for military service. But even substantially lower figures are incompatible with the high birth rate as well as with shortage of hands in areas and occupations avoided by free labor (see pp. 117-18). This is not intended to minimize the gravity of the institution of forced labor. It is just as extraordinary, if its victims amount to "only" a few million. Before the Revolution the number of deportees of all categories was under 100,000 (cf. Vladimir Gsovski, "The Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia," *Fordham Law Review*, Jan., 1939). According to Obolensky-Ossinsky, in 1901-10, 25,000 were deported and in 1911-14, 27,000 (*Mezhdunarodnye i mezhdukontinental'nye migratsii*, p. 84).

²⁴ M. Sholokhov, *Seeds of Tomorrow*, Engl. transl., New York, Knopf, 1935, p. 157.

house for eighteen months. "Kill, it's not ours now"; "Kill, they'll take it for the meat collection tax if you don't"; "Kill, for you won't taste meat in the collective farm." The insidious rumors crept around, and they killed. They ate until they were unable to move. Everybody, from the youngest to the oldest, suffered from stomachache. . . . Everybody belched as though they had been at a funeral repast in memory of the dead. And all were owlish with their intoxication from eating.

Furthermore, cattle handed over to the collectives succumbed for lack of fodder (between 1931 and 1934 the hay harvest declined from 51 to 41 million tons), absence of stables, and lack of care. After collectivization only 40 percent of the livestock remained. The number of horses had fallen from 34 to 16 million. The expected mechanization progressed slowly.²⁵ Meanwhile the total power of traction, mechanical as well as animal (horses and oxen), at the disposal of Russian agriculture declined from 15 to 10 million horsepower.

Management of the newly established *kolkhozes* was in general wholly disorganized. According to a statement by the central committee of the Communist party, this led in 1931 to the loss of more than 15 million tons of grain. The best individual farms had been destroyed, and the collective farming was still in the organizational stage. Thus was laid the ground for a new famine. The authorities continued, on the other hand, to enforce grain deliveries to the government without consideration for the urgent needs of the local peasantry. After the bad crop of 1932 a great famine broke out over vast areas.

Various reports²⁶ give a tragic picture of the great famine in the Ukraine, the lower Volga, northern Caucasus, parts of western Si-

²⁵ Granovsky and Markus, *Ekonomika sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti*, p. 127: "During the first five-year plan only the foundation of machine system in agriculture has been laid down. The second five-year plan brought an increase of the volume of supply and a production of a large assortment of machines which more and more secured the mechanization of the entire process of agricultural work."

²⁶ Correspondence from Russia to *Sotsialisticheski Vestnik*, June 25, 1932, May 10 and 25, July 10, August 25, and December 16, 1933. This Russian socialist émigré newspaper (published up to March, 1933, in Berlin, since April, 1933, in Paris) had at that time the best underground connection with Russia. Auhagen, *Die Bilanz des ersten Fünfjahr Plans*, and in *Osteuropa*, Sept., 1933. Schiller, *Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft*. Auhagen and Schiller had access to information collected by the German embassy in Moscow. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*; Duranty, USSR. Gareth Jones, in *Daily Express*, April, 1934. To verify his facts he traveled on the railroads in the cheapest class and went on foot through numerous villages of the Kharkov region. Professor N. S. Timashev, in *Monde Slave* (Paris), Sept., 1933, quoting numerous private letters, certified that they all were in the hands of the author, who vouched for their authenticity.

beria, and the Kazakhstan, surpassed only by that of 1922. It is described as a famine after which no dog was heard to bark, for all died or had been killed and eaten. Even cases of cannibalism were reported. The famine was accompanied by an epidemic of spotted typhus. It literally decimated the population of some regions.²⁷

No official figures are available as to the loss in human lives caused by this new and terrible disaster. Statistics which might give even a clue to the number of deaths were kept secret. After 1930 data on births and deaths were no longer published.²⁸ For 1931 and 1932 only reports concerning excesses of births over deaths were given, which later were stigmatized as falsifications. For 1933 and 1934 no figures whatsoever on the natural movement of the population were put out. A census taken in 1937 was suppressed after the figures had been collected and tabulated. Nevertheless, a comparison of the 1926 and 1939 censuses and scattered data on births and deaths (see Table 2) give an indication of the magnitude of this catastrophe.

Between the census of 1926 and that of 1939 the population of the USSR grew from 147,027,915 to 170,467,186. This represents a total increase of 23.4 million. In 1927-30 the previous trend was sustained: slight decline in the birth rate and marked decrease in mortality. The population growth for these years can be roughly estimated at 12 million. After the demographic dark of the years of forced collectivization and famine, a spectacularly low death rate for 1935 was disclosed. This was obviously a decline in mortality such as usually follows mass extermination, after the weaker elements of the population have been eliminated. In the next years the death rate returned to the 1928 level. After 1935 there was, however, an upward trend of natality. It can hardly be attributed to the prohibition of abortion, which played a considerable role only in a few big cities. The change resulted rather from an increase of marriageable persons. Couples marry early in Russia. In 1936-38 candidates for marriage were already supplied by the populous classes of those born between the return from the imperial army and mobiliza-

²⁷ Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 88: "The average mortality rate which I found in districts I personally visited was about 10 percent." Duranty, *USSR*, p. 203: The chief of the Ukrainian section of tractor stations "denied that the death rate had been as high as ten percent, but showed no indignation at the question."

²⁸ The publication had been stopped before the famine, probably because of a strong decline in the birth rate.

tion for the Red army. In any case, the population growth in 1935-38 can be estimated at 11 million. Adding the increase for 1927-30, we obtain a total of 23 millions. This means that in the intermediate period (1931-34) the population of the USSR grew by only half a million. In other words, the expected excess of births over deaths for these four years was nearly annihilated. Even making allowance for a birth rate considerably reduced by famine and for errors of registration and calculation, there appears to have been a population loss of several million. A careful and ingenious analysis made by Frank Lorimer²⁹ in two independent ways (extrapolation of life tables of Soviet demographers and calculation on the basis of adjusted vital statistics) revealed a discrepancy of 5.5 million, representing almost all the excess deaths of the years around 1932.

For only a small fraction of the revealed loss of population can be attributed to emigration. As a matter of fact, between 1926 and 1939 legal emigration was limited to foreigners who had to leave the USSR when the Soviet government took measures against aliens in 1937-38, particularly persons of Polish origin who had lived in Russia before the Revolution and had not left with the general exodus in 1920-22.³⁰ The departure of those who had come as technicians and skilled workers,³¹ did not affect the migratory balance, since most of them had arrived late. There was also constant clandestine emigration. "Peasant victims of collectivisation in the USSR fled between 1929 and 1932, escaping individually to Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic States. . . . A certain number of Mennonites and other religious refugees congregated in Harbin as late as 1930."³² However, all these groups are trifling when a deficit of millions has to be accounted for. The only mass emigration between the two census periods is the flight of Kazakhs to China, especially in 1933; but even this emigration involved only some tens of thousands.³³

It can be estimated that the wave of acute mortality of the collectivization period carried off at least 5 million of the whole USSR

²⁹ *The Population of the Soviet Union*, pp. 131-36.

³⁰ In 1929, for once in a way, 3,700 Mennonites were granted permission to leave the country and were transported through Germany to Canada, Brazil, and Paraguay (Horsch, *Mennonites in Europe*, p. 288).

³¹ Simpson, *Refugee Problem*, p. 84. Their number has been estimated in 1932 at 16,000 (H. Schroeder, in *Osteuropa*, July, 1932).

³² Simpson, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 413, 498.

³³ See pp. 101-2 and note 43.

population. This figure includes victims of terror, deportees who succumbed on the road and at the labor yards, but above all victims of famine.

Like all great famines, that of 1932-33 caused mass flight of the hunger-stricken population.

Beginning in the autumn of 1932 railroad stations and country roads were crowded with peasants fleeing from regions where famine was prevalent. "They fled from their barren fields in the hope that somehow or somewhere they might save their lives and their children's by work in towns or concentration camps. Or fled without any hope only because they knew that it was death to stay."⁸⁴ Cities were filled with hordes of peasant beggars and hungry lice-covered children. "Entire villages were emptied, where the crisis raged at its worst. In numerous houses the windows had been replaced by wooden planks. They spoke an eloquent language."⁸⁵ As late as September, 1933, "enormous weeds, of striking height and toughness, filled up many of the gardens and could be seen waving in the fields of wheat, corn, and sunflower seeds."⁸⁶ And although a large part of refugee peasants had already returned to the land, there were still "many deserted villages as tokens of past woe."⁸⁷

Millions of peasants were ousted from their homes by famine and misery. But they were not the only ones on the go. All Russia was moving. The lack of food stimulated a migration of workers in industry, transportation, construction, and road building. By 1929 complaints about labor turnover were being voiced; they were multiplied in the following year. The Soviet press deplored the fact that certain factories, especially buildings under construction, had become regular passageways.⁸⁸ The tremendous construction projects of the five-year plan and the rapid growth of industry called for an increase in the labor force. Demand for skilled workers by far exceeded the supply. The workers had a wide choice of opportunities and looked out for the best living conditions, dissatisfied mainly with housing facilities. When in 1932 the lack of food became

⁸⁴ Duranty, *USSR*, pp. 192-93: "The number of these fugitives cannot be estimated, but it must have totaled millions." *Duranty Reports Russia*, p. 278.

⁸⁵ Schiller, *Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft*, pp. 44-45.

⁸⁶ Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 83.

⁸⁷ Duranty, *USSR*, p. 203. Of course, such desertion resulted not only from flight but also from mortality, which took whole families. See Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

⁸⁸ See summaries in Prokopovich's *Bulleten' Ekonomicheskogo Kabineta*, No. 79, May, 1930, No. 81, Aug.-Sept., 1930, No. 82, Oct., 1930.

more and more disturbing, "the labor turnover had taken on such threatening proportions that the periodical *Ekonomicheskaja Zhizn* called it the plague of production. . . . Workers fled from one enterprise to another throughout the country, in search of half-way satisfactory conditions and mainly a chance to get enough to eat. . . . In trains and railway stations workers met peasants who in turn fled from the countryside to the city," persecuted by famine.³⁹

Settling the Nomads

Numerous peasants in search of food and work settled in the northern Caucasus and in Transcaucasia or were included in the eastern colonization movement, which was in line with the new system of agricultural exploitation. We have seen that in 1930 individual colonization had been stopped and that this had brought about an immediate drop in organized migration. But the peasants soon found themselves forced to accept this new form of colonization because of their misery. Collectivization set the pattern for the utilization of lands to be colonized. Migrants were transplanted in collective units. Sometimes big state farms were organized in which in-migrants worked side by side with natives. Beginning with 1931 the tendency to build "grain factories" in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Far East rather than in the European part of Russia came to prevail. But just as had been the trouble earlier, the obstacle when it came to land allocation was a lack of good soils suited for the organization of state farms. "We do not have enough fertile land for the *sovkhozes*," wrote a promoter of agrarian innovations as early as 1928. "It is therefore necessary to revise the entire distribution of soils allocated for other purposes."⁴⁰ Nevertheless, there were in 1933 nearly 4 million hectares of formerly uncultivated acreage on lands exploited by *sovkhozes*. In the northern Caucasus, beyond the Volga, and especially in northern Kazakhstan, agriculture expanded at the expense of the untilled steppe and simultaneously at the expense of the natives.

Before the Revolution the nomad families in Russia numbered 2-3 million, comprising over 10 million persons; in 1935 only 450,000

³⁹ *Monde Slave*, 1933, No. 1, pp. 119-20. We shall limit ourselves to this quotation to sum up the turnover problem, which the Soviet press discussed extensively. Figures published in the *Plan*, May 10, 1937, referring to heavy industries, show that in 1930-33 both the number of hired workers and the number of discharged workers considerably surpassed the average number of employed workers.

⁴⁰ A. Muralov, in *Ekonomicheskaja Zhizn*, June 17, 1928.

families (2-2.5 million persons) were left. The permanent settlement of nomads liberated vast areas for colonization. It was carried out in conjunction with a precipitate collectivization process. The natives were forced to bridge the gap between a primitive economy and "socialism." The class struggle was carried to their camps. A definite defeat had to be inflicted upon the beys, large landowners and livestock owners, whose economic and political influence was to be reduced to zero. But the result was once more a catastrophic destruction of cattle.

This process was intimately connected with state-conducted colonization. The Kazakhs, since their lands were particularly well suited for farming, suffered most keenly.

Plans for the economic reconstruction of Kazakhstan provided for "simultaneous agrarian organization, inventory of excess land, and colonization of these free soils."⁴¹ Any manifestation "against a partial transplantation of peasants from the center of the Union" and against "the cession of land to the *sovkhoses*" was denounced as "a nationalistic deviation." It was to be suppressed in order to "organize proper agrarian relationships in Kazakhstan and to strengthen the brotherhood of workers of all nationalities."⁴²

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR had asked the Colonization Committee as early as January 18, 1928, "to select soils in Kazakhstan suited for colonization" and "to assure by means of colonization a rational exploitation" of land in the zone of the Turkestan Siberian railroad, then under construction. The Colonization Committee introduced in the 1928-1933 five-year plan a project for shifting colonists to northern Kazakhstan on a large scale. Its counterpart was the permanent settlement of nomads, so that part of their pastures would be available for colonization. The action was praised as a basis for the general reconstruction of Kazakhstan's agrarian economy and was expected to result "in an enormous growth of the sown area, in the organization of *sovkhoses* and in in-migration."⁴³

⁴¹ Voshchinin, *Kazakhstan*, pp. 55-56.

⁴² Isaev, "15 let borby i pobed," *Revolutsiia i Natsional'nost'*, 1935, No. 11, p. 48.

⁴³ Declaration made by the Central Executive Committee of the Kazakh Republic, quoted in *Sibirskata Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, in "Kazakhskaiia ASSR." Resolution of the 7th Soviet Congress of the Kazakh Republic, quoted in Goloshchekin, *Kazakhstan*, p. 219. Arguments advanced by experts (Oganovsky, Chelintsev, Shvetsov) against forced settlement of the nomads have been denounced as "bourgeois sabotage."

At the same time, the permanent settlement of nomads was to ensure the feeding of the livestock, so as to induce an increase of its quantity and especially its quality. But this miracle, which was to accommodate both the goat and the cabbage, did not come about. The catastrophe predicted by the experts befell cattle breeding. Its economic effects were even more serious than had been the collectivization of the Russian peasantry. In fact, *sovkhozes* and *kolkhozes* obtained the best soils by means of the agrarian reform, while the Kazakhs were forced to enter collectives established on inferior soils. Partly deprived of their pastures and unable to secure fodder for their livestock, many Kazakhs went in for mass slaughter. Others, instead of settling as farmers on allotted lands, hastened to emigrate with their livestock. Isaev, president of the Council of People's Commissars of Kazakhstan, conceded that this mass flight lasted until 1935, when the administration renounced its plan of forced settlement.⁴⁴ The emigration of the Kazakhs partly accounts for their slight actual increase. In Kazakhstan the population increased only 1 percent between the census of 1926 and that of 1939, when the over-all increase for the USSR was 15.9 percent. In the words of a Russian statistician, "during the 1926 census a fairly large number of nomads were recorded in Kazakhstan; part of this population passed to the neighboring Soviet territories, especially the Uzbek and Kirghiz republics, between 1926 and 1939."⁴⁵ But this explanation is insufficient. The same census figures show a decline in the total Kazakh population of the USSR, which fell from 3,960,000 (of whom 3,717,000 resided in Kazakhstan) in 1926 to 3,099,000 in 1939.⁴⁶ Taking into account natural increase before and after the collectivization years, it appears that the Kazakh population suffered a loss of 1.5 million. This enormous decline must be largely attributed to acute mortality, caused by a sharp deterioration of food conditions. But it was also partly a mi-

⁴⁴ Isaev, *Kazakhstan na pod'eme*, pp. 11-12. Murzagaliev, representative of the nationalities office of the USSR, was forced to state at a conference concerning the settlement of nomads on Sept. 20, 1935: "In Buriat-Mongolia and Kazakhstan, things have come to the point where the population which had become sedentary, reverted to nomadism in 1933."

⁴⁵ N. Voznesensky, in *Pravda*, July 2, 1939.

⁴⁶ The 1926 figure is really too low. The official census publication stated: "The newly introduced term 'Kazakh' as indicating the Kirghiz-Kaisakian people, is not sufficiently adopted; therefore a good many Kirghiz have been counted in various Kazakh areas" (*Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 17 dek. 1926, Kratkie svodki*, IV, ix).

gratory loss. The number of Kazakhs who emigrated to China has been estimated at several tens of thousands.⁴⁷

Thus a migratory current originated because of the compulsory reduction in grasslands. Russian colonists streamed in from the west to clear and cultivate these soils. Indigenous nomads left for eastern and southeastern regions.

In the Asiatic part of the USSR the occupation of new lands by the Russian people was thus relentlessly pursued. After 1930 it progressed in the form of group resettlement and the establishment of large state-operated farms. At the same time, the main current of the migratory movement which can be traced to collectivization went to large cities and industrial centers.

In 1931 the Soviet government declared that rural conditions had improved so as to preclude further rural exodus.⁴⁸ But this was wishful thinking. In 1932, during a session of the Central Executive Committee, it was reported that within recent years "the towns underwent an exaggerated growth. . . . The displacement of large human masses caused difficulties in the food supply, overcrowded the towns, and created intolerable conditions. . . . Numerous adversaries of the *kolkhoz* system fled to the towns." It is true that during the years of compulsory collectivization the principal increments to the city proletariat resulted from the influx of peasants whom collectivization had ruined and ousted from their villages. The subsequent famine stimulated a further flight of peasants, both independent farmers and *kolkhoz* members. The *kolkhoz* was designed to ensure equality in the distribution of food; it provided equality of hunger. Yet collectivization was not the main cause of rural exodus. Deeper economic motives underlay the trend to the towns. The Moscow Kolkhozinstitut found in 1931 that the collective farms had an excess labor force of 6-8 million.

Between 1927 and 1930 the yearly net in-migration to the towns rose from one to 2.6 million. In 1931 it attained the peak, with 4.1

⁴⁷ Fuad Kazak, *Ostturkistan zwischen den Grossmächten*, p. 10. Kirkegaard, former postal inspector of Senkiang, noticed that "in 1933 only at Chuguchak some hundred refugees crossed daily the frontier. The Altai district, in former times inhabited predominantly by Mongols, would now, after the immigration of Kazakhs from USSR, present a prevalent Turkish population."—There was also in the preceding period a clandestine emigration of Kazakhs and Kirghizes. See Gustav Krist, *Alone through the Forbidden Land*, Engl. transl., London 1938, p. 139, and Prokopovich's *Biulleten*, No. 62, Oct., 1928.

⁴⁸ Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, p. 332.

million, and it fell in 1932 to 2.7 million. The government first attempted to curb the rush to urban centers by reducing the exodus of *kolkhoz* members. It limited severely the share of food allotted to the family of a *kolkhoz* member who had left the outfit. Later, on December 27, 1932, the passport system was again introduced. All urban dwellers, as well as all persons employed in industry, transportation, and state farms, were required to carry a passport. The settlement of newcomers in the largest cities was prohibited. For awhile it seemed as though the desired aim had been obtained; Moscow and Leningrad in particular were rid of a large part of the kulaks who had sought refuge there. The final result of these measures, however, was not a decrease in rural exodus, but merely a diversion of the influx to other cities and industrial centers, particularly to those of the newly developed eastern regions. This was in line with the general trend. The rural exodus was checked only in 1933, when net in-migration to the cities dropped to some 800,000, and it was fully resumed in the following year. The figures for both 1934 and 1935 are about 2.5 million. Numerous destitute kulaks and famine-stricken peasants found nothing but death in the towns. Hundreds of thousands perished. But millions of others found work and bread in the urban industries.

Industrial progress eventually restored the rural economy. Collectivization had destroyed draft animals, but mechanization of agriculture was soon introduced. The introduction of machinery sharply curtailed manpower requirements and increased the numbers of "superfluous" villagers. The ensuing shifts constitute the third phase in the migration due to collectivization and are intimately connected with the industrialization of Russia.

Industrialization and Agricultural Reconstruction

P. N. Miliukov, who for twenty-five years had been an inflexible opponent of the Bolshevik regime, wrote in 1942, shortly before his death: "The defense against the horrible foe and enslaver threw new light on the hard years, when Russia prepared for war. These months have modified our memories of the brutalities which accompanied Stalin's experiment."⁴⁹

In the preparation for war, industrialization and collectivization were two interdependent elements. The growth of industry helped to restore and develop agricultural economy. On the other hand, col-

⁴⁹ *Novyi Zhurnal* (New York), VI (1943), 195.

TABLE 4
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

Year	Number of Workers in Heavy Industries (In millions)	Gross Production			Manufactured Steel (In millions of tons)
		(In milliards of roubles; value based on the 1926- 1927 prices)	Mined Coal (In millions of tons)	Pig Iron (In millions of tons)	
1908	1.8	4.6 ^a	...	2.6	2.4
1913	2.6	10.3	29.0	4.2	3.5
1916	2.9	10.6	32.0	3.8	3.4
1920	1.2	1.4	8.5	0.1	0.1
1927	2.6 ^b	12.7	33.2	3.0 ^b	2.7 ^b
1932	5.2	36.9	64.3	6.2	4.3
1935	5.9 ^c	62.1	109.0	12.5	6.7 ^d
1938	...	106.8	132.9	14.7	13.3
1940	...	137.5	166.0	15.0	18.3

^a 1900 production. ^b 1926/27 production.

^c January, 1936. In the course of this year it rose to 6.4 millions. ^d 1934 production.

lectivization was the premise for rapid industrialization. In this predominantly agricultural country, the necessary capital investments could be obtained only from the villages; collectivization enabled the government to seize current revenue, and this procedure could be continued effectively because of the steady development of agriculture.

Russian industry recovered gradually after its collapse at the time of the Revolution and the civil war. By 1927-29 the pre-1914 level of production had again been achieved, and it was subsequently surpassed. Russia's industrialization had been started in the last decade of the nineteenth century and had been resumed between 1909 and 1914. Table 4 shows the development of industry in the Soviet Union; it also shows that the passage from a predominantly agricultural to a mixed economy was but the natural outcome of a process which had started long before the advent of the bolshevist system. But the numbers involved in earlier industrialization were modest when compared to the achievements of the five-year plans. The Soviet government recognized the paramount importance of industrialization for Russia's economic future, especially for purposes of national defense, and promoted it at all costs.

The rise of industry facilitated the restoration and the development of agriculture. We have seen that the weakest point in the organization of the *kolkhozes* was the lack of tractive power. During the first

years of the collectivization program the serious decline in the number of draft animals was not balanced by an increase in mechanized energy. But later the situation changed. Output of tractors and other agricultural machinery increased rapidly. In 1931 the production of tractors reached a total of 400,000 h.p.; in 1935 it went up to 2 million. In 1936 total energy, animal and mechanized, attained 16 million h.p., which almost represents the precollectivization level. In 1938 further progress brought the total up to the high mark of 27 million h.p.

Besides great improvements through mechanization, the agricultural experts who directed the work of the *kolkhozes* introduced important reforms in farming methods; the most striking was the substitution of modern crop rotation for the ancient three-field system. In addition, the government made a number of concessions to individual self-interest within the collective which had an extremely favorable influence upon agriculture.⁵⁰ A considerable rise in farm production took place. The extent of sown land remained more or less the same after 1932 (between 100 and 105 million hectares), but the crops were larger each year. The 1933-36 average was 90 million tons, in 1936-39 it surpassed 100 million, and the 1940 harvest yielded 119 million. Probably there should be deducted some loss incurred when the harvest was brought in, but the horrible crises of the first collectivization years were successfully circumvented, and during the years which preceded the outbreak of World War II, the increased production could be accumulated by the Soviet government; this grain reserve may perhaps have been a certain factor in Russia's war preparations.⁵¹

The architects of this progress were persons who had come from the cities. We have seen that the ruin of rural economy which had characterized the period of forcible collectivization was accompanied and aggravated by the influx of all sorts of urban dwellers. They had a hand in the havoc from which they profited, while the best farmers were ousted from the villages. But the situation was slowly reversed. Communist organizers were still sent to the villages, and they

⁵⁰ In 1938 the greater part of the livestock in the *kolkhozes*, with the exception of horses, was owned by individual *kolkhoz* members. Since 1939 the expansion of personal farming in *kolkhozes* has been continuously curbed.

⁵¹ Timoshenko, "The Food Situation in Soviet Russia," *World Grain Review and Outlook*, 1945, pp. 107-8. The matter is contested; see Volin, *Russian Review*, Vol. III, No. 1.

weighed heavily upon agriculture, but the number declined, and they were partly replaced by true representatives of the peasants. The urban elements which now came to the countryside were of a quite different type. They helped introduce machinery into the Russian agricultural system, helped to substitute the tractor for the horse and the steer, and taught the application of modern principles of agronomy to replace traditional methods.

Centers for the new rural life were the machine and tractor stations. They were government agencies and owned tractors, combines, threshing machines, and other complex machines. They were in charge of plowing, sowing, and harvesting, under agreements concluded with the *kolkhozes*. Furthermore, these stations organized and directed the exploitation of *kolkhoz* land through agricultural experts attached to the agencies. This system imposed upon the *kolkhoz* the authority of the Soviet government, but it also promoted agricultural progress.

At first the workers of the machine and tractor stations were almost all city people, but gradually the mechanization of agriculture was increasingly handled by those on the spot. Only by utilizing the local peasantry was it possible to reach a total of more than one million and a half skilled agriculturists, combiners, and drivers of tractors. But it should not be forgotten that the agricultural revolution was started by newcomers from the city. It can be said that the rural influx of thousands of mechanics produced a rural exodus of millions of peasants, for mechanization and its labor-saving devices sharply curtailed the need for manpower. It has been calculated that the work done in 1937 by 1.9 million workers with tractors and agricultural machinery would have occupied 12.8 million independent farmers in a nonmechanized individualistic system. Industry caused the displacement of agricultural laborers, and industry in turn was to absorb these displaced masses.

Urbanization

Statistics offer a striking illustration of the rural exodus. As has been mentioned, the number of collectivized peasant homesteads was continually increased, but this increase was due to the absorption of isolated peasants by the collective. The total number of homesteads comprising both collectivized and noncollectivized units was constantly decreasing, although at a slower rate after 1935, when famine

and the deportation of kulaks had stopped. The total number of peasant homesteads, which was 18 million on the eve of the Revolution, had reached the peak of 25.8 million in 1929. By 1938 it had fallen to 20 million. The latest reported figure—for July 1, 1940—was 19.8 million.

The censuses of 1926 and 1939 also reflect these changes. The intercensus period coincides in the main with the period of industrialization and collectivization. Changes in the composition of the population and in its geographical distribution were the result of the "pull" exerted by the rapidly growing industry and the "push" of the various phases of collectivization: dekulakization, famine, and mechanization.

Between the census of 1926 and that of 1939 the rural population of the USSR fell from 120.7 million to 114.6 million. In 1939 it represented only 67.2 percent of the total population, instead of the former 82.1 percent. These figures should not be taken at face value, because numerous communities registered as "rural areas" in 1926 were carried as "urban settlements" in 1939; 5.8 million persons lived in these new towns. However, the majority of them were newcomers, since such reclassified communities showed a rapid growth in the intercensus period. In any case, the countryside lost its whole natural increase to the cities. For the first time in her demographic history Russia had reached the stage, which had long been the norm in western Europe, when the entire natural increase falls to the cities and agricultural population declines—partly because of rural exodus and partly because of increased local employment in nonagricultural activities. The latter process is reflected by the change in the status of many rural villages which became urban communities.

The urban population more than doubled during this time, increasing from 26.3 million in 1926 to 55.9 million in 1939, from 17.9 percent to 32.8 percent of the total population. The over-all increase in urban population was 29.6 million; 5.3 million can be attributed to its natural increase and 1.3 to the initial population of the reclassified communities. The residual urban increase, due to in-migration from the countryside, amounts to 23 million.⁵² In 1939 two fifths of the urban population were peasants who had come to the city within the preceding twelve years.

Urbanization resulted in a great geographical shift of the popula-

⁵² Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union*, p. 149.

tion. In the old agricultural parts of the Soviet Union (the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the central agricultural region of Russia proper) population growth was far below average (15.9 percent) in the period between 1926 and 1939; in some provinces there was even an important decrease, as high as 7-18 percent. This may be the result of migration to industrial areas and the ravages of the 1932-33 famine. But even in such regions urban centers showed an increase in the number of inhabitants. In contrast, the industrial regions showed a strong upward trend. In addition to an influx of local peasants, their cities attracted a large long-distance migration.

The main stream of migrants from the overcrowded *kolkhozes* went to the old industrial centers. The cities of Moscow and Leningrad alone received an influx of some 3 million.⁵³ Both cities are situated in industrial areas which have their own power of attraction. The Moscow province (including the city) had a migratory gain of 3.5 million; the Leningrad province—of 1.3 million.⁵⁴ Five and one half million persons migrated from a territory surrounding the province of Moscow within a half circle having a radius of 350 miles, mainly to Moscow, Leningrad, and Gorkii.⁵⁵ The old southern coal and ore mining regions of Donbas (Donets Basin) and Krivoi Rog, with the neighboring industrial cities of Dniepropetrovsk and Kharkov, gained more than 2 million new inhabitants, largely from the western agricultural provinces of the Ukraine (see map, p. 85). Other peculiar centers of attraction were the eastern urban settlements.

Before we turn to this topic, we must mention the Jewish migration which set in motion nearly half the Jewish population of the Soviet Union. The suddenness and volume of this migration were due to the removal of legal barriers. Nonetheless it was part of the great current and followed its direction and the trend toward urbanization. Jews were before 1914 mainly urban dwellers, but they were especially numerous in small towns. Their concentration in big cities illustrates a particular instance of the general process of urbanization on which no other data are available.⁵⁶

⁵³ The population of Moscow increased from 2,029,425 inhabitants to 4,137,018; that of Leningrad from 1,690,165 to 3,191,304.

⁵⁴ Sonin, "Voprosy pereseleniia v tretei piatiletke," *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1940, No. 3, p. 84.

⁵⁵ According to data disclosed by Sonin, *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ The population of the cities over 50,000 inhabitants increased from 16.2 million to 34.1 million, i.e., in the same proportion as the total urban population. There are no indications which would reflect the town-town migration.

Before the Revolution the bulk of Russian Jewry resided in the "Pale of Settlement," an area mostly included in the later Soviet territories of Ukraine and Belorussia. Apart from some tens of thousands of native Caucasian and central-Asiatic Jews, only selected groups of European Jews lived outside the Pale of Settlement. Before the first World War most of the Jewish population of the Pale of Settlement, terribly congested and barred from inner Russia, migrated overseas, particularly to the United States and also to western Europe. War and revolution opened for them the road eastward.

A comparison of the censuses for 1897 and 1926 shows for the Jews in the Ukraine and Belorussia a migratory loss which absorbed more than the whole natural increase. On the contrary, Russia proper (RSFSR) showed a gain far above the natural increase. Roughly estimated, 600,000 Jews emigrated from the Ukraine and Belorussia before 1914 and during the civil war to western Europe and the Americas, and 200,000 have moved since the first World War to Russia proper. After 1926 this trend was intensified. In 1926-39, 250,000 additional Jews migrated toward the east and the northeast from the Ukraine, and 80,000 from Belorussia.⁵⁷

TABLE 5
NUMBER OF JEWISH INHABITANTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
(IN THOUSANDS)

	1897 ^a	1926	1939
RSFSR (Russia proper)	258	589	948
Kazakhstan			19
Ukraine	1,673	1,574	1,533
Belorussia	470	407	375
Transcaucasia	43	62	83
Central Asia	20	40	61
Total	2,464	2,672	3,020

^a Sources for computations: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 17 dek. 1926*, *Kratkie Svodki*, No. 4, Moscow, 1928, pp. xvi, xx-xxi, xxiv-xxv; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g.*, Nos. 6 and 7, St. Petersburg, 1905; *Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. XI, "Naselenie"; *Novyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, Vol. XVII, *Evrei*; Seraphim, *Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum*, pp. 290-91.

This migration started literally as a flight from starvation. The Jewish masses lived in the overcrowded towns and boroughs of the

⁵⁷ According to official data disclosed by Zinger, *Dos Banatit Folk*, p. 37.

Pale of Settlement. Their economic position had always been precarious, and the Revolution destroyed their primitive trade and commerce. The more enterprising inhabitants streamed to the big cities, to be employed as civil servants, in particular, in the new governmental services handling production and distribution of goods, and an evergrowing number shifted to factory work. Later, with the progress of industrialization, Jews were drawn into the mighty stream which flowed to the old and new industrial centers of the Soviet Union.

This migration produced a dispersion of Jews over the whole of the Soviet territory, to the remotest cities of Siberia, and to central Asia. It coincided with a process of concentration in new centers. Before 1914 some 300,000 Jews lived in inner and Asiatic Russia. In 1939 one third of the Jewish population of the USSR was domiciled in this area. But out of this million Jews, mostly newcomers, 70 per cent were concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad. However, the increase in the number of Jews in Russia proper does not reveal the whole volume and trend of Jewish migration. Apart from those who left the territories of the Ukraine and Belorussia, hundreds of thousands went to the eastern part of the Ukraine outside the old Pale of Settlement. They, too, flocked to the towns, to Kharkov and the rising urban centers of the Donets mining region. And additional hundreds of thousands streamed into the cities of the former "Pale" itself, while old Jewish agglomerations in small towns were abandoned.

Industrial Migration to the Eastern Territories

The Russian eastward trend which had its origin four hundred years ago is similar to the American westward movement and probably to every "frontier" movement. At first, in Turner's terminology, it was the occupation of the fur hunters' and traders' "frontier." At the end of the nineteenth century, after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the agricultural colonization of Asiatic Russia assumed a mass character. During the nine years preceding the first World War 4 million peasants crossed the Urals. As already mentioned, there was little frontier land left in Siberia on the eve of the first World War. Further colonization necessitated the clearing of forests and the irrigation of the steppe. The Soviet government came up against these same difficulties when, after 1923, it resumed agricultural colonization. Only in Kazakhstan was there noticeable

progress in agricultural colonization, when pasture land seized from nomads was brought under cultivation. Here and there the rise of industrial centers created local markets for agricultural products. Furthermore, the construction of the Turk-Sib (Turkestan-Siberian Railroad) opened central Asia to the grain of western Siberia, while in the former, large additional areas were utilized for the growing of cotton, for which the soil is particularly suited. Thus, the new economic development of the East also made remunerative some expansion of farming areas.

In general, however, particularly in the more remote regions of the East, agricultural colonization under the collective system was even more of a failure than it had been in the NEP period, despite efforts to promote agricultural colonization by granting privileges to colonists.⁵⁸ There was plenty of unoccupied land suitable for farming, but colonization was strictly limited by actual settlement possibilities.⁵⁹ Before the first World War, at the time of the great Siberian colonization, soils were almost ready for immediate occupancy. Now, important preparatory work was required. In some regions it was irrigation, in others draining, in still others deforestation of the tiaga. The necessary capital outlay was heavy, it was doubtful whether the investment would pay off, and available funds were limited.

In an unprecedented effort, at the cost of rigid privations, Russia again and again mobilized enormous capital. It has been calculated that in 1937 capital formation in the Soviet Union amounted to 26.4 percent of the national income, while in the rich United States the average annual accumulation was only 9 percent, in 1922-32, 91 percent having been spent on consumption.⁶⁰ But the process of industrialization ate up all available capital. Even modest colonization plans remained unfulfilled because of the lack of prepared land. In 1939 only 10,000 peasant families (35,000 persons) were transplanted

⁵⁸ Migration of peasants, collective or individual, but for the purpose of joining a *kolkhoz* (these were the only authorized forms of agricultural colonization), was definitely regulated by a decree of Nov. 17, 1937, which granted to the colonists far-reaching tax exemptions, credits, etc. In the Far East agricultural colonization also had to serve strategic purposes. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 the absence of manpower on the spot had made itself bitterly felt. To remedy this evil Red army farms were organized. These were transmigrant *kolkhozes* which enjoyed special privileges if they were organized by soldiers no later than one year after leaving the army and when not less than one half the males able to perform work belonged to the military.

⁵⁹ Sonin, "Voprosy pereseleniia," *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1940, No. 3, pp. 85-89.

⁶⁰ Notkin, in *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1940, No. 10, p. 67.

from inner Russia to the eastern areas. For 1940 the resettlement of 35,000 families (140,000 persons) had been planned. As we shall see, the rural population of the Urals, western Siberia, and Kazakhstan showed an actual decrease in 1926-39. Even in eastern Siberia and the Far East there was no appreciable increase. "Virtually no migration for the purpose of opening up new areas to agriculture took place."⁶¹ The government succeeded in bringing in only enough new settlers from European Russia to replace those who had shifted to industry.⁶² In central Asia new colonization projects involved mainly the local, oriental population.⁶³

It was not agricultural colonization, but above all the occupation of what had become the Soviet Union's industrial "frontier," which now attracted the stream of migrants to Russian Asia. This new trend involved the exploitation of all nonagricultural natural resources of this immense land, but it was concentrated in particular on mining and industry proper.

During the twelve years preceding 1939, more than 3 million persons migrated to the Urals, Siberia, and the Russian Far East. Another 1,700,000 went to Soviet central Asia (Uzbek, Tadzik, Turkmen, and Kirghiz SSR). Including those who came to Kazakhstan, the total number of migrants exceeded 5 million. Of this number about 750,000 migrated in 1927-30 as individual peasant colonists. Others were installed in state and collective farms. However, the vast majority streamed, not to the prairies and virgin forests of Russian Asia, but to its coal and ore mines and to the furnaces and machine tools of its new factories.

The industrial development of Russian Asia was started before the first *piatiletka* and was vigorously pursued under the five-year plans. The authors of the first five-year plan openly admitted that "the plan

⁶¹ Sonin, *op. cit.*

⁶² Mandel, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*, p. 30. It is characteristic that, as has been reported for 1938 and 1939, settlers could be placed mainly in the homes of local people who had moved to the cities (Sonin, *op. cit.*). There were complaints that "peasants who had been established in the Far East before the Revolution proved to be unstable elements; many returned to European Russia or to Western Siberia" (Komarov, "Problemy razvitiia dal'ne-vostochnogo kraia," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1936, No. 2, p. 180. A compulsory transfer of about 200,000 Koreans from the Vladivostok area to Siberia and central Asia has been carried out, according to *North China Herald* (Shanghai), Dec. 8, 1937. Davils and Steiger, *Soviet Asia*, speak of the removal of all Asiatics suspected of sympathy with Japanese, but after the Japanese attacks in summer 1938.

⁶³ Plaetschke, "Neusiedlung in Turkestan," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Feb., 1941, p. 69.

did not involve any substantial changes in the industrial geography of the country." But during the execution of this plan fundamental decisions were taken concerning the creation of a new industrial basis in the east and the speeding up of the industrial development of the eastern regions. The following five-year plans, with their emphasis on appropriate geographical distribution of industry, increased more and more the relative importance of the east.

The primary aim of industrialization of the eastern territories was the development of their abundant natural resources. Skillful planning and a bold approach to the problem are exemplified in the great Ural-Kuzbas Combine. The Ural mining and metallurgical region is the oldest in Russia. Its exploitation dates back to the time of Peter the Great. But for a long period it was neglected and pushed into the background by southern Russia, which had the advantage of near-by ore and coal: Krivoi Rog and the Donets coal basin are separated by less than two hundred miles. To give new life to the Ural land of iron, it was "combined" with the 1,300-mile-distant Siberian coal region of the Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas) which (with the exception of Donbas) became the largest coal center of the Soviet Union.

The second aim in the industrialization of the east was to bring the processing industries closer to sources of raw materials and power. Machine factories were constructed to be fed by ore from the Urals, and the spinning and weaving industry was promoted in the cotton area of central Asia, which had previously sent its raw materials to the Moscow textile region.

The third aim was strategic: to place war industries in a position which would make them as invulnerable as possible in the event of an invasion and to create a new self-sufficient industrial center far behind the probable fighting lines. The war has sufficiently demonstrated the validity of this foresight. The mighty industry created in the east in the days of peace greatly decreased the relative weight of industrial losses caused by the war. Furthermore, it has facilitated the installation of evacuated factories, since it was possible to utilize the services of existing plants, and often the transferred enterprises could be housed in buildings originally intended for other purposes.

Industrialization of the east was accompanied by a rapid growth of its cities and towns. The urban population of the east showed greater relative increase than all the other USSR territory. New cities having populations of about 150,000, such as Karaganda in Kazakhstan

and Magnitogorsk in the Ural region, sprang up on what had practically been waste land. Old provincial towns became unrecognizable as industrial centers with several times their former population. Sverdlovsk (formerly Ekaterinburg), the center of the once modest Ural industry, and Cheliabinsk, which had been known mainly as the frontier point between Europe and Asia, became cities with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants and boasted big modern industrial enterprises. Novosibirsk, center of the region which includes the Kuzbas, tripled its population and became a city of more than 400,000.

The migratory stream which peopled the urban centers of the east was simultaneously a constituent of the current of expansion which flowed over the sparsely populated territories of the east and part of the current of concentration which streamed from the villages to the cities. Only a very small, though qualitatively important, portion of the migrants were skilled workers from the industrial centers of European Russia.⁶⁴ The masses of new city dwellers were supplied by rural areas. First they came from the overcrowded agricultural areas of European Russia. Numerous workers recruited through contracts with collective farms brought their families (or sent for them later) and settled permanently in the east.⁶⁵ Then came the stream from the eastern territories themselves. Of course, the industrial and urban centers of European Russia, too, attracted both the local peasantry and those from the old agricultural areas. But there was still a substantial difference. Roughly speaking, the influx into the industrial centers of European Russia came first from neighboring regions and then from abroad, whereas the rapidly growing cities of the east were built and occupied first of all by immigrants from European Russia and followed later by a constantly increasing influx of local newcomers. This trend to the city and the factory penetrated the rural population of one region after another, from the Urals to the Pacific. Following the local Russian population came the non-Russian natives, to be employed in factories, mining, and construction. Thus, a new source of manpower was available, and labor reserves increased because of the growth of the indigenous population, whose

⁶⁴ Sonin, *op. cit.* They "played a role far out of proportion to their numbers in building the new industries." S. N. Prokopovich observed that "for this reason the business language in factories, works and mines in almost the entire territory of the USSR is Russian" (*Quarterly Bulletin*, April, 1940).

⁶⁵ Sonin, *op. cit.*

TABLE 6

POPULATION CHANGES, 1926-39, IN THE URALS, SIBERIA, AND THE FAR EAST
(IN THOUSANDS)

Population Area	POPULATION		Actual Increase (+) or Decrease (-)	Migratory Gain (+) or Loss (-) ^c
	1926 ^a	1939 ^b		
Total area				
Urban	3,018	9,047	+6,029	+5,500
Rural	15,032	14,927	-105	-2,500
Total	18,050	23,974	+5,924 ^d	+3,000
Urals				
Urban	1,251 ^e	3,513	+2,262	+2,050
Rural	4,478	3,884	-594	-1,300
Total	5,729	7,397	+1,668	+750
Western Siberia				
Urban	877	2,555	+1,678 ^f	+1,500
Rural	6,554	6,354	-200 ^f	-1,200
Total	7,431	8,909	+1,478	+300
Eastern Siberia and the Far East				
Urban	890 ^g	2,978	+2,088	+1,950
Rural	4,000 ^g	4,689	+689	0,0
Total	4,890	7,667	+2,777	+1,950

^a Data of the 1926 census could not be used, in view of changed administrative divisions. After the 1939 census, some figures of the 1926 population as calculated for the new administrative divisions were disclosed. In some other cases figures of population increase or decrease have been reported. All these figures are included in this table, with indication of sources. On this basis all other figures of the 1926 population could be calculated.

^b According to census data on single provinces.

^c The migratory gain for the whole area has been officially stated as more than 3 million. All other figures are estimates by the author.

^d *Pravda*, June 2, 1939.

^e Sul'kevich, *Territorii i naselenie SSSR*, p. 25.

^f Konstantinov, in *Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva*, LXXV (No. 6, 1943), 18.

^g Sonin, in *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1940, No. 3, p. 85.

death rate was decreasing⁶⁶ and who became jobseekers because their economy had been destroyed.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Smulevich, *Burzhuaznye teorii narodonaseleniia*, pp. 399-401. This is a typical phenomenon which occurs at a certain stage in the Europeanization of backward people: their mortality declines as a result of improved medical services and the spread of a few elementary hygienic concepts.

⁶⁷ Thus, it was found that the introduction of Kazakh workers was connected with their "passage to a sedentary mode of life" (Kulumbatov, in *Revoliutsiia i Natsionalnost'*, 1932, No. 5, p. 61). During the year 1931 alone, when the confiscation of Kazakh pastures had become important, 1744 nomad and semi-nomad families switched to work in industrial establishments; 267 families found work in the construction of the Turkestan-Siberian railway and 9,743 on state farms.

The Urals, Siberia, and the Far East together had an influx of 3 million in 1926-39. About half a million went to rural areas; the rest (2.5 million), to the cities. The cities show, however, a migratory gain of 5.5 million. The majority of immigrants into the cities (some 3 million) came from the rural areas of the eastern territories themselves. In spite of some agricultural colonization, the rural population decreased, because its whole natural increase and an additional 600,000 went to the cities.

The participation of the local population in the rush to the towns was particularly high in the Urals and western Siberia. Two thirds to three quarters of the newcomers were local people, Russians and non-Russians.

In eastern Siberia and in the Far East the situation was quite different. The rural population showed no migratory loss, not because there was no rural exodus, but because the latter was compensated for by the influx of colonists from European Russia during 1926-39. It is true that the number of persons who left the countryside in eastern Siberia and the Far East was less than that in the Urals and western Siberia. The shift to factories and urban occupations started in these remote regions later than in areas closer to European Russia, with their predominantly Russian population. However, the drive was as strong as elsewhere, and on the eve of the second World War the cities of eastern Siberia and the Far East were also being occupied by people from the near-by countryside.

In Kazakhstan the total population was in 1939 nearly the same (6,146,000) as it had been in 1929 (6,074,000). However, this does not mean that there was no in-migration. Under the impact of the Soviet land policy the indigenous Kazakh population (3.7 million) decreased in the intercensus period by some 800,000.⁶⁸ The natural increase of the Russo-Ukrainian population of Kazakhstan afforded a partial compensation for this loss. However, the former level could be attained and even exceeded only through an additional influx of some 500,000. In the early thirties numerous Russian colonists settled on the land of ousted nomads. But on the whole the rural population declined by 1.1 million. On the contrary, the urban population went up from 0.5 to 1.7 million. Obviously, most of the new city dwellers, numbering more than a million, were of local origin.

⁶⁸ The number of Kazakhs on the whole territory of the USSR dropped in 1926-39 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000. See above p. 101.

Concurrently with this increase in urbanization, the trend from European Russia towards the east was losing its strength. In the spring of 1939, at the Congress of the Communist party, an appeal was made to the *kolkhozes* to supply the growing industry with youthful workers, who now allegedly preferred to remain on the farm. The government declared that the new-found prosperity of the villages had put an end to the exodus of hungry peasants in search of bread and work.⁶⁹ This, however, did not reflect the real situation. The collective farms were scarcely rolling in wealth. The majority provided their members with only the minimum living wage, and many not even with that. The pushing force had not ceased. Although industrialization and the movement of millions towards the east had somewhat alleviated the population pressure in the agricultural part of European Russia, the problem was scarcely solved. According to an official estimate of 1940 the "surplus" of labor in the collectives amounted to 5 million persons.⁷⁰ Another expression of agrarian overpopulation in the old areas was the exhaustion of land reserves in order to install young *kolkhoz* members in their own homes—a fact recognized by a decree of May 27, 1939 (which in this connection proclaimed that migration would be organized to regions rich in new land). Under these conditions a general aversion against leaving home could hardly be expected to prevail.

In fact, the *kolkhozes* continued to send their youth to the old industrial centers, to the limit of their absorptive capacity. The shortage of labor was characteristic only of the eastern territories, especially eastern Siberia and the Far East.⁷¹ The lack of manpower in

⁶⁹ Stalin's report to the 18th Congress of the Communist party of the USSR (*Voprosy Leninizma*, p. 586). It was said that collectivization had "guaranteed an unshakable growth of the well-being of the entire *kolkhoze* population," therefore, whatever the number of workers displaced by mechanization of agriculture, "industry can no longer count upon a spontaneous influx of manpower" (Trubnikov, "Istochniki komplektovaniia rabochei sily v SSSR," *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1939, No. 6, p. 153).

⁷⁰ Sonin, *op. cit.*

⁷¹ Trubnikov, "Istochniki komplektovaniia rabochei sily v SSSR," *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1939, No. 6, p. 152, enumerates the regions between which a yearly shift of some 800,000-850,000 workers had taken place. The main area where there was an exodus of workers was always the central agricultural region, traditional center of rural overpopulation and out-migration. As to regions with acute need in manpower, first of all there are the industrial centers Moscow, Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk (Urals) and the sparsely populated northern areas of European Russia, and primarily eastern Siberia and the Far East. Only with respect to the latter, however, did transportation and the yearly return of manpower "create the problem of transplantation and

the eastern territories was particularly acute in occupations which belong to industry only in the wider sense, as used in the official Soviet terminology. It has been stated that "in the first half of 1939 the actual number of workers in industry was more than 500,000 below the plan. A great shortage of workers was felt in the peat industry, mining, lumber preservation, as well as in building."⁷² However, the shortage was especially acute in lumber preservation, for only here were production quotas not met. In other words, Russian peasantry was not eager to cover thousands of miles in order to fell trees in the wilderness of the taiga or to work in peat beds; and when they were brought in, according to contracts concluded with the collectives, they insisted on returning at the expiration of their contract.⁷³ There was always a shortage of hands in these occupations, and hundreds of thousands of deportees lost their lives in doing work which was shunned by free labor.⁷⁴

The great trend was toward the city, with its fascinating life, to the plant, with its machines, those new idols of Russian youth. To work in industry proper and to learn, they were willing to go far from home. Indeed, millions of them had migrated to the cities of the east. Undoubtedly, they continued to go. But urban occupations were more and more filled by the surplus rural population, who left near-by *kolkhozes* because they, too, preferred the factory to work in the forests. Accordingly, it was stipulated that (except in the Far East) workers could be imported only for coal, wood, and peat industries and for ship loading and unloading. "Other branches of industry could and should engage workers on the spot."⁷⁵

The local population was, however, unable to supply industry with skilled labor. And there was, indeed, in the eastern territories a permanent shortage of trained workers, for Russian skilled workers who had helped to build up the industry of the new regions no longer went to the east in numbers required by its expanding industry. On

settlement of workers in this area." See Trubnikov, "Trudovye rezervy," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1940, No. 11; Korobkov, "Pereselenie," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1939, No. 9; Belov, in *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1940, No. 5-6; M. Sonin, in *Pravda*, July 16, 1940. Complaints on labor shortage emphasized that "the dislocation of population did not correspond to the new dislocation of production."

⁷² Trubnikov, "Istochniki komplektovaniia rabochei sily v SSSR," *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1939, No. 6, p. 159.

⁷³ Sonin, in *Pravda*, July 16, 1940.

⁷⁴ See above, p. 94, n. 23.

⁷⁵ Sonin, "Voprosy pereseleniia," *Problemy Ekonomiki*, 1940, No. 3, p. 85.

one hand, they were in great demand in the old industrial regions themselves; on the other hand, they were discouraged by the living conditions of the more distant regions of Asiatic Russia.

In 1940 a propaganda pamphlet appeared under the title *The Far East Expects Settlers*. The appendix reproduced a letter from a girl, designer by profession, which extolled the marvels of the Amur region. However, in it she described how five years earlier she and several girl friends had arrived in Khabarovsk, center of the region, from Leningrad. Their truck had stalled, and they had been forced to walk through the city in open pumps, "knee-deep in the mud." On reaching her destination, she had been astonished at the sight of a funny lamp. "Some castor oil was poured into a saucer, and a wick was put into a slice of potato." Later, she narrated, they suffered from scurvy, which they finally mastered, "having picked, with unimaginable hardship, cloudberry in the woods."

People like the author of this letter mastered all difficulties. But not for everybody was the call of the east strong enough to overcome the harshness of life in the new land. Soviet writers mentioned time and again bad housing conditions and insufficient facilities for cultural and everyday needs (clubs, schools, hospitals, eating places, stores, etc.) as obstacles to the permanent settlement of workers. The increased standard of living of skilled workers made the primitive conditions of the distant new areas all the more distasteful.

To ensure an adequate supply of workers for the factories of eastern Siberia and the Far East,⁷⁶ a decree was issued on October 19, 1940, providing for the compulsory transfer of construction engineers, master mechanics, draftsmen, bookkeepers, economists, planning experts, and skilled workmen from one undertaking or office to another, "irrespective of the geographical location of such an undertaking or office." Furthermore on October 2, 1940, a decree was issued ordering the compulsory mobilization of peasant boys and girls of 14 to 16 for vocational training;⁷⁷ after a training period of six months to two years, they were to work for four years in enterprises designated by the government.

The situation on the eve of the second World War can be sum-

⁷⁶ Trubnikov, "Gosudarstvennye Trudovye rezervy," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1940, No. 11.

⁷⁷ According to *Izvestiia*, Oct. 3, 1940, their number was 800,000 to 1,000,000. In Oct., 1941, the head of the Chief Administration of Labor Reserves asserted that a total of 1,365,000 young recruits had been trained for industry and transport.

marized as follows: (1) skilled workers who were not in need of migratory outlets avoided going voluntarily to the east; (2) agricultural colonization was not a genuine outlet for the millions in increasingly overcrowded agricultural areas of European Russia; (3) the road to the eastern cities was barred by mounting competition from the local rural population; and (4) the only migratory outlet was employment in particularly exacting jobs.

The crucial question was therefore the following: could the eastern territories continue to offer an outlet for European Russia, or were there already serious obstacles, economic as well as demographic, which compelled the Russian people to seek issues in some other direction? In this case the War of 1914-18 was merely the prelude, a first attempt, as yet unsuccessful, to change the direction of the Russian migratory current.

Chapter V
EASTERN EUROPE
1918-39

AFTER THE WAR of 1914-18 the fateful "watershed" was once more re-established. During the war, when the west-east current had been able temporarily to break through, the Russian soldiers had been forced far behind this "divide." The enemy could not push them any farther, but they themselves continued to move and launched new warlike movements to the east and the south. The disintegration of the Russian army at one time enabled the Central Powers to advance beyond the watershed and to occupy all southern Russia to the Don. But this offensive was only a temporary reflux of the dominant current, and the day was not far distant when the victorious armies were to fall apart, as had the Russian troops. The fate of countries temporarily occupied by the Central Powers was, however, quite different. East of the line of separation, Russia was fully reconstituted. But west of the line, a number of new states were to arise in the vacuum which had been created. On the Baltic coast small states were able to establish and to defend their independence with the naval aid of Great Britain. Immense territories outside ethnographic Poland were easily conquered by the Polish military—debris of the fighting armies. In the south, Rumania annexed the Russian province of Bessarabia, without meeting any resistance.

In all these countries, created or enlarged at the cost of Russia, migratory trends to the west soon revived, and they largely influenced the fate of eastern Europe in the interwar period.

Poland's Political Expansion toward the East

At the time of the German collapse the wealthy landowners living in the front-line zone, mostly Poles, appealed for aid to their Polish fellow citizens, for a Soviet reconquest of this area would mean their death sentence. A committee for the "defense of the marches" was formed in Warsaw and entrusted with the organization of a "Lithuanian-White-Ruthenian" army. In regions evacuated by the Ger-

mans, Polish groups, under the motto of "self-defense," took up the fight against invading Red hordes and the local elements who had joined them. This was the spontaneous beginning of the Polish-Soviet war. At first the struggle went badly for the Poles, but after the spring of 1919 Polish forces gained the upper hand, with the help of a fresh army from inner Poland.¹

Before the first World War part of the emigration from Russian Poland, whether permanent, temporary, or seasonal, went to the United States and part went to Germany. The war put a stop to migration to the United States while the movement to Germany assumed a new character: in addition to 300,000 Polish seasonal workers who were retained as a result of the war, 100,000 went of their free will from German-occupied Russian Poland. Furthermore, approximately 350,000 workers were forcibly recruited for labor in Germany, where mobilization has caused a serious manpower shortage. Finally, there were 140,000 Poles among the Russian war prisoners interned in Germany.²

After the armistice the direction of the migratory movement was abruptly reversed. Not only did Allied victory liberate war prisoners and forced laborers, but the sudden dissolution of the German army was followed by energetic measures on the part of the German authorities, who wanted to assure employment in industry for demobilized German soldiers. As a result, even the elements among the foreign workers and prisoners who wanted to remain in Germany were ousted from industry when German workers returned. Between 1918 and 1919 the number of Polish workers fell from more

¹ For the various parts of interwar Poland the division and terminology used by Polish statistics has been followed here: (1) west—old German Poland (provinces Poznan, Polish Pomerania, and Polish Silesia), ethnically Polish; (2) south—old Austrian Poland, former Galicia (provinces Crakow, Lvov, Stanislawov, and Tarnopol); ethnically in the western part predominantly Polish, in the eastern part predominantly Ukrainian; (3) center—old Russian Poland, mainly former "Congress Poland" (provinces Warsaw, Lodz, Kielce, Lublin, and Bialystok); ethnically Polish; (4) east—old Russian territory which administratively did not belong to Russian "Poland" (provinces Vilna, seized in 1920 from Lithuania, and Nowogradek, Polesia, and Volynia, seized in 1921 from Soviet Russia), so-called "Eastern marches" (Kressey); ethnically in the northern part to a considerable extent Lithuanian and Belorussian (White Russian), in the central part Belorussian, and in the southern part predominantly Ukrainian.

² Ruziewicz, *Le Problème de l'émigration polonaise en Allemagne*, pp. 24-26, 88-92. The author is probably right when he cuts in half the number 700,000 representing the Polish workers in Germany according to the Polish government at the 4th International Labor Conference.

than 400,000 to 100,000. When these workers returned to Poland they swelled the ranks of the unemployed.

The territory which subsequently constituted the Polish state probably suffered higher war-produced population losses than any European country (except Serbia). It has been estimated that in 1914-18 Poland's population actually declined by 4 million, that is, by more than 13 percent. However, the population loss was exceeded by the economic loss. The people of Poland lacked both work and bread. American organized relief in 1919 saved the country from a catastrophe similar to the one which then befell neighboring Russia.

Pilsudski's government saw the remedy for this plight in a vast expansion in the east—also known as "federation." His plan was to federate all Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian lands under Polish leadership so as to assure Poland's "economic independence." To reach this goal an army was recruited at first on a voluntary basis. Attempts to create a Polish army date back to the beginning of the first World War. A Polish Legion created by Pilsudski entered Russian Poland with the Central Powers. But its role in "liberating" Russian Poland was insignificant.³ Subsequent efforts to recruit volunteers for a Polish army failed, whether they were undertaken by Pilsudski⁴ or later by the Germans.⁵ But the picture changed radically once the main belligerents had vanished from the scene and their armies had been dissolved. It is true that most of the demobilized soldiers were anxious to return to civilian life. Yet there was a large enough number who had no longer a place in peacetime society or had lost their taste for it. At first voluntary recruiting prevailed, but as early as 1919 compulsory recruiting was introduced, and a few age classes were called up. Despite the wreckage of industry, it was easy to arm these troops with materials taken from the German armies and from reserves piled up by the Allies. By April,

³ Bartel, *Le Marechal Pilsudski*, p. 156.

⁴ Pilsudski, *Du revolutionnaire au chef d'Etat*, pp. 78, 205.

⁵ Germany proclaimed independence for "Congress Poland" (prewar Russian Poland) in the expectation of 800,000 Polish volunteers promised by Polish politicians. Ludendorff counted on only 350,000 recruits; in fact, there were 697. See Erzberger, *Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg*, p. 175: "A famous Polish leader told me then: There are not that many suicide candidates [i.e., 800,000] in all of the Kingdom of Poland" [i.e., Congress Poland]. At the same time, a Polish representative allegedly approached the Russian High Command and proposed the creation of Polish legions: he promised the Russians 500,000 volunteers (Statement by Gen. Ianushkevich before the Extraordinary Inquiries Committee in 1917, in the collection of documents published by Tsentroarkhiv, *Russko-polskie otnosheniia v period mirovoi voiny*, p. 139).

1919, only 80,000 men were at the fighting fronts. With this small force the Poles were able to conquer a great empire.

Besides reinforcements supplied by central Poland, Polish troops had been recruited in the west. A Polish army had been formed in France by June, 1917, made up of Polish enlisted men and officers formerly with the French army, and remnants of the "eastern corps" which had come by way of the Trans-Siberian. A large number of volunteers were recruited among Poles in the United States. This army, called "Haller Army," was sent off to Poland and participated in the struggle for eastern Galicia between Polish and Ukrainian units. The Ukrainian troops who had to evacuate Galicia were followed by a throng of civilians, altogether more than 100,000 persons. These refugees went to the Russian Ukraine, where during the civil war they served as lansquenets, fighting in turn with every party. Most of them fell victims to typhus. A small number escaped to Czechoslovakia.⁶ Farther north, on the Polish-Soviet front, Pilsudski's army, numerically weak, had conquered vast territories almost without losses. They advanced "like a knife in butter."⁷ Part of this territory was merely handed over to the Poles by the retreating German armies, without the Russians attempting to interfere. Elsewhere the Polish advance was also easy. They had only to shake off some undisciplined hordes which called themselves bolshevists (last remnants of the Russian armies which were still at the front). In the cities they occupied, the Polish armies went in for wholesale looting of the Jewish inhabitants. During the entire year 1919 the Soviets did not offer serious resistance. It was only in December, after the Poles had advanced beyond Minsk and reached the Berezina, that Moscow took serious notice of this invasion, which seemed unending, and considered negotiations.

It was the same over all the western Soviet front. The border which the German sword had imposed, which separated Russia from the ocean, stood firm, although the Germans were no longer there to defend it. This amputation remained, simply because no serious effort was made to remedy it. While the ferocious civil struggle went on in the east and the south of Russia, she concluded the first peace treaties in the west with her new neighbors. These segments

⁶ Kutschabsky, *Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und dem Bolschewismus*, pp. 293, 319, 380 ff. See Dotsenko, *Litopys Ukraïnskoï Revoliutsii*, Vol. II, Part 4, pp. 266 ff.

⁷ Pilsudski, *Du révolutionnaire au chef d'Etat*, p. 270.

of the former Russian Empire barred the road towards the German proletariat and the world revolution, proclaimed by the Communist government to be its principal aim. Preparations which had been made to support the world revolution by armed force were never even partially followed up. This was attributed to the fact that Red armies, ready to cross the western frontier, were diverted to the eastern and southern fronts to fight against the White armies in the civil war. But developments during the Polish campaign, after Kolchak and Denikin had been defeated, show that there might have been even more important reasons of a different order. We have seen that Russia's civil war was a warlike migration from central Russia, a grain-consuming area, starved because of the collapse of industry, to the food-producing area of eastern and southern Russia. As long as the Red government organized the movement in this direction, it was carried by a force which neither obstacles nor temporary defeats could deter, and it was finally irresistible. But when the Bolsheviks attempted to escape from the stream which had engulfed them, their carefully elaborated plans were doomed.

In 1920 Poland invaded the Ukraine. Once again the watershed was passed by an invader from the west, who thereby obstructed Russia's north-south movement. The Polish army occupied Kiev. It was as though it had pushed a button to release an explosion. The Poles were crushed by a veritable landslide and barely managed to flee the Ukraine, which was quickly and permanently reconquered by the Soviets. The Russians had thus started a movement which was followed by a furious offensive on the whole Polish front. They were at the doors of Warsaw and imperiled Lvov. Then followed a reversal. The serious losses suffered by the Russian army before it reached Warsaw were fatal, because no replacements had been forthcoming. Unlike the eastern and the southern civil war fronts, there was no "strategic growth" of the army. Furthermore, the army on the western front could not live off the country and depended entirely on supplies sent from the rear.⁸ A strong counter-offensive organized by a French military mission was enough to transform the offensive to a catastrophic retreat of the Red army. After the defeat at Warsaw, a second Polish campaign was under consideration in Moscow. But, in the words of Trotsky, "the lower I went on the military ladder—from an army to a division, a regi-

⁸ Bubnov, Kamenev, and Eydenman, eds., *Grazhdanskaia voina*, II, 21, 268, 280, 315.

ment, a company—the more I realized the impossibility of an offensive war.”⁹

Thereafter, the peace was signed—a peace which corresponded to the ideas of neither party and was not even a rational compromise, a peace which utterly disregarded the rights of people and their ethnic distribution. The peace of Riga (1921) cut in two Belorussia and areas peopled with Ukrainians. It handed to Poland non-Polish territories, without on the other hand carrying out Pilsudski's ideas on the Polish federation and autarchy. But the peace reproduced with minor modifications the 1915-17 front, in other words, the separation line marked by the former watershed.

Colonization of the Poles in the East

Russia's retreat to the watershed gave Poland political domination over the eastern marches. Before this conquest Poland looked upon this area as a “colony.” Not that the Polish government did not know that this area, which it called “a Polish territory” at the Paris peace conference, was not in fact peopled by Poles, but this detail was soon to be attended to. Witos, president of the Polish Council of Ministers, said in 1919: “Poland's borders will extend to the east as far as the plow of the Polish peasant can go.”¹⁰

Agrarian overpopulation constituted the main evil which beset Poland up to the second World War. Basically, it was due to the disproportion between available cultivable land and the number of persons engaged in agriculture. It has been pointed out that even by applying French standards of agricultural productivity, all Polish areas, with the only exception of western Poland, suffered from agrarian overpopulation of 20-50 percent.¹¹ In 1921, 3 million superfluous persons were estimated among those engaged in agriculture, in spite of the decrease of population produced by war. Inequalities in land distribution further aggravated this problem. According to the 1921 census, dwarf exploitations below 2 hectares constituted more than one third (34 percent) and those of less than 5 hectares nearly two thirds (64.7 percent) of the total number of farms. On the other hand, vast holdings of more than 100 hectares

⁹ Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 459.

¹⁰ Revyuk, *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, p. 493.

¹¹ Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*; in particular pp. 56 ff., Table 7, and Map 16. The method was worked out by Dr. Adolf Kozlik, who initiated the study.

occupied more than two fifths (44.8 percent) of the total area and more than one fourth (27.2 percent) of all the tilled land.

The influence of the Russian example was quick to be felt. In the countryside clamors for land redistribution were raised. A report by the agricultural commission presented to the Polish Diet in the spring of 1919 stressed the fact that the land problem should be first of all considered from a political angle and that "the very existence of the Polish state depends on the realization of agrarian reforms." Under popular pressure, laws were passed in 1919 and 1920, when war with the Soviet Union was in full swing, which provided for the break-up of large domains and indemnification of the owners.

But this legislation was connected with another plan. The Polish government intended to satisfy peasants from Poland proper by giving them land in the conquered non-Polish eastern territories, which happened to be regions of large domains belonging to the Polish aristocracy. Their land was to be distributed, not among non-Polish peasants of this area, but among colonists from Poland proper.

At the end of the Soviet-Polish war this colonization policy became even more ruthless. During the course of the war the Polish army had swollen to one million. In Poland economic turmoil was at its peak. To find jobs for demobilized soldiers was the most pressing and vital problem. The economic value of the conquered territories was rather meager in general, but at least they offered land. When the Red army had imperiled Warsaw, President Witos made a pathetic appeal to the troops in which he promised the soldiers that after the war they would be the first to receive plots of land made available through the agrarian reform. After victory Pilsudski confirmed these promises in his farewell proclamation to the troops, in which he sustained their claim to soils which "they have fertilized with sweat and blood," and which called for "those who would turn the sword into the plow." Between 1920 and 1923 a total of 259,162 hectares of land in the eastern marches, taken over by the government or abandoned by its owners, were assigned for gratuitous allocation among soldier colonists who had remained in semiactive service through the institution of military societies. But difficulties soon piled up. The courts recognized claims for indemnity presented by former owners, and the government was thus burdened with a debt of 100 million zloty, in addition to the cost of installing new colonists. In 1923 the allocation of lands for colonization was aban-

done. Only slightly more than one half (142,244 hectares) of the lands originally selected for this purpose were in fact parceled out among former soldiers. Colonization dropped in 1926 and even further in 1928. By 1931 it had almost completely stopped. This grandiose plan thus yielded meager results.

As to the nongratis redistribution of land which had been instituted by the agrarian reform, it was handicapped in the eastern marches and Galicia, as well as in central Poland, by the political influence of the Polish aristocracy. Furthermore, funds were lacking, and reform progressed slowly,¹² especially since the statute of 1925 adopted the principle of total compensation of landowners.¹³ As far as the reform was carried out at all, the primary benefit of necessity went to the local population. The project of colonizing Polish peasants in the newly conquered eastern territories was sheer fantasy. In these areas the land was not yearning for men, but men were yearning for land. In eastern Galicia, the peasants, who were mainly of Ukrainian stock, were no less crowded than the Polish farmers in western Galicia and more so than those in central Poland. In the eastern marches the population density was lower, but population growth was more rapid (see Table 10). Uprisings were to be expected if the local populations were not given their share of the lands on which they had formerly made a living under the ownership of wealthy landowners. Furthermore, as the Polish government had to revert to a sounder economic policy under the pressure of financial difficulties, the interests of agriculture were taken into account. The agrarian reform was therefore mainly utilized to enlarge dwarf holdings, which were the most wasteful units. Finally, all agrarian reforms were obstructed by lack of funds. Important colonization in the eastern marches by immigrant colonists would have required high expenses, which were out of the question. In the end, the non-Polish peasants of the eastern territories received the greater part of the distributed soils. It is true that the Polish minority in this area received a share out of proportion to their number, but the influx of

¹² During the whole period 1918-38, 2,655,000 hectares (one hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres) of soil were distributed under the agrarian legislation, of which 868,000 were in central Poland, 1,025,000 in the eastern provinces, 360,000 in the western provinces, and 402,000 in the southern provinces. Of these 2,655,000 hectares, 1,432,000 served to create 153,600 new holdings, while the remainder served for model farms and other purposes.

¹³ The statute of 1919 provided for compensation of half the estimated land value.

colonists from the outside was insignificant.¹⁴ For the years 1924-27 official data on land distribution contain information on the origin of the 167,203 recipients; only 6.3 percent were of nonlocal origin. In central Poland the percentage of in-migrants who received plots of land was the same as for the whole country (6.3); it was highest in western Poland (12.9) and lowest in eastern Poland (5.0) and Galicia (5.3).¹⁵

Moreover, later a wholesale liquidation of Polish colonization took place. After a few years many Polish colonists abandoned their fields and sold them to non-Polish farmers in the district, while they themselves bought lands in central Poland.¹⁶

In final analysis, there was instead of Polonization of these territories, a relative regression of the Polish element. Even official Polish statistics record for the period between the census of 1921 and that of 1931 a considerable decline of the Polish element (over 10 percent) in eight districts, five of which are located on the ethnographic border, one in eastern Galicia, and two on the northern border of the USSR. There was, on the other hand, an increase in the percentage of Poles in three districts on the ethnographic border; two of them belong to central Poland. Each of the three districts is situated immediately west of a district where a strong decline in the Polish population had been noted. The over-all picture strongly suggests a Polish retreat towards the west.¹⁷

¹⁴ This fact was fully (although reluctantly) recognized by a Polish expert on these questions, Zalecki, *Politika cen ziemi*, pp. 56-61.

¹⁵ Calculated on the basis of data published by the Polish Central Statistical Office in *Kwartalnik Statystyczny*, 1926, No. 1, 1928, No. 1, and 1929, No. 4. According to Revyuk, *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, pp. 494, 499-500, up to 1930 the number of colonists introduced from the outside into the Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Polesie, and eastern Galicia) was 10,722 families.

¹⁶ Zalecki, *Politika cen ziemi*. For "military" colonization see Laeuen, "Polnische Agrarprobleme," *Osteuropa*, Oct., 1934.

¹⁷ Smolenski, "Ludnosc o jezyku ojczystym polskim," *Kwartalnik Statystyczny*, 1933, No. 4, p. 445, comes to the conclusion that "the deficit of Poles has strongly increased in the provinces of Volhynia and Polesie and in the districts of Nieswiez and Nowogrodek." The calculation of "excess" and "deficit" of Poles as compared to the rest of the population per square kilometer "constitutes in a way a measure of the quantitative resistance of the majority group against its degradation, or else a measure of the probability that the minority group will gain the upper hand." It is difficult to compare the census records: in 1921 persons were asked to give their "ethnic nationality," while in 1931 their mother tongue was recorded. Kredel, "Die Nationalitätenverhältnisse im Wilnagebiet," *Osteuropa*, Jan., 1932, tried to adjust the comparison with regard to the provinces of Vilna and Nowogrodek by taking into account statistics on religious faith. He came to the conclusion that in 1921 the Poles constituted more than one third of the population of this region, and that between 1921 and 1931 this proportion has been modified considerably in favor of the Belorussians.

Poland was victorious in the east militarily and politically, but she failed from the demographic point of view. Despite the biased policy of the Polish administration, the Belorussian and Ukrainian population not only failed to relinquish land to the dominating power but also remained on the spot, and their offspring were even more numerous than those of the Poles; furthermore, they were strongly reinforced by a large immigration from Russia.

This immigration was the direct result of the conquest of the eastern marches. The Poles repelled the Red army. But immediately thereafter Poland had to receive a wave of immigrants who came just because the Red army had left.

We have mentioned before the influx of refugees which began in 1919 with the flight of Jewish victims of pogroms. This movement took on even larger dimensions after the victory of the Soviets in the Russian civil war. In addition to White sympathizers and "bourgeois" from inner Russia, there were, especially, urban dwellers (mainly Jews) and peasants from Belorussia and Soviet Ukraine, near the Polish border, harassed by systematic expropriation. The number of refugees who were registered at the border reached 570,000 by July 1, 1921, and the influx continued thereafter.¹⁸ In addition, numerous Polish citizens were then repatriated from Russia. Up to 1925 the total number of repatriates was estimated by the Polish Statistical Office at 1,265,000 (80,000 of them were said to have arrived in 1918, 1,135,000 in 1919-22, and 50,000 between 1923 and 1925).

From the legal and formal point of view refugees and repatriates are two distinct groups; in fact, there is no real demarcation line. Apart from evacuees who returned after the war, a great number of persons who discovered (or forged) their origin in territories which had become Polish after the peace entered Poland under the pretext of repatriation. Genuine war evacuees (persons evacuated during the Great Russian retreat of 1915), whose number may be estimated at 850,000,¹⁹ did not all return subsequently, and not all "repatriates" were recruited among these evacuees. This is shown first of all by the location of territories where the repatriates originated. Three fourths of all war evacuees had been sent to inner Russia. Yet it was

¹⁸ See pp. 49, 53-54.

¹⁹ Polish relief organizations reported 743,000 Polish evacuees. This figure does not include a certain number of persons (officials, wealthy persons, etc.) who had not come in contact with these organizations.

the neighboring frontier region which continued to supply the largest quotas of emigrants. On both sides of the Polish-Soviet border lived the same Ukrainian, Belorussian or Lithuanian population. Inhabitants of Soviet Belorussia and the Soviet Ukraine managed to be recognized as originating from Polish Belorussia or Polish Ukraine, or else they simply crossed the border with the help of relatives or friends from outside. This migration was so important that in 1926 the total population of Soviet Belorussia was lower than it had been in 1920. According to official data, more than half the repatriates were Belorussians and Ukrainians, 625,000 as against 508,000 Poles, including Poles who were former residents of Russia.

On the other hand, the true character of this migration is revealed by the fact that the repatriates largely settled in districts adjoining Soviet Belorussia and the Soviet Ukraine, which were but extensions of their native province as far as language and customs are concerned. It had been estimated that among the 1,135,000 repatriates of 1919-22 more than one half (630,000 persons) went to eastern Poland, 465,000 to central Poland, and less than 40,000 towards the south. Among the 573,000 repatriated after 1921, 450,000 settled in eastern Poland. As far as refugees were concerned, of the total of 570,000 who were registered at the border up to July 1921, 120,000 settled in large urban centers (half at Warsaw; the remainder at Vilna, Lodz and Lvov), 390,000 were found in other parts of former Russian Poland, and former Austrian Poland (as against only 35,000 in former German Poland), which means that the refugees as well largely remained in areas close to the Soviet border.

Westward Migration in Poland and the German Exodus, 1919-23

During the whole period of 1919-30 a very strong migratory current swept through the country from one end to the other. Influx and exodus merely offset each other to a great extent. Almost all immigration into Poland came from the east, and almost all emigration went toward the west (with an off-shoot of Jewish emigration to Palestine). Most immigrants stayed in the eastern part of the country, while most emigrants came from inner Poland, more especially from the provinces situated near the western border. Internal westward migration constituted a link between immigration and emigration.

Between 1919 and 1923 Poland had a migratory gain despite a

great exodus in the west, but in the following period (1924-30) a migratory loss set in (see Table 7). The influx from the east had become much weaker and was more than offset by emigration to the west.²⁰

TABLE 7
MIGRATORY CHANGES IN POLAND, 1895-1937
MIGRATORY LOSS (-) OR GAIN (+)
(IN THOUSANDS)

Period	Total	PROVINCES			
		Central	Eastern	Western	Southern
1895-1913	-2,535	-743	-446	-517	-829
1914-18	-3,663	-1,690	-1,375	-175	-423
1919-23	+984	+368	+711	-180	+85
1924-30	-500	-135	-71	-71	-223
1931-36	-3	+25	-21	-1	-6
1937	-61	-21	-14	-5	-21
1895-1937	-5,778	-2,196	-1,216	-949	-1,467

Sources: Stefan Szulc, *Ruch naturalny ludnosci, 1895-1935*; Samuel Fogelson, "Les Migrations et leur rôle démographique en Pologne," *Congrès Internationale de la Population, Paris 1937*, Vol. IV.

The great migratory gain between 1919 and 1923 for all of Poland is to be attributed to eastern Poland. It resulted from the influx of repatriated Poles and refugees. We have seen that this was mainly an immigration from Soviet Belorussia and from neighboring Soviet Ukraine. Immigrants were finally concentrated in the towns, where they weighed heavily on the labor market and obstructed the shift of the native population towards the cities. No doubt there was a certain displacement to the industrial towns of central Poland, but here natives of Belorussia who spoke a different tongue competed with the large industrial reserve composed of autochthonous Polish peasants. It is thus likely that the migrants to central Poland were mainly the Polish minority of eastern Poland (this is the retreat of the Poles towards the west) as well as Jews from cities and small towns.

²⁰ That a migratory current passed through Poland has been noted by F. Bujak, in the text to the statistical atlas *La Pologne contemporaine*, p. 15. The essential scheme of the migratory current is outlined in this statement, although in oversimplified form. It seems that the author believed in the existence of a trend towards greater homogeneity among Poland's population. As a result, when speaking of migrations he stressed those facts which confirmed his hypothesis.

Before the first World War there was in Poland an important migratory stream. Poles from Russian "Congress Poland" and Austrian Galicia went to western Poland (which belonged to Germany) and to East Prussia. This current continued inside the Reich through internal shifts from eastern Germany to Berlin and the industrial districts of the west. In addition to Germans and Jews, a number of Poles from German Poland were involved in the movement. Thus the Polish colony in Westphalia—which in 1923 was transferred to France—had originally been founded. This migratory stream appeared again immediately after the first World War, in a different form because of the changed boundaries. In the first years of independent Poland's existence, until 1923 or thereabouts, Poles from Congress Poland and from Galicia emigrated mainly to western Poland, while a large number of Germans and alleged Germans left for Germany.

Western Poland consisted of Poznan, Polish Pomerania (the so-called Polish corridor), and Polish Upper Silesia. The Polish uprising which took place in Poznan in 1918, after the dissolution of the German army, was at first a purely local affair.²¹ Subsequently the Polish delegation in Paris won Polish Pomerania by diplomatic means. In Upper Silesia the Germans succeeded in crushing the Polish uprisings, and the insurgents were compelled to emigrate. While an international administration laid the grounds for a plebiscite in this area, partisan warfare broke out. In both camps the participants were outsiders. After the plebiscite in 1921, the Poles invaded Upper Silesia and conquered the eastern part of the province, thereby forcing the partitioning of Upper Silesia. The volunteers who had constituted the German "shock troops" had to transfer to Germany proper in order to pursue their activities.

All these violent collisions were but the reflection of a great migratory movement. The Polish government still indulged in dreams about colonization in the east, but masses of ruined citizens from central Poland and from Galicia had discovered a much more attractive field of expansion in the former German territories. These lands had important industries and access to the sea, and unlike the remainder of the reborn Polish state they had not been devastated during the war. It has been estimated that between 1918 and 1921,

²¹ At first (January 7, 1919) the council even declared that its intention was not completely to break off relations with Berlin.

902,000 persons from former Russian and Austrian Poland immigrated to Poznan and Pomerania alone. After 1921 the immigration area was enlarged by the acquisition of Polish Silesia. Agrarian legislation in Poland helped, indeed, to extend the range "of the Polish plow," but in a westward, not an eastward, direction. In Poznan and Polish Pomerania the total area of landed property belonging to German owners fell by some 31-35 percent between 1914 and 1926 as a result of sales and expropriation.²² In addition to the provisions of agrarian reform, vast plots were made available for colonization by expelling German tenants from public holdings and expropriation of German absentee or non-citizen landowners. There is no reason to suspect the Polish authorities of favoritism with respect to newcomers at the expense of the local peasants, the majority of whom were also Poles. It was, nevertheless, in Polish Pomerania that the percentage of in-migrants was the largest among beneficiaries of the new agrarian legislation.²³ An even larger number of Poles from inner Poland found employment in the towns of western Poland. There was plenty of room everywhere, because a mass exodus of Germans had taken place.

German and Polish authors have variously estimated the number of Germans who left Poland at between 340,000 and 1,200,000. The German authors seek to exaggerate both the number of German emigrants and the number of Germans who remained in these Polish territories, while Polish sources attempt to minimize the number of both emigrant and resident Germans. A more reliable computation, based on the 1914 residence of persons counted in the German census of 1925, yielded a total of 705,000 persons (German and non-German) who immigrated to Germany from former German Poland.²⁴

In three years western Poland had been definitely Polonized. The retreat of the Germans and the advance of the Poles had long been in process. It had continued despite violent measures of Germanization, which had included the introduction of German colonists on lands where the Polish owners had been expropriated. The situation was now reversed. The policy of Polonization succeeded where the policy

²² Czech, *Die Bevölkerung Polens*, p. 144.

²³ See above, p. 129. In particular, peasants from Galicia were installed in Polish Pomerania.

²⁴ *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Vol. CCCCI Part 2, p. 539. The figure includes also those who moved during the war.

of Germanization had failed. The advance of Polonism was following the general direction of the peoples' movement.

The "return to the Reich" of Germans from abroad (*Auslandsdeutsche*) was largely voluntary. Only persons who had settled in Poznan and Polish Pomerania after 1908 (when the German policy of forcible colonization had been inaugurated) were deprived of the right of residence in these territories, and even they were not subjected to mass expulsion by the Polish authorities. Inflation in Germany and the feverish industrial activity which it brought about attracted Germans from abroad. Some were lured by the incredibly low cost of living for persons owning foreign currency, others by the prospect of jobs. Since in the western provinces all residents had German citizenship until 1918, there are good reasons to believe that some Poles suddenly discovered that they had a German soul because they wanted to have their share of the boom in the Reich. The situation was quite different for Poles in other parts of the country, because it was difficult for them to obtain residence permits and especially work permits in Germany. As a result, Poles from central Poland and from Galicia (the most overpopulated areas) migrated almost exclusively to former German Poland. But they, so to speak, pushed out migrants from these areas to the Reich.

Polish statistics which show that no Polish emigrants went to Germany before 1926 cannot be taken at their face value. In German agriculture, in particular, foreigners were continually used, and most of them were Poles. In 1919 almost 100,000 Polish farm workers were employed in Germany. Among Polish workers (who had been employed in Germany during the war) there were many who had not found work in their homeland and returned immediately to Germany. The movement continued thereafter on a reduced scale. The Polish authorities registered no Polish migrant laborers at all, since this movement was prohibited; nevertheless, a clandestine emigration took place. According to German statistics, between 1920 and 1924 some 20,000-30,000 Polish immigrant workers arrived each year, and in 1925 and 1926 there were 50,000 per year. Nor does this exhaust the movement. Whoever visited Berlin in the postwar years must have met a number of immigrants who, although they may have come with or without Polish passports, were certainly no repatriated Germans; for example, the "eastern Jews," favorite targets of attack by German xenophobes and antisemites, and Russian

emigrés who settled in Berlin after leaving Warsaw. According to the German census of 1925 there were 260,000 Polish nationals in Germany as of that date, as well as 155,000 persons who had come to Germany from the territories of former Russian and Austrian Poland.²⁵

On the whole, however, emigration from Poland was in the first years after the war restricted to the flow from the former German territories.²⁶ Its importance was very great. Central Poland and Galicia, overpopulated and ravaged by war, were given a breathing spell after the departure of nearly one million inhabitants who migrated to western Poland. Simultaneously, they profited from commercial traffic with this area where industry had not been destroyed.

In 1923 Germany's "inflation prosperity" became "inflation misery"; then a short period of deflation followed. As a result, the attitude of Germans who still resided in Poland underwent a radical change: they lost all desire for emigration. Simultaneously the German government felt that the national interest now required that they should stay where they were. In 1925 Poland undertook to expel those who had already opted for repatriation to Germany, but these expulsions were soon stopped, because of British intervention, when Germany called upon Great Britain for assistance.²⁷

Although the exodus of Germans from western Poland represented a heavy population loss, up to 1923 emigration from all parts of Poland (including Jewish emigration to Palestine) was more than offset by the influx from the east. After 1923, however, the "repatriation" of Poles from Russia was terminated. This event coincided with a change in Russia's migratory trends. Her eastward shifts were resumed, and the whole Russian territory, up to the "watershed," took part in this movement. From then on the watershed truly separated two worlds.

Poland's migratory balance had thus been temporarily stabilized, and she could now turn her energies towards providing new demographic and economic outlets for her excess population. This opera-

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Overseas emigration was greatly limited because of the American quota regulations. In 1921, 107,000 Poles emigrated overseas. Thereafter the yearly figure of overseas migrants fell to some tens of thousands. These figures include Jewish emigrants to Palestine.

²⁷ Polonicus, *Die Deutschen unter der polnischen Herrschaft*, pp. 21, 35-37. The German author was quite unaware of the irony inherent in this situation.

tion proved arduous, and the transitional period was extremely difficult.

Polish Emigration, 1924-31

The industries of central Poland were seriously handicapped when her ties with Russia were broken, for the latter had been her best customer (in 1910-14, approximately 90 percent of all exports from Congress Poland went to Russia) and had also supplied important raw materials. Furthermore, Poland had been deprived of her markets in the Danube basin, where she had formerly sold Galician oil, and her German market for agricultural products and coal.

Temporary reconstruction measures in Europe opened once more commercial opportunities as well as immigration territories. Germany, with funds provided by the Allies, was able to buy Polish agricultural products. These imports almost compensated for the loss of the German market for Polish coal. And the 1926 strike in Great Britain opened the Scandinavian countries to Polish coal exports—a position which she has maintained since at the expense of Great Britain.

Polish emigration as well was gradually re-established (see Table

TABLE 8
EMIGRATION AND REPATRIATION OF POLISH NATIONALS
(YEARLY AVERAGE IN THOUSANDS)

	1919-25	1926-30	1931-35	1936	1937	1938
Total number of emigrants	82.5	192.8	45.9	54.7	102.5	129.1
Emigrants to European countries	32.9	135.8	27.1	29.8	78.6	107.8
France	31.1	57.0	10.3	8.4	33.0	20.5
Germany	...	72.5	7.1	1.1	12.2	63.6
Emigrants to non-European countries	49.7	57.0	18.8	24.9	23.8	21.3
The United States	30.9	8.5	1.4	1.0	1.6	3.0
Canada	...	20.7	1.3	1.5	2.0	2.6
South America	...	23.9	4.9	8.9	16.5	12.1
Palestine	...	2.5	10.3	10.6	2.9	2.5
Repatriates from European countries	4.6 ^a	85.3	42.3	41.5	39.0	91.9
Repatriates from non-European countries	23.2	6.6	4.2	2.2	1.8	1.7
Repatriated war refugees	168.8

^a This figure was not given in the official Polish statistics; it is quoted here from Zarychta, *Emigracja Polska 1918-1931, Table I.*

8). More than twice as many emigrants left Poland between 1926 and 1930 as had left in the 1919-25 period. This increase was due to the great development of continental migration. Overseas emigration increased very slightly. Small gains in number of emigrants to Canada and South America were offset by the decline in emigration to the United States because of the introduction of the quota system.

Viewing the large increase of emigration to European countries in the period 1926-30, we must, however, emphasize that official statistics refer only to emigration of Polish nationals; therefore, the main emigration of the earlier period—the exodus of Germans—was not carried in the official statistics.

The large-scale emigration of Polish nationals began in 1924. Most migrants went to France. Furthermore, a seasonal and temporary movement of laborers was directed to Germany.

A remarkable correlation between the origin of migrants and their destination should be pointed out. Emigration to overseas countries was supplied in equal proportions from all parts of the country, but 83 percent of those who went to European countries between 1926 and 1931 (the last year before the heavy drop in emigration) were recruited in the western and southern border areas: Galicia (167,000 continental and 126,000 overseas migrants), western Poland (98,000 continental and 16,000 overseas emigrants), and the provinces of Lodz and Kielce, border provinces of former Russian Poland (394,000 continental, mostly to Germany, and 26,000 overseas emigrants).

In western Poland the large number of immigrants from inner Poland, many of whom settled in the cities, seemed at first to imperil, because of their overpopulation, the level of economic development. But fertility was relatively low in this area, and emigration, first of Germans and later of Poles, contributed to the maintenance of a fairly high standard of living. After 1923 the emigration of Germans had greatly diminished, and there were fewer departures from western Poland than in the first postwar years. But pressure from inner Poland had decreased as well, because the territories where it had originated—Central Poland and Galicia—had found direct outlets abroad.

Before the first World War, a yearly seasonal emigration from Russian Poland to Germany had been customary. In the postwar years the channel of migration, leading straight from central Poland, had been reopened.

Germany, which before the war employed more than one million alien workers, introduced a system of special permits and registration cards, which enabled it to restrict the number of immigrant seasonal workers to a minimum (28,000 on the average during the years 1920-1924). During the years 1925-1927 the shortage of German agricultural workers involved a steady increase in the annual quota of immigrants, and the average number of immigrants rose to 57,000 in 1925-1927. The alien workers who thus immigrated to Germany came mostly from Poland.²⁸

Emigration to Germany had become almost exclusively a seasonal shift of agricultural laborers, since German industry remained closed to aliens. The temporary nature of this migratory movement was therefore even more pronounced than it had been before the war. In 1926-31, 395,000 Poles emigrated, and 366,000 were repatriated.

But more important than these temporary shifts—which nevertheless were of substantial help to Poland's economic development—was the predominantly permanent emigration to France. It started in Galicia. The introduction of the American quota system was a terrible blow for this most overpopulated part of Poland. The French industrialists, in search of manpower, took advantage of this opportunity and sent their recruiting agents to Poland.

Polish emigration to France involved 218,000 persons in 1919-25, but assumed larger proportions after 1923. Between 1925 and 1930, 285,000 emigrants were registered, and only 39,000 returned from France during the same period. The number of Poles residing in France, which in 1921 was only 45,000, reached 309,000 in 1926 and 508,000 in 1931. The vanguard of the Polish migratory movement, composed of Polish miners from Westphalia, had arrived in France in 1923 during the French occupation of the Ruhr.²⁹ The Committee of French Mines subsequently decided to hire other Polish miners in Poland itself. Recruiting in Westphalia had been justified by the shortage of skilled miners in France. This reason no longer held for the newly enlisted workers, who were unskilled peasants. They were to work with older and experienced miners who spoke their language. The French employers had found these foreign workers satisfactory, for they proved more docile than native labor and did not demand salaries commensurate with the strenuousness and health hazards of the occupation. In 1930 the French coal mines employed

²⁸ International Labor Office, *Migration Movements 1925-1927*, pp. 33-34.

²⁹ See pp. 181-82.

113,518 foreigners as against 186,727 Frenchmen. Poles constituted about 70 percent of the alien workers. In the Pas de Calais department alone, 125,000 Poles were concentrated: this represents one fourth of all Polish residents then in France and 12.1 percent of the French population of the department. In the Nord department 82,000 Poles were registered. Once Polish colonies had been established and their special "qualities" ascertained, the French General Immigration Board, which was in charge of intake and placement of foreign workers, endeavored to supply them also to other branches of industry, for all "unpleasant, dirty, unhealthy, and unsafe" jobs. From the mining centers in northern France, Polish immigrants spread out into the northern departments. Others were finally established in Paris. A Polish colony was founded on the Moselle River, and attempts at Polish colonization in the southwest were even inaugurated. But the overwhelming majority of all Poles (80 percent) remained in the north and northeast of France.

Demographic-Economic Situation before the World Depression

Thus, until the world crisis, emigration, although it involved a smaller number than before the first World War, always succeeded in withdrawing from the country the "superfluous" elements. The role of the United States had been partly assumed by France which, in 1921-30, had a net-immigration of some 600,000 Poles.³⁰ Simultaneously Germany continued to receive a number of seasonal workers. And finally there was Jewish emigration to Palestine, restricted in scope, it is true, but nevertheless offering relief for unfortunate Jewish craftsmen and also increasing opportunities in the cities for the excess rural population.

On the other hand, if the United States failed to provide migratory opportunities, they did supply Europe with capital, which acted as a stimulant upon Poland's economy as well. Not only did it indirectly affect Poland, since Germany's prosperity created a new market for Polish goods, but also a direct effect was felt because of the introduction of foreign capital into the Polish economy.³¹

Relative prosperity and constant emigration possibilities enabled Poland to support her population, which increased from 27.4 million

³⁰ Estimate of the French Statistical Office, *Mouvements migratoires entre la France et l'étranger*, p. 102.

³¹ Even money sent home by the emigrants represented an important active item in the Polish balance of payments.

in 1921 to 32.3 million in 1931 and was estimated at 35.1 million in 1939. However, Poland's population growth which seems tremendous if only the interwar period is being considered, is much less outstanding if the 1914 population is taken as a basis for comparison. Unlike most of the other European countries, Poland had suffered a severe net loss of population during the first World War. Only by 1929 was the prewar level (estimated at 30.3 million) reached again.³²

Furthermore, natural increase was slowly declining (see Table 9).

TABLE 9
CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES IN POLAND
(YEARLY AVERAGES PER 1,000 INHABITANTS)

<i>Period</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Births</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Natural Increase</i>
1896-1900	Poland	43.5	25.0	18.5
	Provinces:			
	Central	42.7	23.8	18.9
	Eastern	43.6	26.1	17.5
	Western	44.4	23.9	20.5
1921-25	Poland	34.7	18.5	16.2
	Provinces:			
	Central	33.6	18.2	15.4
	Eastern	38.1	17.4	20.7
	Western	33.2	16.7	16.5
1926-30	Poland	32.3	16.8	15.5
	Provinces:			
	Central	32.0	16.4	15.6
	Eastern	36.4	16.4	20.0
	Western	29.1	14.7	14.4
1931-35	Poland	27.6	14.6	13.0
	Provinces:			
	Central	26.8	14.0	12.8
	Eastern	30.2	14.4	15.8
	Western	25.8	10.4	15.4
1936-38	Poland	25.2	14.0	11.2
	Provinces: ^a			
	Central	25.1	13.7	11.4
	Eastern	27.6	13.6	14.0
	Western	24.3	13.2	11.1
	Southern	25.4	15.4	10.0

^a 1936-37.

³² Szulc, *Ruch naturalny ludnosci*, p. 128.

After a delay of twenty years, Poland went through a process identical with Germany's and England's demographic evolution: births declined more rapidly than deaths. This was partly the result of urbanization. But the slowdown of natural increase affected all Poland, even the eastern part, where urban development was only in its early stages, as well as southern agricultural Poland, where agrarian overpopulation had reached disastrous proportions.³³

It could thus be hopefully expected that Poland's demographic development would lead some day to an adaptation of the country's population to its resources. Indeed, the possibilities of enlarging its economic space through industrial development were far from exhausted, while natural increase was slowly checked by the decreasing number of births. For a peaceful and relatively even adjustment of this kind, there was only one prerequisite: the constant availability of migratory outlets. But precisely this requisite was eliminated by the world crisis. It was then that Poland lost her two main outlets: temporary emigration to Germany and permanent emigration to France.

World Depression

The world depression struck a mortal blow at Poland's economy. Foreign investors withdrew their capital. Poland's imports could no longer exceed her exports. The drop in agricultural prices ruined the farmers, and as a result their purchasing power declined. Undernourishment became more widespread. "The peasant had to sell more and more grain to buy an indispensable pair of shoes, and he came to eat less and less bread himself."³⁴

Industry also was vitally affected. The domestic market became curtailed because of reduced purchasing power, exports were cut off as autarchic policies were developed abroad, and foreign investments were withdrawn. Unemployment rose as production fell. Following is a passage from a memorandum on the population problem in Poland, presented by St. Grabski at the Tenth International Studies Conference:

³³ It should be emphasized that the fall of the birth rate was an independent event, not related to a temporary peculiarity in the age or sex distribution. This is shown by the decline of the number of births per thousand women aged 15 to 29 from 180 in 1900-1901 to 110 in 1931-32. The *Statistical Year Book of the League of Nations* listed as net reproduction rates: for 1927-28, 1.30; for 1934, 1.11.

³⁴ From an article by Adam Rose in *Gazeta Polska*, 1934, quoted in *Osteuropa*, Oct., 1934, p. 15.

Since 1929, and until the end of 1935, the number of persons employed in mining and factory work fell from 841,000 to 585,000. As a result of stagnation in the crafts, commerce and other professions during the past 6 years, the number of gainful positions in Poland has declined by at least 350,000. On the other hand, the number of persons who must earn a living has increased by one and a half million over the same period. The true number of persons in need of gainful employment who are unable to secure it now amounts to 800,000.

One of the consequences of the new situation in the cities was that the process of urbanization had been stopped; that is, that the population of the seriously overpopulated countryside lost their outlet by means of internal migration.

Under these perilous conditions Poland was deprived of her migratory outlets abroad. Between 1931 and 1935 emigration underwent a catastrophic curtailment. The number of emigrants dropped from 243,000 in 1929 to 21,000 in 1932. Continental migration declined because of the crisis, which first affected Germany and shortly afterwards also France. In 1931 the Reich government prohibited all immigration of foreign workers. Simultaneously Polish immigration to the United States was stopped almost entirely. Canada followed a similar course, and immigration to South America declined as well. The only increase in departures was to Palestine, and these involved Jews exclusively.

This was the only important movement which took place during and after the world crisis. For the whole period between 1921 and 1937 Jewish net emigration from Poland approached 400,000;³⁵ the proportion was five times higher than among the total population. Nonetheless, Polish leaders kept insisting that foreign governments and Jewish organizations must provide additional possibilities for the removal of Jewish masses, in order to create space in towns for Polish migrants from the overcrowded countryside.

Meanwhile, in France energetic measures were taken to force an exodus of resident Poles, in order to alleviate the situation created by the world depression. Between the French census of March, 1931, and that of December, 1936, the number of Poles in France fell from 508,000 to 463,000. This decline of 45,000 corresponds to an excess of repatriated Poles over Polish immigrants into France. In 1932-36 the departing Polish laborers outnumbered the incoming by 77,750,

³⁵ Tartakower, *Yidische emigrazie*, pp. 30-32.

according to French registration. Polish statistics showed an excess of 76,860 repatriates from France over Polish emigrants to France.³⁶

If we compare the years 1931-36 with earlier periods (see Table 7), we see that the outstanding feature is that migration is almost in balance. It had become balanced in western Poland, where emigration to France no longer surpassed immigration from inner Poland. It was almost balanced in Galicia, where the loss of outlets in France was felt just as strongly. Relatively the largest migratory loss was recorded in eastern Poland, because immigration from Russia had come to an almost complete standstill. Furthermore, emigration in a new direction, namely, to Latvia, began at that time. This emigration was at first small and involved mainly persons from the Vilna border province. It was a movement of seasonal workers, a number of whom eventually settled in Latvia.³⁷ Central Poland maintained a migratory gain because its cities attracted newcomers from the east and the south. Westward migration coming from the center was obstructed because it could no longer move on, neither as temporary emigration to Germany nor as permanent settlement in France.³⁸ The current seemed to be blocked all along. It was not a change in direction, but a bottleneck.

The situation created in Poland by the absence of outlets was generally described as "Malthusian." The *London Times* wrote on March 22, 1938:

Since the year 1921 the population of Poland has been growing at the rate of something over 400,000 a year. Pressure of population is at the root of most of Poland's social and economic problems at the present time. It goes far to explain Polish anti-Semitism and the discontent which is never far below the surface in the rural areas, where overpopulation has made agrarian reform and the rationalization of agriculture vitally necessary.

³⁶ French statistics according to *Bulletin du Marché du Travail*, 1932-36, and *Annuaire Statistique Abregé*, 1943; Polish statistics according to *Statystyka Pracy* (published by the Polish Central Statistical Office), 1937, No. 4, p. 232, and 1938, No. 1, p. 25. The French Central Statistical Office estimated for 1931-35 a net emigration from France of 30,000 Poles (*Mouvements migratoires*, p. 103).

³⁷ In 1934-38, 88,000 emigrated to Latvia and 82,000 returned. In 1939, when war broke out, 17,000 Polish agricultural laborers were stranded in Latvia.

³⁸ In 1937 Polish emigration to France picked up again. French statistics showed for 1937-39 an excess of 31,670 arrivals of Polish workers over departures. According to Polish statistics, in 1937-38 the Polish emigrants to France outnumbered the repatriated by 33,860. Temporary emigration to Germany was also resumed, in connection with Germany's war preparation. In 1938 Germany admitted 120,000 foreign workers for agriculture. Half of them came from Poland. In 1939 there was practically no immigration into Germany from Poland.

. . . In France the agricultural population averages 44 to the square kilometer of agricultural land; in Poland the figure is 79. Even the most conservative estimates place the surplus population of Poland at 3,000,000, and 7,000,000 have been suggested by some authorities. If one is pessimistically inclined, one may compare the rising pressure of the population to water piling itself behind a dam. Up to the present the dam has held, but it is a question whether it can hold indefinitely unless substantially strengthened.

Seventeen months later the dam was pierced—by the Germans. The final result was Poland's expansion up to the Oder and the Neisse.

Baltic States

The evolution of the Baltic States was somewhat similar to that of Poland. The westward movement was resumed after a short reflux towards the east. Demographic conditions favored the east-west trend. When it came to crossing frontiers, however, only the German minorities were able to do so.

The temporary eastward reflux culminated in 1918-19 in the *Balticum* campaign carried out by General von der Goltz. This looting expedition was connected with an attempt at colonization. But after the *Balticum* volunteers had helped the Latvians to expel the Russians, they had to return to Germany. They were followed by some 25,000 Baltic Germans.³⁹ This exodus of the German minority was the climax of a long-drawn-out process which since 1881 had been under way in the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire.⁴⁰ In the interwar period the number of Germans in Latvia and Estonia declined from year to year, because of their very low birth rate and even more as a result of emigration to Germany.⁴¹

³⁹ See pp. 171 ff.

⁴⁰ According to the Russian 1897 census there were 165,600 Germans in the three Baltic provinces of the Empire, corresponding in territory more or less to the future states of Estonia and Latvia. The German landowners attempted to attract German colonists from other parts of the Russian Empire. On the eve of the first World War there were some 17,000 German peasants in the Baltic provinces; the number of Germans nevertheless declined rapidly.

⁴¹ The censuses of 1935 and 1934 reported only 78,000 Germans in Latvia and Estonia, a number which was further decreased to some 70,000 up to the 1939 "repatriation." In November, 1939, the Latvian Minister of Interior reported increased emigration to Germany in the course of the preceding 5 years, after the advent of the National Socialist regime (*Valdības Vestnis*, Official Latvian Publication, Nov. 21, 1939). However, a comparison of the census of 1930 with that of 1935, in conjunction with data on excess of deaths over births, shows that in this period, too, the Germans in Latvia showed a migratory loss of some 5,000, or 7 per cent. There was a migratory loss in Estonia as well.

The reflux towards the east had thus been a short-lived one. The new border which separated the Baltic States from the USSR roughly coincided with the "watershed" which was re-established in this area as markedly as it has been on the Polish-Russian border. After repatriation activities had come to a standstill, there was no longer a migratory movement across the Soviet border. Internal migration went in the opposite direction.

This westward trend coincided with the declining fertility of population. In Latvia the highest birth rate (24 per thousand in 1935) and excess of births (10 per thousand) were registered in Lettgallia, a province situated near the Soviet border, where Russified—or even plain Russian—elements dominated. In other provinces the natural increase of population was substantially slower (birth rate 15-17 per thousand, birth excess 1-2 per thousand). In Riga the number of deaths slightly surpassed that of births. This geographical differential corresponds also to the ethnic differential. In 1935 the Latvians had a birth excess of 2.7 per thousand; the Russians, of 11.8; the Germans, a death excess of 7.2.

Prolific Lettgallia sent her migrants to other provinces of Latvia. It was found that from 1925-29 on, the number of inhabitants did not rise in Lettgallia despite the high birth rate. Migrants went mainly to Riga, the capital, which shows that the internal shift was also in direction of the coast. As usual, the movement proceeded by short steps. It has been estimated that 37,000 persons left Lettgallia between 1925 and 1930. During these years the city of Riga received approximately the same number of immigrants. It was found, however, that the majority of migrants from Lettgallia moved, not to Riga, but to provinces close to Riga, where rural exodus had left vacancies.

As a result of the land reform, the Germans, former masters of these countries, had become an almost wholly urban group, and their numbers declined. They were replaced by a new social layer of Latvians, those one-time serfs of the Germans. Simultaneously, Latvian peasantry shifted more and more to the towns. Their places were taken by a population of different ethnic composition, namely, by Russians from Lettgallia, a much more prolific group.

The population of Latvia (1,950,000 in 1935) did not recover its prewar level; the slow natural increase could not offset the losses which the first World War and the ensuing revolution had inflicted.

Although Latvia's separation from Russia limited her economic position, she suffered from a manpower shortage. Migrants from Lettgallia were not numerous enough to fill the gap; seasonal agricultural workers had to be admitted each year from neighboring Lithuania and Poland.

Similarly, Estonia's population remained almost stationary in the interwar period (total population: 1,107,000 in 1922; 1,126,000 in 1934). Here again, there was an excess of deaths over births among the German group. At the other extreme, persons of Russian stock in the eastern part of the country had much higher birth rates than Estonians. Nevertheless, it was the Reval (Tallinn) district which between 1922 and 1934 showed the outstanding population increase (10.5 percent) obviously because the capital and port attracted numerous in-migrants. In the rest of the country, only the Petchora district, situated on the border of the USSR and having an overwhelmingly Russian population, had a considerable population growth (6.6 percent). Contrariwise, the Narva district, also on the Soviet border, on the Gulf of Finland, and also partly inhabited by Russians, showed a population decline (-2 percent); here out-migration surpassed the high natural increase. This exodus is to be connected with the influx to Reval. The migratory stream followed the coast from east to west.

The population of the small Baltic States, cut off from Russia's immense human reservoir, hardly increased at all. It shifted away from the Soviet border, while the German minority gradually retreated from the Baltic States. For the Baltic countries, as well as for Poland, the basic question finally boiled down to this: Will the separation at the "watershed" be respected, or will it be annihilated by a Russian westward current?

The Balkans

The map on page 148 conveys an idea of differential population pressure in the Danube Basin, insofar as it is attributable to natural increase. Comparisons of this kind should be considered most carefully, for differential pressure depends largely upon the relationship between population growth and the economic development of a country. It is, nevertheless, significant that south of Poland, too, natural increase grows weaker towards the west and the northwest.

We shall see in Chapter VI that in Czechoslovakia the excess of



2. Natural Increase of Population in Southeastern Europe, 1931-36

births over deaths which is greatest in the eastern part of the country is associated with a definite eastwest migration. In the countries of southeastern Europe the study of migratory shifts is difficult because of the lack of census data and also because of administrative changes in the composition of districts. Furthermore, these figures fail to reflect the true strength of migratory trends, because for a time they could be curbed by narrow political boundaries. It appears, nevertheless, that after the reflux which occurred at the end of the first World War, the shift to the west was resumed everywhere.

In 1918 Rumania exploited Russia's temporary weakness and annexed Bessarabia. However, the demographic results of efforts at Rumanization were meager.⁴² The annexation resulted rather in a larger admixture of Russians, for it opened the gates for a heavy influx from Russia, torn by civil war. The Rumanian report to the League of Nations stated the number of refugees as more than 100,000. This figure is probably inflated; but even a conservative estimate arrived at 60,000.⁴³ The demographic result of Rumania's expansion towards the west was entirely different. The annexation of Transylvania was followed by the exodus to Hungary of some 200,000 Magyars.⁴⁴ Space thus vacated in Transylvanian cities was being filled by Rumanians from local villages, as well as from other parts of Rumania, where the rural birth rate was one of the highest in Europe, although it fell from 44.2 per thousand in 1921 to 29.9 in 1939.⁴⁵ The trend towards the west was stimulated by the relatively more rapid industrial development of Transylvania. However, on the whole, flight from the countryside stayed within moderate limits,

⁴² This became evident in 1940, when the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union produced a flight of Rumanians who had come into these provinces after their annexation by Rumania. The refugees, estimated at between 35,000 and 40,000 persons, were for the most part officials or persons engaged in liberal professions (Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population*, p. 85).

⁴³ According to a report made to the International Committee of the Red Cross. As probably some part of those 60,000 were repatriations, Sir John Hope Simpson (*The Refugee Problem*, pp. 412-13) estimates the number of refugees at 45,000. The 51,859 Turks and Tartars who left from Dobrudja have been replaced by 23,000 Makedo-Rumanians.

⁴⁴ The number registered in 1918-24 was 197,000. Altogether about 400,000 people migrated from their places of domicile into rump Hungary, according to an estimate made by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in connection with the 1941 census. This figure includes also refugees from former Hungarian territories allotted by the Trianon peace treaty to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

⁴⁵ Mortality was also very high: 25.8 per thousand in 1921; 18.5 in 1939. There was, however, a great excess of births.

for industry was not sufficiently developed to offer employment to large numbers of people.

The Greek expansion at the expense of Turkey had started in the Balkan wars which preceded the first World War, and it continued after 1918 up to the autumn of 1922, when Greece's military defeat brought about a complete reversal. After the Smyrna disaster some 800,000 Greeks fled from Asia Minor, and 200,000 from eastern Thrace. Furthermore, according to the Lausanne agreement (January 30, 1923) on population exchange, Greece had to receive the remaining 190,000 Greeks from Turkish Asia Minor, while 388,000 Moslems (including those who had emigrated in 1921-22) were transferred from Greek territory. Hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees streamed into Greek Macedonia and Thrace. Their settlement threw a heavy burden upon the local population. The installation of refugees in villages and towns inhabited by persons of Bulgarian stock led to conflicts. The abundance of manual workers among the refugees put the Bulgarian farm workers in a precarious situation. These factors stimulated the exodus of Bulgarians.⁴⁶

As a result of the Balkan wars and of the first World War, Greece received western Thrace and part of Macedonia, largely inhabited by Bulgarians. The Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919) provided for a voluntary population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria. Yet it was "but a continuation of prewar migratory movements, for a current of emigration existed already."⁴⁷ Even under Turkish rule agrarian conditions as well as political disorders had provoked a continuous emigration of Bulgarians from Macedonia and Thrace; tens of thousands went annually to the United States or to Bulgaria. The movement assumed a mass character under the impact of the Balkan wars and the first World War. Some 70,000 Bulgarians fled in 1918 before the advancing Greek and Allied armies, and 53,000 after 1923, under the terms of the Neuilly Treaty. This influx of more than 120,000 Bulgarians was counterbalanced by the exodus of only 46,000 Greeks from Bulgaria.

Including refugees from Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Rumania, there had to be dealt with by Bulgaria a total influx of more than 250,000 who were predominantly settled in the eastern part of

⁴⁶ Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, pp. 105-7. Wurf bain, *L'Echange Greco-Bulgare*, pp. 35-36.

⁴⁷ Wurf bain, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

the country. Although largely compensated by the departure of Greeks and Turks, this influx was a heavy burden for Bulgaria, an almost purely agricultural country, which had the densest rural population (except Albania) in Europe. The population tried to adapt itself to its living space by a reduction in births, which dropped from 39 per thousand in 1921-25 to 22.2 in 1940, birth control having found its way to the remotest villages. In the meantime the population streamed from the countryside to the towns. Rural exodus mostly coincided with migration towards the west, to Sofia.⁴⁸ The population of the capital rose from 154,000 in 1920 to 355,000 in 1938. In view of the low level of industrial development, there was a rush to government service; the number of poorly paid officials grew far beyond actual needs.⁴⁹

Yugoslavia, too, saw a short reversal of migratory trends at the end of the first World War. Following the Balkan coast, the current went from north to south, rather than from west to east. It was reflected in the repatriation of Serbs from Hungary, the emigration of more than 20,000 Bulgarians from Yugoslav-incorporated Macedonia, and the settlement of Serb colonists in Yugoslav Macedonia. But this reflux was short-lived. The migratory trend of the following years was once more in the opposite direction.

Yugoslavia showed a higher population growth than that of any other European nation: from 11.9 million inhabitants in 1921 to 13.9 million in 1931 and 16 million in 1941 (according to an estimate for March 31, that is, on the eve of the German invasion). This growth was due to a high birth rate, while losses due to emigration were very small. There was, however, much variation in fertility and in excess of births in the various parts of the country. The north (the Belgrade area, Slovenia, Croatia, and Slavonia), where industrialization had progressed, showed a strong decline in fertility whereas the purely agricultural south, especially the mountain regions, maintained their high birth rate. People streamed from this backward area to the better-developed north. This section not only attracted newcomers because of its industry but also received internal migrants for pur-

⁴⁸ In 1927-34 more than 163,000 persons (i.e., one fourth of Bulgaria's natural increase) left the countryside, 25,000-30,000 of them went abroad and some 110,000 went to Sofia and its suburbs (Vajaroff, in *Bevölkerungsfragen, Bericht des internationalen Kongresses in Berlin 1935*, p. 208).

⁴⁹ *Südost Economist*, July 18, 1941. They numbered 130,000. Including families, 650,000 persons, i.e., about one third of the urban population, derived their income from this source.

poses of colonization under the Agrarian Reform provisions,⁵⁰ as well as seasonal agricultural workers. But these migratory outlets proved insufficient. In general, the resources of the country were poorly developed. The increase in employment opportunities did not keep pace with the rapid growth of the population. People sought any kind of work. Often peasant girls were willing to serve as housemaids without wages. Despite the population shifts which occurred during and after the first World War, the census of 1931 revealed that more than 75 percent of all inhabitants still resided in their birthplace. This stability was not because migration was not needed, but because migration possibilities were lacking.

For southeastern Europe, as for Poland, the loss of the American outlet was a heavy blow. Before the first World War, in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Hungary "a large proportion of village proletarians were directly or indirectly (through emigrants' remittances) affected by emigration to the United States."⁵¹ Whereas millions emigrated then, the number was in the interwar period reduced to thousands (see Table 10). Between 1920 and 1929 the net overseas emigration from

TABLE 10
OVERSEAS EMIGRATION^a FROM SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
(ANNUAL AVERAGE IN THOUSANDS)

<i>Years</i>	HUNGARY		RUMANIA		YUGOSLAVIA		BULGARIA		GREECE	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Net</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Net</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Net</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Net</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Net</i>
1920-25	3.8	2.9	8.9 ^b	7.3 ^b	11.1	3.6	12.0 ^c	...
1926-30	5.9	5.4	12.7	9.9	16.4	11.9	2.1 ^d	2.0 ^d	8.2 ^c	2.7 ^e
1931-35	0.9	0.0	1.8	0.4	2.1	+1.9 ^f	0.3	0.3	11.8	2.6
1936-39	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.1	3.5	1.8	0.5	0.5	8.8	3.6

Source: Information collected by the International Labor Office.

^a Nationals only.

^b 1920-24.

^c Including tourists.

^d 1927-30.

^e 1929-30.

^f Net immigration.

Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece amounted altogether to some 250,000. Since the world crisis in 1930-39, the balance of emigrants and repatriates was about even.

The loss of the large American outlet could in no way be compensated by migration to the few European countries which admitted

⁵⁰ There were in the north even more nonlocal settlers than in the south. In the rest of the country the land was distributed among local peasants.

⁵¹ Adamic, *Two Way Passage*, p. 51.

foreign workers. Even France, which received the great bulk, registered at the peak, in 1931, only some 100,000 aliens from southeastern Europe.⁵²

There were two other outlets—open, however, only to specific groups: the Turkish and the German minorities.

In Turkey the vacuum created by the extermination of Armenians and the mass exodus of Greeks in 1922-23 was only partly filled by the transfer of Turks from Greece. Between 1921 and 1928 some 60,000 persons of Turkish descent immigrated into Turkey from Rumania and other Balkan countries. In 1931-39 about 100,000 Turks migrated to Turkey from Bulgaria, and some 40,000 from Rumania and Yugoslavia.

The German minorities abroad, with few exceptions, show in the interwar period a slow, but steady, decline.⁵³ The main factor was the low birth rate. The natural increase of the Germans was much lower than that of the surrounding non-German population.⁵⁴ Another factor was de-Germanization. There was, however, also a migratory loss. The ethnic Germans of southeastern Europe had a disproportionate share in the emigration from this area.⁵⁵ They took advantage of their "ethnic nationality" to enter Germany.⁵⁶ This influx increased after the advent of the National Socialist regime. A large proportion of the 500,000 immigrants who came to Greater Germany (that is, the old Reich plus Austria and the Sudetenland) between 1933 and 1939 consisted of immigrants of German stock,⁵⁷ many of them from southeastern Europe.

⁵² 31,443 Yugoslavs, 20,374 Greeks, 19,731 Hungarians, 19,704 Rumanians, and 4,919 Bulgarians. To them must be added several thousand Russian refugees who had come from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

⁵³ According to official statistics (contested by the Germans), the number of Germans decreased in Yugoslavia from 506,000 in 1921 to 499,000 in 1931, and in Hungary from 552,000 in 1920 to 479,000 in 1930. The German-speaking population of Budapest (German-speaking Jews not included) was, in 1920, 49,000, and in 1930, 32,000. In 1944, before the flight of the Germans, the Hungarian Statistical Office reported 22,259 Germans in Budapest.

⁵⁴ Excess of birth per thousand in Hungary (1931-35), Magyars 6.9, Germans 3.8; in Rumania (1934), Rumanians 14.2, Germans 5.5; in Yugoslavia (1935), total 14.5, Germans 3.0.

⁵⁵ *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums*, I, 269, 281, 336. März. *Gestaltungswandel des Südostens*, p. 99. "Auswanderungsfieber unter den Dobrudscha-Deutschen," *Nation und Staat*, May, 1939.

⁵⁶ The German census of 1933 showed 17,258 Yugoslav nationals; 12,982 gave German as their mother tongue. To them must be added those naturalized, who were almost all of German stock.

⁵⁷ Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population*, p. 8.

The population of Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece increased in the interwar period from some 44 million to 58 million, that is, by some 14 million. The number of those who could find a way out of this area amounted only to several hundred thousand. They did not even balance the influx from Asia.

In the Balkans, as in Poland, the main problem was the growing agricultural overpopulation. The basic disproportion between available land and the size of agricultural population was here just as serious. Land reforms, carried through since 1918 under the fear of communism, largely ignored the problems of increasing the total agricultural production and of strengthening the peasant's purchasing power. Besides, industrialization possibilities were hampered by limited natural resources. At the same time, these culturally and economically backward countries highly profited from weapons for combating mortality forged by the more advanced western nations. Despite governmental indifference and peasants' ignorance, "a small number of public health workers by selfless and unsparing efforts have done little less than miracles."⁵⁸

The Balkan States were the last countries in Europe where a decline in the death rate, which for a time surpassed the decline in the birth rate, resulted in a tremendous growth of the population. "Their population reached its maximum size at a time when overseas opportunities had passed the peak."⁵⁹ Thus, great natural increase meant for them endless land parcellation and impoverishment. Population pressure forced them into urbanization and industrialization efforts without adequate economic basis or into "belligerent national expansion": "Before the first World War, a series of warlike disputes already were the immediate consequence of this state of affairs, where surplus populations could not be absorbed by industry."⁶⁰

The situation was substantially aggravated in the interwar period, when the nations of southeastern Europe lost all migratory outlets. "Belligerent national expansion" seemed more and more to be the only issue.

⁵⁸ Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars*, p. 95.

⁵⁹ Reithinger, *Das wirtschaftliche Gesicht Europas*, p. 28.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Chapter VI
CENTRAL EUROPE
1918-39

GERMANY was the last country greatly to benefit from nineteenth-century colonizing migration. Her excess population was absorbed by transoceanic outlets. In the eighties of the nineteenth century Germany sent the largest contingent of immigrants to the United States. Simultaneously, her resources were considerably enhanced by the discovery of new raw materials and the growth of extensive new markets. In 1850, when David Copperfield returned to England after spending three years on the continent, he remarked upon the fact that he had not seen a coal fire in all that time. But Germany was soon to become aware of the richness of her huge coal reserves. Tremendous industrial growth followed; factories sprang up near the pits, and dwellings multiplied. In forty peaceful years and inside unchanged political boundaries Germany's living space was miraculously enlarged. Her population increased from 41 to 65 million between 1870 and 1910.

This growth of the German population was closely related to another migratory process. Internal shifts paralleled overseas migration.

As had been the case elsewhere, the growth of the population in Germany was largely due to declining mortality. It has been estimated that in the years preceding 1914, 700,000 persons were spared each year in Germany who would have died if conditions which prevailed thirty years earlier had persisted. But the decline in mortality affected only the cities. Rates for rural areas were almost identical on the eve of the first World War with those of fifty years earlier. The over-all growth of the German population which occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth can be attributed to a combination of three factors: (1) the persistence of a high birth rate in rural areas; (2) internal shifts from the countryside to the cities; (3) a declining urban death rate, especially a decrease in infant mortality. This means that of each generation, a greater number of potential parents survived.

Cities have always existed and have grown because of the influx from outside. In former times the descendants of earlier in-migrants were decimated within a few generations by the ravages of death, which stalked in the slums of all the proud centers of western civilization. But with the coming of the modern era and its progress in the fields of medicine and public sanitation, the towns were the first to apply elementary principles of hygiene and thereby to cut down considerably their death rate. It is also true that birth control was first practiced in the towns. This was the normal adaptation of city dwellers to a lowered death rate, especially to the decline in infant mortality. But with respect to newcomers, the life-protecting and prolonging institutions of the city were much more significant than their birth-restricting influences. Disinfected drinking water, vaccination, and public medical services became available to everyone, and their effects on the life of the primitive immigrants was immediate: their life span was extended and the existence of their numerous children was protected. Psychological factors leading to limitations of family size, which predominated with city dwellers of longer standing, only gradually affected the newcomers. It has been observed that decline in fertility sets in only in the second or third generation. Immigrant couples retain rural views on morals and sex habits. Migration to the city may even increase the size of their families because of increased earnings, which was precisely the motive of their migration.

At the time of the great population growth in Germany, rural exodus absorbed the whole natural increase of the countryside. Germany's gain of 24 million between 1871 and 1910 occurred completely in the towns; the percentage of rural dwellers declined from 64 percent to 38.5 percent in this period. Urbanization was associated with a falling birth rate (from 40.7 per thousand in 1871-80 to 33.9 in 1901-10). But the decline in mortality was even more marked (from 27.2 in 1871-80 to 18.7 in 1901-10). The excess of births continued to accumulate. In other words, the growth of the German population was more and more accelerated.

Germany's demographic evolution was in the main similar to that of most modern industrial populations (with the exception of France, where the fall in the birth rate affected the countryside almost as rapidly as it did the towns and as a result the decline in deaths was soon offset by a decline in births). But the particularly abrupt char-

acter of Germany's population growth is noteworthy. If compared with that of England, it can be seen that once more the decisive factor was the migratory movement.

England's urban growth was consistently checked by overseas migration, which in the beginning of the twentieth century was stimulated anew, when Canada, the last area of colonization, was being settled. On the other hand, the free course of internal and external migration and unrestricted imports has led since the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the direct depopulation of the countryside, and the very source of the "stream of fresh blood" was thus partly exhausted. Fertility rates of the rural population were still fairly high, and the countryside continued to supply additional contingents of migrants to the town and overseas, but the percentage of the population affected by this high birth rate had been reduced. After this period natural increase was somewhat slower, and with the steady decline in the birth rate a certain stabilization was arrived at.

Not so in Germany. However important the rural exodus, it never resulted in a decrease in the absolute number of rural inhabitants. Rural exodus was partly checked by agricultural protectionism. On the other hand, emigration of Germans to foreign countries declined abruptly before the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, while the percentage of rural dwellers diminished, absolute figures remained the same, and "the source of fresh blood" remained intact. Its diminution could only have been caused by a decline in rural fertility, but up to the beginning of the twentieth century birth control was unknown in the German countryside. It first appeared in 1905.

After 1905 the birth rate began to fall more rapidly than the death rate, and natural increase slowly diminished (from 14.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1901-05 to 14.1 in 1906-10 and to 12.4 in 1913). But in absolute figures natural increase reached its peak in 1906-10 (887,-127) and declined only slightly in the years preceding the outbreak of the first World War (833,800 in 1913).

But the rural population continued to leave the countryside. Overseas emigration was at a complete standstill by the end of the nineteenth century, and the shift was largely to the German cities. For a short time the hopes voiced by Chancellor Caprivi (1890-94) had come true: in a period of rapid population growth, the export of goods was substituted for the export of men. When the limits of market expansion had been reached, an effort was made to extend

Germany's economic foundations by violence, and Europe was hurled into a gigantic war.

Between 1914 and 1918 the excess of deaths in Germany was 900,000. Military losses amounted to 2 million. The civilian population lost 700,000 to 1,000,000 through abnormal deaths attributable to the rise in mortality (as compared to the years before and after the war). In addition, mobilization sharply reduced the number of births (the so-called birth deficit has been put at 3 to 3.5 million). After the war fertility did not recover to the extent of reaching its prewar volume. Both birth and death rates resumed their downward trend, but the decline in births became steeper (see Table 11).

TABLE 11
NATURAL POPULATION GROWTH IN GERMANY (1937 BORDERS)^a

<i>Years</i>	IN THOUSANDS			PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS		
	<i>Births</i>	<i>Deaths</i> ^b	<i>Excess of Births</i>	<i>Births</i>	<i>Deaths</i> ^b	<i>Excess of Births</i>
1913	1,606	885	721	26.9	14.7	12.2
1920	1,599	933	666	25.8	15.1	10.7
1921-25	1,385	829	556	22.1	13.3	8.8
1926-30	1,187	758	429	18.4	11.8	6.6
1931	1,048	734	314	16.0	11.2	4.8
1932	993	708	285	15.1	10.8	4.3
1933	971	738	233	14.7	11.2	3.5
1934	1,198	725	474	18.0	10.9	7.1
1935	1,264	792	472	18.9	11.8	7.1
1936-40	1,344	826	518	19.6	12.0	7.6
1941	1,308	846	462	18.6	12.2	6.4
1942	1,055	871	184	14.9	12.3	2.6
1943	1,132	875	257	16.0	12.4	3.6
1944 ^c	605	506	99	17.2	14.4	2.8

^a Population: 58.5 million in 1910; 63.2 in 1925; 66.0 in 1933; 69.3 in 1939.

^b Military deaths not included.

^c First six months; rates calculated for a full year.

The number of births per 1,000, women between the ages of 15 and 45 which had been 170.9 per year in 1876-80 had already fallen to 116.5 by 1913. In 1924-26 it was 78.4, and it subsequently fell to 69.4 in 1927-30, 62 in 1931, and 58.9 in 1933. The net reproduction rate (showing the trend in the replacement of one generation by another) declined from 1.4 before 1914 to 0.7 in 1933.

The decline in the birth rate continued at a rapid pace in the towns, but was also outstanding in the countryside. Thus, in the rural areas

of Prussia the birth rate fell from 35.2 for the average of the years 1906-10 to 24.6 for 1924-25 and to 20.6 for 1925-30.

The German cities saw a sudden collapse of the birth rate that was almost unparalleled in history. Consequently there was an abrupt decline in natural increase. In 1932 the excess of births for all Germany was 4.2 per 1,000 inhabitants, but in communities of more than 15,000 inhabitants this excess was only 1.6. In the fifty largest towns, which together contained more than 30 percent of the German population, it fell to 0.8 percent, and Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Dresden, Munich, Frankfurt a.M., and five other cities even recorded an excess of deaths.¹

The collapse of the birth rate began at a time when misery had befallen large sectors of the German population. The severe shortage of food in German cities, which had become more and more serious during the hostilities, did not subside immediately after the armistice. Difficulties in providing enough food for children were particularly acute because of the lack of milk. Then came the inflation of the mark, which not only ruined persons with fixed incomes but also gradually decreased the real wages of all workers until a point was reached, in October, 1923, when the weekly labor of a skilled worker was worth a quintal of potatoes; when he had to work two days for a pound of butter and six weeks for a pair of shoes.

However, the true cause of the falling birth rate cannot be traced to economic conditions. This decline occurred not only in towns but in the countryside as well, although the latter profited from inflation. Furthermore, the decrease persisted in the prosperity period between 1924 and 1929. Demographic and social factors offer the explanation: war losses among men of fighting age, the temporary removal of husbands, and the experiences of war prisoners who discovered how French farmers secured their own and their heir's prosperity. Furthermore, a very important contribution to the collapse of the birth rate was made by a factor which should have had the opposite effect according to the traditional school of thought—the slackening of rural exodus.

After the German defeat cities were no longer able to absorb newcomers. Rural exodus came to a complete standstill. When the mark became stabilized and industrial real wages went up (1924), the

¹ *Wirtschaft und Statistik* (official bulletin of the Reich Statistical Office), 1934, No. 5.

former migratory movement picked up again.² But this recovery was short-lived. From 1930, after the period of prosperity was over, the movement was again arrested and even partly reversed. Decline of internal migration had a dual influence on births: the most fertile part of the urban population was no longer constantly reinforced by new arrivals, and sometimes it even lost strength, for first-generation urbanites were naturally the first ones to return to their native villages. As a result, there was the terrific decline in city birth rates which made of Berlin the most sterile city in the world. Simultaneously, rural birth rates fell. In general, the absence of outlets for overpopulated areas does not result in lower natality, but in higher mortality. But this was not the case for the rural German population. There was a sudden improvement of living conditions in the countryside during the War of 1914-18 and especially during the inflation. Workers' children went without milk, but it was plentiful for farm children. It was no longer necessary to sell all one's possessions to raise money for taxes and the mortgage, which could be paid easily with devaluated currency. Once the habit of properly providing for children had been acquired, parents came to prefer good care for existing children to the rearing of additional ones. Furthermore, the younger generation, which would have founded new families had they migrated to the towns, failed to procreate at all if they remained at home and helped around the farm, where they were merely burdens.³

The German people thus sought to adapt themselves to reduced earning opportunities. But this adaptation occurred at a time when they had already reached the limits of their economic base. A heavy inheritance from the past weighed upon them, in the form of those born before the first World War. Birth rates had then been at a peak, infant survival had also been very high, and this generation had not participated in the war. The cohorts of 1900-14 were more numerous than any previous ones. Since the end of the war the weight of this enormous "block"⁴ was felt more and more. The effects of a declining birth rate would not be noticeable until much later, for after all, the ratio between new-born babies and dying old men affects but remotely the shape of a population. Workers came of age

² Nevertheless, "the growth of the towns was much slower than it had been before the war" (*ibid.*).

³ Herberle and Meyer, *Die Grosstädte im Strome der Binnenwanderung*, p. 58.

⁴ The expression was used by Duthel, *La Population Allemande*.

in numbers never witnessed before. For fifteen years these overflowing cohorts burdened the labor market and swelled the ranks of the unemployed. In 1932 the "block" sent its last contingent of eighteen-year-olds to the labor market. These young people formed a class apart; they were "jobless by profession, without hope and without future." Declassed from the start, they were led by men stigmatized by war⁵ and founded the national-socialist state, based upon violence and war projects. After 1933 the flow was stopped, and the "hollow classes" came of age. But it was too late. The harm had been done.

None of the German demographers saw the coming danger. They bypassed the problem of the too-numerous pre-1914 generation, whose presence thwarted every effort peacefully to adapt future generations to the country's resources. This very adaptation—the limitation of births—horrified the German population experts.

To fight "national suicide" was one of Hitler's most publicized aims. As soon as he had seized power, measures to encourage a rise in the birth rate were worked out and applied.

After 1933 Germany's demographic evolution underwent a deep change (see Table 13). Natality recovered—not only the crude birth rate (per thousand inhabitants), but also the number of births per 1,000 women between 15 and 45 years, which went up from 58.9 in 1933 to 77.3 in 1935-36. Mortality went up as well, but there was, nevertheless, a marked increase in the excess of births.

The results achieved by the Nazi government should be neither exaggerated nor minimized. Between 1934 and 1939 a marked increase in the birth rate took place, not only in the countryside but also in the towns, even in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. The rise in natality was associated with a rise in mortality, but the latter was not too pronounced. Furthermore, it can only be partly accounted for by a deterioration in food conditions and the reduction in medical care made available through social insurance, which resulted in a greater number of deaths caused by disease. Increased mortality was largely the unavoidable result of the gradual aging of the nation.

Although the excess of births was considerable, it was not as outstanding as Nazi propaganda asserted it to be. It never reached the level which prevailed under the Weimar Republic up to 1925. But the trend was modified. Instead of gradually diminishing, natural

⁵ Heiden, *Adolf Hitler*, I, 240, 244.

increase went up in 1934, and subsequently it stayed at the same level, even rising somewhat more during the two years preceding the outbreak of the second World War.

The obvious cause of the increase in births lies in the multiplication of marriages. Their number (per thousand inhabitants) increased from 7.9 in 1932 to 9.7 in 1933. It reached the peak with 11.1 in 1934, oscillated between 9.1 and 9.7 in 1935-38, and rose again to 11.1 in 1939, under the impact of the war.

There can be no doubt that the birth-promotion measures sponsored by the Hitler government played an important part. "Marriage loans" led many young people to marry earlier. As a result, the birth of a certain number of children was advanced a few years.⁶ But while the marriage loans played their part, the true basis for this increase in the number of marriages was the coming of age of larger generations. During this reign of youth the main influence was once more exercised by the "block," by those born before the War of 1914-18, but too late to take part in the war. It only applies to the men, of course, the number of adult women having remained more or less stable. After the war the lack of men of marriageable age brought about in Germany the significant phenomenon of the "struggle for the man." Between 1934 and 1938 the situation became again more favorable with respect to the balance of the sexes.⁷

The constantly growing numbers of men of marriageable age had automatically brought about an increase in marriages and births;⁸ marriage loans merely accelerated this natural evolution. But the increase in births cannot be solely attributed to that demographic factor. This is proven by the fact that there was not only a larger number of marriages and first-born children during this period but also a higher incidence of second and third children in the same family.

⁶ "Neue Beiträge zum deutschen Bevölkerungsproblem," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1935, Sonderheft 15.

⁷ Burgdörfer, *Zurück zum Agrarstaat*, p. 120, recognizes this fact in a different context, but he never mentioned its influence upon marriages and births.

⁸ It should be noted that the rise in the birth rate began as early as May, 1933. Burgdörfer himself was struck by this rapid influence of the national-socialist regime, for "in Germany it also takes 9 months until a child is born." He nevertheless makes an attempt to credit Hitler with this rise: under the influence of the new regime abortions became infrequent (Burgdörfer, "Bevölkerungsentwicklung," *Bevölkerungsfragen, Internat. Kongress Berlin, 1935*, p. 87). But children born in May, 1933, had been conceived more than 5 months before the "National Revolution," the decision to have children (and not to undergo abortion) was taken before the revolution.

At the population congress held in Paris in 1937 Burgdörfer, director in the Reich Statistical Office, speaking of the German successes, dwelt especially upon the "moral attitude of the population" based upon its "confidence in the economic and political future." But where did this confidence stem from? The political horizon was as somber as ever. The German soil produced no more than it had produced under the Weimar Republic, and outlets for German industrial products increased scarcely at all. But there was work, and there was hope—both generated by preparations for war. Armament industries rapidly absorbed millions of unemployed. The war which was being feverishly prepared promised to enlarge Germany's *Lebensraum*; the looting of the Jews was the first installment of future conquests by the "master race." Germany's population policy, which aimed at replacing the expected losses of the second World War and preparing cannon fodder for subsequent wars was one of the elements of Germany's belligerent plans. This policy awoke an echo in the hearts of the German people. They lived in the delusion of economic security and were intoxicated by a vision of future conquest and domination.

This belligerent mentality was especially pronounced among the declassed youths who had seized the country, but it was the mentality of large masses of the German population as well. The quantitative problem of the "block" was complicated by another factor: the deep change in the quality of the German people. Once more we find here the influence of migration.


After the first half of the nineteenth century the shift from the countryside to the towns coincided with another movement, going from east to west. The towns of western and central Germany were invaded by an immense flood coming from the lands beyond the Elbe. These lands had been colonized during the Middle Ages by Germans from the old German territory (west of the Elbe River), who passed on their language to its mixed population. Social conditions in these areas differed entirely from those of Germany proper; in these lands the rural population remained in genuine feudal servitude until the nineteenth century (while in Europe, west of the Elbe, the breakdown of this absolute form of serfdom had occurred as early as the thirteenth century). Some legal vestiges of this feudalism survived until 1918 and were even later reflected in prevailing customs. Under the command of their Junker masters, these serfs of yesterday submitted old Germany to Prussian hegemony. These

same serfs subsequently swarmed over the industrial centers which developed in the old western territories, rich in coal mines and waterways. The demographic relationship between the region east of the Elbe and "old" Germany is analogous to the urban-rural situation. Fertility was higher beyond the Elbe, but population growth (except in Berlin) was insignificant as compared to that of central and western Germany. The reason for this difference is found in the continuous population shift from the agricultural regions beyond the Elbe to the industrial area between the Elbe and the Main. This migratory flow crowded into the industrial centers up to the time of the first World War, especially after overseas migration had been cut off, for the latter was also in great part made up of persons from eastern Germany, and it continued during the interwar period.

It has been calculated that the "Prussian east" (all Germany east of Berlin) had a migratory loss of approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ million persons between 1840 and 1933. In fact, the number of out-migrants was far greater, for there was a large migratory influx from Poland. The number of overseas migrants from this region was slightly more than one million for this period. The remainder went to Berlin and to old Germany. In 1907, 2,328,000 persons born in the Prussian east lived in other parts of Germany, mainly in Berlin, the Rhineland, and Westphalia.

These figures fail to reflect the important influence of this migration upon the composition of the population. The higher fertility of the eastern populations and the extension of their life span, brought about by their migration to the west, increased the relative role played by these migrants in the population of old Germany, especially in the industrial centers. It may be estimated that 40 percent were here of East-German extraction.⁹ A German demographer, speaking of the relation between eastern and western Germany, inadvertently used the word *Unterwanderung* (surreptitious immigration), which means that one population was in a way undermined and ousted by another. Indeed, such a process took place in old Germany. The numerous and prolific newcomers brought with them qualities acquired during

⁹ Migratory loss of the German East, including descendants, has been estimated by Rogmann, "Bevölkerungsentwicklung des Ostens," *Archiv für Landes- und Volksforschung*, at 8-10 million. Assuming that overseas emigration was balanced by immigration from abroad, Rogmann's estimate would indicate as well the number of eastern Germans (with descendants) in the rest of Germany. In the latter area the global population of cities having more than 50,000 inhabitants was 21.4 million.



3. Internal Migration in Prussia, 1914-25

centuries of social, political, and economic serfdom. There is no need to resort to the dubious hypothesis that these "acquired qualities" were biologically transmitted to their descendants. Even in mixed marriages the influence of family life would be a strong enough factor to bring about this result. Thus, the Prussian type, disciplined, servile, and brutal, formerly a minority in Germany, became more and more the prototype of the new German. The political domination of the Prussian Junkers was able fatally to influence the German mentality because the people of Goethe and Schiller had been transformed by the continued admixture of former serfs of these same Junkers.

This accounts for the progress of barbarism in Germany, which grew despite developments in the fields of public education, science, and technology. Its consequences came to the surface during the War of 1914-18, when the "scientific barbarians" attempted to seize the wealth of more civilized peoples in their first attempt to force an outlet to the west.

Under the "national revolution," prologue to a new aggression, the barbarization of Germany was wholly accomplished. Long undermined by the gradual transformation of large groups of the population, German civilization collapsed suddenly. One of the cruelest ironies of history is the fact that the corruption and elimination of the historical German "race" should have been achieved under racial slogans.

The German Defeat in 1918

Before the first World War the prevailing direction of migratory movements in Europe west of the watershed had been from east to west. A sizable immigration from the east entered Germany on the eve of the war, and even more arrived after 1914. This influx was an important factor in Germany's war economy. At the outbreak of the war the Poles, Ukrainians, and Belorussians employed in agriculture numbered almost half a million, representing 9/10 of all foreign agricultural laborers in Germany. More than 3/4 of these workers were Russian nationals. Their status was that of "civilian prisoners." This was a new juridical concept, devised by the German administration, which enabled the retention of these workers in servile condition with interdiction against quitting their jobs.

The importance of forced labor for the German economy grew in

the course of the war. A large quota was supplied by the west. Apart from the French and the Belgian prisoners of war, there were those abducted to Germany or recruited as so-called "volunteers." The latter had become unemployed because the Germans had carried off machinery and stocks and had interfered with the payment of unemployment compensation. Most of the workers were employed for purposes of the German war effort in their countries of residence, but others were sent to Germany; 107,000 Belgian "volunteers" went to Germany, and 60,000 were forcibly deported.

But the main labor contingents were supplied by the east. When, after their failure to break through in the west, the Germans invaded the immense eastern territories, they found there new manpower, especially for agriculture. By October 10, 1918, Germany held more than 2 million prisoners of war, including 1,200,000 Russians, whom the Germans were in no hurry to liberate, despite the peace of Brest-Litovsk.¹⁰ Almost one million of these prisoners were engaged in agriculture. The Germans, furthermore, conducted veritable raids in eastern occupied territories, and abducted men and young women to Germany. Forcibly abducted workers from Russian Poland in Germany numbered at least 350,000,¹¹ and deportations to Germany, especially for farm work, took place from other parts of German-conquered Russia as well. These activities continued even after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, up to the end of the German occupation.

But a reflux was already under way. The final attempt of the east-west current to force the gates of the west ended in failure. After the armistice the defeated German troops returned from the western front, an immense¹² and sometimes chaotic mass. The German army had to evacuate the Rhineland, and a considerable number of refugees joined the retreating armies—mainly groups which for personal or business reasons were connected with the German army, and followed its evacuation imposed by the Allies.¹³

¹⁰ According to the *Reichszentrale für Kriegsgefangene*, there were 2,042,000 prisoners on Oct. 10, 1918. 1,420,000 Russian prisoners were in German captivity in the course of the war; 1,207,000 remained by Oct. 10, 1918. Allowance being made for deaths, escapes, and exchanges, it can be seen that the Germans liberated practically none after the peace of Brest-Litovsk.

¹¹ Ruziewicz, *Le Problème de l'émigration polonaise en Allemagne*, pp. 26, 91-92.

¹² The total number of Germans mobilized for military service amounted to 13,250,000. At the end of the war the German forces numbered 8,000,000, of whom 3,400,000 were on the western front, 500,000 on other fronts, and 1,400,000 in German-occupied countries.

¹³ *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, CCCC1, 552.

The void created in the Rhineland by the military evacuation and its civilian following was soon filled by immigrants from the west.¹⁴ The main quota was supplied by Germans from Alsace-Lorraine, who left the province after its return to France. The German Migration Office put at 120,000 the number of emigrants from Alsace-Lorraine to Germany during and after the war, including the year 1920.¹⁵ According to the 1925 census, the number of persons who had lived in Alsace-Lorraine in 1914 and were domiciled in Germany in 1925 was 132,000. This migratory branch was extended by the immigration into Alsace-Lorraine of Frenchmen from other parts of France. Up to 1921 their influx did not, however, exceed 50,000.¹⁶ Furthermore, inquiries on residence in 1914 revealed that in 1925 there were in Germany 5,000 immigrants from Eupen-et-Malmédy and 37,000 from the Saar territory, then under international control. This number of 174,000 repatriates fails to reflect the total influx into the Reich from the former German areas in the west.¹⁷ To obtain complete figures, the German Statistical Office adds in similar cases approximately one fourth to the reported numbers. If we apply this method to this particular immigration, a total of some 220,000 is reached.

Detailed information on the geographical distribution of immigrants is available for those from Alsace-Lorraine: two thirds settled in Prussian Rhineland, Baden, Hesse-Nassau, Westphalia, Württemberg, and the Palatinate; those provinces were either occupied by the Allies or else belonged to the zone from which German troops and

¹⁴ Besides German in-migrants, there were Allied troops and foreigners who followed these armies. At the time of the 1925 census there were 116,000 occupation troops; 87,000 of them were Frenchmen. At that time there were only 7,300 French civilians in all Germany, as well as 6,900 Belgians and 6,400 Englishmen, but the number had been considerably higher before the stabilization of the mark.

¹⁵ *Reichstagsdrucksache*, 1920-22, No. 484, p. 13.

¹⁶ Baulig, "La Population de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine," *Annales de Géographie*, Jan., 1923, pp. 20-23. Between the German census of 1910 and the French census of 1921 the population of Alsace-Lorraine suffered a net decrease of 164,000 or 8.8 percent (as compared with a net decrease of 4.4 percent between the census of 1911 and that of 1921 for the remainder of France). There were 220,000 non-Alsatian German civilians and 65,000 other foreigners in Alsace in 1910. In 1921 the number of foreigners was only 133,000. The German garrison of 82,000 of 1910 was replaced in 1921 by a French garrison of 50,000. See Hubert, *La Population de la France pendant la guerre*, pp. 456, 460.

¹⁷ This inquiry failed to record: (a) children who were born in the countries in question (Alsace-Lorraine, etc.) after the beginning of the war and were subsequently taken to Germany; (b) persons who had come to Germany after the beginning of the war and had died or left for other countries before the 1925 census.

military establishments had been evacuated by virtue of the armistice and the Versailles treatise. Only 4 percent went to Berlin. The majority of immigrants from Eupen-et-Malmédy are found in neighboring Prussian Rhineland, and half the immigrants from the Saar territory settled on the left bank of the Rhine, in Prussian Rhineland and in the Palatinate.¹⁸

Here we can clearly distinguish a stream of migratory movements from west to east: flight of the Rhineland population in the wake of the German troops to the interior of Germany, immigration into Germany of inhabitants from Alsace, Lorraine, Eupen-et-Malmédy, and the Saar, and immigration into Alsace-Lorraine of Frenchmen from the interior of France.

The effects of this refugee influx were most detrimental to Germany. A disorganized army and panicky refugees streamed into a country severely shaken by war, whose economic foundations were shattered. Peace at first merely destroyed her artificial "war economy." Before 1914 Germany's ever-increasing population could make a living, thanks to her export industries. The war had crippled these industries and wiped out foreign commerce. Germany's most immediate problem was the lack of subsistence means. Not only had the war deprived the country of imported foodstuffs, but Germany's agriculture had suffered a severe blow as well. Farm labor had been sharply curtailed as a result of mobilization. In the east vast spaces had remained untilled. Livestock had been reduced by two thirds. During the war severe rationing measures had been introduced, and agriculture had been maintained by slave labor. Defeat and revolution in Germany put an end to this system. Forced laborers, civilians, and war prisoners were released; two million war prisoners were liberated after the armistice, and except for a certain number of Russians, they left Germany without delay.¹⁹ The number of foreign workers fell from more than 700,000 in 1918 to some 250,000 in 1919. Agriculture lost more than one million laborers. Despite the large number of demobilized, it was not possible to recruit among the unemployed a sufficient number willing and able to do farm work. The labor shortage in agriculture was very acute, and its disastrous effects upon production soon became manifest.

¹⁸ *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, CCCCI, 539-40.

¹⁹ In 1919, 200,000 Russian prisoners were still employed in German agriculture. As for German war prisoners, the majority of the 700,000 men captured on the western front did not return before the beginning of 1920.

The German Revolution was born out of the weariness of the army. Only later did politicians of the extreme left step in with phrases borrowed from the Russian vocabulary and give to this collapse the desired political shading. The majority of the revolting soldiers had only one thought: to return home (*zu Mutter*). Besides, even if the soldiers had been kept under arms, there would have been no possibility of feeding and supplying them. However, "active" elements of a special type remained in the barracks to devote themselves to politics. "In this way a most undesirable selection took place. The good ones left, the evil stayed . . . this category of soldiers planned to become annuitants of the Revolution."²⁰ Among these "pensioners" (one of them was Adolf Hitler) were recruited the Spartacists,²¹ as well as the nationalist saviors of "law and order," who dreamed of a war of vengeance.

The promoters of the bolshevist Revolution in Germany finished their short careers upon the Berlin barricades during the Spartacist uprisings and at the time of the defense of the Soviet Republic of Bavaria. They were exterminated by nationalistic counterrevolutionaries, whom the social-democrat government had hired "to restore order." The nationalists were led by officers who had been left jobless by the dissolution of the army. They recruited volunteers and organized "free corps" made up of the unemployed or adventure-seeking young people. When in later years a regular armed force was re-established, those "free legions" were not in the least discontinued. The Versailles Treaty limited the Reichswehr to 100,000 men. There was room for only one tenth of the former officers. In their effort to circumvent the limitations upon the size of the Reichswehr, German military leaders sponsored paramilitary formations, which were a clandestine military reserve and guarded munitions depots hidden from Allied control. As time passed, these paramilitary organizations assumed a more and more antirepublican character; they were later to become an instrument of terrorism in the hands of the rightists. Here can be found the embryo of the private army with which Hitler was to conquer Germany.

A decisive share in the development of these formations can be attributed to certain shiftless elements, who at the time of the first

²⁰ Scheidemann, *Der Zusammenbruch*, pp. 215-16. The facts reported by Noske, *Zehn Jahre deutscher Geschichte*, p. 33, and *Von Kiel bis Kapp*, p. 77, illustrate the moral level of these "revolutionaries."

²¹ Members of the extreme left, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.

and worst confusion of the armistice period had sought an outlet in the east.

The Baltic Adventure

We have stressed the participation of former German war prisoners in the Russian civil war. Germans who found themselves inside Russia joined the Red army and became professional bolshevists. At the same time, other Germans used the struggle against the bolshevists as a pretext for staying in the Baltic States or for waging war there. After the German capitulation, the Reich was permitted by the Allies to delay the evacuation of former Russian territories, because this evacuation would "deliver the population to the horrors of bolshevism." The Germans attempted on this basis to conquer once more the Baltic States, openly aiming at colonization,

This German army was also in the process of dissolution. The delegate of the revolutionary government of Berlin reported that the bulk of the German army was most anxious to return home and had no lesser worry than to defend the Baltic States against "the horrors of bolshevism." "But wherever there was a chance to make some money, you could always find someone who would take advantage of it, and in such a case, the homeland no longer exerted any appeal."²² It was soon possible to recruit troops on a voluntary basis among soldiers of the old army who wanted to stay in the Baltic States. They were joined by Baltic Germans (members of the aristocracy and upper middle class), some Russian and Latvian detachments, led by German officers, and an increasing number of adventurers, recruited in the Reich, who were mainly attracted by the promise of the distribution of free land.

When the Germans first invaded the Baltic States, in 1915, they thought of colonizing these countries. They were supported in these plans by the local Baltic Germans, who thus hoped to maintain their social domination and to protect their lands against the growing demands of the native peoples. The agrarian revolution in Russia stimulated this policy of the Baltic Germans. In Courland the aristocracy offered 1/3 of their land for settlement by German farmers. Colonization plans were subsequently extended to all of Latvia and Estonia, which Germany occupied in 1918. After the collapse of the Reich, neither the Baltic aristocracy nor the Germans abandoned

²² Winnig, *Am Ausgang der deutschen Ostpolitik*, pp. 47, 63.

the project. General von der Goltz, whose mission it was to "defend Eastern Prussia against bolshevism," came up with the grandiose idea of taking up again "in a different form and under the banner of the anti-bolshevist struggle, the German policy towards the east," which meant her policy of conquest and colonization. This domination was to be extended not only to the neighboring provinces, "which were depopulated and ruined, and called for hard-working German peasants for their fertile lands," but to all Russia as well, for the latter, "after the extermination of her intellectuals," was "most impatient to find German leaders."²³ In December, 1918, the new Latvian government promised the right of residence to all foreign soldiers who had participated in the defense of the country against the bolsheviks. This promise was interpreted by the German soldiers, who knew that they could count on the local barons, as a recognized demand for land. Recruitment for the Baltic "Free Corps" in Germany met with considerable success. The prospect of free land was not the only incentive. The recruits themselves used the name "lansquenets."²⁴ They were a mercenary outfit in the worst sense of the term, ready to wage war under any banner, but always for their own profit. They made an attempt to overthrow the Latvian government and to substitute for it a government of Baltic Germans, which would have been completely in their hands. After the Allies acceded to the demands of the Latvian government and put pressure on the German government to recall these volunteers, Goltz's troops were transferred to the service of a "Russian government" represented by the adventurer Bermond-Avalov. The latter invaded the Baltic States with troops recruited among Russian war prisoners held in Germany and with the consent of the German government. No less than the intervention of the British navy and an Allied ultimatum to Germany were needed to put an end to this expedition by a large corps of mercenaries.

Some 30,000 German and Russian soldiers were evacuated to Germany after the failure of the expedition. But the lansquenets came not alone. Their bosses and allies, the local barons and other Baltic Germans, left Estonia and Latvia, where the power finally reverted to the local populations, with the resulting loss of lands and privileges

²³ Von der Goltz, *Als politischer General im Osten*, pp. 84 ff. Winnig, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

²⁴ *Landsknechte wurden wir* (We Became Lansquenets) is the title of a book written by Captain Bella in 1923.

by the German minority. But the sinister role played by all these dejected elements had not yet come to an end.

The Free Corps from the Balticum were "the shock troops of counterrevolution who had started on their march from Riga to Berlin."²⁵ General von der Goltz who was in charge of these men boasted that he infused his soldiers with the idea that thereafter they were to treat their fatherland like a battlefield.²⁶ When the government of the German Republic ordered the dissolution of the Baltic troops, the latter resisted demobilization and were prepared to maintain their existence by any means. In March, 1920, Kapp organized an uprising which was literally an attempt by the Balticum fighters to conquer Germany.²⁷

After Kapp had failed, part of the Balticum fighters managed to have themselves hired by the republican government, the very government they aspired to overthrow. They were sent to "reestablish law and order" by shooting Ruhr miners. Others became conspirators and political assassins. They were to be found in every secret military and terrorist outfit. Later, they joined Adolf Hitler and were among the German shock troops which waged guerrilla warfare in Upper Silesia in 1921.²⁸ The German emigrés from the Baltic also played a considerable part in the birth and development of the great "outcast movement" which Nazism started out to be.

Nevertheless, in a way the "Baltic fever" had been beneficial for Germany, for in a crucial period it had kept busy the most desperate and irresponsible elements. During their absence the reconstruction task could be initiated.

The Influx into Germany from the East and Internal Shifts

The expulsion of the Balticum adventurers and the influx of Baltic-German refugees coincided with a general reversal of the migratory movement. Germany was compelled to give up some of her eastern territories, and these attracted a very active Polish in-migration. Somewhat later, the struggle for Upper Silesia ended in another

²⁵ Rosenberg, *A History of the German Republic*, pp. 121-23.

²⁶ Von der Goltz, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

²⁷ During his reign, which lasted for a few days, Kapp sat in Berlin "surrounded by a few thousand soldiers from the Baltic States" (Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 137).

²⁸ See p. 133. Participation in the struggle for Upper Silesia is a recurring trait in the biography of Hitler's sub-Fuehrers.

retreat. German emigration from the sector of Poznan which had been occupied by the Poles before the Versailles Treaty was started as early as 1919; from the remainder of Poznan and from Polish Pomerania the Germans left in large numbers by 1920, and eastern Upper Silesia sent her contingent by 1922. From Poland, Danzig, Memel, and Russia a stream of "co-nationals" penetrated into the Reich and claimed their share in the fatherland.

The German Migration Office²⁹ estimated the net immigration into the Reich (post-1919 boundaries) since the beginning of the war, up to and including 1920, at 950,000-970,000 persons, this total being composed of the following groups: 120,000 immigrants from Alsace-Lorraine, 500,000 immigrants from other territories detached from the Reich, 190,000-200,000 German nationals from abroad (including 20,000 from the colonies), 70,000 *Deutschstämmige*, that is, ethnic Germans (100,000, of whom 30,000 reemigrated subsequently), 20,000 Baltic Germans (25,000 immigrants, of whom 5,000 reemigrated), and 50,000-60,000 Jews from eastern Europe (estimate based on the excess of immigrants over emigrants).

Among this total, only the 120,000 immigrants from Alsace-Lorraine came from the west. The overwhelming majority of the 500,000 immigrants from other formerly German territories came certainly from the east (Poznan, Polish Pomerania, and Danzig); the same holds true for the Baltic Germans and the Jews from eastern Europe, who together totaled some 70,000-80,000. In addition, a large part of the German nationals repatriated from abroad (from countries which had not formerly belonged to the Reich) came also from the east, from the old Russian Empire. The great German settlements of merchants, industrialists, technicians, and others disappeared from Soviet Russia and declined strongly in Lodz and other Polish areas. The category of ethnic Germans (*Deutschstämmige*) was also largely made up of refugees from Russia. They had fled civil war and bolshevism just as had other Russians, and they took advantage of their "racial affinities" to seek asylum in Germany, where they asked residence privileges. In fact, among those whom the German statistics grouped under the heading "ethnic Germans" and also among Jews from eastern Europe was partly the vanguard of the emigration from Russia; the main stream of the Russian refugees was to arrive later.

²⁹ *Reichstagsdrucksache*, 1920-22, No. 4084. For an evaluation of this estimate, see Müller, *Deutsche Bevölkerungsstatistik*, p. 254.

TABLE 12

PERSONS ENUMERATED IN THE REICH IN 1925 WHO ON AUGUST 1, 1914,
LIVED OUTSIDE THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF THE REICH

<i>Former Country of Residence</i>	<i>Number of Immigrants</i>	<i>Number of Foreigners among Immigrants</i>
European territories detached from Germany		
Poznan and Polish Pomerania ("Western Prussia")	468,000	
Polish Upper Silesia	90,000	
Danzig	44,000	
Memel	16,000	
Hultschin ^a	3,000	
Danish Schleswig	12,000	
Alsace-Lorraine	132,000	
Eupen-et-Malmédy	5,000	
All detached territories	770,000	21,000
Former German colonies	9,000	...
Saar	37,000	...
Other countries		
Eastern Europe	253,000	148,000
Southeastern Europe	115,000	72,000
Southern Europe	13,000	5,000
Western Europe	134,000	24,000
Northern Europe	9,000	...
Non-European countries	36,000	9,000
Total	1,377,000	279,000

^a Ceded to Czechoslovakia.

An important emigree colony was formed in 1922-24. The German census of 1925 took into account changes which had occurred between 1920 and 1925.³⁰ Its results (see Table 12) are very precise and detailed and show still more conclusively the influx from the east.

On the basis of these data, the German Statistical Office estimated at more than 1.5 million the total number of immigrants who entered Germany between the beginning of the war and the census of 1925.³¹

Three fundamentally different elements can be distinguished in this immigration. There was the influx into Germany proper of persons from territories detached from the Reich. In the second place, a number of German nationals who prior to the war had lived abroad returned to the Reich because of certain restrictions which were be-

³⁰ *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, CCCCI, 538-44.

³¹ See above, note 17, on categories of immigrants who fall outside this classification.

ing imposed upon their activities and because of a general atmosphere of hostility. In the third place, there was the usual immigration of foreigners. Despite the diversity of migrants and the different motivations involved, the geographical direction of the current was very definite. Among immigrants from territories detached from the Reich, 4/5 came from the east. Adding immigrants from eastern Europe, a total of 874,000 newcomers from the east is reached. They constituted almost 2/3 of the 1,377,000 recorded immigrants.

As usual, the majority of the immigrants settled near the border which they had crossed. Three fourths of the former residents of Poznan and Polish Pomerania recorded in 1925 were in territories east of the Elbe (325,000, of whom 84,000 were in Berlin). The small remnants of the former Prussian provinces of Poznan and western Prussia, which were retained under the name "frontier-march" (*Grenzmark*) received 26,000 immigrants, "a very considerable number in proportion to the size of this province." West of the Elbe, only the Rhineland-Westphalia area took an important share of these immigrants (64,000).

The eastern regions, which now received the bulk of the immigrants, were in turn centers of out-migration. Out-migrants mainly went to the great industrial centers which, with the exception of Berlin, were situated in northwestern and western Germany. This fact is again illustrated by data on past residence collected at the time of the census. A special study³² established on this basis the number of persons shifted from one part of Prussia to another. We have used its results for the map on page 165.

We are faced here with the continuation of the east-west current which we have seen in Poland. After passing the German border, the current still followed the same direction. It was simultaneously a long-distance migration and a series of short-distance moves, and the two here intertwined. Short-distance shifts eventually ended at the same spot where long-distance migration went. In the west, this goal was the industrial region of Westphalia and the Rhineland. True, this current only went there insofar as it was not diverted to Berlin. This metropolis absorbed immigrants from everywhere and never restored them. But its main quotas were supplied by the east. Those who escaped the tentacles of this insatiable monster, continued

³² Keller, "Wanderungen zwischen den preussischen Provinzen," *Zeitschrift des preussischen Statistischen Landesamts*, Vol. LXX, 1931.

their journey beyond the Elbe. In central and western Germany the east-west current pursued its course, so to speak, behind the back of Berlin.

Rogmann, who studied the history of the exodus from eastern Germany, came close to the idea of continuity in migratory currents. He found a "joint action" of long- and short-distance migrations. "Migration not only proceeds at long-distance towards the ultimate reception area, but also by *étapes*, through several intermediate points. Migration from remotest territories is in itself one of the causes which occasioned the departure of inhabitants from territories situated in more forward areas."⁸³ We have seen that this holds true for immigration into the Reich from the detached eastern territories as well as for internal shifts. The two movements are closely connected, and they give the impression that the first pushes the second.

With the help of the method employed for the first time by the German Statistical Office in 1925 (comparison between present and past residence over a given period) the course of the east-west current was shown more clearly for the interwar period than it had ever been in the past. But we can in no way conclude from this evidence that this orientation of German migration had become more pronounced in this period. In fact, the opposite held true. The volume of the current which penetrated into Germany through her new eastern borders was larger than ever. But inside Germany the stream towards the west was weaker. There was no issue abroad. Only towards the end of this period did Germany send a short-lived, but heavy flow of emigrants abroad, to the west, to France, and to the United States. This history of Germany's migrations helps one to understand the political history of this period.

Inflation, Emigration, and Prosperity

The flow of immigrants from the east invaded a country more or less back on its feet, but economically ruined by war. The immediate outlook was dark. Germany was a densely populated industrial country and needed to import both foodstuffs and raw materials. Before 1914 she could pay for them by means of exports and interest from investments abroad. The war had annihilated German investments abroad. Outlets for German industrial products had been

⁸³ Rogmann, *Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung im preussischen Osten*, p. 136.

curtailed by the growth of local industries abroad and the capture of markets by competitor nations. German economists insisted that "Germany found herself in a position of relative overpopulation, which means that under the new economic conditions it was no longer possible to supply the same population with the same amount of goods and services as had been possible before the war."³⁴ Estimates of the "excess" German population varied from 6 to 20 million.

These estimates are obviously exaggerated. They furnished one form of propaganda against the peace treaty, and the sincerity of the German complaints about overpopulation is doubtful. The author of one such estimate, Jung, who was president of the Migration Office, declared simultaneously that large-scale emigration would be "a national disaster for the Reich," for Germany needed every one of her sons to repair "the damages caused by the war and the hunger blockade." But during the months following the German defeat the people were truly in an emigration mood. "The eyes of stranded and desperate men turned to lands which had suffered little from war. Once more, as in the forties and the eighties of the past century, emigration fever became a sort of mass psychosis."³⁵

But emigration possibilities were extremely limited. "Among overseas countries, few were open to German emigrants immediately after the war. Asia, Africa, Australia, and Canada were closed to the Germans; the United States approved entry permits only in exceptional cases. Brazil had also been an enemy nation and gave out immigration permits with reluctance."³⁶

The moment of the emigration "psychosis" went by. The German authorities did not take advantage of the remaining available outlets (in Latin America) as a safety valve against the state of tension in Germany and the accumulation of new explosive forces. Considering Jung's ideas on the subject, it is not surprising that his administration did nothing to eliminate those 6 million Germans whom he considered superfluous, but whom he nevertheless wished to retain in the Reich. It is true that no one abroad was particularly anxious to receive Germans. The idea that absorption of immigrants might deflate a future German danger certainly occurred to no one.

Temporarily, Germany found a quite different solution for her

³⁴ Thalheim, *Das Deutsche Auswanderungsproblem der Nachkriegszeit*, p. 70.

³⁵ Thalheim, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

economic problems. On August 31, 1923, the German minister Von Raumer summarized the German economic effort since the war with cynical frankness. "At first, we lived off the losses of foreign countries, then off our own annuitants, and finally we spent our economic reserves."³⁷ By blasting her currency, Germany inaugurated a series of operations through which she benefited at the expense of foreign investors, while she noisily complained about the unbearable burden of reparations. Germany dumped abroad an estimated 11 billion marks in currency, stocks, mortgages, and so forth, which eventually lost all value. The urban middle class was stripped through depreciation of bank accounts, bonds, and pensions. On the other hand, all owners of rural property, small and large, benefited from inflation, for they received the prewar equivalent for their products and saw their mortgages considerably reduced. But the main profiteers from inflation were the great industrialists. "Heavy industry enjoyed a Golden Age. It was freed of debt, and continually obtained from a kindly Reichsbank fresh credits which were in practice never repaid. Thanks to the inflation, the industrialists paid almost nothing in taxes, and they carried on production at the lowest possible real wages."³⁸

Under the circumstances, German industrialists organized the dumping of products abroad and thus retrieved part of the commercial position lost during the first World War. In this way, Germany was able to pay for some of her indispensable imports. Wages were miserable, but at least there was practically no unemployment.

However, operations with depreciated currency could be continued only as long as the mark was still an accepted instrument of payment. In 1923 the financing of resistance against the French occupation of the Ruhr dealt the mortal blow to the mark. The number of jobless grew rapidly. In addition, more than 150,000 *saboteurs* were expelled from the occupied region, and they constituted more applicants for relief, exacting and tumultuous customers who made for constant disorder and insecurity. In the fall of 1923 the country was on the verge of a civil war. In Saxony and Thuringia the rumbles of the Red Revolution were heard. On the other hand, the ruined middle class, other formerly privileged groups who had lost their status, officers who had not entered the Reichswehr, and other de-classed persons raised the banner of revolt against the "Jewish

³⁷ Horkenbach, *Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis heute*, p. 172.

³⁸ Rosenberg, *A History of the German Republic*, p. 150.

Republic." In Bavaria "the Christian order was saved from the Marxists" when a dictatorship which gave a foretaste of future developments was established; some Jews were expelled, and their property was sequestered. Encouraged by this regime, Hitler attempted his famous Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in November, 1923.

The situation was not basically improved after the mark had been stabilized. Unemployment increased. The means for exporting and importing which the German industrialists had come to rely upon during the inflation were no longer there. In July, 1923, Germany had 180,000 unemployed on relief rolls, and five months later they numbered one and one half million.

In December, 1923, no thoughtful observer would have wagered five shillings on the continuance of the Weimar Republic, for all the democratic forces in the country had been demobilized and all the trumps were in the hand of the counterrevolution. But when the next spring came, the state of martial law faded softly and silently away. The enabling law expired, the currency remained stable, and the Democratic Republic suddenly reappeared without creating any particular sensation and without any dramatic struggle. This miracle came as a result of a change in reparations policy, resulting from the intervention of the New York Stock Exchange in German affairs, and also as a consequence of Stresemann's efforts.³⁹

But there was another factor which had alleviated the tension before the matter of reparations had been temporarily solved and before Wall Street's intervention and Stresemann's appeasement policy. The east-west migratory current which went through Germany found a temporary outlet. This was a sufficient safety valve to prevent an immediate explosion.

A certain emigration towards the west had existed before 1923. Agricultural populations were not shifted, for they enjoyed relative prosperity, and industrial workers hesitated to take the decisive step of leaving their country. There were a number of intermediate elements which then supplied a contingent of emigrants. Domestic servants, mostly girls from the countryside, in general the most mobile element of an urban population, were the first ones to take to the road. They mainly went to The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries; some went to Switzerland. They numbered tens of thou-

* *Ibid.*, p. 221.

sands in 1922.⁴⁰ An important emigration of skilled workers occurred in 1923. It took the same direction, towards Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and some went to Spain. This movement can be largely termed an emigration in search of better money. Foreign currency was sought for subsequent spending in Germany, and indeed this emigration was of an essentially temporary character. The German Migration Office put the number of emigrants to European countries at 45,000 in 1923. Thalheim estimated the total volume of continental emigration of Germans at 160,000 between 1919 and 1924.

A migratory movement of much vaster dimensions broke out abruptly in 1923. It was not temporary and did not involve Germans. It originated in Westphalia, whence it went straight westward to France, a country into which an ordinary emigration from Germany could not have penetrated at all. We have mentioned that in certain cases when a migratory current is repelled on the battlefield, it nevertheless penetrates to its goal after the hostilities are over, because the victorious country needs manpower and invites immigration. The German attempt to force an outlet in the west failed in 1918, and postwar conditions and national feelings further reduced the possibility for even a minor immigration of Germans into France. Yet, the channel was eventually opened. The east-west current, which had been obstructed by the French border before the War of 1914-18,⁴¹ at last poured into France.

During the first World War the greater part of the large coal basin of northern France was almost immediately occupied by the enemy. This area supplied approximately two thirds of France's coal. Almost all French miners had been evacuated. Like many other migrations, this one determined a change in profession among many of the evacuees, and after the war a considerable number failed to return. The French coal mines, which had employed more than 200,000 workers on the eve of the war, disposed of no more than about a hundred thousand in the first years following the peace, when three times as many were needed. For in addition to reconstruction needs,

⁴⁰ *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nov. 24, 1922, reported 100,000 in Holland. However, in 1922 the services for the protection of young girls on railroads recorded but 10,000 emigrant girls in 7 months.

⁴¹ A. and E. M. Kulischer, *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge*, p. 169.

France had a new consumer—the recuperated Lorraine steel industry, formerly supplied by German coal.

It was then that France decided to occupy the Ruhr. The problem was solved, not because of the occupation, which in itself was rather unproductive, but because manpower needed for France's mines was thus recruited. It was solved through the influx of Polish miners from Westphalia, who for the past twenty-five years had immigrated into this part of Germany. During the occupation recruiting agents were sent by the Committee of French Mines. Their task was simplified, because it had been agreed between France and Poland that in occupied areas Polish consulates were authorized to issue passports to persons of Polish descent in order to facilitate their journey to France. In still another way did the French occupation stimulate subsequent migration to France. Polish miners had not joined the German-organized protest strikes against French occupation, and they feared German reprisals after the departure of French troops. They therefore preferred to leave for France. It can be further assumed that numerous German strikebreakers pretended to be Poles so as to be able to depart.

Some 20,000 to 30,000 miners migrated under this arrangement. Including their families, the total was estimated at 150,000 persons by the Polish consul at Essen. This evacuation of Polish miners and their families abruptly relieved unemployment in the coal industry. Simultaneously, German emigration to the United States increased suddenly. This was the period when America took severe measures against immigration and importation of foreign goods. But the quota system introduced in 1921 and reinforced in 1924, while it limited European immigration as a whole, favored "old immigration," such as that from Great Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia, at the expense of the "new immigration" (from eastern and southern Europe). Overseas migration from Germany rose abruptly, from 37,000 in 1922 to 115,000 in 1923 (93,000 of whom went to the United States). Such emigration figures had not been heard of in Germany since 1893; the yearly average in 1911-13 had been only 22,000. The cause of this sudden influx was the panic which broke out during the collapse of the mark. Because only small numbers had immigrated in 1922, large numbers could come in before July 1, 1923. The yearly quota of 68,000 German immigrants to the United States was filled as early as December, 1923, for the period from July 1, 1923 to June

30, 1924. Subsequently the quota was reduced to 51,000, in 1924, and even to 26,000, in 1928. Nevertheless, almost 60,000 Germans went overseas in 1924, and an even larger number in the three following years. Approximately three fourths of all migrants went to the United States. It should be pointed out that although after 1870 the agricultural region beyond the Elbe had been the principal reservoir of overseas, as well as of internal, migration, in the postwar years "the zone supplying the largest proportion of emigrants was farther to the southwest. This was a return to the past, to the situation which had prevailed in the middle of the nineteenth century. Northwestern Germany retained a strong trend towards emigration, but the part played by the northeast diminished. On the other hand, a new center of emigration developed in the industrial regions of central and western Germany."⁴²

The true impact of this emigration cannot be understood from the average figures for these years, but must be sought in the sudden exodus of more than one hundred and fifty thousand persons in 1923-24, to whom must be added an approximately equal number of Poles from Westphalia who went to France and the emigration to The Netherlands, which was only temporary, but nevertheless removed persons from Germany for the time being. Those were only momentary safety valves, but they were active at a time when tension had become almost intolerable. It should be stressed that some of the most dangerous elements, few in number, took part in this emigration over the whole period (1919-24). The Versailles Treaty had stipulated that Germany was to forbid all emigration for enlistment in foreign armies. Nevertheless, a number of former officers emigrated. When Hitler's government recalled them, in 1938, for reintegration into the German army, their number was given as 3,000. The clause of the Versailles Treaty also had not prevented the enlistment of very many Germans in the French Foreign Legion.⁴³

In 1923 the pressure from abroad was lessened as well. Immigrants

⁴² *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, CCCVII, 58.

⁴³ R. Hennig and L. Körholz, *Einführung in die Geopolitik*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1933, p. 102. The authors estimated 40,000 Germans among the total effectif of 54,000 of the French Foreign Legion in 1933. This statement is confirmed by A. Raulet, *Legion über Alles, Souvenirs sur la Légion Etrangère*, 1934, pp. 136, 176: "Among 100 *legionnaires*, there are at least 60 Germans . . . The majority of the *legionnaires* come from central Europe. Almost all speak German. Belgians, Italians, and Frenchmen who enlist learn to speak the tongue of Goethe as soon as they arrive."

from the east, formerly attracted partly by progressing depreciation of the German currency, no longer poured in, and when the mark was eventually controlled, they left the country. The great influx of Germans from abroad was completed. Immigration from Poland was at rest until 1925.

The basic economic problem was, however, far from solved. The population grew, and its economic basis was reduced and could not be expanded as long as there were no foreign outlets for German production. But once the impending catastrophe had been avoided, new gold streamed into Germany. The United States had become the creditor of the world and did not accept any goods in payment. She had to invest excess capital which accumulated in her vaults. Germany seemed an excellent field for investments for American and also some European capitalists. The Reich itself, its various provinces, municipalities, industries, rural estate holders, had all expropriated their former creditors during the inflation. Here was an opportunity for productive investment, partly through the construction of "super-factories" for nonexistent markets, partly for the production of such essential and urgent projects as "the largest organ in the world" and the "most luxurious press exhibition."⁴⁴ Yet who would question the soundness of investments in a country which prospered so visibly? All branches of industry were busy, mainly supplying each other. Unemployment was almost licked; wages went up. The Germans were "the most peaceful people on earth"; the spirit of Locarno triumphed. The cost of this achievement had been a mere 25-30 billions of gold marks which the Germans had borrowed; at the same time, they paid 8 billion of them in reparations, half of it in goods. The unfortunate part of it all was that this prosperity and peace presupposed an eternal flow of capital from creditors endowed not only with unshakable faith but also with unlimited funds.

World Depression and the Advent of National Socialism

In 1929, when America herself faced financial troubles and discontinued her loans, Germany's artificial prosperity came to an abrupt end. Widespread unemployment broke out. The towns no longer appealed to in-migrants, and soon a reflux took place. In 1924-30 the global population of larger cities (more than 100,000

⁴⁴ Stresemann's letter to Jarres of November 24, 1927.

inhabitants) had an annual migratory gain of 105,000 persons; in 1931-32 there was an annual loss of 90,000.

We have seen that in Germany the rural exodus largely coincided with the east-west movement. Accordingly, the year 1930 marked a definite change in the trend of internal migration. The turn can be distinctly observed in East Prussia, since in this province the system of registration of arrivals and departures functioned not only in larger cities (as elsewhere in Germany) but also in all other communities. As revealed by these direct statistics, the migratory loss rose from 6,000 in 1926 to 21,000 in 1929; it then fell off to 4,000 in 1930, and a migratory gain of 4,000 was recorded for 1931. In 1932 the migratory balance was almost even.⁴⁵ The reversal of internal migration had immediate repercussions on immigration from the east. From 1931 on, the number of foreign workers permitted to enter the Reich for employment declined rapidly: farm laborers (Poles and Czechoslovaks) decreased from 141,000 in 1929 to 43,000 in 1932; industrial workers, from 96,000 to 66,000. "The employment of foreign labor was restricted because of widespread unemployment in Germany."⁴⁶

This new depression period differed from the inflation period in that the hardships of the towns were in no way paralleled by rural prosperity. Heavily in debt and crushed by taxes, the peasants suffered from the decline in urban purchasing power. The only profiteers were the Junkers, whose crops brought better prices because of a high tariff on imported grain. The peasants, however, who needed to purchase large amounts of grain for cattle breeding, which was their main source of income, were extremely dissatisfied by these conditions. Organized collective resistance against distress for debts or unpaid taxes was frequent.

Much ado was made about helping the peasants by internal colonization. Attempts to do so had been made from 1919 on (law of August 11, 1919). They were, however, frustrated by the uncrushed power of the Junkers. The average yearly number of farms set up

⁴⁵ Böker and Bülow, *The Rural Exodus in Germany*, p. 51. Konopatzki, *Die innerdeutsche Westwanderung der ostpreussischen Bevölkerung*, pp. 20-21. Comparison of population censuses does not adequately reflect changes in internal migration. After 1925 the next census was taken only in 1933. The migratory balance of the various parts of the Reich if computed on the basis of these two censuses yields the net balance of two fundamentally distinct periods: the so-called prosperity period (up to 1929) and the "general bankruptcy" period thereafter.

⁴⁶ *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, CCCCII, 81.

for new colonists was but 3,000 until 1930. In 1931 and 1932 Chancellor Brüning attempted to further agrarian colonization by putting to this use the lands of insolvent Junkers. He succeeded in settling 18,000 colonists in the course of two years, but the Junkers managed to have him removed from office for precisely this reason. It may be observed that under the Nazi regime the number of colonists fell constantly, from 5,000 a year in 1933-34 to 800 in 1939. Altogether, only 78,663 colonists were settled between 1919 and 1939.

In 1923 the critical situation was saved by the sudden availability of outlets abroad. No such issues presented themselves during the crisis which began in 1929. Even the very small German quota for immigration into the United States was not fully utilized: these were the depression years, when numbers of ruined immigrants returned from the United States to Europe. In the previous period The Netherlands for a short period had been a land of immigration, but the world crisis had hit them acutely. France, the only great immigration country in Europe, was in turn faced by a serious depression in 1933, and thereafter expelled even some of those foreigners, whom she had previously accepted.

German statistics on emigration are incomplete, even as far as overseas migration is concerned: only part of the emigrants leaving from non-German ports are recorded. An official estimate⁴⁷ put the total emigration in 1927-29 at 78,000 to 68,000 yearly. The estimate for 1930 is 45,000; for 1931 and 1932, 18,000 and 17,000. In 1931-32 an excess of arrivals over departures (11,000 and 22,000), respectively, has been counted in the ports of Hamburg and Bremen.

Germany was thus struggling in an inclosure. Pressure increased, while the voluminous cohorts of those born before 1915 continued to enter the labor market. The ranks of the unemployed swelled constantly. In 1929, 1,898,604 unemployed were registered. The number rose to 3,075,580 in 1930, to 4,519,704 in 1931, and to 5,575,492 in 1932, amounting to 30 percent of all workers. In 1933, 4,804,428 were registered; the actual number of unemployed was estimated at 6 million.

These masses of "Uprooted and Disinherited of all Germany" became Hitler's followers, first of all those among them who "came of age at a time when the crisis had thrown millions out on the

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

streets.”⁴⁸ The 4,600,000 new German voters who went to the polls in 1930 were mainly young people who had begun their adult life without work and had remained unemployed for years. They brought Hitler his first great electoral success.

From this young “elite” Hitler recruited his private army with the help of wealthy industrialists. After 1930 “the gold of the industrialists has soon converted the idealistic swashbucklers of the S.A., the Storm Troops, into an army. It is true that they were still bullies, but bullying had become their profession. They now lived not only for their ideals but also on them. At that time, in the summer of 1930, critical judges estimated the number of storm troopers at forty thousand.” Enrollment continued in 1932. “The S.A. had a strength of five hundred thousand men when Hitler took over power. Soon it had risen to three million.”⁴⁹

The part played by subventions from big industrialists for the Nazi machinery seems to substantiate the theory that basically Hitler was only an agent of capitalism. This was probably the idea of the capitalists who had financed Hitler as an instrument of defense against the bolshevist danger. But these subventions paved the way for a “National Revolution,” which was no plenary triumph of capitalism;⁵⁰ it was the conquest of the state by the declassed who took over. It should be stressed that the number of militant “surplus” workers, active agents of the Revolution, was but half a million at the time of the catastrophe. The situation might have been saved if

⁴⁸ Heiden, *Der Fuehrer*, p. 351.

⁴⁹ Olden, *Hitler*, pp. 214, 315.

⁵⁰ The outstanding book by Franz Neumann, *Behemoth; the Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, has not succeeded in proving the eminently capitalistic character of the Third Reich. The author has shown that in the national-socialist state capitalism was still holding some of its positions, but no more than that. It is said, and not without reason, that under a democratic form of government, the capitalist interest group often holds the reigns of power behind the back of the official government. Nobody can pretend that Hitler and his associates were mere puppets in the hands of German financial and industrial magnates. Nor does the social composition of party leadership, which increasingly penetrated the Reich government, have any intrinsic connection with the capitalists. “A composite picture of the district leader shows that he was born around 1890, attended elementary school, served as an officer in the first World War, was a school teacher—if he had any fixed profession—and joined the party in its early years” (p. 377). The gigantic rise of party-owned enterprises (e.g., the Herman Goering works set up partly through expropriation, partly through compulsory financing by private industry (p. 301), or the role of the “Councils of confidence” which were “used to terrorize both the workers and the employer” (p. 424)—these, and many other economic and organizational innovations—whose importance was growing, hardly reflect a picture of capitalistic rule.

these 500,000 men—not all of Germany's 6 million unemployed—had been removed. These 500,000 desperados, who remained in the country, became professional destroyers of civilized society. Their victory precluded a gradual and peaceful solution of the unemployment problem, which would have come about through the termination of the world crisis, the smaller volume of the new age groups ("those born in the war years" were then coming of age) and finally the aging of the German population. The growing accumulation of masses, the absence of outlets, and the cessation of internal migration brought about one of those typical explosions whose historical function it is to force an outlet for compressed energy.

Expulsion of Jews

National Socialism brought unveiled expansion of the German living space at the expense of non-Germans. The treatment of Jews was a prelude; they were robbed of property and income and terrorized into leaving the country. Then followed Germany's expansion by violence into Austria and Czechoslovakia. This warlike process culminated in the second World War.

The Maginot Line was to protect the civilized Occident against the coming stream, like a new Roman limes. Meanwhile, and before this myth was dispelled, this barricade which separated two worlds had attracted numerous victims of the national socialist catastrophe. A number of refugees crossed the border which the German armies did not as yet dare approach.

The refugees whom the terror regime ousted from Germany were the followers of preceding governments as well as political and religious opponents of the new regime.⁵¹ The overwhelming majority of emigrants were, however, Jews and "non-Aryans," in fact, persons of Jewish descent.

The demographic evolution of German Jewry is both a reflection upon and a forecast of Germany's population development. As early as 1910 Dr. Theilhaber predicted the "decline of German Jewry."

⁵¹ Furthermore, the return of the Saar to the Reich after the plebiscite of 1935 resulted in the emigration not only of Frenchmen (estimated between 5,000 and 10,000), but also of other inhabitants of the Saar (6,700 to France and an additional 1,000 to other countries). The German government installed in the Saar officials and workers from nearby Palatinate and Hesse. On the other hand, several thousand workers from the Saar were sent to Germany (information given to the author by Braun, president of the Service for Refugees from the Saar, in 1938 in Paris).

His work drew heavy criticism from Jewish circles. Ten years later the accuracy of his dark prophecy began to be obvious.

The Jewish exodus from the countryside and from small towns to larger centers stopped population growth. Then came a rapid decline, even in absolute figures. Germany's Jewish population became more and more concentrated in a few large centers. In 1933, 70.9 percent of Germany's Jewish inhabitants (available statistics cover only persons of the Jewish faith, not all "non-Aryans") were domiciled in large cities, instead of 20 percent as in 1871 or 50 percent as in 1900. Half of them were concentrated in six large towns, 33 percent in Berlin alone. Urbanization was associated with an unprecedented collapse of the birth rate; 25 percent of all Jews remained unmarried, half of the married couples were childless, and one fourth had only one or two children. The over-all aging process which threatened the entire German population had already affected the Jews. According to the census of 1933, 45 percent of all Jews were more than 45 years old.⁵² Just as Theilhaber had predicted, there was among the Jews an excess of deaths over births. In 1933 this excess was 9.4 per thousand in Prussia. An additional factor was intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews. From 1925 to 1933 the number of German Jews declined by 11.5 percent.

The geographical shift of the Jews followed also the general direction of the migratory current, but at a much faster pace. Before the first World War the Jewish population of the provinces of eastern Germany had already experienced a rapid decline. Berlin and to a lesser extent the centers of the Rhineland and of Westphalia gained by Jewish migrations, which involved not only internal shifts but also immigration from the east. In 1933 some 100,000 of the 500,000 recorded German Jews came from eastern Europe.⁵³ Thus, Germany's Jewish population decreased and at the same time underwent a transformation: the more prolific eastern Jews increased at the expense of the old-established German Jewish families.

Under Hitler the exodus of Jews from the countryside and the smaller towns was accelerated, for there their situation had become unbearable in the early days of the new regime. The small Jewish communities, already in the process of depopulation before the ad-

⁵² Subsequently the aging process was accelerated by the emigration, which involved mainly the younger generation.

⁵³ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1935, No. 4.

vent of Nazism, rapidly became extinct. But this continuation and acceleration of a process of long standing seems very secondary in comparison with the new and decisive factor of the Jewish exodus from Germany.

The westward emigration of German Jews, mainly to the United States, which had formerly been very important, ceased almost completely in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The advent of Hitler gave rebirth to Jewish emigration, which then became a mass exodus—a migratory movement, involving those who under normal conditions would never have left Germany.

When Hitler came to power he declared that he would gladly give a thousand marks to every Jew who would leave the country. In fact, however, less human and more effective methods of promoting Jewish migration were adopted. Step by step the Jews were excluded from every branch of economic activity and deprived of every possibility of making a living. Of course, the main object of this policy was to favor those who took the place of the ejected Jews. Party members in particular filled the vacancies thus created for officials and employees. They became commissars in Jewish enterprises, and later their directors. The Nazis made life in Germany impossible for Jews, with the direct aim of inducing them to leave. They wanted morally to obligate the civilized nations to receive the oppressed Jews. Indeed, at the beginning of the persecution, in the spring of 1933, there was something like an awakening of conscience and an outburst of pity. France and other European countries opened their borders to the refugees. Temporary facilities were given for emigration to Palestine. But this attitude was short-lived. On the other hand, the process of leaving Germany was complicated by the Reich's financial policy, which in the years immediately preceding the war practically amounted to complete expropriation of emigrants. After he had paid all taxes and sold his blocked marks to the Reich's *Golddiskontobank*, he received in the end only about 8 percent of the proceeds from the sale of his property.

In spite of all these obstacles, however, the pushing force was strong enough to bring about the emigration of hundreds of thousands, who had to abandon almost everything they owned and face strong employment restrictions in the reception countries.

Three principal waves can be distinguished in the Jewish exodus from Germany between 1933 and 1939. The first panicky flight of

refugees followed immediately after the establishment of National Socialism. The second wave came after the promulgation of the anti-Jewish Nuremberg laws of September 15, 1935, and the third after the pogroms of November, 1938.

According to the census of 1933, Germany then had a Jewish population of 499,700, to which must be added 3,100 Jews from the Saar (census of July, 1933), making a total of 503,000. Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, estimated the total number of Jews who left Germany between April, 1933, and July 1, 1939, at 215,000. Adding emigration during the months of July and August 1939, the total emigration would amount to about 226,000. To obtain a complete figure of Jewish refugees from Hitler Europe up to the outbreak of the second World War, we must add those from Austria, and Bohemia-Moravia. We thus obtain a total of some 360,000-370,000.

These figures refer only to refugees of the Jewish faith. To them must be added the so-called "non-Aryans" (that is, Christians of Jewish or partly Jewish origin, to whom anti-Jewish laws were also applied) and, furthermore, numerous "Aryans" who emigrated for political reasons, especially immediately after Hitler had assumed power. Taking into consideration these additional groups, Sir Herbert Emerson estimated in his report of October 20, 1939, that a total of 400,000 refugees had left Greater Germany since 1933.⁵⁴

Only insignificant numbers went toward the east, where both governmental policy and popular feeling excelled in antisemitism. According to the census of May, 1933, the number of foreign Jews in Germany (the overwhelming majority of whom came from the east) was 100,000; among them were 56,000 Polish Jews. The total number of foreign eastern Jews who returned home between February, 1933, and April, 1936, has been estimated at only 21,000. During the same period, 93,000 German and foreign Jews had emigrated from Germany. The total number of Jews repatriated from Germany and Austria to countries of eastern Europe up to May, 1939, has been put at 40,000, from a total of 266,000 Jewish emigrants.⁵⁵ In 1938 a mass expulsion of Polish Jews was instigated in Germany, but Poland refused to receive these Polish citizens.

⁵⁴ League of Nations, A 18a, 1939, XII. The Reich Statistical Office gives the figure of 400,000 as a rough estimate of the number of refugees up to the census of May, 1939 (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, Nos. 5-6 and 20).

⁵⁵ Simpson, *Refugees; a Review of the Situation since Sept., 1938*, p. 30.

A quite different part was played by the countries of western Europe, especially by France. They were partly countries of immigration, partly transit lands for emigration abroad. In December, 1933, 60 percent of all refugees from Germany were in western European countries.⁵⁶ A large number of them subsequently went overseas. Simultaneously a growing current of overseas emigration left directly from Germany. In December, 1937, some 90,000 persons, out of a total of 154,000 refugees, were in overseas countries. They were distributed as follows: Palestine (27.2 percent); United States (17.1 percent); South America (13.4 percent); South Africa (3.1 percent). But in 1938-39 masses of Jews again fled to France and other countries of western Europe. It can be estimated that at the beginning of the war 370,000 Jews left Germany, Austria, and Bohemia-Moravia—200,000 went overseas, and 170,000 to other European countries: about 50,000 to Great Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden; 85,000 to France, Belgium, and The Netherlands; 10,000 to other countries of northern, western and southern Europe; 25,000 to eastern Europe.

Confiscation of Jewish property provided a substantial revenue for the German treasury⁵⁷ as well as for some private profiteers. The expulsion of Jews from their economic positions and from the country created opportunities for non-Jewish competitors. But in the end the elimination of the most active elements of Germany's population could not enlarge the living space of the German people. It supplied mainly a psychological incentive. The only way out for Nazi Germany was war.

Rearmament and the Stimulation of Westward Migration

Hitler's regime was based on two principles: in the first place, unemployed men had to be taken off the streets at all costs, and, in the second place, a program of heavy rearmament was to "break the chains of the Versailles *Diktat*." Immediately after the Nazis came to power, various measures were started in order to fight unemployment. However, these measures, such as work spreading, elimination of women from the labor market, and even public works, in fact only replaced "a certain number of registered unemployed by an equal

⁵⁶ Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 139, 150.

⁵⁷ The flight tax revenue was 0.9 million Reichsmarks in 1932 and 342.6 million in 1938. The one billion assessment on Jewish property in Nov., 1938, amounted to one twentieth of Germany's total tax receipt.

number of invisible unemployed.”⁵⁸ Only the tremendous German rearmament actually did away with unemployment.

It has been alleged that rearmament grew rather out of the original concept of creating work and was not an independent result of war preparation. Certainly, a huge industrial apparatus had been built up in the “prosperity” period and yearned for utilization. However, Hitler never concealed his aspirations, “that finally in blood and fire there should be an end to a world peace which otherwise will be the end of our people.”⁵⁹ From the beginning, the Third Reich was firmly decided to secure living space for Germany’s population through conquest and subsequent extermination of millions of the conquered population.⁶⁰ The entire groundwork of national wholesale war was fully outlined and in operation by 1935. Its main features were reintroduction of compulsory military service and the growth of the armaments industry.⁶¹ In itself, however, war preparation offered an intermediate outlet for the surplus population and jobs for all. Of course, this boom could not last, for it would lead eventually to a lowering of consumption and would require such huge foreign credits for raw materials that, despite the cowardice of appeasers abroad and their fear of Soviet Russia, foreign loans would not be forthcoming forever. Hitler clearly pointed it out in his following statement to the German Commanders-in-Chief, when he announced his decision to strike against Poland: “We have nothing to lose. We can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out for more than a few years. . . . We have no other choice. We must act.”⁶²

In the meantime, however, war preparation solved Germany’s unemployment problem. The official spokesman for the German Statistical Office wrote in April, 1937:

⁵⁸ Waelbroeck and Bessling, “Some Aspects of German Social Policy under the National Socialist Regime,” *International Labor Review*, Feb., 1941, p. 129.

⁵⁹ Heiden, *Der Fuehrer*, p. 325.

⁶⁰ See the quotations from Hitler’s secret statements in Mendelssohn, *The Nuremberg Documents*, pp. 15, 30-33, (“The only way out is to secure greater living space . . . The German question can be solved only by way of force”), 36, 106-108, 125, 140-141 (“the decision to strike was always in me”).

⁶¹ In a memorandum submitted to Hitler on May 3, 1935, Schacht took as its premise “the fact that the execution of the armament programme is . . . the mission of Germany policy and that everything else therefore must be subordinated to this purpose” (Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, p. 17).

⁶² Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

The reestablishment of Germany's freedom to rearm, solemnly proclaimed on March 16, 1935, was the decisive event which bestowed a task upon Germany's industries, especially as far as the building and metal trades are concerned. The results were soon visible. Unemployment declined month after month. . . . In March, 1937, only 1,240,000 jobless were left. . . . From the middle of 1936 on, a certain shortage of skilled labor, especially in some branches of the metal industries became manifest.

Two years later the same periodical was in a position to announce that unemployment no longer existed. "Instead of a lack of jobs we are now faced with a manpower shortage which it becomes increasingly difficult to meet."⁶³

As a result, the trend toward urbanization became more and more pronounced, and agriculture lacked manpower. Before the advent of National Socialism a certain reflux to the countryside had taken place in Germany as a result of depression. In the early stages of the Third Reich it had become an organized program. Farm workers were virtually tied to the soil. The institution of the *Landjahr* (a year of compulsory agricultural service for young people) was to initiate the younger generation into the tasks and joys of rural living. Rearmament and the associated industrial rebirth marked the end of the return to the soil. In 1935 rural exodus was resumed, and it became so important that between the census of 1933 and that of 1939 all communities of less than 2,000 inhabitants showed a migratory loss of approximately one million.⁶⁴

To alleviate the manpower shortage in agriculture, the Nazi government resorted to foreign labor. In 1937 the government not only decided to readmit foreign seasonal workers but even to recruit a certain number; 17,000 Polish farm workers immigrated in 1937, and 60,000 in 1938. Poland then refused permission to let more farm workers leave the country.⁶⁵ But the Germans "interfered in no way with the numerous cases of illegal immigration on the part of Polish

⁶³ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1937, No. 8, and 1939, No. 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1937, No. 21, 1939, No. 8, 1941, No. 20. The large cities (more than 100,000 inhabitants) show a migratory gain of 271,000 between 1933 and 1939. This represents a very heavy in-migration in 1938 and the first months of 1939, considering that according to registration data, the cities had in 1933-36 a migratory loss of 205,000 and in 1937 a migratory gain of only 65,000.

⁶⁵ The aim of the Polish government was to reach an agreement which would enable the seasonal migrants to accumulate some savings (*Industrial and Labor Information*, published by the International Labor Office, Feb. 20, 1939).

laborers.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, Italy sent, both in 1938 and in 1939, some 30,000 workers to Germany during the harvest season. From 1937 immigration was also organized from Austria and Czechoslovakia. Altogether, 120,000 agricultural foreign workers were employed in Germany in 1938, and the number was undoubtedly much larger in 1939. On the eve of the war the recruitment of foreign industrial workers had also been started.⁶⁷ Furthermore, as we shall see in detail below, Hitler's conquests in 1938 (Austria and Sudetenland) and 1939 (Bohemia-Moravia) attracted immigrants from the conquered territories who went to work in the booming armament industries of Germany.

The armament boom thus led to a resumption of rural exodus and also to immigration, mainly from the east. Consequently there was a revival of internal shifts in Germany in the east-west direction. This traditional migratory movement as restored, however, shows some important new features.

A vast territory in inner Germany—from the sea to Thuringia and from Berlin to the Weser—had become the main area of in-migration. It showed in 1933-39 a migratory gain of 900,000 (3.9 percent of the population in 1933), which surpassed even the natural population increase of 846,000.

This great in-migration region had two centers. One was Berlin and the suburban district of Potsdam. It should be noted that the capital itself showed a migratory gain of only 78,000 (1.8 percent), that is, absolutely and relatively less than its immediate surroundings, with a migratory gain of 224,000 (15 percent). This was the result of dislocation of industry for strategic reasons. The other center was located in the heart of Germany. For the past one hundred years central Germany had been an area of out-migration. In 1871-1910 central Germany suffered a migratory loss of 570,000. It became an in-migration area only after 1933. The period between 1933 and 1939 shows an excess of in-migration of more than 150,000.⁶⁸ This gain must be attributed to the new armament industries, which were created in Central Germany, in the illusion that there they

⁶⁶ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, Jan. 5, 1941. Workers were even encouraged to cross the frontier according to Winiewicz, *The Polish-German Frontier*, p. 6.

⁶⁷ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5.

⁶⁸ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, April 25, 1941. This is only a balance of figures of in- and out-migration, which are both very high.

would be safe from enemy bombing in the event of war. The in-migration territory extended also towards the north, that is, to the Danish frontier and the ocean, where the German shipbuilding industry was located. The Schleswig-Holstein province, which includes the naval base of Kiel, showed one of the highest migratory gains: 96,000 (6.8 percent). A secondary in-migration area was southern Germany (with the exception of the southwestern borderland on the French frontier). As early as 1937 southern Germany showed the greatest increase in the number of workers, next to the new central industrial region.⁶⁹ Between 1933 and 1939 Bavaria (excluding Palatinate) had a migratory gain of 83,000 (1.2 percent) and Württemberg a gain of 75,000 (2.8 percent). Here the main attraction centers were the cities of Munich and Stuttgart and their suburbs. Roughly speaking, southern Bavaria, with Munich, received the whole emigration from northern Bavaria, that is, 54,000, plus some 80,000 from the outside.

At whose expense were these migratory gains obtained? The first sources were the Sudetenland and Austria, as well as Bohemia-Moravia and Italy. The second source was the influx from eastern Germany, particularly from Silesia and the eastern part of Pomerania, which showed a total migratory loss of about 200,000. But the traditional eastern territory of out-migration was extended to include even the highly industrialized country of Saxony (as distinguished from the Prussian province of the same name), which suffered a migratory loss of 79,000.

There is, however, a third and quite new area of out-migration, namely, western Germany. After the foundation of the German Reich this region had become, together with Berlin, the main goal of internal migration. Between 1933 and 1939, Rhineland-Westphalia—this bulwark of German industry—showed for the first time an excess of out-migration over in-migration. Of course, in proportion to the number of inhabitants this migratory loss was small: 2.3 percent in Westphalia and 1.3 percent in the Rhine Province (whereas Silesia and the eastern parts of Pomerania lost by migration 3.1 percent to 4.3 percent). But in view of the density of their population, the absolute number of people who left Westphalia and the Rhine Province was important; it amounted to 219,000.

The migratory current from the east dominated once more. But it

⁶⁹ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1937, No. 21.

showed some peculiarities connected with war preparation and pre-war territorial expansion. The current did not go farther than the western part of central Germany, for the projected attack on France required the partial shifting of industry from the endangered border zone. The inclusion of Saxony in the emigration area reflected the emphasis on heavy, instead of textile, industries. The participation of the Sudetenland and Austria in this movement was due to their annexation by the Reich.

Austria

In 1930 the Allied armies evacuated the Rhineland, and in 1931, for the first time, "claims for revenge and death were heard in Germany's ballot boxes" (Briand). Hitler came into power in 1933, and in 1935 Germany occupied the Rhineland. Temporarily she went no farther. Hitler "offered peace to the world" and guaranteed the French frontiers. Three years later, Austria was invaded and annexed; in October, 1938, the Sudetenland knew the same fate; and in March, 1939, Bohemia and Moravia were subjugated, while Slovakia became a vassal state. However, we may ask ourselves if these political conquests really were expansion in the demographic sense, leading to an enlargement of Germany's *Lebensraum*.

After the War of 1914-18 Austria was also affected by the eastward reflux of the migratory movement. In this country the reflux found expression in the emigration from Vienna: Czechs, Poles, and other citizens of countries which ceased to be a part of Austria left for their respective countries of origin. But afterwards the direction of the migratory current toward the west was resumed, despite Vienna's location in the eastern extremity of the country.

Before the German conquest migratory gains, inasmuch as they were not absorbed by the city of Vienna (which probably received, in addition to the entire influx from eastern Austria, all immigration from abroad) ⁷⁰ benefited mainly the western sector of the country. Data on the birthplace of inhabitants in some important towns⁷¹ also indicate the east-west trend of internal migration.

⁷⁰ According to the 1934 census, 23.8 percent of Vienna's inhabitants were born outside the borders of post-1918 Austria. The majority originated in territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (15.7 percent were born in Czechoslovakia).

⁷¹ The 1934 census indicates that the greatest percentage of residents born in another region were in Salzburg (35.6) and in Innsbruck (21.4); Vienna contained only 18.8 percent.

TABLE 13

POPULATION CHANGE AND MIGRATORY BALANCE BY REGIONS IN AUSTRIA
BETWEEN THE CENSUSES OF 1923, 1934, AND 1939
(IN THOUSANDS)

<i>Regions (from East to West)</i>	INCREASE (+) AND DECREASE (-) OF THE POPULATION		CALCULATED MIGRATORY GAINS (+) OR LOSSES (-)	
	<i>1923-34</i>	<i>1934-39</i>	<i>1923-34</i>	<i>1934-39</i>
Burgenland	+13		-19	
Vienna	-5	-162	+49	-88
Lower Austria ^a	+34	-27	-31	-47
Upper Austria ^b	+31	+24	-24	+6
Styria	+40	-6	-20	-20
Carinthia	+36	+13	-5	0
Salzburg	+25	+11	+8	+7
Tyrol	+37	} +15	+7	} +2
Voralberg	+17		+4	
Total	+228	-132	-31	-140

^a Since the annexation, Gau Niederdonau, comprising also parts of Burgenland.

^b Since the annexation, Gau Oberdonau, comprising also parts of Burgenland.

In the absence of any demographic or economic outlets, the absurd location of the capital of this nonexistent empire caused permanent economic difficulties in Austria. The world crisis further aggravated her state of chronic depression, because it deprived Austria of the philanthropic assistance from abroad which had been bestowed upon her in one form or another. Also, it did away with all means for Austrians to escape the terrific overcrowding of their country. Internal westward migration was to a certain extent continued by emigration of Austrians to Germany. But between 1925 and 1933 the number of Austrians in Germany fell from 129,000 to 81,000. Then emigration to Germany was resumed in a new form. Austria was in a state of intermittent civil warfare. Some socialist refugees found asylum in Czechoslovakia and Russia. Much more considerable was the number of Austrian Nazis who fled to Germany. An Austrian Legion was founded in Bavaria, 15,000 to 50,000 strong, according to various estimates.

The prolonged economic crisis and urban unemployment caused a slowdown of rural exodus. True, the rural communities lost between 1923 and 1934 a large proportion of their natural increase through migration to the towns. But in the majority of districts there

was an increase in absolute population figures; this fact alone is an indication of very limited earning opportunities in the cities.

All Austria could do was to adapt herself to these conditions by limiting births. This she did with exemplary speed. The collapse of the Austrian birth rate surpassed even the German decline in the years before Hitler. The numerical importance of Vienna accounts for this development, since almost 30 percent of Austria's population was concentrated in the capital. This overwhelming decline brought about in Vienna such a large excess of deaths over births that the strong in-migration did not compensate it. Vienna's own population seemed to make room for arrivals from the rural and more prolific districts of eastern Austria. The negative balance of the Vienna population and some other towns arrested the growth of the total population. In 1933-34 the natural increase of Austria's population was on the average only 3.6 per thousand a year; in 1937 and 1938 there was even a very slight excess of deaths (4,000, or 0.6 per thousand in 1937; 500, or 0.1, in 1938).⁷²

If ever population problems could be solved within the limits of a static demography, it must be stressed that Austria had taken the right road. This was one of the causes for the indisputable improvement which Schuschnigg emphasized in his last and pathetic report, in which he claimed for Austria the right to exist.

The *Anschluss* was followed by Germany's large-scale seizure of public and private property. A mob of Nazi officials and organizers invaded the country. The conquerors attempted, however, to create room for the overcrowded Austrian population by their usual methods. Marshal Goering formally promised the Viennese to provide opportunities in Vienna by eliminating the Jews. He also engaged himself to do away with unemployment.

The Jewish population of Austria had already been declining before the *Anschluss*. Their number fell from 222,000 in 1923 to 191,000 in 1934. When Austria was annexed in March, 1938, only 180,000 Jews were left, 165,000 of them in Vienna.⁷³ This continued decrease can be attributed to a declining birth rate, change of religion, and also emigration to Palestine (approximately 1,000 emigrants yearly).

⁷² The Nazis were able to increase the birth rate in Austria, just as they did in the old Reich. Birth rate: 12.8 per thousand in 1937; 14.0 in 1938; 20.6 in 1939. Deaths increased as well: 13.4 in 1937; 14.1 in 1938; 15.3 in 1939. The insignificant excess of deaths was replaced by a moderate excess of births.

⁷³ Report of the Jewish Community of Vienna, May 2, 1938-July 31, 1939.

The persecution of Austrian Jews which began immediately after the annexation caused a wave of emigration on a much larger scale. Sir Herbert Emerson estimated the number of Jews who left Austria up to July 1, 1939, at 97,000. At the outbreak of the war the total would probably number approximately 106,000.⁷⁴

To fight unemployment, public works were inaugurated. Shortly thereafter, armament industries were also launched in Austria. But the most immediate outlet for Austrian unemployed was work in Germany, especially in Bavaria. Between the census of 1934 and the census of 1939, Austria's migratory loss was 140,000. Official German statistics ascribe this loss to two important migratory movements which began after the *Anschluss*: the Jewish exodus (some 100,000) and the migration of laborers to the Reich, "where they promptly found bread and work."⁷⁵ We have already noted that Bavaria showed during the same period a migratory gain of some 83,000. This province was on the route of Austria's westward migration. Once the border was abolished, this current went through into Germany and met with the internal southward migration of German workers.

Czechoslovakia

Thus, Germany's expansion could not find an outlet in Austria. New issues had to be found, and there followed Germany's assault against Czechoslovakia, which was allegedly motivated by the oppression of the German minority in Sudetenland, a district of Bohemia situated near the German and Austrian frontiers.

During the interwar period natural increase in Czechoslovakia was highest in the east and declined the farther one went west. In the eastern part of the country (Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine) the population was in the demographic stage in which natural increase is on the upswing because of a recent drop in mortality. Farther west, the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans had already reached the stage in which natural increase is slow because of the rapidly falling birth rate. President Benes declared in 1933:

⁷⁴ *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, Feb. 7, 1941, gave the figure of 105,000 Jewish emigrants from Austria up to the census of May, 1939. According to the report of the Jewish Community of Vienna, 104,000 Jews left Vienna (where almost all Austrian Jews were then concentrated) up to July 31, 1939, including 1,680 who went to Germany. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee stated that up to the end of 1939 about 124,000 Jews had escaped from Austria.

⁷⁵ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, Nos. 2 and 20.

TABLE 14
POPULATION CHANGES IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK PROVINCES

Provinces (from West to East)	NATURAL INCREASE		MIGRATORY GAINS (+) AND LOSSES (-)	
	In thousands	As a percentage of the population	In thousands	As a percentage of the population
BETWEEN 1921 AND 1930				
Bohemia	407.2	6.1	+31.6	+0.5
Moravia and Silesia	319.0	9.6	-93.0	-2.8
Slovakia	453.5	15.1	-121.9	-4.1
Carpatho-Ukraine	136.0	22.5	-15.3	-2.5
BETWEEN 1930 AND 1940 (IN THE LIMITS OF THE PROTECTORATE)				
Bohemia	70.5	1.6	+326.7	+7.3
Moravia	128.0	4.4	+122.8	+4.2

The growth of the Slovak population is such that in a few decades, Slovakia will no longer afford sufficient space; in the future, the Slovaks will exert greater weight in the national community than the Czechs. The latter will have to recognize that the true road to national union will lead to a Slovakization of Czechs rather than a Czechization of Slovaks.⁷⁶

The migratory current went through Czechoslovakia from east to west. Slovak pressure upon the Czechs⁷⁷ in turn stimulated Czech encroachment upon Sudeten territory. The natural increase of the Sudeten Germans was lower still than that of the Czech population.⁷⁸ The shift from the countryside to the cities and that from the south to the north and northwest of Bohemia were at the same time encroachments of the Czechs on the Germans. Internal shifts in Bohemia were even more intense than migration between the various provinces of Czechoslovakia. This internal movement was mainly directed towards Prague (which showed between 1921 and 1930 a migratory gain of 150,000) and also to the lignite deposits at the foot of the Sudeten mountains and the surrounding industrial districts. As a

⁷⁶ Quoted by Rogmann, *Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung im preussischen Osten*, p. 96.

⁷⁷ The Slovaks constituted also the majority of seasonal farm laborers who went to Austria, as well as of overseas migrants (105,000 in 1922-32 against 40,000 Czechs).

⁷⁸ The decline of births among the Sudeten Germans began before 1914, and in some industrial districts before 1900. In 1935-36 the excess of births over deaths was only 0.7 per thousand. According to the secret *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren*, 1942, p. 11, the Germans of the Protektorat had in 1939 more deaths than births (81.7 births on 100 deaths).

result of these shifts, the "language frontier" was slowly pushed back at the expense of the Germans. The reinforcement of the Czech minorities in mainly German areas, the weakening of the German minorities in the remainder of the country and the elimination of German "islands" followed. These changes started as early as 1880 and merely continued after 1918. The number of inhabitants in the Bohemian districts which later became the "Sudetenland" increased between 1921 and 1930 from 3,424,000 to 3,652,000. This represents an average growth of 7.3 per thousand, which the Reich statistics ascribed to a strong immigration of Czechs. This trend continued after 1930. The German census of 1939 recorded 125,000 recent Czech immigrants in the Sudetenland.⁷⁹

There can be no doubt that the autonomist aspirations of the Sudeten Germans aimed at cutting off the migratory flow from inner Bohemia.⁸⁰ But the international crisis which this question caused in 1937-38 had at first a quite different result: the Sudeten Germans themselves were offered a migratory outlet in the Reich. Germany could not refuse to receive her "persecuted brethren." The number of registered refugees was put by Hitler at 200,000.⁸¹

The immediate result of annexation was a worsening of conditions in the Sudeten area, because economic ties with Bohemia had been severed. In December, 1938, one million inhabitants of the Sudetenland received German "winter relief."⁸² Under the circumstances, emigration to Germany was further stimulated. No longer was there the obstacle of a political frontier. The Reich, furthermore, organized

⁷⁹ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1939, No. 13, 1940, No. 11.

⁸⁰ The afore-mentioned 125,000 Czechs were deprived of their residence rights after the annexation of Sudetenland by Germany. The census of May 17, 1939, carried them as "persons of unascertained nationality." A later order of Jan. 11, 1940, recognized them as nationals of the "Protectorate."

⁸¹ Political persecutions were stressed as causes of the movement to the extent to which this demagogy was needed. Two and a half years later the official mouthpiece of the German Labor Office, discussing the exodus of Sudeten Germans on the eve of the annexation, did not even mention the political causes of the emigration. It was entirely accounted for by unemployment which had hit the country after the crisis of 1929 and affected 250,000 persons in October, 1938. "When in 1938 Sudeten and Czech economy were decaying, the labor market became completely disorganized. Thousands and tens of thousands of German workers crossed the 'green border.' They were well received in the Reich, which even then lacked manpower." (*Reichsarbeitsblatt*, May 5, 1941.

⁸² The cost of relief action between Oct. 1 and Dec. 31, 1938, amounted to 60 million marks, of which only 4.6 million were contributed by the Sudetenland itself (*Kölnische Zeitung*, Jan. 21, 1939).

the recruitment of workers through employment offices.⁸³ Between the Czechoslovak census of 1930 and the German census of 1939 the population of the Sudetenland decreased from 3,652,000 to 3,410,000. Migratory loss was 317,000, due mainly to migration to the old Reich.⁸⁴

The abolition of the frontier between Germany and the Sudetenland opened an ultimate outlet for the east-west current, but the new German Czechoslovak frontier, which cut Bohemia into two parts, represented a dam in the middle of the current. The political events, however, tended further to strengthen the migratory current. The secession of Slovakia was followed by the expulsion of approximately 150,000 Czechs, among whom were many officials and civil servants. On the other hand, the annexation by Hungary of the Carpatho-Ukraine and parts of Slovakia resulted in the expulsion of some 100,000 Slovaks and Czechs from these areas.

The borders set up at Munich were short-lived. In March, 1939, the remainder of dismembered Czechoslovakia was included in Greater Germany as the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. After the occupation of Prague, Hitler declared that Bohemia and Moravia had "for a thousand years" belonged to the living space of the German people. German immigration followed immediately upon annexation. The number of immigrants increased with the progressing program of Germanization. On the other hand, the German invasion caused the flight of thousands of Jews, especially those who had sought refuge in this country after they fled from Germany, Austria, and the Sudetenland. But simultaneously an important emigration to Germany and Austria took place.

After Bohemia and Moravia had been seized, the German government encouraged immigration of Czech workers to the Reich. This was a prologue to the enormous intake of foreign labor which was to become one of the foundations of Germany's war economy. In the first four months following the annexation (March-June, 1939) 52,000 Czechs were hired for work in the Reich (including Austria), in addition to 40,000 Slovaks.⁸⁵

⁸³ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, May 5, 1941.

⁸⁴ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, No. 20. The flight of about 100,000 Jews and anti-Nazis merely offsets the Czech immigration during the previous years.

⁸⁵ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, Oct. 15, 1940, and Jan. 5, 1941. On Nov. 1, 1939, the number of Czech workers reached 85,000.

The overwhelming majority of German immigrants to Czechoslovakia came from the old Reich, especially from Prussia, not from Austria. On the other hand, most of the Czech workers went to Austria. The combined movement constitutes a straight flow of migration which crossed Bohemia-Moravia from north to south, the Germans entering Bohemia from the north, and the Czechs emigrating southward. The first large colony of Czech workers abroad was in Linz, in Upper Austria, where there was a labor shortage due to the emigration of Austrians who had gone to work in Germany.

The Slavic Flood

Like a navigator who attempts to go against the stream, Germany, through her "peaceful conquests" of 1938-39, opened the floodgates and facilitated the flow of the migratory current in the direction opposite to her conquests.

True, expansion in the southeast was merely a secondary branch of Nazi activities. The German dream had been the enlargement of Germany's *Lebensraum* in the east. Great efforts were put forth to strengthen the "ethnic wall" against a Slavonic flood. The exodus of Germans in the east was to be prevented by the internal colonization and industrialization of eastern Prussia.⁸⁶ But the exodus continued all the more. In 1937-38, on the eve of the war, emigration from eastern Prussia, fortress of Germanism, once more reached the pre-1914 high mark.⁸⁷ A similar situation prevailed in Silesia, which was inclosed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in other provinces along the Czechoslovak frontier. The German emigration reservoir was situated on both sides of this frontier and comprised the Sudetenland, the border districts of Bavaria, and even highly industrialized Saxony.⁸⁸

On the eve of the second World War a German author reached the following conclusion:

The Poles and the Czechs exert immediate pressure on the German area. Both in turn are subject to pressure of their eastern Slavic neighbors,

⁸⁶ In a symposium which appeared in 1936 (Thalheim and Hillen-Ziegfeld, eds., *Der deutsche Osten*) one author after the other comes back to this topic; see pp. 72-76, 186, 478, 484.

⁸⁷ Erich Koch (Gauleiter of East Prussia), *Das Reich*, March 23, 1941.

⁸⁸ See pp. 196, 202-3. See for Silesia—*Reichsarbeitsblatt*, February 5, 1941, and Dietel, "Bevölkerung in Schlesien seit 1935," *Archiv für Bevölkerungswissenschaft*, March, 1941; and for Bavarian border districts, Kurt Trampler, in *Der deutsche Osten*, p. 206.

Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians, as well as Slovaks. The push of Slav masses moving eastwards is felt in the Slavic regions by successive steps, similar to waves which push each other. . . . The western Slavs weigh more and more heavily on German regions and on the Reich borders, and they themselves are impelled by the pressure of Slavs farther east. . . . The detachment, at Versailles, of large parts of the Prussian state, immediate neighbor of the Slavic countries, and the ejection of Germans from areas beyond the eastern frontier are the first visible signs of Europe's Slavization.⁸⁹

The author expressed the hope that the flow which threatened the German area could be stopped if the entire German people joined forces to oppose it. But the reason why the entire German people failed to do so was that the Germans themselves were involved in the current. Inside Germany, the east-west trend was just as strong.⁹⁰ The Germans participated in the migratory current by retreating in the east and exerting pressure inside Germany on the central and western parts. A mass accumulation occurred, especially in central Germany. Then the current encountered a strong barrier. It had to assume a warlike character to penetrate to the western limits of the European continent.

⁸⁹ Rogmann, *Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung des preussischen Osten*, pp. 96-97, 99, 100-101.

⁹⁰ Cf. Rogmann's own observation in "Grundlinien der Bevölkerungsentwicklung des preussischen Osten," *Archiv für Landes- und Volksforschung*, May, 1938, p. 263.

Chapter VII
SOUTHERN EUROPE IN
THE INTERWAR PERIOD

THE APENNINE and the Iberian peninsulas are birthplaces of tributaries to the main European current of migration. Italy is a classical example of the relationship between overpopulation, migratory trends, and warlike expansion. A glance at the evolution of population and migratory movements in Spain greatly contributes to an understanding of her civil war.

Italy after the First World War and the Advent of Fascism

It has been pointed out that, compared to the losses of Germany, Russia, France, and England during the first World War, those of Italy were relatively low. Casualties in the Italian army were 700,000. The population suffered a further loss of 800,000 through abnormal deaths. Fertility remaining still high, was temporarily reduced (so-called birth deficit of 1,200,000). Despite such losses, the population of Italy declined very slightly during the war. In 1914, even before Italy became actually a belligerent, a large number of Italian emigrants returned to their homeland.¹ Even more important were measures taken by the Italian government to restrict emigration, which before the war had involved large numbers of Italians.

After the first World War, Italy's rapid population growth was resumed. In 1901 the population was 32.5 million inhabitants, in 1911 34.7, and in 1921, 36.4 million (inside the old boundaries; 38 million inside the postwar boundaries). In 1920 the excess of births once more reached 13.1 (birth rate 31.8) per thousand. Emigration figures also rose again, but they no longer attained the prewar level (see Table 16). For a time there was a substantial rise in the emigration to France,² as well as to Belgium and The Netherlands. Small numbers went to Germany, the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian

¹ After Italy's entry into the war the number of repatriates dropped considerably. It has been calculated that up to January, 1918, only 200,000 of the one million Italians of draft age living in the Americas had returned to their homeland.

² However, see p. 213 concerning emigration to Lorraine.

Empire, and Switzerland. However, the availability of outlets in European countries and a certain increase of emigration to Argentina could not compensate for the restriction imposed on immigration by the United States as early as 1921. In 1920 there were 349,000 Italian immigrants to the United States, a number almost equal to that of the prewar period. In 1921 only 67,000 were able to immigrate, including a number of war veterans who had resided in the United States and were not affected by the quota regulation. By 1922 only the fixed number of 42,000 were admitted. This closing of the United States dominated the whole situation.

For some time Italy's economy as such was unable to provide a sufficient basis for the constantly growing population. Emigration had played a dual role, for it represented an outlet for Italy's excess population and also a tangible increase for her national income through remittances of emigrants. Before the advent of fascism the Italian government called emigration "an automatic safety valve" (an expression used in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1920 and in the *Bolletín della emigrazione* in 1922). American immigration legislation removed this safety valve. Simultaneously, Italy's resources had suffered a marked decline. Agricultural production in 1920 was 18 percent lower than it had been before the war, while the depreciation of Italian currency decreased the value of agricultural production by 30 percent. In the cities a number of factories were closed, because government purchases had been discontinued as a result of inflation. The cost of living went up rapidly.

In the midst of this economic chaos demobilization was carried out. The strength of the Italian army was 3 million in 1918, 1,400,000 in 1919, and approximately 500,000 in 1920. At the same time, half a million Italian war prisoners returned to Italy.

In one of his speeches Mussolini said, alluding to Italy's red-white-green flag:

The soldier has returned from the trenches, or rather, he has been evacuated. But what was thy booty, unfortunate tricolor soldier, red as the bloody Carso trenches, white as the Alpine icicles, green as the bile which you swallowed when watching the draft dodgers? Here is your booty: your civilian clothing."⁸

But during the war great promises had been made, among them the distribution of land, long-standing demand of Italian peasantry

⁸ Speech of Nov. 4, 1925 (Mussolini. *Scritti e discorsi*. V 187)

against the owners of the latifundia. The principle was accepted by almost everybody, including Mussolini ("Land for the Peasants," *Popolo d'Italia*, June 2, 1915). Here and there peasants forcibly seized holdings; these seizures were partly legalized in September, 1919. During this same period Italian workers developed the sit-down strike technique, which Mussolini approvingly termed the "constructive strike."

But the most significant feature of this period, the one which set it apart from other epochs in Italian history when social problems had been no less serious, was the presence of a growing number of "superfluous" elements. Their number had multiplied since the end of the war, and emigration no longer provided an outlet for them. Mussolini stated: "Around me . . . I saw the first Black shirts, the Arditi, legionnaires, war volunteers, all fighters who were ready to start the struggle anew and to dig trenches in the squares of Italian cities."⁴ Organizations founded by these "ardent" (*arditi*) men, who made it a full-time job to fight their fellow citizens, were composed partly of common-law criminals, who had been amnestied in 1915 so that they could join the army, partly of wartime officers who had become so accustomed to giving orders that they despised the thought of working. But the majority were men ruined by inflation. In Italy economic collapse was not so widespread as it had been in Germany, but on the other hand, it was not followed by industrial prosperity. Once a fighting organization had been set up, the struggle was to yield maximum profit to the fighters. Fascists and Arditi were at first hired by big landowners who wished to defend their holdings, which the government had promised to the peasants. They then passed into the employment of speculators, who had greatly profited during the war, and also of industrialists who found themselves in difficulties with their workers. Yet this was but a temporary episode in the history of fascism, a mere steppingstone in their conquest of the Italian state.

The conquest came from the north. Mussolini himself declared that originally fascism was a "Milan phenomenon." A mass of war refugees had crowded into northern Italy. Among a total of 632,000 war refugees were 42,000 Italians repatriated "because of the war" from foreign countries and 86,500 irredentist Austrians. The remainder were inhabitants of the frontier zone who had fled or been

⁴ Speech of Oct. 25, 1932 (*ibid.*, VIII, 130).

evacuated as a result of Italian defeats.⁵ Among these uprooted people could be found numerous listeners to demagogic propaganda. The active group of the Arditi had come from the northern front, where the Italian army had been beaten and dispersed as early as 1915 by German and Austrian troops. The tension was increased by the arrival of a new belligerent outfit. While the Allied Supreme Council endeavored to settle the fate of Fiume, a former Austro-Hungarian port on the Adriatic Sea, the Italian poet Gabriel d'Annunzio assembled a gang of adventurers, who, on September 12, 1919, seized Fiume in a surprise attack. Pressure from the Italian government forced D'Annunzio's retreat in the beginning of 1921. But when the "Fiume legionnaires" came home, their return gave the signal for a more vigorous campaign inside Italy. Thus, from the front and from Milan, where it originated, fascism had spread into the Po valley and farther south to Emilia, where gangs of mercenaries, led by Mussolini, won their first victories over agricultural laborers. Although after the collapse of Austria, Italy participated in the unimpeded advance of the Allied armies, it can be said that the march on Rome in 1922 was the culmination of a warlike and migratory movement caused by the defeat of the Italian army.

Differential Natural Increase and Internal Migration

The Italian birth rate underwent a slow decline before the first World War, in connection with urbanization, especially in northern Italy. In 1880 there were 38 births per 1,000 inhabitants; the rate had fallen to 33.3 by 1902. But natural increase (and even actual increase, despite emigration) went up constantly, because the decline in mortality was even more outstanding. After the war of 1915-18, the picture was different: the death rate continued to fall, but the birth rate fell even more rapidly. The net reproduction rate decreased from 1.4 in 1921-25 to 1.1 in 1931-35. Natural growth slowed down, not only in relative but even in absolute figures (see Table 15).

Declining fertility was paralleled by urbanization. It should be stressed that for Italy this term has a specific meaning. Since the epoch of perpetual invasion during the Middle Ages, the bulk of agricultural population has lived in small towns. According to the census of 1931, the "rural" population as such represented only 1.4

⁵ *Censimento dei profughi di guerra*. Porri, *Cinque anni di crisi nel Veneto*, pp. 42 ff.

TABLE 15
ITALY: POPULATION MOVEMENTS
(ANNUAL AVERAGE)

Years	RATES PER THOUSAND			IN THOUSANDS		
	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase	Natural Increase	Migratory Loss	Actual Increase
1913	31.7	18.7	13.0			
1921-25	29.8	17.4	12.4	473	160	313
1926-30	26.8	16.0	10.9	436	80	356
1931-35	23.8	14.1	9.8	410	24	386
1936-40	23.2	13.8	9.4	411	9	401
1941-42	20.6	14.0 ^b	6.6	299
1943-45 ^a	19.1	15.0 ^b	4.1	187
1946 ^a	22.6	12.0	10.6	481

^a Excluding Venezia Giulia and Zara.

^b Excluding deaths due to acts of war.

percent of the population, while 48.3 percent lived in communities of 1,000-10,000 inhabitants. Rural exodus thus translated itself into the growth of larger communities, with more urban characteristics. This was the case for the periods between the censuses of 1921, 1931, and 1936. Population gains were highest in the few cities having more than 500,000 inhabitants (Rome, Milan, Naples, and Genoa), which in 1921 contained 3,001,000 persons (7.1 percent of the total Italian population) as against 4,042,000 in 1931 and 4,481,000 (10.4 percent) in 1936.

Urban concentration was associated with the depopulation of certain rural areas. The population of various mountain regions, particularly in Piedmont, the Apennines, and Calabria, actually decreased.⁶ Exodus from the mountainous regions occurred in a series of migratory movements. Some inhabitants left for distant places, others merely went to the near-by hilly country, from which other peasants in turn emigrated to the plains or else to the towns.

But depopulation of the mountains was merely a tangible sign of the great agrarian crisis, which affected not only the higher altitudes. It has been observed that in particular "zones of greatest depopula-

⁶ The same phenomenon was observed in Switzerland (see memorandum by H. Bernard, presented to the Tenth International Studies Conference, Paris, 1937), in Austria (F. Knotzinger, *Der Rückgang des Gebirgsbauerntums in Niederösterreich*, 1938; O. v. Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst, in *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, Dec., 1938, pp. 74 ff.), in France, and elsewhere.

tion are located in the vicinity of densely populated territories.”⁷ In other words, in addition to the push of the least fertile agricultural regions, the pull of industrial areas plays an influential role.

The actual growth of cities—in Italy as elsewhere—which is much higher than that of rural areas, is merely the result of migratory shifts to the towns. According to the 1931 census, 57 percent of all inhabitants of provincial capitals had been born where they were then living, while in smaller communities the percentage of locally born residents was 75 percent. Natural increase, in fact, was much slower among the urban population. Because the number of inhabitants does not reflect with sufficient accuracy the urban or rural character of an Italian community, a redistribution into four categories according to the degree of *ruralita* (as expressed in the percentage of the population gainfully employed in agriculture) was carried out. In 1936-37 the excess of births in the most rural communities was more than twice as high (11.4) as in most urbanized settlements (5.5).

Differences in the demographic evolution of urban and rural areas interplay with regional variations in the rates of birth and death. These variations are typical of the cultural and economic contrasts between the south and the north which are so characteristic of Italy. Births, deaths, and natural increase are lowest in the northwest, the most industrialized and most progressive part of the country. The decline is particularly acute in towns, but also affects the countryside, especially the vicinity of the French border, where contacts with the French were numerous. On the contrary, in southern Italy, in Sicily and in Sardinia, where the standard of living was very low, a high birth rate persisted and resulted in high natural increase, although death rates were also very high. Another center of high natality and high natural increase was located in northeastern Italy (Venetia). Central Italy held an intermediate position. In 1940 natural increase varied from 0.8 per thousand in Piedmont and 1.6 in Liguria to 16.1 in Calabria and 17.6 in Sardinia. It reached 12.4 in Venetia. In central Italy, excluding Latium, it ranged from 5.6 to 9.1. Latium (the Rome region) showed a high excess of births (12.1), probably as a result of the large number of in-migrants in Rome, among whom the first generation continued to be prolific, while mortality was relatively low.

⁷ Giusti, “Lo sviluppo demografico dei maggiori centri urbani,” *Giornale degli Economisti*, March, 1936, p. 162.

Southern Italy and Venetia, regions of high birth rate, were the starting points of large migratory currents. Great internal shifts characterized especially the interwar period and were due to the absence of overseas outlets. Before 1900 emigrants from northern Italy went to other European countries, as well as overseas. They undertook the colonization of Argentina, one of the greatest achievements of constructive migration of all times. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the mad overseas rush started in southern Italy, where the population had suddenly increased to a considerable extent when mortality dropped under the influence of a progressive administration and the introduction of science from northern Italy. Emigrants from southern Italy mainly went to the United States. When American legislation restricted this emigration, the population of southern Italy was forced to search for new outlets. As a result, a strong current of internal migration was started, which swept through the entire peninsula. In addition, the Fascist government took a series of measures against emigration abroad and thus furthered still more the persisting infiltration from south to north which tended to "meridionalize" the population of Italy.

Official Italian statistics, based on the censuses of 1901 and 1931, which supply data on persons born in one region (*compartimento*) and residing in another, show that the total number in this category had considerably risen (general increase in mobility), but that the highest increase was among persons born in southern Italy and residing in the central or northern part of the country. The existence of a south-north current is thus revealed. However, the 1931 census enables us to establish with greater precision the direction of this migratory current. According to the demographic features, the eighteen Italian *compartimenti* can be considered as six regions.⁸ Only two regions—northwestern Italy and Latium, the province of Rome—show a greater number of residents born outside the region than those who were born in the region but at the time of the census lived outside it. These are the regions of in-migration; all other regions are characterized by out-migration, with an inverse excedent. In

⁸ In order to adjust the regions to demographic characteristics, we have somewhat deviated from the usual division in four regions: northern, central, southern, and insular Italy. Northern Italy was divided into northwestern and northeastern; Latium, as containing Rome and dominated by the capital's attraction, was excluded from central Italy.

northeastern Italy the excess was nearly as high as in the combined regions of southern and insular Italy.

The city of Rome exerted an enormous attraction, especially upon its immediate vicinity. Those who left the near-by countryside and small towns took the road to Rome. Furthermore, the current which originated in the south was partly absorbed by the Eternal City, but it partly by-passed Rome to form a new migratory stream. Venetia, in northeastern Italy, was also an area of out-migration, so that a secondary east-west current coexisted with the south-north current. Inasmuch as the latter was not absorbed by Rome, the two met in northwestern Italy near the French border. This area showed a remarkable gain through internal migration and sent a large emigration to France, which, continuing the current penetrated deeply into France.

Before 1914 emigration from northern Italy spread fanlike into Austria, Switzerland, and France. Beyond the Italian border this movement took a definite northwestern direction, spreading as far as the Ruhr, Paris, and especially, in one continuous stretch, from Switzerland to Lorraine and Briey-Longwy.⁹ However, on the eve of the first World War, Italian emigration tended to lead towards the west. Austria had played a dominant part as immigration territory for Italians, but while still important, her share was declining. Switzerland and France gained in importance, and "if we take into account the fact that the majority of emigrants who went to Germany settled in German-annexed Lorraine, we can see that even before the war the share of France was the most important among the European countries."¹⁰ After the war of 1914-18 this trend came definitely to predominate, despite the fact that Italy's political expansion was towards the northeast. The political expansion was in line with the former direction of Italian migration, which had resulted in the reinforcement of the Italian element in the provinces bordering on Austria, and strengthened Italian irredentism there. At the very moment when the Italian flag was raised over these provinces, the wide channel through which immigrants had been able to reach these lands had become blocked. Formerly south Tyrol and Istria were parts of

⁹ Alexander Kulischer and E. M. Kulischer, *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge*, pp. 163, 166 ff.

¹⁰ Woog, *La Politique de l'émigration de l'Italie*, p. 47.

a large empire, with Vienna as its capital. It was the latter, in particular, which attracted immigrants, especially temporary workers. Furthermore, Vienna's economic power was felt even in northern Italy. While workers from Venetia went to Austria and returned with their earnings, residents of Vienna came to Venetia to spend their vacation money.

In 1918, in place of this ancient splendor there stood unfortunate Austria and impoverished Vienna. The economic foundations of Venetia and of the two newly conquered provinces, Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia, were severely shaken. "During the war, the movement from the mountains to the plains had been accelerated because of the demand for labor. After the war, the mountaineers who had become acquainted with the advantages of living in the fertile Po valley and its confluents settled there as farmers, tenants, or landowners. They became serious competitors for the local residents. . . . Landowners took advantage of overpopulation and imposed Draconian conditions upon their tenants."¹¹ The newly conquered Austrian provinces which had lost Vienna as an outlet also became reservoirs of westward bound out-emigrants. An important migration toward the west got under way.¹² It led to the industrial centers of northwestern Italy and to France.

The direction of the current which we had observed in 1921-31 remained the same in the subsequent period, between the census of 1931 and that of 1936. The only regions with migratory gains were still Latium (146,000) and northwestern Italy (82,000). Actual immigration in the latter region, where internal currents converged, was substantially higher, as it overbalanced a net emigration of 170,000 persons, who left northwestern Italy for foreign countries within the same period (according to direct registration). Regions of out-migration were northeastern Italy (migratory loss 127,000, net emigration abroad 91,000), southern Italy (migratory loss 203,000, net emigration abroad 25,000), and insular Italy (migratory loss 159,000). Thus, after 1931 the direction of the migratory current was

¹¹ Mauco, *Les Etrangers en France*, p. 106. Cf. Wlocewski, *L'Installation des Italiens en France*, pp. 67-68.

¹² Despite a high excess of births, the population growth of Venetia was only 3.1 percent between 1921 and 1931. This was the lowest rate for all of Italy, with the exception of Venezia Tridentina (formerly South Tyrol), where it was but 3 percent.

still from south to north¹³ and from east to west. However, the latter became weaker, because it was hampered in its flow into France. Therefore, the actual rate of population increase in northeastern Italy went up. In Venetia the actual increase was 30,000 per year between 1931 and 1936 as against 13,000 per year in 1921-31. An accumulation of masses happened simultaneously in northeastern and northwestern Italy, but took on a different aspect in each case. In the northeast it was due to the high natural increase of a prolific population which found the channel leading to the west more crowded than it used to be. In the northwest the population was less prolific, but the accumulation resulted from a direct influx, combined with the decrease of emigration possibilities.

Italian Emigration

We have emphasized a change in the direction of Italian migration which occurred after the first World War. Overseas countries had come to play a secondary part as compared to reception areas in Europe. In lieu of the United States, France had become the main immigration land for Italians. This change brought about a redistribution of emigrants as to provinces of origin. From the beginning of the twentieth century up to the second World War, a direct relationship existed between the direction of the migratory current and the provinces participating in the movement. Emigrants to European countries originated mainly in the northern part of the country, while the majority of overseas migrants were from southern Italy.¹⁴ Between 1900 and 1914, as long as the overseas current predominated, most emigrants originated in the south, but after the first World War northern Italy supplied the majority. Between 1921 and 1930 Venetia, Piedmont, and Lombardy together supplied 47 percent of all Italian emigrants. In 1931-36 the share of these three regions amounted to 54.9 percent.

¹³ See also the reports on seasonal workers migration, in *Le Migrazioni nel Regno e nell'Africa Italiana*, 1936-37. During ten years, up to and including the first 9 months of 1937, the Commissariat for Migration and Colonization had registered 3.5 million seasonal migrant laborers (of whom 85 percent were agricultural workers). These migrations took place mainly within the boundaries of the same region. There was, however, a migratory loss in Apulia and Emilia and a migratory gain in Piedmont.

¹⁴ According to *Statistica delle migrazioni da e per l'estero*, 1936, 76.8 percent of all continental migrants came from the north, 45.3 percent of overseas migrants came from the south, and 29.9 percent from the north.

TABLE 16

ITALY: EMIGRATION AND MIGRATORY BALANCES
(ANNUAL AVERAGE IN THOUSANDS)

Years	EMIGRATION				NET EMIGRATION			
	Total	Trans- oceanic	European and Mediterranean	To France	Total	Trans- oceanic	European and Mediterranean	To France
1913	873	560	313	83	...	371
1919	253	106	147	98	...	16
1920	614	409	205	157	...	331
1921	201	117	84	45	77	23	54	25
1922-26	316	132	183	145	161	72	89	70
1927-31	193	73	120	79	75	22	53	39
1932-36	67	24	43	23	14	3	12	9
1937-40	51	20	31 ^a	7	+5 ^b	10	+15 ^b	+23

^a Including 42,308 South Tyrolese transferred to Germany in 1940.

^b Net repatriation due to the return movement from France since the outbreak of the war. It exceeded the transfer of Tyrolese (see note *a*).

In the interwar period both European and overseas migration declined considerably. There was, however, a remarkable difference. Overseas migration, which in 1922-26 had been but a small remnant of the mighty prewar stream, underwent a further decline in 1927-31. After the United States was closed to immigrants, Argentina also closed its gates. Continental migration, on the other hand, declined less rapidly. Only after 1931 did it decrease in similar proportion.

After the first World War continental migration assumed a different character. It was no longer seasonal or temporary, but became largely permanent, especially in the case of France, where migration not only had become much more important numerically but also had led to permanent settlement. For the period 1921-30 Italian statistics indicate a surplus of emigrants over repatriates of 529,000. Figures supplied by the French control office, which are very incomplete, report for the decade 1920-30 a net surplus of 314,000 immigrants from Italy. The French census of 1911 reported 419,000 Italians in France. The interwar censuses showed a rapid increase of this number: to 451,000 in 1921; 760,000 in 1926; 808,000 in 1931; 888,000 in 1936. The French Statistical Office estimates the net immigration of Italians in 1921-30 at 550,000.¹⁵

¹⁵ *Mouvements migratoires entre la France et l'étranger*, p. 102.

Most Italians continued to enter France by way of the Mediterranean, as before the first World War. Thus, "between the Italian border, Lyon, and the Mediterranean, a compact Italian wall came to be erected. The density of the Italian element gradually increases as one approaches the border. This Italian population consists of Italian citizens, of newly naturalized persons of Italian origin, and of French children born from Italian parents."¹⁶ Even before 1914-18 Italian immigration into southeastern France was closely related to an internal French migration, which generally went from south to north. In fact, Italian immigrants participated in this movement.¹⁷ But after 1923 a new chain came to be formed which extended the Italian zone of immigration to the southwest of France.

Gradual depopulation of the countryside and small towns of southwestern France had started before the first World War, through a birth deficit and also a slow exodus of the population. It was not urbanization, but rather lack of local urbanization, which led to a particularly heavy depopulation of the countryside. Wherever local industrial centers are being developed, they represent new markets which make profitable certain forms of agriculture. In this way urbanization contributes to the maintenance of a local peasantry. Southwestern France developed no regional industries, and as a result a depreciation of land values set in. The decline of agriculture may have been the cause, as well as the result of the "one child system" and the flight to Paris. The vacuum which childlessness and departure created among the peasants of southwestern France made room for colonists from northern Italy.

There had been several previous attempts to fill this vacuum. Belgians and Swiss were to be settled there, but they never came. Peasants from Brittany and Savoy were tried, and Poles, even Jews from Poland; all these efforts failed more or less. Spaniards who had long been accustomed to immigrate into this area were generally too poor to settle as independent farmers. Immigrants from northern Italy alone were truly successful in this region, probably because they were genuine farmers accustomed to similar land.

In the Po valley land was worth up to 30,000 lire a hectare—in the southwest of France domains sold for between 3,000 and 7,000 lire a hectare, including the farm dwellings. After someone had taken the

¹⁶ Wlocewski, *L'Installation des Italiens en France*, p. 39.

¹⁷ Kulischer, *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge*, p. 166.

initiative, "the good news" spread that in the place of Argentina, a colonization area was available within one day's travel by railway from home. A migratory movement rapidly took on important dimensions.

A number of special traits characterized this immigration: it was almost entirely agricultural, and it created a class of genuine farmers who revalorized abandoned land and became permanently attached to it. It was beneficial for both the country of emigration and the country of immigration. In Italy, it relieved agricultural overpopulation. In France, it increased the active population, led to the production of agricultural goods which more than offset the increase in consumers, and introduced a more prolific element without subsequent impoverishment. But the Fascist government put serious obstacles in the way of this emigration, because these Italians settled far from the border and became permanently attached to the French soil. French nationalists also raised alarmed clamor because of the Italianization of Gascony. In 1926 the influx of Italian colonists was halted.

In the nine departments of southwestern France the total number of Italian colonists was only 52,000.¹⁸ The part played by this movement is mainly of interest insofar as it reveals the potentialities of constructive colonization and their frustration in the name of nationalistic population policies. Among the total Italian immigration to France, this experiment was of secondary importance.

Only a minority of all Italians—as of other foreigners in France—were engaged in agriculture. Most of them were employed in industry, commerce, and domestic service. Italians were especially numerous in the building trades. Furthermore, the Lorraine mining district attracted many Italian immigrants. They went even farther north, as far as the Atlantic coast in the Pas-de-Calais department. Last, but not least, Italians formed one of the most important foreign groups in the Paris area: according to the 1931 census 142,000 Italians resided in the Seine department (which contains Paris) and in Seine-et-Oise.

When the world crisis broke out, the French government took a number of steps to bring about the repatriation of Italians. The wave

¹⁸ According to the 1931 census. For 1936 a number of 70,000 has been reported. In 1925 alarmed Frenchmen spoke of an invasion by 200,000 Italians.

of xenophobia which then prevailed in France found an active supporter in the fascist government, which opposed the assimilation of Italians abroad.

This new attitude was developed by the Mussolini regime, while the latter still officially stressed the importance of emigration.¹⁹ Italian emigrants were to be exploited in the interest of the Italian state from the financial, military, and political viewpoints. Fascist Italy intended to benefit from the savings accumulated by Italians abroad. Emigrants were to remain subject to draft if the fatherland needed cannon fodder, meanwhile they were to promote Italian interests in foreign countries. The Fascists strove to maintain compact Italian groups abroad, which were not to be absorbed by the local population. Even before all emigration had been curtailed, the emigration of women had been especially regulated. Pregnant women had to return to Italy for their confinement so as to give birth to Italian children. Males also were indirectly compelled to return to Italy at periodic intervals for "a bath of Italianization." Patriotic utilization of leisure time was organized by the *dopolavoro*²⁰ attached to Italian consulates abroad. In 1927 an Italian newspaper stated that emigrants should not be "Italians who will turn the back to their fatherland, but Italians who shall extend the borders of the homeland—ideal borders and maybe even some day, material borders."²¹ It should not come as a surprise that reception countries were not delighted by such prospects. Yet in France, Italians were not forcibly removed, as the Poles had been. In fact, they received preferential treatment there.

Italy's Military Expansion

During the Ethiopian campaign an Italian colonel told a foreign correspondent: "You have closed your frontiers to our emigrants. We can no longer cross the Atlantic. We can no longer go beyond the Alps. With our yearly increase of almost 500,000 inhabitants, we were forced to look to Africa."²² The loss of migratory outlets was, indeed, the main cause for Italy's warlike expansion.

During the first years of fascism, in 1923-24, emigration had been

¹⁹ Fascist authors simultaneously extolled Italian measures combatting assimilation of emigrants and lamented immigration restrictions imposed by foreign countries.

²⁰ Recreation organization.

²¹ *Resto del Carlino*, April 7, 1927.

²² *Le Temps*, Oct. 12, 1935.

once more considerable, because of the labor shortage in France and a certain increase in immigration possibilities to Argentina. The Duce did not conceal that he sought to increase emigration. On June 28, 1923, at a dinner of the Italo-American Association, he declared in reply to a speech by the American ambassador that "Italy would greet with satisfaction an opening in the somewhat rigid meshes of the Immigration Bill so that there could be an increase in Italian emigration to North America."²³ And in December, 1924, Mussolini boasted that he had succeeded in sending out of the country a larger number of Italians: "Considering the enormous and almost anguishing disproportion between the resources of our territory . . . and its constantly growing population, you will understand the gravity of the problem." After rejecting birth control and warlike conquest of colonial areas, Mussolini declared that there were two other solutions to the problem.

The first one is to utilize the national territory to the last square inch. . . . The second one is emigration. An agency set up in our Ministry of Foreign Affairs enables us to follow all possibilities of employment abroad for our labor force. . . . We have thus been able to have 400,000 emigrants in 1923 and 250,000 in the first 8 months of the current year, while in 1921-1922 the figure had fallen below 300,000.²⁴

Mussolini adopted the policy of restricting emigration only when peaceful migratory outlets had already been barred. Then warlike expansion became the goal to which all subsequent demographic and economic actions were subordinated: "Since Italy is overpopulated, it is necessary that she be even more overpopulated, so as to be able to invade other countries," the leading thought of the Duce might well be phrased.

In 1924 Mussolini proclaimed:

We are in an inferior position with respect to raw materials, we have been heavily struck by the introduction of the Immigration Bill. It is not enough that countries now prosperous declare: "let us keep quiet." If we Italians, do not know where to install our excess population, if we do not know where to obtain raw materials which might enable us to exist within our boundaries, for us this will be a policeman's peace and not a free and truly human peace.²⁵

²³ Mussolini, *Scritti e discorsi*, III, 183. The quoted translation is found in *Mussolini as Revealed in His Political Speeches*.

²⁴ Mussolini, *Scritti e discorsi*, IV, 431-34.

²⁵ Speech of Nov. 4, 1925 (*ibid.*, p. 386).

Three years later, however, Mussolini had the conviction that the end of peaceful migration was an inalterable fact and that Italy had to put to advantage "her most precious product," her "crop of manpower,"²⁶ to seize the space she needed. Under these conditions, it was evidently imperative further to increase this "production."

In his famous speech of May 26, 1927, Mussolini declared that "Italy, in order to amount to anything in this world, would have to arrive by the second half of this century at a population of at least 60 million inhabitants."²⁷ A strange spectacle could then be observed: volumes could be filled with Italian statements on overpopulation, yet at the same time the government launched a furious population policy. Heavy taxation of single persons, childless couples, and one-child families, tax reductions for prolific families, priorities for family fathers in government and community employment, subsidies and premiums at childbirth, protection of pregnant women, prohibition of all birth-control propaganda—all these and many other measures were taken. The government also interfered with the shift to the towns of rural dwellers, which it viewed as a sterilizing process. Yet all attempts at raising the birth rate failed miserably.²⁸ The policy was inaugurated in 1926; the fall of the birth rate was continuous before and after this date (see Table 15), although it remained high enough to insure persistent natural increase.

The Italian government was probably more successful in preventing emigration to the few outlets which had remained available. In 1927 an order was issued to all prefects "rigorously to control" emigration. After 1928 new measures were taken to limit emigration "so as to avoid a too-heavy demographic loss for the nation and to conserve for Italy the power of those thousands of workers whose presence had formerly enriched foreign countries."²⁹

These measures contributed further to reduce the scope of emigration, already seriously limited by economic conditions and the hostility of reception countries. On the other hand, a certain clandestine emigration took place. There was, furthermore, a political, anti-fascist emigration, which reached its peak in 1926-29. Italian

²⁶ Toynbee, *Abyssinia and Italy*, p. 13.

²⁷ Mussolini, *Scritti e discorsi*, VI, 42.

²⁸ On March 8, 1937, the Fascist Great Council admitted that the expected results had failed to materialize. More rigorous measures were therefore adopted.

²⁹ Antonucci and Trillo, "Provenienze e destinazioni delle correnti dell'emigrazione italiana," *Proceedings of the International Congress at Rome*, IX, 298.

political refugees also went primarily to France. Their total number has been put at 10,000.⁸⁰

While attempting to check as far as possible the emigration of workers abroad, the Italian government sponsored internal migration so as to transform agricultural laborers—a constantly dissatisfied element—into independent farmers. In connection with great public works, spectacular results were achieved, such as the drainage of the Pontine marshes, where some 4,000 families have been installed at the cost of two milliard lire (\$25,000 per family). But internal colonization did not turn into a mass phenomenon. On October 28, 1928, when he started his integral land reclamation program, Mussolini asserted that it would eventually give land and bread to millions of Italians. In the course of the following ten years, the number of those who actually obtained "land and bread" did not exceed 20,000 families.⁸¹ On December 19, 1932, Mussolini extolled the achievements of land-reclamation as follows: "Once upon a time it was necessary to cross the Alps or to travel across the ocean when seeking for work. Today the land is here only half an hour distant from Rome."⁸² He failed to mention the fact that the total number of colonists installed in Italy under the rule of the Fascists amounted to less than one percent of those who had found work and decent living conditions beyond the Alps and the ocean.

The Duce's favorite plans, which consisted of furthering Italy's ruralization and leading his people towards the "healthy industries of the land and the sea," failed altogether. With the increasing lack of peaceful outlets abroad, the Italian people, more than ever, tended to shift in ever larger numbers towards the cities and towards industry in a narrower sense.

The development possibilities of Italy's economy were strictly limited by her meager natural resources. The fascist "battle of the grain" had extended the cultivated area to the verge of diminishing returns; yet only 41.4 percent of Italy's land surface was cultivated. Industrial expansion was also hampered—by the poor subsoil, deficient in coal and iron ore. The combined efforts of agriculture and

⁸⁰ Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 119.

⁸¹ Furthermore, the reclamation project itself gave work to a number of unemployed. Through Oct., 1930-Oct., 1934, the total number of working days devoted to the project amounted to 57 million. This means an average employment of about 50,000 full-time workers.

⁸² Mussolini, *Scritti e discorsi*, VIII, 148. The quoted translation is found in Tassinari, *Ten Years of Integral Land-Reclamation*, p. 87.

industry could not keep pace with the constant population growth. Between the census of December 1, 1921, and that of April 1, 1936, the natural increase amounted to 6,529,000. Of them, 1,584,000 were removed by emigration, mostly before the world crisis. The population of Italy grew from 37,974,000 in 1921 to 42,917,000 in 1936.

In a country such as Italy where half the population is employed in agriculture (48.2 in 1936), unemployment registration only partly reflects the actual situation. It shows the number of those who lost their jobs, but not of peasants inhibited in shifting to the industrial sector of economy. However, a comparison of registration figures is significant. In 1929 the highest number of unemployed was 489,000, but it rapidly increased in the following years and in 1933 it rose to 1,229,000. By subsidizing industry, a further growth of unemployment was prevented, but no decline was achieved. The number of jobless remained more or less the same; in 1934 it was still 1,158,000. By February 1, 1935, it had fallen to 1,012,000, and by May 31, 1935, to 755,000, but this decline was to be attributed exclusively to the mass intake in war industries of unemployed workers, in view of the coming Ethiopian campaign.

This had become the Duce's last solution.

For a politician in search of a shortcut towards his goal of relieving unemployment and redistributing purchasing power, it might be tempting to mobilize a million men, to draft a quarter of these to Africa, and to re-employ hundreds of thousands more at home on the manufacture of munitions.³³

But it was more than that. Mussolini's plans coincided with the pressure exerted by the Italian masses. A correspondent of the *Temps* grasped the underlying motive of the Ethiopian campaign:

Here is a people on the march. By what deeper forces are they being pushed? It is poverty, overpopulation, in one word, the harsh conditions which have prevailed in Italy ever since the other countries locked their doors to Italian immigrants. This is not an impetuous and joyous war, but a war of necessity. It was not dictated by the quest for riches, it was not a capitalist war, but a war of peasants who sought land.³⁴

But when peasants set out to look for land in hand, there is no guarantee that they will find it. And it does not follow that overpop-

³³ Toynbee, *Abysinia and Italy*, p. 25.

³⁴ *Le Temps*, Aug. 5, 1935.

ulation which motivated a campaign of conquest will be alleviated after the goal has been reached.

The politicians' machinations were doubtlessly successful insofar as mobilization and armament put a temporary stop to unemployment. But after the African war Italy's purchasing capacity had been merely redistributed, not increased, in fact it had rather been diminished. Furthermore, if Italy had expected to find "living space" through her African conquests, she failed thoroughly. Overpopulated Italy once more had launched herself on a conquest of imaginary settlement areas. As early as the nineteenth century Italy had owned colonial territories in East Africa (Eritrea and Somaliland); in 1912 Tripolitania was conquered. But from the viewpoint of colonization the results were meager indeed. Mass settlement of colonists was either just impossible, as in the cases of Eritrea, with its poor resources, and Somaliland, with its torrid climate; or else, as in the case of Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) huge capital would have been required, which was lacking both on the part of individual colonists and the Italian government. In 1931, when the last census was taken, only 4,600 Europeans lived in Eritrea and 1,700 in Somaliland.⁸⁵ In Libya the number of Europeans rose between 1931 and 1936 from 50,000 to 67,000, and in 1938, after the conquest of Abyssinia and possibly to relieve the ensuing disenchantment, a spectacular installation of 20,000 colonists was undertaken. But everywhere Italians constituted a small minority as compared to the natives.⁸⁶ Colonization neither led to the Italianization of the conquered areas nor offered a notable outlet for emigration. It has been calculated that on the eve of the Ethiopian campaign Italians in New York alone were twenty-five times as numerous as in all Italian colonies put together.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ The Italian population on the eve of the war has been estimated at 7,000.

⁸⁶ In 1938 the population of Libya was estimated as follows: total 888,000, including 89,000 Italians, 6,000 other Europeans, and 793,000 natives (*The Italian Colonial Empire*, p. 25). The general picture was not changed, even if between 1938 and 1941 the Italian population increased by several tens of thousands in Libya as well as in eastern Africa.

⁸⁷ A more substantial outlet for Italian emigrants than the Italian colonies, was French owned Tunisia, as availability of French capital made here for greater employment opportunities. In 1921, 85,000 Italians resided in Tunisia as against only 54,000 Frenchmen. By 1931 the figures had been equalized: both national groups numbered 91,000. In 1936 the number of Frenchmen exceeded that of Italians (108,000 as against 94,000). The rapid growth of the French elements is partly attributable to naturalization. Between 1921 and 1931, 30,000 persons, among them 18,000 Italians, were naturalized.

When Italy embarked on the policy of expanding her "living space" beyond the Mediterranean, she aimed at colonization areas as well as at new sources of raw materials and markets for her manufactured goods. Mussolini told foreign journalists: "We have openly stated what we wish to get out of this colonial operation. First of all, security, and then expansion possibilities for a prolific people which has exhausted its own ungrateful soils, but does not want to starve."³⁸ And after the conquest of his "empire" the Duce stated: "Hereafter Italy belongs to the satisfied nations."

The disillusionment was all the more painful to bear, although victory had been won at a very small cost: 2,313 dead among the Italian troops, 1,593 dead among the colonial troops (Africans), and 453 Italian workers killed. Illusions began to fade very rapidly.

Significant warnings that the development and exploitation of Abyssinia will be long, costly, and difficult have already supplanted the first facile statements that Abyssinia held out off-hand to the Italian emigrant the mineral wealth of Eldorado, combined with the grazing capacity of Australia and the grain-growing properties of the Ukraine.³⁹

At the time of the Italian census of 1936, 470,000 Italian soldiers and workers were in Italian East Africa. A closer statistical breakdown reveals that in the period 1935-38, 204,000 workers went to East Africa (the largest contingent—40,000—came from Venetia) and 192,000 were repatriated.⁴⁰ They could not compete with the local population, since wages for an Italian worker were 60 lire, whereas the natives worked for 8 to 10 lire. In addition to workers who could not find suitable employment, hundreds of small businessmen returned to Italy. They had gone in the hope of making a fortune in Africa; most of them returned after having achieved bankruptcy. Among the mass of demobilized soldiers who had at first considered staying in the country after demobilization, only 3,000 remained as colonists. "The principal reason given to the people as a justification for the Ethiopian conquest was the need to provide bread for several million men. But this aim has not been attained."⁴¹ The total population of Italian East Africa (including besides Ethi-

³⁸ Devaldès, *Une Guerre de surpopulation*, pp. 10-11.

³⁹ Macartney and Cremona, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*, 1938, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁰ Piccioli, *Costruzione del impero*, p. 1075.

⁴¹ J. Tharaud, in *Paris-Soir* Jan 23, March 6, and March 11, 1939. Hollis, *Italy in Africa*, p. 248. Grober, *Hilfsmittel der italienischen Ackerbausiedlungen*, p. 248.

opia the old Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland) as of May 1, 1939, was estimated at 12,100,000; among them were 130,000 white residents, almost all Italians. A large number were employed in a military capacity or on public works. Agricultural immigrants constituted only a small portion.

It cannot be judged at this point what the results of the Ethiopian conquest would have been in the long run had Italy had time to carry out her program of exploitation and colonization. In any case, Italy did not find in eastern Africa the immediate demographic and commercial outlet which she had sought. A new attempt was therefore made to enlarge her "living space." This time the Balkans were invaded.

Italy's economic entanglement with Albania dated back to 1926, but its commercial effects had been insignificant. Italian troops invaded Albania in the spring of 1939. Once more, great hopes were put on land reclamation and the exploitation of natural resources. But even friendly observers were forced to recognize "that one should have no illusions as to the potential economic wealth of Albania, for her unexploited riches, which is a subject of recurring discussion, are not only unexploited, but probably nonexistent."⁴²

Nor did Albania offer room for colonization. The cultivated area represents but 11-12 percent of the total surface, which could be only slightly increased by expensive reclamation work. Agricultural density (260.2 per 100 hectares) exceeded even that of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In the interwar period hygienic improvements reduced infant mortality, and the custom of vendetta had been successfully eliminated. This led to high natural increase (reportedly 16.7 per thousand in 1938). The rapidly increasing population had no outlets, since all frontiers were closed. Thus, the above-quoted German writer foresaw that Albania's incorporation would start the emigration of Albanians towards the west, that is, to Italy.

"Imperial" adventures did not alleviate the population pressure in Italy. There was no improvement of economic conditions. Emigration was almost stopped (see Table 16). In 1939-40 the transfer of Tyrolese Germans was overbalanced by a return of 105,620 Italians from France, at that time involved in the war. The population of Italy increased from 42.9 million in 1936 to 45 million in June, 1941. Masses continued to stream in search of bread and work from the

⁴² Busch-Zantner, *Albanien-neues Land im Imperium*, p. 16.

south and the northeast. A calculation of Italy's population changes after the census of 1936 up to September, 1942⁴³ (it reflects mainly the period before Italy entered the war) shows a migratory loss of 142,000 in southern and insular Italy and of 195,000 in northeastern Italy (besides a loss of 52,000 in central Italy, Latium excepted). As in the foregoing period, the only regions with migratory gains were Latium (the region of Rome)—178,000, and the northwestern industrial area—210,000. The Italians continued to leave the provinces adjacent to Greater Germany and to stream in the direction of the then-closed French border. In June, 1941, the border was crossed by the Italian army, allied to Germany.

In the meantime, even before the invasion of Albania, Italy had engaged in another warlike movement—towards Spain. It was linked to a current which proceeded inside Spain.

The Two Spains

An eminent expert pointed out that the Spanish civil war was "but the somehow unavoidable outcome of the latent conflict between the two Spains: on the one hand revolutionaries and rationalists inflamed by new ideas and full of dynamism, and on the other hand traditionalists who had remained faithful to concepts and an ideal to which they ascribed the past greatness of their homeland."⁴⁴

This ideological conflict, however, had deeper roots and involved not only the few who made a living from politics but also the mass of the people concerned with the daily search for bread.

One of Spain's peculiar features was the contrast between the heart of the country and the coastal regions. The interior of Spain included more than two thirds of the country, but less than half the population. The greater part of her population and 80 percent of her industries were located near the coast. But—to use the terminology usually reserved for the Russian area—this zone was also a "grain-consuming area." Agricultural goods were produced in the interior of the country.

This contrast between the two zones, although of long standing, underwent a deep evolution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The southern coastal region on the Atlantic partook only slightly

⁴³ "Present and Postwar Population Problems of Italy," *Population Index*, July, 1943.

⁴⁴ Marvaud, "La Guerre civile en Espagne," *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, Oct.-Dec., 1936, p. 561.

of Spain's industrial development, and the southern Mediterranean coast was entirely left out. On the other hand, industries sprang up both in the northern mine region and in the center of the country, gravitating to Madrid. It is therefore more appropriate to speak of a contrast between central and southern Spain on the one hand and northeastern Spain on the other.

To this economic disparity corresponds a demographic contrast, not limited to population density, which is, of course, much higher in the more industrialized areas. The contrast in population structure, in customs, and in living conditions is reflected in differential birth rates and death rates. In addition, northern and northeastern Spain attracted immigrants and determined the flow of internal Spanish migration.

Up to the time of Spain's civil war her population grew at a more and more rapid pace (see Table 17).


TABLE 17
NATURAL POPULATION GROWTH IN SPAIN

<i>Years</i>	<i>Birth Rate (Per thousand)</i>	<i>Death Rate (Per thousand)</i>	<i>Excess of Births (Per thousand)</i>	<i>Natural Increase (In thousands)</i>
1901-05	35.1	26.1	9.0	174
1921-25	28.8	20.2	9.6	211
1926-30	28.5	17.9	10.6	245
1931-35	27.0	16.3	10.7	258
1936-40	21.7	18.0	3.7	94
1941	19.6	18.7	0.9	24
1942	20.2	14.7	5.5	142
1943	22.9	13.2	9.6	254
1944	22.5	13.0	9.5	253
1945	22.8	12.1	10.7	290

In the early twentieth century Spain entered that phase of the demographic process in which the death rates fall more rapidly than birth rates. But great regional differences prevailed. The map on page 229 shows the division of Spain into regions in which both mortality and natality are high and those in which both are low.⁴⁵

Two Spains stand out on this map. There is, on the one hand, the

⁴⁵ Almansa, "Balance vital de España," *Proceedings of the International Congress, Rome, 1931*, pp. 166-69, 177, 211, has established the same fact on the basis of statistics referring to the first quarter of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the last published data on births and deaths still reflect the same features (Cf. *Anuario estadístico de España*, Vol. XXI, 1944-45).



4. Migration and Natural Increase of Population in Spain

area of high birth rates and death rates, which also has the highest natural increase. This is central and southern Spain, poor, backward, rural, and religious, reservoir of out-migrants and also the area where Franco's rebellion was to triumph from the start. The other area, northeastern Spain, has a low mortality, but an even lower fertility, and therefore a small natural increase. It is more thoroughly industrialized, urbanized, and progressive, and is an area of in-migration which became Republican territory during the Spanish civil war.

Internal migration was the usual movement from the countryside to the cities, which has been observed in all parts of the world. Table 18 gives an idea of its scope.

TABLE 18
POPULATION GROWTH IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS
AND OTHER PARTS OF SPAIN
(IN THOUSANDS)

<i>Census Years</i>	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940 ^a
Provincial capitals					
Population	3,088	3,412	4,008	5,088	6,317
As a percentage of the total population ^b	16.8	17.4	19.1	21.6	24.4
Natural growth in the intercensus period	...	63	2	235	...
Migratory gain	...	261	594	845	...
Other communities					
Population	15,507	16,515	17,295	18,476	19,561
Natural growth during the intercensus period	...	1,702	1,303	2,046	...
Migratory loss	...	694	523	865	...
Total population	18,594	19,927	21,303	23,564	25,878

^a Cf. p. 239 note 62 on the reliability of this census data.

^b *Boletín de estadística*, Sept., 1942, p. 109. There is a slight discrepancy as compared to absolute figures given by other official sources.

The capitals of the various provinces gained increasingly from decade to decade as a result of internal migration. In the beginning of the twentieth century (1900-1910) the cities gained more than a quarter of a million, while an even larger portion of those whom the countryside could not accommodate went overseas. Between 1910 and 1920, during the war years, the cities had to absorb the entire rural exodus—more than half a million—and in addition they received tens of thousands of repatriates from overseas countries. After the first World War (1920-30) rural exodus increased considerably.

Almost half the migratory gain during this period was absorbed by two centers: Barcelona (252,000) and Madrid (156,000).

This was not purely a movement from rural districts to local urban centers. In predominantly agricultural regions long-distance migration to industrial centers of national importance, such as Barcelona, Madrid, and Bilbao, originated as well.⁴⁶ But a certain uniformity of direction prevailed.

The afore-mentioned contrast between the interior of Spain and the coast had been created by an earlier migratory current connected with Spain's past expansion by way of the sea. The population flocked to the coast, whence in former times a fleet of conquerors and colonists departed and where later simple emigrants embarked for overseas countries. In that same coastal zone commerce and industry were developed, in close connection with maritime activities. The same migratory current continued in the twentieth century before as well as after the first World War.

The migratory trend towards the coast is apparent from the data on the birthplace of residents, collected during the 1930 census. Catalonia, the Cantabrian region, and western Andalusia showed strong migratory gains. Other coastal regions exerted a lesser attraction, or else their migratory gains were offset by shifts from one coastal area to some other more richly endowed spot. In particular, the Levantine region was the channel for the current which went from southern Spain to Catalonia. On the other hand, the coastal zone supplied the main contingents of overseas migrants. On the whole, they came from the same provinces, despite social and economic progress in some of these areas. Galicia on the Atlantic coast in the northwestern part of the country held first place and supplied more emigrants than all the rest of Spain. Next came Andalusia, in the south, also located on the coast, neighboring Estremadura, and the Basque and Asturian provinces on the Gulf of Biscay. Emigrants who went to Algeria mainly originated on the southeastern coast. These currents were of a peculiar character. The cities of the coastal zone received in-migrants from the interior of the country, while rural areas located near the coast sent emigrants across the Atlantic Ocean or the Mediterranean.

⁴⁶ Those are the conclusions reached by the Spanish Statistical Office on the basis of data on the birthplace of people enumerated in 1930 (*Censo de la poblacion de España el 31 de diciembre de 1930*, I, lxxxv).

The current which eventually flowed to the New World dated back to the time of the discovery and conquest of the Americas. In the nineteenth century opportunities for large-scale overseas migration were revived, especially in Argentina. Spain had a large transoceanic migration for the last time in 1920: total of emigrants 151,000; net emigration 104,000. Thereafter the number of emigrants fell each year. In 1921-25 the annual average of emigrants was 73,000 (net emigration 27,000); in 1926-30 it decreased further, to 46,000 (net emigration 6,000). During the world depression there were more repatriates than emigrants: a net immigration of 21,000 yearly in 1931-35.

The attraction of overseas countries, especially of Argentina, decreased considerably. In the latter country population growth and rural exodus barred foreigners from the labor market in the countryside and in the towns.⁴⁷ Consequently, the attraction of the coast dwindled, too.

Since the end of the first World War a new movement of the migratory current gained more and more strength. It went from southern and inner Spain toward the north and northeast: to the central region, including Madrid, the Basque provinces, and chiefly to Catalonia, as can be seen from the map on page 229. In-migration areas are shaded, while all out-migration areas have been left blank. This map might be a map of the Spanish civil war, the three shaded areas covering the centers of Republican resistance (with the exception of the Levantine region, and we have mentioned before the special position of this coastal zone): Catalonia, the central region and the Basque provinces. Although internal migration was mainly directed to the industrial areas, it was also connected with a new migratory current, determined by immigration opportunities in France. For a time France became a substitute for overseas outlets, which were no longer available. The French censuses showed a continuous increase in the number of Spaniards in France: in 1911, 106,000; in 1921, 255,000; in 1926, 323,000; in 1931, 352,000.

Spanish immigrants in France mainly settled in the frontier departments of the Pyrenees. They came mostly from northern and

⁴⁷ Furthermore, seasonal agricultural migration stopped almost entirely, for farm wages had dropped markedly as a result of the decline in wheat prices on the world market, making it no longer profitable to undertake the trip across the ocean. Cf. Niedenthal, "Bevölkerungsstatistik Argentiniens," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, Dec., 1938, pp. 733, 737.

eastern Spain, areas of in-migration as far as Spain herself was concerned. Once more we see here a very definite connection between the migratory movements. Barcelona and to a lesser extent Bilbao attracted farm lads from the interior of Spain; peasants from Catalonia and the Basque provinces preferred to work in France, and some of them settled there.

Spanish immigration to France began before the first World War. In 1914-18 Spaniards, being nationals of a neutral power, constituted an important portion of the supplementary labor force needed by France. Although this immigration was largely temporary, about 200,000 Spaniards who came to France in the four war years remained there permanently.⁴⁸ Simultaneously, Spanish industry underwent an enormous development and seized markets abroad which the belligerents had been forced to abandon for the duration of the war. In Catalonia industries were booming to an extent never known before, and the factory owners called for peasants from the remotest areas of Spain. Suddenly large outlets at home and abroad were opened up for the Spanish population.

The new markets which Spain gained during the war, especially those in South America, could not supply a permanent foundation for her industries. These countries subsequently developed their own industries. Furthermore, Spain's former competitors reentered the scene, especially the Germans, who introduced their dumping policy. They even succeeded in reinvading the Spanish home market. Nevertheless, internal migration to the industrial center of Catalonia continued. It had become customary for the peasants from southern Spain to seek fortune in Catalonia. The following passage is typical.

Almeria . . . is the poorest province of Spain, a sort of Moroccan desert. There people rent an olive or fig tree for 5 francs a year, surround it with a fence of thorns, and settle with their chicken, their pig, and their family. As soon as they have saved 40 or 50 pesetos, enough to pay the fare, they kill the chicken and the pig and take the boat for Barcelona in the little port of Aguilas. For them, Barcelona is paradise. In the days when business was good, they easily found work in the factories or farms and a somewhat less miserable life than the one they had left behind.⁴⁹

Emigration to France also continued after the war. It was partly a seasonal shift, especially during the vintage season, but part of it

⁴⁸ Huber, *La Population de la France pendant la guerre*, pp. 200-201.

⁴⁹ Tharaud, *Cruelle Espagne*, p. 84.

was permanent. The French Statistical Office estimates the net immigration of Spaniards in 1921-30 at 200,000.⁵⁰ It had a distinctive "coolie" flavor: Spaniards undertook the hardest and dirtiest jobs, which Frenchmen would scorn.

After 1931 the economic crisis and French administrative policy interfered with immigration from Spain. Unlike the case of the Polish nationals, no mass repatriation was carried out, but the Spaniards were also deprived of work permits if they had resided in France less than ten years. As a result, the immigration of registered workers rapidly decreased, being outnumbered by the departing Spaniards. We have seen that during the world depression the number of repatriates from the Americas surpassed the number of emigrants. The same held true with respect to Algeria.⁵¹ The country no longer had a single migratory outlet.

At the same time, differential population pressure increased constantly, as a result of accelerated population growth. Strangely enough, the accelerated natural increase coincided with the displacement of human masses from prolific agricultural areas to the "sterilizing" urban and industrial areas. But it was precisely this shift which made for higher natural increase, because life expectancy was prolonged, while high fertility rates were maintained in the first generation. The same phenomenon had occurred earlier in Germany: the life expectancy of peasants had been increased when they moved to the cities. In Spain, this evolution was less conspicuous, because the contrast was not so much of the rural-urban order, as it was geographical, between areas of different industrial and cultural development. Mortality was not lower in the town than in the near-by countryside, rather, the contrary held true⁵² But there was a great difference in mortality rates between the various regions of Spain, and thus life expectancy was greatly extended when rural dwellers from poorly developed regions migrated to towns located in areas of low mortality. According to the 1930 census 43 percent of Barce-

⁵⁰ *Mouvements migratoires entre la France et l'étranger*, p. 102.

⁵¹ Emigration to Algeria had always been relatively unimportant, as can be gathered from the following figures on Spaniards in Algeria: 155,000 in 1901; 144,000 in 1921; 110,000 in 1931. Of course, the decline must be attributed to naturalizations. In 1931-34 there was an insignificant excess of immigration over repatriation, but from 1935 on departures were more numerous than arrivals. In French Morocco the number of Spaniards rose from 16,000 in 1921 to 23,000 in 1936.

⁵² *La Demografía española en el decenio 1921-1930*, Vol. I, Part 1: "Balance vital de España," p. 200, and in *Boletín de Estadística*, Dec., 1942, p. 152.

lona's inhabitants had been born in the city, but only 19 percent of the remainder came from Catalonia. For them migration to Barcelona brought no increase in life expectancy. But it did for all other newcomers, for the Catalonian death rate was one of the lowest in Spain.

The Spanish Civil War

The continuous growth of Spain's population (see Table 18) increased the cost of total agricultural production, since inferior land had to be put to use in order to feed everybody. Imports of foreign food products were barred by high tariffs. The world depression dealt a severe blow to some of Spain's agricultural exports. Under these circumstances the purchasing power of the Spanish population declined rapidly, and industry in turn was affected. The impoverishment of the rural population reinforced the trend to industrial centers, but because of the depression the new arrivals could not find employment in factories.

The Republican Revolution of 1931 was carried out among the industrial population of Catalonia, Madrid, and the Levantine and Basque provinces. Agrarian reform was one of the Republic's first measures. It attempted to relieve the miserable situation of the farm population in central and southern Spain, whence emigration to overpopulated industrial areas had been considerable. But the reform progressed at a very slow pace. In two years only about 8,000 acres had been redistributed and some 2,000 families installed on small holdings. A flow of rural migrants continued to stream into Madrid and Barcelona. Unemployment resulted, reaching 400,000 in 1932 and one million in 1936, and large masses of newcomers were thereby reduced to pauperism.

In 1933 a rightist majority had come into power, and agrarian reform was practically suspended. After the victory of the popular front in February, 1936, the redistribution of land was vigorously reinaugurated. Seventy-five thousand peasants were settled in Estremadura. These government reforms and the increasing number of land riots which had broken out in the countryside led to resistance on the part of the landowners. But this time still another force played an important part, a force which by its very nature was destined to launch the old against the new Spain.

Before compulsory and universal military service had been intro-

duced into the various European countries, the army had absorbed all those who were unable or unwilling to work. The officers corps held a very special position, however. While one of the aims of militaristic institutions was to safeguard the continued existence of the aristocracy, on the other hand, and even more so, the officers served the "king" for the defense and the expansion of the country. In the course of the nineteenth century this situation changed. The soldier was no longer a professional, but merely a mobilized citizen; the officer had become a specialist. But in Spain, of all places, a country which had given up her old imperialistic aspirations, lost her colonies one after the other, and was not threatened by any other European power, the evolution was in the opposite direction. It seems that the Spanish army existed for the exclusive purposes of supporting 20,000 commissioned officers. This bureaucratic organization spent most of its budget on the appointment of generals and officers. According to various estimates, there were on the eve of the 1931 Revolution 6-10 soldiers for one officer. Besides, a large part of the troops existed on paper only. Because the army, or rather the officer corps, played an outstanding role in domestic politics, its interests were safeguarded throughout the various political regimes. In 1932 the Republic committed the grave offense of reducing the number of officers on active duty by 7,000. On the other hand, the supremacy of the civilian authorities was to be enforced. These policies were pursued with great vigor after the victory of the popular front in 1936. The generals and the other officers who led the fight against the Spanish Republicans were men whose very existence was actually threatened.

The Spanish civil war introduced foreign elements into the peninsula, who played an outstanding part in the struggle. On the Republican side, besides a few Soviet fliers and technicians, fought the International Brigade, about 45,000 men strong.⁵³ The majority of its members came from France. Part of them were Frenchmen, part foreigners who had lived in France—Germans, Poles, Russians, and others who had established themselves in France at the end of some migratory shift.

On the other hand, the assistance which Franco received resulted in the introduction of Moors and Italians into Spain. The French conquest of Morocco, terminated in 1913, had brought peace to the

⁵³ *Voice of Spain* (London), Aug. 26, 1939. Madariaga, *Spain*, p. 386, stated that at a given date the International Brigade numbered 22,000 men.

country. In the ensuing period an energetic campaign against prevailing diseases resulted in considerable population growth. Furthermore, the defeat of Abd-el-Krim in 1925 put an end to the looting expeditions of native mountain tribes in Spanish Morocco and deprived them of one of their steady sources of income. Thus, Franco found a precious reservoir of recruits in Spanish Morocco and even some in French Morocco. In the early stages of the Spanish civil war these troops played such an important role that some observers spoke of "a reconquest of Spain by the Moors." This "re-conquest," however, was stopped at the gates of Madrid by Spanish workers, with the assistance of refugees of all nationalities, German Jews, Poles, and French communists. But there were no spontaneous outbursts on the part of most of the Spanish peasantry to back the Republican counter-offensive. The Republic had not benefited the peasants in areas without big landowners where there had been no land distribution. In regions of large landownership the peasants certainly did profit when they no longer had to pay for the lease of land, which frequently amounted to 50 percent of crop values. But in fact these gains were largely offset by heavy requisitioning during the war on the part of the Republican authorities. A fair and cautious observer noted:

Wherever the insurgent [i.e., Franco's army] advanced, thousands and thousands of peasants leave their home. . . . But at the same time these peasants have given very few volunteers, indeed, to the government troops. . . . They know from what to flee, but they hardly know for what to fight.⁵⁴

The Italian intervention proved to be the decisive factor of the civil war. In terms of the migratory current, the Italian participation formed the link between the Spanish stream (which in its warlike form followed the ancient channel of peaceful migration) and the Italian stream, which had deviated to Spain after its unsuccessful attempts at expansion in Africa.

Germany and Italy were Franco's allies; but the two countries played very different roles during the civil war. Besides sending material to Spain (which was incidentally associated with the German seizure of Spain's natural wealth, especially her nonferrous ore) Germany sent only 6,000-10,000 men.⁵⁵ They were largely techni-

⁵⁴ Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit*, pp. 205-6.

⁵⁵ Madariaga, *Spain*, p. 386. Hitler hesitated to hasten Franco's progress. As he stated in a secret conference on Nov. 5, 1937, he was "more interested in a continua-

cians, aviators, and so forth. Italy's contribution, however, was of a very different order. She sent at least 40,000 men.⁵⁶ Despite all talk of nonintervention, this was a regular army, equipped and organized by the Italian government. But most of the soldiers were volunteers who had been lured by financial advantages and opportunities for advancement. They came from southern Italy, where unemployment was widespread, or else they were recruited among the soldiers who had come back from Ethiopia, where they had vainly hoped to settle.⁵⁷

The military uprisings and the arrival of Moor troops caused a flight of the population to territory which remained in Republican hands. The ensuing offensives of Franco's troops and the bombing of Republican towns by air during the 2½ years of the Spanish civil war (1936-39) led to new refugee movements and sometimes also to organized evacuation. By August, 1938, 2,000,000 refugees were in Republican territory; of them, more than one million were in Catalonia. They originated in the central region, Castile, Estremadura, Andalusia, Asturias, the Cantabrian region, and Aragon, as well as in the invaded districts of Catalonia.⁵⁸

It was the bitter necessity of war which caused these movements, but they followed the direction of the prevailing migratory current. The advance of Franco's armies and the flight of refugees proceeded along the old lines of internal migration. The current even succeeded in penetrating again into France from which it had been barred since the world depression.

Early in 1939 the conquest of Catalonia by General Franco led to a mass flight across the frontier. The Republican army retreated into French territory, together with a throng of civilian refugees. A report presented to a committee of the French Parliament stated that a total of 450,000 Spanish refugees had come to France, including 220,000 members of the Republican army. Some of these refugees

tion of the civil war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean" (Mendelssohn, *The Nuremberg Documents*, p. 226).

⁵⁶ The figure was given in a semi-official statement issued by the Italian government on Oct. 18, 1937 (Madariaga, p. 399). *Voice of Spain*, June 24, 1939, quotes *Forze Armate* (Rome), June 8, 1939, to the effect that from the middle of Dec., 1936, to the middle of April, 1937, 100,000 men had been sent to Spain.

⁵⁷ *Paris-Midi*, Aug. 29, 1937.

⁵⁸ Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 161-66. There were also refugees who fled from Republican territory. However, they numbered only several thousands.

subsequently went to the Western Hemisphere. Plans of a large-scale resettlement in Mexico did not materialize; however, some 15,000 emigrated to Latin America between 1939 and 1943, most of them to Mexico. More than half the refugees gradually returned from France to Spain after September, 1939; nearly 200,000 remained in France. Besides, there are in North Africa several thousand refugees who went there directly from Spain or by way of France.⁵⁹

Franco's army lost in battles and from diseases 140,000 persons;⁶⁰ probably the losses of the Republican army were substantially greater. It has been conservatively estimated that due to the civil war the growth of Spain's population was one million less than it would be under normal conditions.⁶¹ Of this number, 500,000 or more may be attributed to military deaths and other excess mortality, 200,000 to 300,000 to reduced fertility, and more than 200,000 to the exodus of refugees.⁶² Economic density, however, did not decrease. Devastation caused by civil war dealt a particularly hard blow to agriculture. Rural exodus became more acute than ever, despite prohibitive measures taken by the authorities. Several years after the end of the civil war Spain remained a starving country, unable to feed her population, while her rulers adopted a pronatalist policy copied from that of fascist Italy.

Yet the impact of the bloodshed during the civil war was strong enough to keep Spain in a true state of nonbelligerence during the second World War.

⁵⁹ Furthermore, 8,000 refugees (more than half of them children) found refuge in Russia (United Press dispatch, Nov. 25, 1945). Villar Salinas, *Repercusiones demograficas de la ultima guerra civil española*, pp. 89 and 185, estimates the migratory loss from the civil war at 250,000 or more.

⁶⁰ Villar Salinas, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 185. However, Villar Salinas exaggerates the part of reduced fertility. According to his own calculation (pp. 27-28), official statistics show a birth deficit of 374,000. Since births were incompletely registered, the actual birth deficit was lower.

⁶² The census of Dec., 1940, shows a population increase of 2,314,000 since 1930. This would mean that in the period of the civil war the loss through both an abnormal death rate and birth deficits only amounted to some 100,000-150,000. However, the census figure is in apparent contradiction even with official data on the natural movement of the population, showing for the intercensus period an excess of births over deaths of only 1,760,000. This is a maximum figure, for during the civil war registration of deaths was even less accurate than that of births. Furthermore, there was for 1930-40 a migratory loss of some 70,000 (104,000 net-immigration from overseas and some 50,000 from France in 1931-35; and 225,000 not returned civil war refugees). Accordingly, the maximum figure for Spain's population increase in 1930-40 would be below 1,700,000. The origin of 600,000 more who suddenly appeared in the census can hardly be accounted for.

Chapter VIII
TOWARD THE SECOND
WORLD WAR

AFTER THE WAR of 1914-18 the "watershed" was not only re-established, with some hesitation, but also in a sense, even consecrated by the political frontier of the USSR—a very real separation of two worlds which turned their backs to each other.

In Russia, after their civil war and the famine of 1922-23, the eastward migratory movement was resumed. At first, the traditional agricultural colonization of Asiatic Russia prevailed, but because of the exhaustion of accessible free land, this movement encroached upon the soils of old colonists and the pastures of nomads. The exploitation of nonagricultural riches and the industrialization of eastern Russia came to be the main objectives of the newcomers. Simultaneously another and even more abundant flow of migrants streamed into the old industrial centers of European Russia. At the price of enormous sacrifices Soviet Russia obtained the necessary capital and set out to reconstruct her economy in a new form, thus ensuring new outlets for her excess population. Although Russia's industrial program was partly dedicated by military aims, the interwar period was one of great economic progress for Russia, despite the horrors of the first years following the Revolution and those of forcible collectivization. This interval was characterized by remarkable population growth, steady increase in production, and a slow rise of living standards.¹

West of the watershed, the first World War marked the end of the expansion which had given Europe and the white race mastery of the universe. The population of Europe continued to grow, but it found no migratory outlets.

During the first fourteen years of the twentieth century the population of Europe, excluding the interwar Soviet territory (that is, the area west of the "watershed") increased approximately from 310 to 345 million. The population loss from World War I was equivalent to

¹ It must be borne in mind that these improvements started from a very low level, as a consequence of the destruction of lives and goods by the Revolution and communist policy up to the NEP.

the natural increase for 1914-19, so that the population in 1920 was about what it had been at the outset of World War I. Again it grew larger, reaching 399 million on the eve of World War II. There was thus in the interwar period a gain of some 55 million. The annual average increase was as high as before the first World War. Of course, there had been then a great migratory loss, but even the natural increase was not substantially lower in the interwar period than before 1914.

It has been emphasized that a persistent natural growth in northwestern Europe was but a result of past fertility, which had left a large percentage of the population in the childbearing ages. Actual fertility has become so low and families have been held so small that the population has no longer been reproducing itself. In the interwar period the "net reproduction rate"² dropped in northwestern Europe (except Ireland and The Netherlands) below 1. It may be important to realize this in order to understand forthcoming demographic trends. But it does not alter the plain fact that there were each year, in all countries save France, more mouths to be fed and more hands to be employed. The fertility of the population of eastern and southern Europe remained substantially above the replacement level. A sharp decline of mortality began in most of these countries only a short time before World War I, and this decline produced its full effect in the interwar period. Since fertility remained high (even if it also declined), the natural increase of population was in absolute figures greater than ever before.

Yet, in contrast to the situation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Europe could no longer send the surplus of her growing population across the ocean. The great intercontinental migrations had come to a standstill. On the eve of the first World War the colonization of the frontier had been almost completed in the United States, and was peremptorily stopped. Immigration was suspended during hostilities marking a decisive turn; subsequent legislation in the United States prohibited its resumption. South America, in turn, rejected most of the European current. The Dominions actually closed their doors to all but British immigrants.

The consequences of the anti-immigration policy for Europe's eco-

² The net reproduction rate is the mathematical expression for the replacement of one generation by another. A net reproduction rate of 1 signifies a trend towards a stationary population, above 1, towards a growing population, below 1, towards a declining population.

conomic and political situation can scarcely be overestimated. However, its deeper roots should be understood. Understanding does not mean justification.

The End of Colonizatory Migration

Creative migration is a more adequate distribution of the labor force. Areas which possess natural resources worth developing, and have (or are able to obtain) capital for their development, are supplied by migration with the amount and the kind of labor required for the development of resources. From this point of view there was still in the interwar period (and is today) an immense field open for creative migration. However, human activity is ruled rather by tradition than by rational considerations. The era of the great intercontinental migration was the era of the occupation of open spaces. When the globe was almost occupied, the great intercontinental migration came also to an end.

No doubt all free land was not yet exhausted in the sense that there were still large uncultivated areas which could be turned into fertile soil if the necessary capital and labor were invested. This indisputable fact often astonished persons who could not understand why countries disposing of such free lands not only failed to organize immigration but also often had restrictive legislation. Furthermore, they could not see why the European unemployed did not seem to show any enthusiasm when those areas were offered for colonization.

Yes, there were new lands, but neither their quantity nor their quality were sufficient to prompt the twin currents of expansion and concentration which had characterized the foregoing period of colonizing conquest by the white race. On the other hand, the increase of non-European population in the older colonies was an obstacle to the resumption of earlier trends.²

We have already noted that in periods of progress there is an intimate connection between the current which leads to colonizing ex-

²This idea has been presented by the author and his late brother as early as in 1932 in the book *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge*. Independently W. D. Forsyth developed, in his remarkable book *The Myth of Open Spaces* (Melbourne, 1942), the idea that the great European overseas emigration has found its main barrier in the exhaustion of open spaces which could absorb vast masses of immigrants. However, Forsyth does not realize the intimate connection between the currents of expansion and those of concentration. He supposes that the latter are being substituted for the former and sees the solution of overpopulation in open doors for exchange of goods. Destroying the myth of open spaces, he preaches the myth of unlimited markets.

pansion and the current which leads to urbanization and industrialization. In the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries colonization supplied an increasing volume of raw materials and foodstuffs to the industrial nations of Europe and opened up a series of new markets. The growth of European cities in turn created a constantly growing outlet for colonial products. The pattern was not changed by the rise of American industry as long as the occupation of the frontier continued. The total absorptive capacity of industry and the industrial and commercial metropolis was even greatly increased. New York and Chicago became world centers of attraction like London and Berlin.

But changes which were in preparation before 1914 became manifest after the first World War. When the open spaces had been occupied in the New World, the rural exodus had begun also in the Americas and in Australia. The local newcomer to the city barred the European immigrant from the industrial labor market. On the other hand, local industry had everywhere developed with the help of a new urban population and enjoyed government protection, and this process was accelerated by the war in Europe. The new local industry closed the local markets to the industrial output of European centers. Furthermore, European production came to be on the defensive with respect to the budding and cheap industries of Asia, which dumped goods in all parts of the world. Exports lagged, European industry was no longer capable of finding new outlets, and consequently the purchasing power in the home country diminished rapidly. This situation had a serious effect upon colonization, because expansion of the European market, previously principal customer for colonial products, could no longer be counted upon. Why should the European³ jobless become cultivators anywhere in the New World, when coffee was being thrown into the ocean and wheat used for fuel, not because no one there would have liked another cup of coffee or another roll, but because the competition of people who had never tasted coffee now reduced the purchasing power of potential coffee buyers.

Lack of capital for investment in colonization projects was but another aspect of the same feature. Alfred Marshal observed that "the

³ Another question is, would it have been of advantage for the masses of Asia to take up the empty spaces of South America, Australia, or Canada, if they had had the necessary means of transportation and if their immigration had been, not restricted, but encouraged?

tendency to a diminishing return was the cause of Abraham's parting from Lot, as of most of the migrations of which history tells."⁴ Colonization is a search for new lands which promise with the same labor and capital higher returns than could be achieved at home. In the nineteenth century this opportunity was present. The interplay and interdependence of labor and capital during that period are effectively described by M. L. Hansen, who devoted his too-short existence to the study of immigration and colonization in the United States.

Without labor, capital was dead; without capital labor was helpless. In the early decades of colonization they moved together. The trading company sent out goods and servants in the same vessel. In later times, although they proceeded by different ships and by different routes, ultimately they came together on the prairie or in the rising industrial town. . . . On the outward voyage European freighters carried locomotives and rails, pumps and drills for the mines, sometimes gold for the pay rolls. The economist describes this traffic as the export of capital and, when the statistician traces it upon his chart, he very properly finds a remarkable conformity to the fluctuations in the movement of European emigration.⁵

The situation was quite different in the changed world of the interwar period. "Most of the pioneer lands that remain are 'marginal' in climate, fertility, and transport."⁶ Money no longer streamed in as a stimulus for pioneering. No more frontiers and no more new lands could be profitably colonized. An attempt was then made to organize colonization by artificially directing a flow of capital to selected areas.

It would be wrong to believe that capital returns are an index of the efficiency of a colonizing enterprise. John Stuart Mill made a sweeping statement: "The exportation of capital and labor to a new country being one of the best of all affairs of business, it is absurd that it should not, like other affairs of business, repay own expenses."⁷ But in fact "things were never as they used to be." Recalling this truth, Isaiah Bowman adds: "Colonists have always had to be aided.

⁴ Alfred Marshal, *Principles of Economics*, 8th ed., London, 1930, p. 151.

⁵ M. L. Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, New York, 1940, p. 7.

⁶ Isaiah Bowman, Introduction to *Limits of Land Settlement; Report to the 10th International Studies Conference, Paris 1937*; submitted by the American Coordinating Committee for International Studies, p. 2.

⁷ *Principles of Political Economy*, Book V, ch. xi, sec. 14.

The 'proprietors' of the American 'plantations' always lost on their investment because the colonists could see only their own hardships and the heavily populated cemeteries in their midst and cared little for mere monetary losses on the other side."⁸

On the other hand, we know of numerous organized migrations which settled areas in which the necessary funds were not invested in expectation of immediate returns, but nevertheless were most successful. The Russian agricultural colonization in Asia before the first World War is the most remarkable example. Iamzin, a Soviet scholar who is not inclined to glorify the achievements of tsarism, acknowledges that the great migration to Siberia in the course of the last years of the tsarist regime, with the assistance of the government, "has after all created the present economic power of this part of the Soviet Union."⁹ The installation of 850,000 families (3,800,000 persons), who crossed the Ural from 1906 on, represented a total fiscal expenditure of 250 million rubles only. This means approximately \$150 per family. In this case, prevailing trends were properly used to advantage. By stimulating and canalizing spontaneous migration, economic results of such magnitude were achieved that the capital investment appears small.

But other experiments in organized migration were carried out as well, experiments marked by heavy investment, long-range preparation, careful selection of migrants—and eventual failure. Phillips and Wood make the following observation on the British settlement in the Australian state of Victoria.

During the period 1904-28 some 15,000 new settlers were placed upon the land under various Closer Settlement Schemes at the total cost of 34,000,000 Pounds. But during the period 1922-27 alone a total of 14,000 people left rural occupations for the towns and cities. Clearly from the point of view of the effect upon the community, this process is just the same as if the newcomers had been "drafted" straight into urban occupation. Indeed, to the extent that the majority of such migrants are drawn from industrial experience, the process probably involves a considerable loss in the total net efficiency of the community.¹⁰

⁸ Isaiah Bowman, "Possibilities of Settlement in South America," in his *Limits of Land Settlement*, p. 293.

⁹ Iamzin and Voschinin, *Uchenie o kolontzatsii i pereseleniakh*, p. 143.

¹⁰ P. D. Phillips and G. L. Wood, *The Peopling of Australia*, Melbourne, 1928, p. 21.

Agrarian overpopulation was effective in the new as well as the old countries. Plans for rural settlement thus contributed to rural exodus.

The system of capital investment was frequently inadequate. To be reasonable, the subsidy of migrations must pass between the Scylla of the purely charitable approach and the Charybdis of the purely commercial point of view. We have just seen that in the long run immediate returns are by no means the only measurement of success in migratory or colonial enterprises. But financing which disdains reimbursement may easily be transformed into the least rational form of philanthropy. Some institutions, eager to promote "return to the soil," disbursed sums which yielded so little that it could be questioned whether it would not have been better to spend that amount on straight relief. Other agencies tried to be overbusinesslike, but the loans had been given without any calculation of the settler's possibilities, and reimbursement became an unbearable burden.

With few exceptions, organized migration has left no conspicuous traces.¹¹ It has been calculated that if emigration had proceeded freely on the prewar scale in the interwar period, 20 million additional Europeans would have emigrated. Colonization projects "compensated" this loss by settling thousands. They accounted for only a small portion of those who left Europe, even though emigration was in general sharply reduced. It could not be otherwise. The era of colonization could not be revived. What the world needed—and what would consequently promote migration—was economic expansion independent of geographic expansion, by continued development of resources and increased overall production. As far as there was planning, it aimed, not at economic expansion, but at economic shrinkage. But in spite of all planning economy expanded and made possible a certain immigration to the Western Hemisphere, disdainfully called "immigration by infiltration." The world depression demonstrated the collapse of the traditional approach. Its repercussion on migration was evident. During the depression the return movement was so strong that in some years more people left than entered the Americas. In 1931-35 the migratory loss of the United

¹¹ Palestine offers the most outstanding example of organized and subsidized migration, but this experience is not considered in detail here because of many political, valuational, and financial aspects which make it unique.

States was more than 100,000. The influx of refugees from Germany just compensated this loss until the outbreak of the second World War.

The Continental Migratory Current

According to data collected by the International Labor Office, net emigration from Europe amounted in the interwar period to about 3.8 million. On the other hand, Europe had a considerable influx from abroad. After the first World War, Europe was forced to receive the wreckage tossed on her shores by two waves from Asia—1,200,000 Greeks from Asia Minor, after the Smyrna disaster in 1922 (whereas in the inverse direction 600,000 Turks left Europe, including those who subsequently emigrated from various Balkan countries), and 125,000 Armenians. Immigrants entered the European continent also at the other end of the Mediterranean. In North Africa the peace and the economic and medical progress effected by the French administration decreased the mortality of the natives, while their birth rate remained very high. The overcrowded population was eager to invade metropolitan France. Despite formal restrictions, a slow, but persistent infiltration took place. Between the French census of 1921 and that of 1936 the number of Africans increased by 49,000. For the following three years statistics show a net immigration of 25,000 workers. The actual numbers were probably considerably higher. The total immigration of North Africans (including that in 1919-20) may be put at 100,000. If we add to those who came from other continents 1.4 million immigrants from Russia,¹² the influx into Europe outside the Soviet Union totals 2 million. It equaled one half the European overseas emigration, which was small in itself.

On the European continent (west of the watershed) population movements were determined before the first World War by a pronounced westerly trend. In 1918 the end of the war brought a temporary reversal, evidenced by the setback of the German armies in France and Belgium, the Allied occupation of the Rhineland, the French occupation of the Ruhr, and the Polish conquest of parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine. But the former westerly direction was

¹²Total of Russian émigrés 1,500,000. Of them, 175,000 went to Asiatic countries. Of those who went to Europe, 180,000 subsequently returned to Russia. Furthermore, there were 250,000 foreign nationals who left Russia after the Revolution (see p. 56).

TABLE 19
POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE, 1918-39

MAIN STREAM FROM EAST TO WEST			
<i>Years</i>	<i>Route</i>		<i>Group</i>
1918-22	Russia to Europe outside the Soviet Union	1,150,000 ^a	Russian émigrés
1918-22	Russia to Europe outside the Soviet Union	250,000	European aliens
1918-25	Russia to Poland	1,100,000 ^b	repatriated Poles
1918-19	Germany to Poland	300,000	Polish workers
1918-21	Former Russian and Austrian Poland to former German Poland	900,000	Poles
1920-30	Central Poland and western Galicia to eastern Poland	60,000	Polish colonists
1918-25	Baltic States and former Russian and Austrian Poland to Germany	200,000	Germans and others
1918-25	Western Poland, Danzig, and Memel to Germany	700,000	Germans
1919-39	Poland to France	450,000	Poles
1918-21	France (1914 territory) to Alsace-Lorraine	50,000	French
1918-20	Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen-et-Malmédy, and Saar to Germany	200,000	Germans
1918-25	Western Europe to Germany	100,000	Germans and others
1923	Germany (Ruhr) to France	150,000	Poles
1919-39	Czechoslovakia to France	60,000	Czechoslovaks
1919-39	Various European countries outside the Soviet Union to France	100,000 ^c	workers and others
1933-39	Germany, Austria, and Bohemia-Moravia to European countries outside the Soviet Union	170,000 ^d	Jews
1938-39	Austria to Germany	50,000	Austrians
1937-39	Czechoslovakia (Sudetenland) to Germany	250,000	Sudeten Germans
1938-39	Hungarian annexed Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine to Slovakia and Bohemia-Moravia	100,000	Slovaks and Czechs
1939	Slovakia to Bohemia-Moravia	130,000	Czechs
1939	Czechoslovakia to Austria and Germany	100,000	Czech and Slovak workers
CONFLUENT FROM THE SOUTHEAST			
1918-25	Near East to Europe outside the Soviet Union	125,000	Armenians
1922-23	Turkey (Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace) to Greece	1,200,000	Greeks
1918-26	Greece (Greek Macedonia and Thrace) to Bulgaria	120,000	Bulgarians
1918-28	Bulgaria to Greece	50,000	Greeks
1921-28	Greece to Turkey	400,000	Turks
1921-39	Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to Turkey	200,000	Turks
1918-24	Rumania (Transylvania) to Hungary	200,000	Hungarians
1918-24	Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to Hungary	200,000	Hungarians
1919-39	Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey to France	150,000	workers and others
1919-39	Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia to Germany and Austria	150,000	ethnic Germans and others

TABLE 19 (Continued)

CONFLUENT FROM THE SOUTH			
<i>Years</i>	<i>Route</i>		<i>Group</i>
1919-39	Italy to France	650,000	Italians
1919-36	Spain to France	250,000	Spanish workers with families
1938-39	Spain to France	200,000	Spanish refugees
1919-36	Portugal to France	50,000	Portuguese workers with families
1919-39	French North Africa to France	100,000	North-Africans
OVERSEAS EMIGRATION			
1919-24	Europe outside the Soviet Union overseas	2,400,000	emigrants
1925-39	Europe outside the Soviet Union overseas	1,400,000	emigrants

^a Total about 1,500,000; subtracted émigrés in Asiatic countries and those who returned from European countries.

^b Total 1,265,000; subtracted part included in the Russian emigration.

^c As far as not listed elsewhere.

^d 140,000 to western Europe, 25,000 to eastern Europe.

soon resumed. The richest and the most advanced countries, with a sharply reduced birth rate and large industrial centers, continued to attract migrants from poorer countries which had not known a similar industrial development and whose population growth had been maintained by declining mortality. This westerly trend coincided with the direction of the general current which once more swept across the European continent, with the exception of the USSR (see map on page 85).

Data on continental migration are extremely meager. Nevertheless, they convey the impression that a great population was shifting towards the west in Europe (excluding the USSR). Insofar as recorded (see Table 19), the major migratory shifts on the European continent up to the outbreak of World War II involved 10 million persons. The main stream went toward the west; 5.9 million moved from east to west, and 0.7 in the opposite direction, so that a net of 5.2 million shifted from east to west. To them must be added 2.3 million who were shifted by the tributaries of the main migratory current from the Balkan, Apennine, and Iberian peninsulas. This total of 7.5 million accounts for only part of the whole volume of the migratory movement. Minor international migrations, which proceeded mostly in the same direction, have been disregarded. Internal population movements have not been included, with the exception of the great flood in resurrected Poland. In order to vis-

ualize the European migrations in the interwar period, we should at least include the persistent shifting of population from east to west in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, the movement of Italians from the south and the northeast, and the last section of the current—the northward migration in France.

Thus, the east-west current swept across Europe, accumulating a vast migratory potential near barricaded borders. It sometimes managed to force the barricade, by a migratory process long outmoded and often warlike, the result or the forerunner of wars. New types of migrants gradually prevailed. The typical emigrant of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries traveled at his own expense and frequently carried with him his modest savings, to be used for his establishment in a better economic position and in the freer air of a new country. Three new and altogether different types predominated after World War I: the repatriate, the refugee, and the coolie.

The resumption of the east-west current resulted largely from the political changes caused by World War I. In the first years following the peace of 1919 international migration could be accounted for partly by repatriation. Poles from Soviet Russia, Germans from Poland, as well as from Alsace-Lorraine, Hungarians from Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and many others returned to the countries of their real or "ethnic" origin.

After the end of World War I political emigrants came to central Europe in unprecedentedly large numbers from the former Russian and Ottoman empires. Up to 1924 the Russian "emigration" (which was by far the most numerous) rolled slowly over Europe toward the west. Near the end of the interwar period new waves of refugees came from Germany and Spain. Those Germans who had been compelled after 1933 to leave the country were not persons who had been unable to find their place in the economic and social setup of the country, but on the contrary they had held substantial positions. The Germans forcibly enlarged their "living space" at the expense of their Jewish compatriots. It was the prologue of the system to be applied by the master race to conquered peoples throughout Europe. Another wave came from Spain during their civil war. Spanish immigration into France, for a time barred, was now resumed in the form of refugees.

A third type of migration was the contract laborer, a worker who

migrates at the employer's expense after signing a contract. This system had been unpopular, because too closely related to the indentured servant system, and during the period of free migration it survived only in some remote countries for Chinese and Hindu coolies. But during and especially after the first World War the contract labor system was revived in Europe and this time it was applied to white men. Because of his precarious and dependent position, the alien worker was a dangerous competitor for local labor, and a godsend for what is known as the "belligerent employers." But the special underprivileged status of the modern coolie has not been built up under the pressure of employers' special interests. His status is the natural result of the reluctance with which foreign workers were being admitted in European countries. Measures were taken to protect local labor by limiting the rights of immigrants.

In France especially the "status of foreigners" received the most careful attention. Her population had become stationary long ago, and during the first World War she had suffered a great loss in manpower. Workers were needed for postwar reconstruction, and France had therefore admitted foreigners by a system of organized, selected, and controlled immigration. The contract laborer, imported by the Employers' Association, was considered the normal type of foreign worker in France. Arbitrary expulsion threatened every foreigner. From an exceptional government action, the expulsion procedure had become the usual practice of the "police des étrangers." Moreover, it was frequently resorted to in order to reduce the numbers of a specific alien group.

Expulsions were exceptional, but their repercussions had unfavorable results in the emigration countries. In Poland people wondered whether they could to any extent rely upon such a precarious procedure—whether they could go to a country where they would be received with open arms when workers were needed (when all possible advantage would be taken of them), but would be sent home at a time of depression when their own homeland might be in such a critical situation that it could not employ or support newly arrived workers. On the other hand, Italian fascism found an ally in the French administrative xenophobia. Italians abroad were organized. It was planned that their hostility towards the countries of their residence was to find concrete expression during a future invasion—a plan which, incidentally, failed to materialize.

The recognition of these facts should however not minimize the role which France played in the interwar period as a country of immigration. France's need of additional workers from abroad was a test of her highly developed economy. France's approach to the refugee problem was basically humane. Notwithstanding all complications and outburst of xenophobia, France became in the interwar period the main reception area for foreign workers and, to a minor extent, for refugees. Despite the German defeat in 1918, the migratory current toward the west found its way across the Franco-German border. Before 1914 the westward current from Poland and Germany had been halted by the Franco-German border, because it conflicted with a movement coming from Italy. The first World War made room for both currents. From the south, France received Italians and, furthermore, Spaniards, Portuguese, and North Africans. Immigrants from the east were not Germans, but, apart from other neighbors (the Belgians and the Swiss), Poles, Czechoslovaks, Russians, Armenians, and various peoples from the Balkans. The number of alien workers reported was 2,473,000 arrivals and 1,027,000 departures between 1920 and 1939. This represents a net immigration of 1,446,000 persons. The total influx was substantially greater. The French Statistical Office estimates the net immigration of aliens in 1919-20 at 330,000, and in 1921-31 at 1,950,000. A loss of some 100,000 between 1931 and 1936 was more than compensated in the following years. Thus, some 2,300,000 immigrants settled in France between the two World Wars. Despite immigration restrictions and a certain decrease during the world depression, the number of aliens constantly increased. The French census of 1931 showed 3,076,000 aliens (naturalized citizens included), that of 1936—2,715,000. Henry Béranger, French delegate at the Evian conference of July 6, 1938, spoke of 3 million aliens in France.

The Approaching Catastrophe

From the end of the First World War, the economic and demographic evolution tended towards a new war. Europe had lost her vast outlets for an excess population. It would be naïve to assume that the richer European countries, those whose economic density was lower and who occupied only a small fraction of the continent, could have replaced the absorptive function of the vast overseas territories. Furthermore, the same evolution which closed the ocean

routes to migrants put a stop to the extension of markets for the industrial production of rich countries. Therefore, the majority of these countries gradually prohibited altogether immigration of workers in search of employment. Countries with sea borders found it easy to exclude undesirable immigrants. Elsewhere, free migration across political borders was halted. And almost everywhere a foreigner was not allowed to enter the labor market unless he was a contract laborer.

For a time it was possible to hope that gradually an exchange of goods could make the displacement of men unnecessary. Markets were to be substituted for migratory outlets. But in fact, the restrictions imposed upon migration coincided with the promotion of the idea of economic self-sufficiency.

The tremendous investments absorbed during the war by armament industries and other new enterprises had to be redeemed. But the interests of the capitalists in the various countries were vigorously protected by their respective governments because they also guaranteed employment for the local labor force. National employment opportunities had to be provided, since outlets for men and for goods were no longer available. The same setup stimulated protectionism in the field of agriculture: a desperate effort was made to retain the population in the villages where technological achievements constantly reduced manpower needs. Exhaustive efforts were made to inhibit further technological progress, to reduce production, to prevent the importation of cheaper goods. The total result was a steady rise in the cost of living and further decrease in the purchasing power of ruined populations.

Naïve observers believed that the Third Reich found a solution: production at any price, regardless of cost or necessity, as a remedy for unemployment. However, even apart from the German longing for conquest, it was unavoidable that in the absence of other aims such a production should become more and more a preparation for war. The system was thus equipped with an economic and a financial basis. The seemingly unending aimless production implied a promise of utilization and adequate returns, at the expense of future victims.

As barriers and autarchy increased, the situation became more and more serious. The catastrophe appeared unavoidable. In a number of countries antisocial elements were in control and were followed by large masses, to whom they preached the theory that living space must be conquered. The application of this theory—within the

country against specific groups, on the outside by unsuccessful colonizing expeditions—had been started. In central Europe the “superfluous” elements of the population were organized into a formidable war machine.

The frustrated migration current was ready once more to assume a warlike character.

Chapter IX
THE DISPLACEMENT OF
POPULATION DURING THE
SECOND WORLD WAR

IN THE COURSE of human history the great mass migrations proceeded mainly by means of or in connection with wars. Freedom of migration was the rare exception. The second half of the nineteenth century was a rare period in the history of Europe, with open spaces, free migration, and peace, which ended in World War I. Open spaces were almost exhausted. And far from helping to overcome economic obstacles, the various governments competed in the erection of additional barriers against peaceful population movements.

So the primitive way of promoting the passage of migratory currents came to be re-established. Frontiers where each immigrant had once been carefully filtered were crossed by millions whose passports were guns and whose visas were bullets. They set in motion millions of others who marched unarmed between streams of blood and tears.

*The German Expansion and Its Effects*¹

World War II did not break out in the most congested area, as a simplified demographic approach might suggest. After the groundwork had been laid, hostilities were started by those best fitted to carry out the work of destruction.

The German armies overran Poland in September, 1939. Their conquest pushed out of the country approximately 300,000 refugees. Some 50,000 fled across the southern frontier to Hungary and Rumania, a like number northward to Lithuania, while the bulk of the refugees escaped to the eastern part of Poland, which was being occupied by Russia.

The Germans had conquered a country even more densely populated than the adjacent parts of Germany. To expand the German living space, a racial purge of western Poland, incorporated into the Reich, was announced. "Whoever belongs to the Polish race must

¹ For details see Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*.

leave this land." The expulsion and deportation of Poles from the "Incorporated Provinces" to the so-called "General Government" (that is, the remainder of German-occupied Poland, corresponding roughly to central Poland) started as early as October, 1939. About 1,500,000 persons were deported, 1,200,000 of them Poles, and 300,000 Jews. But after that, the expulsion of Poles from western Poland ceased. It had soon become clear that further expulsions would depopulate the country and frustrate all projects of economic exploitation. Poles constituted the only available labor source for agriculture, as well as for industry. The economy of the country needed manpower, which the German people did not offer and could not produce. Making a virtue out of necessity, the Nazi authorities declared that German settlement had been temporarily discontinued so that space might be reserved for returning veterans. But this was only a pretext. In fact the temporary German surplus population had been limited to the "block" now called to the colors for a violent expansion of the German living space. There were no other reserves "to consolidate the achievements of the sword by a human rampart of German settlers."

Another source of German settlers was found, not in the Reich, but among the "ethnic Germans" (*Volksdeutsche*), that is, foreign nationals of German extraction. Their mass resettlement was started after October 6, 1939, allegedly for purposes of repatriation: the German people was to occupy "an unbroken living space . . . common blood shall not be separated by arbitrary frontiers." But in fact this "repatriation" was practically limited to the Soviet and the Italian spheres of interest. Hitler consented to the transfer of Tyrolese (some 80,000 were repatriated in 1939-43) to avoid a difficult decision: either to tolerate the forced Italianization of the Tyrolese Germans or else to protect their autonomy at the risk of upsetting Germany's good relations with Italy. And he was forced by the Soviet government to organize the transfer of some 400,000 ethnic Germans from the Baltic States, western Ukraine and Belorussia (former eastern Poland), northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia. After having annexed the eastern part of Poland, the Soviet Union was prepared to extend her domination to the Baltic States, and Rumanian-held Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. The Soviet Union wanted these territories to be free of German minorities, and Hitler "recalled them to the fatherland." They answered his call, panic stricken by the Red advance. Before the outbreak of German and Russian hostilities, the

true character of this operation had been veiled by nationalistic slogans, but on the very day of the invasion of Russia, June 22, 1941, Hitler declared when speaking of the Soviet-German agreement of September 28, 1939 (on the delimitation of spheres of interest in Poland):

The consequences of this treaty . . . were very severe, particularly for Germans living in countries concerned. Far more than 500,000 Germans, men and women, all small farmers, artisans, and workmen, were forced to leave their former homeland practically over night.²

After the rapid occupation, in April, 1940, of Denmark and Norway, followed the great German advance in the west. On May 10, 1940, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Belgium were invaded; then the Maginot Line was circumvented, and northern France was overrun. The Belgian army capitulated, the British evacuated from Dunkirk, the French retreated and fell apart. Several thousand Dutch and Belgian civilians escaped to England; the great mass of refugees streamed into France. Joined by millions of refugees from northern France and from the Paris area, this flood of humanity, estimated at 5,000,000 people, swept through central and southern France. Overcrowding trains, moving by cars, carts, bicycles, and on foot, mingling with hastily evacuated offices and factories, they obstructed the roads and made further resistance impossible. Only a small fraction of these refugees were able to escape to French North Africa or to cross the Spanish border and by way of Lisbon reach Great Britain and America.

After the German-French armistice, the great majority of refugees returned to their homes in the course of many months. Several hundred thousand remained, however, in the so-called "unoccupied" zone of France, which the Germans were to occupy later, in November, 1942. In 1941 the crossing of the demarcation line between the occupied and the unoccupied zones became increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, both a legal and clandestine movement brought about a slow, but steady, displacement of the French population from the north to the south. The German invasion reversed the traditional migratory trend from the south to the capital and the industrial areas of the north. The new movement was a result of the wish to escape

²The *New York Times*, June 23, 1941. On October 11, 1939, Count Ciano entered in his diary: ". . . under Russian pressure the Germans got eighty thousand men out of the Baltic states in a few hours" (*The Ciano Diaries*, p. 158).

German rule, but it also represented a shift to the predominantly agricultural south, actuated by food scarcity, which made for a simultaneous movement from towns to the countryside.³

In Alsace-Lorraine the German occupation resulted in population displacements of a specific character. Like western Poland, this territory was to be Germanized. To lay the groundwork for the building of a "natural wall," the German authorities expelled 100,000 French-speaking inhabitants in the fall and winter of 1940 to the then unoccupied part of France.⁴ Some 75 percent of the deported were farmers, and their land was used in the first place to enlarge the holdings of neighboring peasants of German stock. The planned colonization of Reich Germans in this area materialized even less than it had in the Incorporated Polish provinces, although additional space had been provided through a draft of Alsace-Lorrainians in the German army and new mass deportations, this time directed to Germany, which altogether involved 210,000 persons.⁵

The next German expansion move was directed to the southeast. The Balkan campaign began on October 28, 1940, with Italy's invasion of Greece, but it was unsuccessful until German armies entered Yugoslavia and Greece on April 6, 1941, and occupied Yugoslavia within a few days. On April 27 the German army took Athens, and on June 1, with the occupation of Crete, the Balkan campaign came to an end. Segments of the routed armies escaped to the opposite shores of the Mediterranean, followed by thousands of civilian refugees.⁶ However, great waves of war refugees remained in the Balkans. Long before the war all Balkan nations had suffered from agrarian overpopulation. To those countries which had cooperated with her, Germany gave an opportunity to relieve population pressure at the expense of their neighbors. Since their annexation by Bulgaria in October, 1941, and up to 1942 the Greek provinces of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace suffered a net population loss of more

³ There was therefore also a migration to the western part of the occupied zone. The population shift is still reflected in the French census of March 10, 1946. See *Bulletin de la Statistique Générale de la France*, September-November, 1946, p. 380; February, 1947, p. 90.

⁴ *Le Mouvement de la population en France de 1939 à 1942*.

⁵ Bourgeois, "La Situation démographique," *Population*, January-March, 1946, p. 121.

⁶ 19,570 Yugoslav and 17,000 Greek refugees, in 1942. The number of Greek refugees increased by later flights from Greece and Italian Dodecanese. In 1944 the following distribution of Greek refugees has been reported: 12,535 in the Middle East, 5,766 in Cyprus, 2,432 in Belgian Congo, 1,047 in Ethiopia, 513 in Tanganyika.

than 90,000.⁷ Greeks fled in masses to what remained of the Greek state or were deported to Bulgaria, while 122,000 Bulgarians (peasants, officials, craftsmen, and others) were settled in the annexed Greek provinces.

In Yugoslavia land reform laws were abolished, and settlers who had occupied the land since 1918 were dispossessed and ousted from their farms. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs were evicted from Bulgarian-occupied northern Macedonia, from German-annexed Slovenia, and from the Axis-created puppet state of Croatia. The total number of refugees in Serbia who had fled from other provinces after the collapse of Yugoslavia has been estimated at 300,000.⁸

Great displacements of population also occurred in Rumania. Hitler took it upon himself to impose ethnic delimitations between Rumania and her neighbors. In August, 1940, northern Transylvania was ceded to Hungary. More than 200,000 Rumanians moved from there to rump Rumania⁹ and 160,000 Hungarians left southern Transylvania for Hungary.¹⁰ In September, 1940, Rumania was forced to cede southern Dobruja to Bulgaria; in order to establish ethnic uniformity in both parts of the Dobruja, 62,000 Bulgarians had to leave northern Dobruja, which remained with Rumania, while 110,000 Rumanians were removed from southern Dobruja.

On June 22, 1941, the German armies invaded Russia. This seemed to be the realization of plans which Hitler had set down nearly twenty years earlier: France was to be destroyed in order to open the way eastward into Russia, so that in a hundred years 250 million Germans would thrive on land given to the German plow by the German sword.

Millions of Russians fled before the advancing German armies. As the Russians retreated, they evacuated the population and removed the factories. The chief purpose of this policy was to prevent men and vital materials from falling into German hands; hence the so-called "scorched earth" policy meant the removal of goods or their destruction if immediate removal was impossible. In the second

⁷ Xidis, *The Economy and Finances of Greece under Axis Occupation*, pp. 10-11.

⁸ *Politika*, November 23, 1944. The number of registered refugees was 217,175, of whom 65,442 were from Croatia, 54,332 from Bosnia and Hercegovina, 6,202 from Slovenia, 21,017 from Backa, 43,307 from Macedonia, and 26,875 from Montenegro.

⁹ 218,927 according to the Rumanian Commissariat for Refugees. The Rumanian census of April 6, 1941, showed 202,233 refugees.

¹⁰ According to a statement of the Hungarian Foreign Office, given to the Budapest correspondent of the International Labor Office.

place, evacuated men and materials were to be used in safer areas east of European Russia and behind the Urals.

We have shown that on the eve of the second World War the trend to the east was losing its strength and that the Soviet government had remedied the labor shortage in the eastern regions by means of enticement and coercion. Wartime conditions brought a simultaneous growth of the labor force and industrial capacity of the east. Two of the overwhelming problems created by the war emergency actually balanced each other—the evacuation of large-scale enterprises and the eastward migration of millions of refugees. The transplantation of industry facilitated the settlement of refugees, who supplied the labor to reinstall, and labor to operate, both evacuated factories and new plants. It was no longer necessary to stimulate the migration of workers; they were only too glad to have a chance to escape from the advancing enemy. In fact, the government took care to prevent a general population displacement, which would have obstructed the highways and, furthermore, resulted in a mass influx to an area unable to house and feed them. Only a small part of the rural population was evacuated. In urban centers factories were removed, together with skilled and many other workers. Besides, officials and a large proportion of the Jews were evacuated to save them from German atrocities.

The total number of those who fled or were evacuated from German-occupied areas to inner and Asiatic Russia can be estimated at 12,000,000, including more than 1,500,000 transferred or deported from former eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia.

The victorious German armies came close to the approaches of Moscow; they besieged Leningrad, reached the Volga, hoisted the swastika on the highest Caucasian peak. Russia seemed crushed. An immense area fell under German rule. Into the conquered land poured the master race. But even less than in the case of Poland was there a real migratory movement, which would have enlarged the settlement area of the German people. Attempts to attract agricultural colonists from Germany, as well as from the Netherlands and Denmark, failed. Merely an army of officials, overseers, farm managers, employees, and foremen spread over the eastern territories, to administer them and to supervise and exploit the labor of the local

population. In the summer of 1942 a leading German newspaper clearly stated the German position: "The proportions between space and people have been reversed. The problem of how to feed a great people in a narrow space has changed into that of the best way of exploiting the conquered spaces with the limited number of people available."¹¹

The principal movement of Germans crossing the borders of the Reich has been that of the armies. Early in 1943 Greater Germany was estimated to have mobilized, mainly for the Russian front, ten million men (seventeen million up to the end of the war,¹² including one million *Volksdeutsche*). The armies were followed by civilians who performed tasks directly connected with military needs or the needs of the German war economy (fortification work, railway service, food supplies, armament industry, etc.).

All these movements were closely controlled by the German government so as to fit in with war needs. Beginning in 1942, however, a new turn in military events caused a mass dislocation of a different kind among the German population. Evacuation from bombed German cities affected two large groups: women and children were sent to safer regions, and factories were removed, together with their workers. The great majority of evacuees moved to the neighboring countryside, numerous others were sent to German areas less exposed to air attacks. But hundreds of thousands of Germans found refuge outside the Reich, in annexed or occupied territories and in satellite countries. If these evacuees are added to the afore-mentioned officials, workers, colonists, and the like, the total of Reich Germans abroad may be estimated at nearly 2,500,000 in 1943.

When the victorious legions expanded Rome's frontiers, they shipped to their homeland endless columns of slaves taken among the subjugated people. Parallel to the victorious march of millions of German soldiers, but headed in the opposite direction, millions of prisoners of war and foreign workers streamed into Germany.

Changes in Germany's mobilization policy of foreign manpower were determined by the course of the war. Military operations gave Germany access to vast labor reservoirs, but they also caused ever-growing manpower losses, which had to be compensated.

On the eve of the war the Reich's labor reserves were already low,

¹¹ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 22, 1942.

¹² According to General Marshall's Report of September 1, 1945.

and the effects of mobilization were immediately felt, especially in agriculture. The rapid conclusion of the Polish campaign provided a new and abundant source of manpower, which was immediately and fully utilized. Prisoners of war were the first source tapped, but all possible methods were applied to recruit civilian Polish workers as well. Propaganda, indirect pressure, coercion, and deportation were utilized in turn to maintain a steady supply of Polish manpower. In this way was supplied without delay the agricultural labor which Germany needed so urgently. Trainload after trainload brought thousands of Poles to replace mobilized German peasants.

Having thus strengthened her economic basis, Germany occupied Denmark and Norway and subsequently undertook her great offensive in the west. The months which followed the collapse of France marked the climax of Germany's economic and military achievements. An enormous booty of arms, munitions, and other materials had fallen into German hands. The food situation had been greatly relieved by stocks piled up in the occupied countries before the German invasion. One and one half million German soldiers were living off the rich land of France. Satisfactory military developments and the temporary lull in land operations made it possible to grant extensive leaves to a great many peasants and industrial workers.

As the pressure on Germany's domestic labor supply was relieved, further seemingly inexhaustible manpower reserves became available. Nearly 2,000,000 war prisoners had been taken. Another 2,000,000 workers had been thrown out of employment in the countries of western Europe as a result of destruction and economic dislocation after defeat. Demobilized soldiers and returning refugees swelled the ranks of the unemployed, while the food shortage and rising prices made for difficult living conditions. Indirect pressure was sufficient to provide German industry and agriculture with the workers they required. The withholding of unemployment compensation from workers who refused to go to Germany acted as an effective incentive for "voluntary" enlistment.

Political control of the countries of southeastern Europe which the Reich secured during the spring of 1941 further increased the available labor supply. Indeed, during this second stage of the war, between the Compiègne armistice and the opening of the Russian campaign, Germany could afford to pick and choose. Said Adolf Hitler: "We are in a position today to mobilize the manpower of

almost the whole of Europe, and that I shall do so industrially, you may well believe." Germany could obtain from war prisoner camps, from occupied countries, and from her allies all the workers she needed to prepare the decisive blow against Russia.

The course of the Russian campaign created a new situation. It turned out to be, not a Blitzkrieg, but a long and bloody war, which required the constant call-up of fresh soldiers and an endless supply of armaments. From that time on Germany constantly appealed for help against Russia under the slogan of defending Europe against bolshevism. One form of this aid was military. Italians, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats, and Slovaks sent fresh auxiliary troops to the eastern front, while token legions of volunteers were formed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the Baltic States, and Spain. But by far the major assistance which Germany demanded from her allies and from the conquered countries was in the form of agricultural and industrial production and labor supply.

However, recruitment possibilities no longer corresponded to German needs. To meet her requirements, Germany began to squeeze out the necessary labor force in the occupied countries by restricting or closing down all industries which were not working for Germany. In the spring of 1942 direct compulsion became more and more frequent. From that time hundreds of thousands of trained workers were deported from the Netherlands, Belgium, and France (with the support of the Laval government). But the main source was found in the occupied territories of the USSR, where mass deportations had been carried out from the very start.

Prisoners of war and foreign civilians employed in Germany constituted only part of the foreign labor force which was made to participate in the German war effort. The working population of the occupied countries was at first employed, voluntarily or under compulsion, in their own homelands. Furthermore, prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers were not only employed in Germany but also sent from one occupied territory to another. In 1943 the International Transport Workers Federation estimated that 2,000,000 workers fell into this category. Many worked on the construction of the Atlantic Wall and other fortifications, employed by the notorious Organization Todt, named after its founder, General Todt, but commonly called Organization Tot (death), because of its mass consumption of human material.

But the main and ever-growing stream of foreign workers flowed into the Reich proper and helped to provide the economic and technical basis for the German armies. Like a gigantic pump, the German Reich sucked in Europe's resources and working population. The total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached.¹³ The new influx was due to new mass deportations from the eastern territories, where the retreating Germans were no longer interested in maintaining any economic order, and furthermore, after the surrender of Italy, to the conversion into prisoners of war of the Italian army interned in Germany. But these events belong to the second period of the war, when population displacements were no longer caused by German expansion, but by German retreat.

More than 30,000,000 Europeans were transplanted, deported, or dispersed between the outbreak of the war and the beginning of 1943. This total includes millions of uprooted Jews, of whom about 1,500,000 escaped Nazi rule, some 300,000 through emigration overseas and to neutral countries and the remainder through evacuation to the interior of the Soviet Union. Up to the end of the war more than 5,000,000 Jews were deported to extermination camps in Poland and elsewhere. Almost all perished.

The German Retreat and Its Effects

One of the most important consequences of the German invasion of Poland in September, 1939, was that it made the Russian bear throw his first tentative glance in the direction of the west. In fact, we have seen that the spontaneous return of persons of German stock to the "old Fatherland" was but a flight from the advancing Soviet power, which recovered the old Russian possessions in the Baltic, in Poland, and in Rumania. Simultaneously, in the north, 415,000 Finns evacuated the Karelian Isthmus during the winter war of 1939-40 and

¹³ An article "The Mobilization of Foreign Labor by Germany," *International Labor Review*, October, 1944, pp. 469 ff., reproduced my estimate of a total of 8.6 million of foreign labor in Germany: 6.4 million civilian workers, including approximately 100,000 Alsace-Lorrainers and 2.2 million employed war prisoners. German records disclosed after the war was ended showed a total of 7,907,000: 5,977,000 civilian workers and 1,930,000 employed war prisoners (*Statistical Handbook of Germany*, 1946, pp. B5 and B8a). German statistics did not list Alsace-Lorrainers as foreign workers.

after the Finnish defeat.¹⁴ A few months after the exodus, thousands of Soviet colonists had taken their places. There was also a Russian influx into the other newly incorporated Soviet territories.

This was only the prelude. The political and even more the demographical implications remained uncertain. Was it only a westward removal of the frontier and of the "watershed"? Or had the Russian people crossed the watershed in a fateful turn towards the west? Hitler precipitated the course of events. By his attack on Russia, he destroyed the dam which had barred the human ocean of Eurasia from the rest of Europe. A few years later Germany was to be submerged by this human flood.

The German invasion at first caused Russia's military retreat. We have seen that it temporarily gave new impetus to the slackening Russian trend to the east. But then the Russian military and industrial power, forged during long years of privation and supported by America and England, triumphed in their full strength and splendor.

The German defeat before Stalingrad marked the turning point in World War II. The subsequent Russian advance set into motion new millions of people in the Soviet Union, Poland, and northern and southeastern Europe.

As early as September, 1943, while the stream of bombed-out evacuees from the Reich still continued towards Poland, numerous Reich Germans fled in the opposite direction. Those hastily moved back included officials and colonists, who had come to exploit the rich Ukraine, as well as German women and children who had been evacuated from bombed cities to safer areas in the east. As the front lines moved up, came the turn of German refugees from Belorussia, western Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and then from Poland and southeastern Europe. This return movement from Germany's ephemeral *Lebensraum* proceeded throughout the year 1944. The returning Reich Germans were given priority for evacuation. Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of them fell into Russian hands during the great offensive of January, 1945, and shared the fate of the local "ethnic Germans."

As long as Germany ruled Europe, the *Volksdeutsche* were the privileged representatives of the "master race" and the foremost exponents of the German policy of oppression and exploitation of non-Germans. Panic-stricken, they tried to escape retribution when the

¹⁴ According to official Finnish statistics disclosed by *Transocean*, January 23, 1945.

retreat of the German armies was at hand. The German authorities assisted in their evacuation, but it was no longer a well-organized transfer as had been the earlier repatriation of other German groups from the Baltic, Bessarabia, Tyrol, etc. This evacuation "had to be done during a military retreat which occupied to overflowing all communications and means of transport, bridges and ferries, railways and vessels, and was compelled constantly to vary its dispositions by events at the front."¹⁵

The first mass evacuation of *Volksdeutsche* carried out during the German retreat was that of the Black Sea Germans, mostly descendants of colonists who had immigrated in the eighteenth century under Catherine the Great. The 1926 census reported 449,415 persons of German extraction in the south of the Soviet Union (Ukraine, Crimea, and northern Caucasus). At the beginning of the war the Soviet authorities relocated some of them to inner Russia. The 350,000 who remained were removed by the Germans between August, 1943, and July, 1944.¹⁶ The great majority (300,000) were sent to former western Poland,¹⁷ where they joined other groups of *Volksdeutsche*, resettled in 1939-40, as well as a new flood of refugees from central Poland and Galicia. Thus, the Incorporated Provinces, which had been destined to become an eastern extension of the German living space, "a granary of the Reich and of the nation's blood," became the last refuge for ousted remnants of once prosperous German colonies. For a great part, however, the refuge turned out to be a trap. Up to the end of 1944 the evacuation of Germans from the east could be carried out in time. But things were different when the Russian army reached western Poland, during the decisive offensive of January, 1945. The Germans considered the Incorporated Provinces part of the sacred German soil, and every male German between the ages of 15 and 65 was to stay and defend it. On the other hand, the suddenness of the Russian penetration and the encirclement of vast regions resulted in a general collapse of the German evacuation scheme west of the Vistula. Millions of Germans were concentrated in this area: some 700,000 members of the local German minority, 800,000 resettled persons of German descent, more than half a million German citizens who had come to the Incorporated Provinces during

¹⁵ *Völkischer Beobachter*, July 21, 1944.

¹⁶ *Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau*, July 13, 1944.

¹⁷ *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, December 12, 1944.

the war, and a growing crowd of refugees—Reich Germans and *Volksdeutsche* from Polish and Soviet territories which had just been abandoned by the German army. Several hundred thousand among them succeeded in escaping to Germany, but hundreds of thousands were trapped, many in marching columns and almost all as homeless and uprooted as fugitives in a hostile land.

In southeastern Europe, too, old-established German minorities abandoned their position. The total of Rumanian Germans who were evacuated and fled with the retreating German army can be reckoned at 200,000. They included the majority of the 250,000 Transylvanian Germans whose forefathers had stood firm against the Mongols in the thirteenth century. In Yugoslavia, as early as 1942, the so-called ideologically determined transfer of 20,000 ethnic Germans was actually a sudden removal from areas taken by Partisans.¹⁸ Thousands followed early in 1944. This retreat of the German minority became a mass movement after September, 1944, when the Russians entered Yugoslavia. Numerous Hungarian Germans, too, left the country. In Slovakia the flight from the Partisans was, early in 1945, followed by the evacuation of the greater part of the German folk group.

Organized "repatriation" in 1939-41, enrollment in the German army (73,000 from Rumania, 40,000 from Hungary, about 30,000 from Croatia, and over 10,000 from Slovakia) and flight from the Russian advance had greatly reduced the German minorities in Soviet-conquered Europe. Many of the remaining adults were deported for labor to Russia (70,000 from Rumania and 100,000 from Yugoslavia). The century-old German expansion in eastern and south-eastern Europe had been annihilated during the few years of Nazi rule.

The displacement of Germans constituted only part of the population shifts which took place between the Arctic and the Balkans as a result of the Russian advance.

In 1941-43 about 250,000 Karelians had returned to their homes located in territory recaptured by the Finns. In 1944, after the conclusion of the second peace treaty with Russia, they were again evacuated to inner Finland. Since 1939, 6,506 Finnish refugees have escaped to Sweden, including about 2,500 deserters from the army;¹⁹

¹⁸ Sattler, *Die deutsche Volksgruppe in unabhängigen Staat Kroatien*, p. 66.

¹⁹ Finland Radio, March 12, 1945. They returned in 1945 after the Finnish amnesty law was applied.

to them must be added 40,000 Finnish children who were given asylum there. Military activities in northern Finland led to the temporary evacuation of some 125,000 persons from the battle zone to Sweden. When northern Norway threatened to become a theater of war operations, the Germans forced 45,000 persons to move southward.²⁰

In the Baltic countries, the Russian offensive gave new impetus to refugee movements which had been in progress since the German occupation. The first to move were the Estonian Swedes, last traces of the seventeenth-century Swedish domination. They were welcomed in Sweden, which organized, in agreement with the German authorities, the removal of 6,500 Estonian Swedes. The cooperation of the Germans could be secured, because they had already drafted the most valuable male labor force. The same circumstance permitted another organized transfer from German-occupied Russia, that of the Ingrians, or Ingermanlanders, people of Finnish stock from the Leningrad province (former Ingermanland), the last descendants of the aborigines who inhabited this area before the Russian conquest under Peter the Great. Their shifting started in the spring of 1943, when the food shortage in the battle zone around Leningrad became appalling. They were at first removed to Estonia (together with numerous Estonians and Latvians who had migrated to Ingermanland after the revolution of 1905), and later sent to Finland. Up to May, 1944, 65,000 Ingermanlanders arrived in Finland,²¹ which was still at war with the Soviet Union and, in view of mobilization and heavy war losses, could utilize even women, children, and old people for farm work.

The flight of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians across the Baltic Sea started in the early period of the German occupation. But it was greatly stimulated by the Russian advance, when people were afraid of either coming under bolshevist rule or else being deported to Germany, or, worse still, of being caught in the battle zone. Altogether 30,000 refugees reached Sweden, and more than 8,000 fled to Finland.

More numerous were the Balts who shifted with the retreating Germans. This movement was caused by various motives. Straight compulsory evacuation was limited to some coastal areas and to the

²⁰ Oslo Radio, May 6, 1947. By the fall of 1947 almost all had returned to their homes.

²¹ *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* (Stockholm), May 10, 1944. After the end of the Finnish-Soviet war, 46,000 to 47,000 applied to return (Finland Radio, December 5, 1944).

eastern part of the country. These areas had been cleared of their inhabitants as early as the fall and winter of 1943-44. At that time the Germans evacuated the coast and the eastern part of Estonia imperiled by the Soviet advance in an attempt to "scorch the earth"; but then all evacuees had remained in the Baltic countries. In the summer of 1944, however, during the final retreat of the German armies, the Germans not only actively encouraged the evacuation of the population towards Germany, but cases of forced evacuation were also reported. While some Balts tried to escape evacuation by every possible means, others voluntarily joined the retreating Germans. These included not only active collaborationists but also those who had profited from the German restitution of enterprises socialized in 1940 by the Soviets and of private land property distributed by them among poor peasants.²² To them must be added the families of some 60,000 Balts who fought in the German army. The total number of evacuated Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians of all shades, from forcibly abducted to those who fled before the Reds, may be roughly estimated at 300,000.²³ Part of them became stranded in Poland or East Prussia; others reached Germany.

In other Soviet territories (Belorussia and the Ukraine) the German retreat was also accompanied by mass removals. The chief aim of this measure was to procure labor for Germany, but it was not the only aim. As in the Baltic countries, the Russian advance was to be obstructed by the creation of waste areas. This policy called for mass abduction of the population.²⁴

There was, however, also a spontaneous flight, mainly in order to rescue life and property during furious battles. Ever so often the population had no choice: they could not stay in No-Man's Land, and the only escape road from the war zone led westward, in the direction of the German retreat.

²² The number of enterprises restored by October, 1943, was 35,635 in Latvia (in November, 50,000), 10,723 in Estonia, and some 10,000 in Lithuania.

²³ *The Economist* (London), December 28, 1946. Baltic sources estimated the total at 500,000 to 800,000 including some 200,000 workers who had been recruited in previous years. German sources quoted the grossly exaggerated figure of 1,000,000.

²⁴ *Aftondningen*, November 28, 1943: "German troops are burning everything in the territory from which they have been obliged to retreat, and are driving the civilian population like cattle before them." A German officer who had been at the Eastern front wrote in the *Berliner Börsen Zeitung*: "To evacuate a district is easier said than done . . . The majority of the population must be taken along."

German and German-inspired sources offered a very different interpretation of this movement; they described all Soviet civilians who followed the retreating German troops as refugees who preferred flight to the coming bolshevist tyranny. To evaluate these statements, it is enough to mention that these sources do not hesitate to describe as voluntary the removal of Russian and Ukrainian workers and of American, British, and French prisoners of war to inner Germany in front of the approaching Red army.²⁵ The story of the great anti-Soviet and Ukrainian separatist movements, the myth of the tremendous "national" Russian army organized by General Vlasov, the legend of countless masses²⁶ of Russians and Ukrainians who joined the retreating Germans to escape the Red army—all were part of the Nazi fable concerning the liberation of eastern people from the bolshevist yoke.

Nonetheless, there were undoubtedly a considerable number of Russians, Ukrainians, and other people eager to join the retreating Germans. They were anti-bolshevists who had helped the occupants because of political conviction, Ukrainian separatists who had hoped to achieve national independence with German help, and administrative and economic collaborationists.²⁷ Their relative number was probably not higher than in western and southeastern Europe, but their fear of retaliation was greater in view of German propaganda on bolshevist atrocities and the severe and arbitrary justice dealt out by the Soviet authorities in reconquered regions.

Thus, apart from deportation for labor, the German retreat led to a mass movement of entire families, especially peasants. The Germans tried to exploit the presence of all these uprooted groups. Great numbers evacuated from northwestern Russia to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were employed as farm hands and in factories. Later, part of them were shifted to East Prussia. Evacuees from eastern Ukraine were at first settled in the western part of Soviet Ukraine to raise crops for the German armies. With the subsequent retreat of

²⁵ *Der Angriff*, January 28, 1945; *Transocean*, January 30, 1945; *German European Service*, January 31, 1945.

²⁶ They were said to number "millions." The German controlled *Frit Folk* (Oslo), May 15, 1944, even reported, on the basis of a statement by four anti-Soviet refugees, that "about 80 percent of the Ukrainian population followed the retreating Germans."

²⁷ On indigenous populations of Crimea and Northern Caucasus see below, pp. 297-99.

the Germans, these displaced people were removed farther west. Several thousand entered Hungary via the Carpathian passes.²⁸ Others, together with fleeing Poles, crossed the frontiers of Slovakia. More than 20,000 Cossack refugees went as far as into northern Italy.²⁹

At the southern end of the front the Russian advance drove to the west large numbers of Rumanians. In the summer of 1941, when Rumania joined Germany and invaded the Soviet Union, the southwestern corner of the Ukraine, including the city of Odessa, came under Rumanian domination and was renamed Transnistria. In the fall of 1943 the approach of the Red army caused the panicky flight of officials and other newly arrived Rumanians, as well as of the old-established Rumanian minority in Transnistria. Then came the turn of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Moldavia. Altogether it was an exodus of 700,000 persons.³⁰

In Hungary masses of refugees fled before the advancing Russians. Hungarian Nazis, soldiers' families, and some other refugees were allowed to cross the Austrian border.

Military activities hardly affected the territory of the old Reich until the beginning of 1945. The great Russian offensive of January, 1945, immediately took in the province of East Prussia. Then came the turn of Pomerania, Silesia, and Brandenburg. Millions streamed westward from these German territories beyond the Oder, mingled with German and non-German refugees from Poland, the Baltic countries, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. In overcrowded trains, in unending columns of vehicles, and on foot, dragging bundles with their only belongings, this "cargo of wailing and terrified humanity"³¹ moved in deep snow and cold, enduring the fate which the German armies and authorities had in previous years imposed upon millions of innocents. Wounded soldiers, forcibly removed from hospitals, evacuated war prisoners, and foreign workers increased the obstruction on trains, on roads, and in rest centers. The Russian

²⁸ *Magyarsag* (Budapest), June 14, 1944, gave a figure of 200,000 refugees. Obviously this is an exaggeration. A scheme disclosed by the same paper on August 10, 1944, provided a communal allocation of 4 refugees per thousand inhabitants. It means (since the refugees were excluded from the capital) that the Hungarian authorities estimated a total of less than 40,000 Russian and Ukrainian refugees.

²⁹ *Völkischer Beobachter*, March 18, 1945; 8,000 soldiers with their 16,000 wives and children, according to postwar reports.

³⁰ Bucharest Radio, January 24, 1945. Their relocation began as soon as hostilities had ceased in the country.

³¹ *Der Bund* (Bern), February 5, 1945.

pincer movements frustrated the attempt of millions of Germans who tried to flee. But other millions succeeded in escaping in the course of the removal (at the end of 1944), the great maritime evacuation, and the unorganized flight during the Russian advance.

In the west the Allied invasion produced another mass movement. Hundreds of thousands of Reich German civilians returned from the liberated countries,³² followed by thousands of "collaborationists."³³ With the progressing conquest of Germany, endless columns of evacuees and refugees from cities in the western part of the Reich streamed into inner Germany, where they joined the millions already displaced as a result of air bombing.³⁴

There was, however, a substantial difference between the human flood which came from the west and that which came from the east. When hostilities ceased, the flood ebbed away in the west; it rose in the east even more. The majority of the non-German refugees returned to their homes. However, part of them—almost all from the east—mingled with remnants of those who were formerly deported to Germany and increased by a new influx, formed a mass of "non-repatriable" displaced persons and refugees. As for the German refugees who had fled before the advancing Allies, those from western Germany could later be relocated. But to the millions of Germans from the east the way back was firmly and finally barred by the abhorrence of neighboring nations and the removal of Poland's frontier to the Oder and the Neisse. Another population shift towards the west was thus inaugurated, to be continued after the end of the war by flight, expulsion, and organized transfers of population into what remained of Germany. The old east-west current has been re-established, backed and reinforced by Russia's turn towards the west.

³² Only small parts were trapped, as 10,000 in Paris and 40,000 in Strasbourg.

³³ 20,000 French (half of them from Alsace-Lorraine) settled in Germany (Bourgeois, "La Situation démographique," *Population*, January-March, 1946, pp. 117, 121). 12,000 to 15,000 collaborationists fled from Belgium (*Kölnische Zeitung*, October 11, 1944). The number of Dutch may have been as high (cf. *Van Honk*, Plauen, October 7 and 11, 1944).

³⁴ According to *Reichs Gesundheitsblatt*, February 3 and November 3, 1943, and May 31 and December 20, 1944, the population of German towns with over 100,000 inhabitants decreased between January, 1943, and September, 1944, in all parts of the Old Reich except Silesia (which was a reception area for refugees) by 6,230,000 (from 21,349,000 to 15,119,000).

Chapter X
**POSTWAR POPULATION
MOVEMENTS**

THE TWO MAIN FEATURES of war-induced population changes are war losses and the redistribution of population, as a consequence of war and postwar territorial alterations and political decisions.

*War Losses*¹

In January, 1939, the Soviet census showed a population of 170.5 million in the USSR. By 1940 there may have been 173 million or more. Annexations (in 1939-40 and 1945) added an area which had had before the war a population of 23 million.² About 196 million lived within the borders of the present USSR territory when war broke out in central Europe. Under normal conditions this population might have approached 215 million by 1946.³

On January 22, 1946, G. F. Alexandroff, Propaganda Chief of the Communist Party Central Committee, stated that the Soviet Union's population then totaled 193 million.⁴ A somewhat lower figure—191,585,000—is due to the repartition, early in 1947, of the USSR into districts for the elections to the Highest Councils of the Soviet republics (*Trud*, December 24, 1946).

During the war 2 million persons left the territories which either then belonged to the USSR or were subsequently incorporated into the USSR.⁵ Apart from this migratory loss, the population of the

¹ Although the writer gratefully acknowledges the use of official statistical materials on war losses compiled in part jointly with A. J. Jaffe, he alone accepts responsibility for the facts and the interpretation of the present section.

² Estonia 1,130,000, Latvia 1,990,000, Lithuania 2,460,000, Russian part of East Prussia 1,000,000, Memel district 150,000, Eastern Poland 11,800,000, Carpatho-Ukraine 700,000, and Bessarabia and northern Bucovina 3,700,000. The Karelian Isthmus has not been considered, since its whole population left for inner Finland.

³ Cf. Lorimer's computations, *The Population of the Soviet Union*, p. 188. They are somewhat exaggerated, since the abnormally high fertility of 1938 has been taken as basis (see pp. 314-15).

⁴ *Associated Press* dispatch from Moscow, January 22, 1946.

⁵ 700,000 ethnic Germans transferred in 1939-43; 500,000 German refugees from Russian East Prussia; 500,000 as a balance of the Polish Soviet population exchange; 300,000 nonrepatriable displaced persons.

Soviet territory remained about the same as it had been before the war. In other words, the whole expected population increase was nullified by the war.

Of course, this does not mean that 20 million persons actually perished. A substantial part of this figure represents the so-called "birth deficit." Russia was invaded in June, 1941. With respect to births, the years 1940 and 1941 were normal. From 1942 on, fertility must have declined under the impact of mobilization. Transportation difficulties prevented the granting of furloughs to soldiers, as was done in western Europe; the situation of the Soviet Union in the second World War can be compared with that of all belligerents in the first World War. In 1915-19 the number of births dropped in Germany by 40 percent; in France by 46 percent. The decrease was less spectacular in the Russian Empire, where males were not so rigidly subject to mobilization as they were in western Europe (and in USSR during the second World War). However, the number of births declined (in provinces for which data are available) below the prewar level: in 1915, by 13 percent; in 1916, by 34 percent; in 1917, by 46 percent.⁶ True, even in the second World War mobilization progressed gradually in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the number of illegitimate births may have been substantially increased.⁷ On the other hand, apart from the effect of mobilization, fertility suffered because of evacuations, hardships, and, in the occupied territories, deportations to Germany. On July 8, 1944, in the midst of the war, a decree was promulgated introducing grants and allowances beginning with the third child. To this decree was attributed an increase in the birth rate, which in 1945 was said to be 35.3 percent higher than that of 1944.⁸ Whatever the causes of this increase (many families were reunited after the liberation of occupied territories), the fact that the actual birth rate of 1945 was not disclosed is a hint that it fell seriously in 1944. There is no reason to assume that the average decline of the birth rate in Russia was smaller in the second World War than in the first. Proportionately, the birth deficit

⁶ Kohn, *The Vital Statistics of European Russia during the World War 1914-1917*, pp. 78-79 and 128-129. Kohn estimated the total deficit of Russia's population during the first World War (less than three years) at more than 6 million.

⁷ It is significant that the Decree of July 8, 1944 (see below), which aimed to promote child bearing, contains special provisions for unmarried mothers.

⁸ Associated Press dispatch from Moscow, November 21, 1945. The first nine months of 1944 and 1945 have been compared.

would amount to at least 8 million; probably, it was higher. Thus, losses from excess mortality could anyhow not exceed 12 million.

We have scant information regarding the number of deaths caused by war and wartime conditions. The main source is the following statement made by Stalin in March, 1946.⁹

As a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans, and also during the German occupation and through the deportation of Soviet citizens to German slave labor camps, about 7,000,000 people. In other words, the Soviet Union has lost in men several times as many as Britain and the United States together.

There is no reason to believe that the losses have been minimized; the figure is contained in a statement emphasizing the losses of Russia in comparison with those of her Allies; however, the estimate is conservative. It has been reckoned that the Red army lost 3 million men who were killed on the battlefield or died from wounds.¹⁰ Two and one half million Jews were exterminated. This would mean as if there were only additional 1.5 million lost among all other population groups in occupied Soviet territory. France lost (apart from 100,000 murdered Jews) 660,000 civilians: 170,000 victims of the war (in France); 190,000 prisoners and deportees who died; 300,000 who succumbed to adverse living conditions in excess of normal mortality rates.¹¹ On the same scale the occupied part of the Soviet Union (where there had been a population of 85 million) would have lost 1,300,000 civilians. Military activities affected the civilian population of the Soviet Union much more than they did in France: the terror was more cruel, the treatment of the prisoners and draftees was worse, and living conditions were harder. The estimated total of 7 million may not include the excess mortality resulting from destruction of dwellings, scarcity of food, fuel, and medical help, and other hardships. In any case, Stalin's statement clearly does not refer to the nonoccupied territory, where the losses were also high. The Germans could not take Leningrad, but hunger, cold, and bombardment

⁹ United Press dispatch from London, March 13, 1946, reporting a Moscow broadcast. The same data are in the *New Times* (Moscow), May 1, 1946, No. 9.

¹⁰ Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, January, 1946. 7.5 million (incl. missing), according to George C. Marshall, in "Ten Eventful Years," *Enc. Brit.*, 1947.

¹¹ The first two figures according to *Bulletin de la Statistique Général de la France*, February, 1947, p. 88, the last according to Vincent, "Consequences de six années de guerre," *Population*, July-September, 1946, p. 434.

depleted its population by 650,000.¹² Mortality was high among the millions evacuated in wintertime and badly sheltered in the reception places. The general war produced deterioration of living conditions must have exacted a heavy toll in human lives. Such factors must certainly have increased the losses of the Soviet Union by additional millions in excess of the disclosed figure of 7 million. The lowest limit of the total excess mortality may be put at 9 million; its upper limit might be, as suggested by the reduced fertility and the present population figure, as high as 12 million.

It seems that in Europe outside the Soviet Union few countries emerged from the war with a reduced population.¹³ In Germany great military casualties brought about an excess of deaths over births of more than 2 million. In France the combined action of war mortality and usual low fertility resulted in a net population loss of 1.1 million. In Poland the slaughter of Jews and other exceptional mortality account for a decrease of population by 2 million or more. In Yugoslavia the corresponding figure would be, according to semi-official population estimates, about 1 million.

These net losses have been equalized by the increase of population in other belligerent, as well as neutral, countries. When the second World War broke out (or, more exactly, on January 1, 1940), the population of Europe outside the Soviet Union numbered 399 million.¹⁴ In order to obtain comparable prewar and postwar population figures for the same areas, we must subtract 23 million inhabitants from territories incorporated into the Soviet Union during and at the end of the war. Hence, the Europe which is today outside the USSR had a prewar population of 376 million. Inasmuch as few censuses have been taken since the war, statistical data on the present population is incomplete. However, they suggest for 1946 the same figure 375-76 million (including more than one million Germans and other European prisoners of war still in Russia).¹⁵

¹² According to a statement made by the Mayor of Leningrad to the CIO delegation (United Press excerpts from the report of the delegation, Washington, D.C., March 17, 1946.)

¹³ Migratory changes not being taken into account.

¹⁴ According to the best available data compiled by Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*. Subsequent statistical publications brought no substantial change in the above estimate.

¹⁵ On March 15, 1947, the Soviet government stated that there were 890,532 German prisoners of war in the USSR. Furthermore, there are 100,000 Hungarians

The great wartime population shifts, which reshuffled the peoples of Europe, only slightly affected Europe (outside the USSR) considered as an entity. It had a migratory gain of about 1.7 million.¹⁶

The demographic feature was essentially the same as in the Soviet Union and as it was in Europe outside Russia after the first World War: the number of inhabitants at the end of the war approximately equaled the population before the war. In all cases war eliminated the natural increase which could have been expected. For 1940-46 this expected natural increase of the population of Europe outside the Soviet Union (plus migratory gain) comes to 12-13 million.

The character of the losses produced by the two World Wars was different. The loss estimated for the first World War includes a birth deficit of 11 million.¹⁷ This somewhat artificial notion means that half the expected natural increase was prevented by lowered fertility. In the second World War furloughs for soldiers, full employment, and possibly psychological reasons account for a number of births probably not much smaller than those of peace time. In various countries, belligerent as well as neutral, such as Great Britain, France (in spite of the lack of prisoners of war), The Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia, there was even an unexpected rise in the birth rate, which, at least temporarily, reversed the trend of declining fertility. In the German-ruled poor countries of the East the situation was different. In Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece greatly deteriorated conditions of life might have caused not only

and 35,000 Austrians whose repatriation has been promised by the end of 1947 (Stalin's letter of July 21, 1947, published in *Oesterreichische Volksstimme*, July 24). The assertion, often made, that there are 2.5 to 4 million still in Russian lands is incompatible with other information. The Germans had mobilized somewhat over 15 million in Germany proper (see p. 261, note 12). Five million were killed or wounded and discharged. More than 8 million German prisoners were taken by the Western Allies (7.8 million by the U.S. and the British armies). Accordingly, the total of German prisoners taken by the Russian army would be about 2 million. The Russian figure of one million repatriated prisoners has been challenged. In any case, between June, 1946 (when the official release scheme started) and Oct. 1, 1947, 288,314 German prisoners of war and 36,674 civilian internees returned from the Soviet Union. Mortality among prisoners was certainly very high. On June 7, 1947, a resolution of the premiers of the German states demanded the return of 2 million prisoners of war. Apart from those in the Soviet Union, there were by September, 1947, about 500,000 in France, 80,000 in Yugoslavia, 40,000 in Poland, and 9,000 in Czechoslovakia. Those under British control (267,000 in the United Kingdom and 77,000 in the Middle East) and in Belgium (20,000) were in process of repatriation.

¹⁶ Overseas net-emigration, 300,000; immigration from Soviet territories, 2,000,000 (see above, note 5).

¹⁷ Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*, p. 83.

a rise of general and infantile mortality but also a decrease of physiological fertility. But it cannot be doubted that even the most harassed countries of eastern Europe had an excess of births over "normal" deaths, although a smaller excess than usual.

An evaluation of the decline of births presumes available vital statistics and requires their meticulous study. We can but say that the so-called birth deficit was in the second World War relatively low, possibly as low as one million or less and probably anyhow not larger than two million. The population of Europe outside the Soviet Union remained after the war the same as before, not because growth was prevented by a lowered fertility, but mainly because millions were exterminated.

Civilization had made it possible to check epidemics, which in former times levied tributes many times as high as those imposed by military activities. Still, in the first World War influenza and (in eastern Europe) typhus accounted for millions of deaths. In the second World War their number was insignificant in relation to the whole. The main means of death were not germs, but arms and gas chambers.

We have more or less reliable information on military casualties. The number of persons belonging to the armies of European nations (outside the Soviet Union) who were killed in battle or died from wounds has been estimated at 4.3 million.¹⁸ To them must be added civilian losses from war casualties, which greatly exceeded half a million, mainly by air bombardment.¹⁹ The total number of victims of military activities may be estimated at 5 million.

The practice of exterminating the peaceful population of conquered countries became obsolete many centuries ago. The Germans restored this practice on a scale never before recorded. The main victims were the Jews. Of 5.5 million exterminated Jews, nearly 3 million were nationals or residents of European countries and territories lying now outside the Soviet Union.²⁰

¹⁸ Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. *Statistical Bulletin, January, 1946*: Germany, 3,250,000; United Kingdom, 250,000; France, 200,000; Italy, 150,000 to 200,000; Poland, 125,000; Yugoslavia, 75,000; Hungary, 75,000; Finland, 50,000. Cf. below, note 23. The German losses might be somewhat higher; in Sept., 1947, the German prisoners of war service counted 1,107,261 missing in the east.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, July, 1946. Losses from air bombardment were especially heavy in Germany: 305,000 killed, according to The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report; European War*, Sept. 30, 1945, p. 15.

²⁰ The area ruled by Germany and her satellites had a prewar Jewish population of 4.5 million. Of them about 300,000 escaped overseas, to Great Britain and to

The number of non-Jewish civilians murdered by the Germans is also very large. However, reported estimates are greatly exaggerated.²¹ The total may be put at one to one and a half million. The number of those who died in captivity and forced labor was certainly more than half a million.²² Starvation and semi-starvation greatly increased the wartime mortality. Even in France it amounted to 3/4 percent of the population. The percentage was lower in other western European countries, but substantially higher in countries such as Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Loss of one million by starvation would be a rather conservative estimate.

Thus we arrive at a total of 10 to 12 million victims of excess mortality.²³ This figure corresponds to the assumption that the birth deficit was small.

This very rough estimate has been presented only in order to visualize the immediate demographic effects of the second World War. The main fact is that Europe's population remained as large as it had been before the war. War has not alleviated the population

neutral countries. An estimate of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, *Weekly Review*, October 16, 1946, showed on the same area 1,363,000 Jews. Adolf Eichmann, who was in charge of the extermination of Jews, estimated that altogether 6 million Jews were killed (*Nazi Conspiracy*, p. 82).

²¹ See below, note 23. The Polish official estimate of 1.7 million (3.9 including Jews) is not compatible with the records of the census of February, 1946. Reasonable figures have been given by the Czechoslovak Statistical Office; 138,000 Jews and 55,000 non-Jewish civilians; and The Netherlands Bureau for War Documentation, 114,000 Jews and 17,000 non-Jewish civilians.

²² Among the French it amounted to 2 percent per annum. Mortality was higher among those from eastern Europe. Many of them, exhausted by work and starvation, were among the 275,000 killed as "useless eaters" (*Nazi Conspiracy*, p. 77).

²³ Following are the war losses according to reports presented by the governments concerned, to the Conference on Reparations in Paris, November-December, 1945 (figures in thousands, the first indicating military losses, the second, civilian losses): Albania, 16 and 2; Czechoslovakia, 46 and 204 (later corrected figures in *Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Vol. I, No. 4, 1947: Killed 212; increase of mortality, 100); France 238 and 415 (later corrected figures give a total of 610); Greece 708 and 488 (later corrected total 518); Luxembourg 3 and 1; The Netherlands 3 and 197 (later corrected total 265); Norway 2 and 7; United Kingdom 272 and 96; Yugoslavia 305 and 1401. Poland's war losses have been indicated by Vice Minister Wolski, head of the Office of War Reparations, as 6,028,000 (*Poland of Today*, March, 1947); according to President Berut, 5 million were exterminated (Smulevich, "Nekotorye voprosy vosproizvodstva naseleniia," *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika*, 1947, No. 3, p. 53). Not all these figures are reliable; some are exaggerated. The losses of the Allied nations would amount to 9,838,000. Adding 4,000,000 for Germany and Austria, 80,000 for Finland, and at least 700,000 for Italy, Hungary, and Rumania in its present borders (325,000 military deaths, 300,000 Jews exterminated), we obtain for Europe outside the Soviet Union, a total of 14.6 million, exceeding the theoretical maximum.

pressure in all of Europe. It eliminated a further increase of physical density, but it accelerated the increase of economic density. Goods were demolished, production was destroyed, and there are not enough hands fit to restore them. A commission of the United Nations, which studied the economic reconstruction of devastated areas, stated that "most serious from the point of view of economic development is the shortage of Europe today of people with managerial training, of technicians, of foremen and of skilled industrial workers. In the occupied countries during the war, there was very little industrial training of the young, while large groups of skilled workers have lost their skill, due to mobilization and to forced labor at work quite unrelated to their normal occupations." In eastern Europe "the large scale elimination of the Jewish population has left the distribution system in a state of virtual disorder." On the other hand, "the pre-war phenomenon of agricultural overpopulation still prevails."²⁴ The unfavorably changed ratio of nonworking population will for many years constitute an additional burden for Europe's economy.

As happens frequently under such conditions, attempts have been made to enlarge the living space by a redistribution of wealth. Radical land reforms, involving the expropriation and division of large estates was carried through in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Albania, as well as in several parts of Germany.²⁵ Other laws provide for nationalization of coal and ore mining and heavy industry. These changes have not been confined to eastern Europe. The partial nationalization which has been carried through in Great Britain and France gives a preview of things to come. A new era is in the making in Europe, an era of vanishing private capital and of coming planned economy. It is, however, doubtful whether these fundamental changes will bring immediate relief to poor countries which suffer above all from insufficient production and lack of enough capital to increase the output. In particular, the effects of land parcellation has been attenuated because there is such a large number of claimants. Agriculture's difficulties may even be in-

²⁴ United Nations, *Preliminary Report on Economic Reconstruction*, pp. 12-14.

²⁵ In Poland the maximum size is 250 acres of any land or 125 acres of arable land; in the British zone of Germany, 370 acres, in the French zone, 250 acres, in the Soviet zone, 250 acres; in Czechoslovakia, 125 acres of arable land; in Rumania, 111; in Hungary, 107; in Albania, 50 to 100. In the Soviet zone 5,086,000 acres of confiscated land have been shared out among 496,695 families; 33 percent was allotted to 83,802 families of transferred Germans (*Tass*, Sept. 12, 1947).

creased, as they were in the early stages of the Soviet economy. Land distribution among landless agricultural workers and holders of dwarf farms will raise their consumption level as long as their gains are not annihilated by population growth. But experience has shown that conversion of capitalistic large-scale farm economies into small and capital-poor holdings results in reduction of total production and in a substantial cut in marketable surpluses. The supply of food for urban centers decreases until the efficiency of land utilization is restored on a new basis.


The ideological approach to the postwar radical reforms emphasizes the changed control of the means of production. But the actual motive power is a pursued equalization of access to the means of subsistence, diminished by war. This process of equalization is taking place not only within nations but also between nations; in the latter case, mainly through a compulsory redistribution of Europe's population.

Postwar Population Transfers

The following decision was taken at the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2, 1945): "The three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner."

The Allied Control Council of Germany, which was charged with the execution of this decision, announced on November 20, 1945, a preliminary resettlement plan. It provided for the transfer of 6,650,000 Germans (3,500,000 from Poland, 2,500,000 from Czechoslovakia, 500,000 from Hungary, and 150,000 from Austria) and their distribution among the four zones of occupation. The transfer was scheduled to start on December 1, 1945, and it was to be effectuated before August, 1946. There was some delay, but in the main the action has been carried through. The two principal groups—millions of Germans from Czechoslovakia and from Poland—have been removed to Germany.

The German minority of Czechoslovakia numbered approximately 3.5 million. During the German occupation 500,000 Sudeten-Germans entered the German army. When the Red army approached,



6. Redistribution of Populations Produced by the Second World War

the majority of Slovak Germans were evacuated. Numerous others (from the main German group in the border region of Bohemia-Moravia) fled to Germany and Austria before and after the end of the war, making a total of 300,000 refugees. An estimate of the Czechoslovak Statistical Office listed for June 30, 1945, 2,645,000 ethnic Germans still in Czechoslovakia. On October 20, 1946, the last German transport left the country. The number of transferred ethnic Germans has been officially stated at 2,400,000.²⁶ Later it was reported that 2,674,000 Sudeten Germans had moved to Germany. This figure includes (in addition to the organized transfer from Czechoslovakia) wartime refugees who fled to Austria and were subsequently transferred to Germany, Sudeten Germans who went to Germany either by choice or by compulsion before the organized transfer, and those who moved there afterward. In March, 1947 a number of 229,000 remaining Germans were reported. Before the transfer it was assumed that about half a million Germans would be exempted from expulsion as "good citizens." Subsequently, however, the Czechoslovak authorities showed an increasing unwillingness to trust members of a minority consisting of four fifths of active Nazis. On the other hand, many non-fascist Germans preferred voluntary expatriation to a process of Czechization. Finally, the Germans who remained in Czechoslovakia were exempted from expulsion mainly for a quite different reason—originally unforeseen—because they were "indispensable workers."

Before the war Poland had a German minority of 700,000 persons. Hitler's "repatriation" of ethnic Germans from the Baltic states, Rumania, southern Russia, and elsewhere to the "incorporated provinces" brought the total up to 1,500,000, of whom 200,000 or more enlisted in the German army. It has been estimated that about one million Germans fled from old Poland.²⁷ The remainder may have disguised themselves as Poles.

The lands acquired by Poland up to the Oder and the Neisse comprised the eastern territories detached from Germany (with the exception of northern East Prussia, which came to Russia) and the

²⁶ *Statistický Zpravodaj*, December, 1946. Apart from the German minority of Czechoslovakia, 800,000 Germans (Reich Germans and refugees from the Balkans) immigrated to the country during the war. They fled or were expelled at and after the end of the war.

²⁷ Szulc, "Demographic Changes in Poland," *Population Index*, Jan., 1947, p. 5.

former Free State of Danzig. Before the war the population of this area numbered 9.1 million, of whom 1.5 million were Poles or half Poles and the rest Germans. Reduced by enlistment in the army and by war losses, the German population of this area probably numbered about 6.5 million in 1945, when the great exodus started. It may be estimated that 4 million Germans left the territory at the end of the war and especially afterwards, since the Polish census, taken on February 14, 1946, that is, before the organized transfer started, showed less than 2.5 million Germans in new Poland. By December 31, 1946, an additional 1,616,555 Germans had been removed under the transfer scheme.²⁸ By June 1, 1947, altogether more than 2 million Germans were transferred, and the 289,000 who remained were to be moved as soon as possible.²⁹

The transfer from Austria was completed before the schedule date. By July, 1946, 161,000 Reich Germans (who had immigrated after 1938) and Sudeten German refugees were moved to Germany from the United States Zone in Austria, and 70,000 from the Russian Zone.³⁰ On the contrary, the transfer from Hungary progressed slowly. By July, 1946, 118,000 Germans were evicted from Hungary. The Hungarian Government accused the United States military authorities of hampering the transfer and started to concentrate the German population in special zones in Hungary in order to provide room for Hungarians who were to come to the country by exchange of population with Czechoslovakia. In July, 1947, the Soviet government permitted the transfer of 60,000 Germans from Hungary to the Russian Zone in Germany.³¹

Altogether about 4.7 million Germans have been transferred (not counting those transferred from Austria, since they either form a part of the 300,000 refugees from Czechoslovakia or were returning Reich Germans): 2.4 million from Czechoslovakia, 2 million from Poland, and 178,000 from Hungary. To them must be added those who fled or were expelled before the organized transfer started:

²⁸ *Powszechny Sumaryczny Spis Ludności*, p. xvi. At the Moscow Conference, Secretary of State Marshall stated the total number of Germans evacuated from the areas in the east as 5 to 6 million, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, as 5,678,938.

²⁹ Warsaw Radio, Aug. 18, 1947.

³⁰ *New York Times*, February 3 and July 8, 1946.

³¹ To those transferred must be added numerous Hungarian German wartime refugees in Austria and Germany. In the August, 1947, elections to the Hungarian Parliament 170,000 "Swabians" (ethnic Germans) were excluded from the electoral registers pending expatriation.

300,000 from Czechoslovakia, 1,000,000 from old Poland, 4,000,000 from new Poland, 500,000 from the northern part (annexed by Russia) of East Prussia, and several hundred thousand from the Balkans.⁸² Of them about 180,000 Sudeten, Hungarian, and Balkan Germans are in Austria, 100,000 in Denmark,⁸³ and the rest in Germany. By July 1, 1947, more than nine and one half million German refugees were reported in rump Germany.⁸⁴

Thus, millions of refugees were thrust into Germany (whose area was reduced by 25 per cent) with perhaps a hundred pounds of baggage and five hundred to a thousand marks as their only property. The housing and feeding of those destitute people has presented a grave burden for the reception areas. In June, 1946, the German Council of States of the American Zone stated that nearly 50 percent of their expenditures went for the relief of refugees. Their inclusion in the productive life of Germany, with her stagnant economy, made slow progress all the more since women and children were in the majority among the refugees, the men having been enlisted in the German army.

The flight and expulsion of Germans enlarged, in a somewhat primitive way, the living space of non-German populations. In Yugoslavia and Rumania the German minority formed islets surrounded by Slavs, Rumanians, or Magyars. The "ethnic Germans" were far wealthier than the average citizen in these countries. In some regions, such as the Yugoslav Banat, they controlled the whole economic life. Their lands and other property was considerably enlarged during German occupation. Its confiscation substantially increased the "land fund" for distribution among small farm owners and landless peasants. More complicated were the economic consequences in Czechoslovakia and Poland, where the transfer of Germans emptied large territories and sensibly curtailed the labor force.

⁸² In May, 1947, Yugoslavia and Rumania started to expell the remaining *Volksdeutsche*. By July 1, 1947, 19,000 recently expelled Yugoslav Germans had been counted in Austria. No Germans had been expelled from Russian East Prussia. However, a voluntary transfer was organized in the summer of 1947. By July 1, the first 2,500 volunteers reached Berlin.

⁸³ At the end of the war, 210,000 Germans had fled to Denmark, 166,000 from German territory subsequently annexed by Poland, and the rest from the present German territory. By August, 1947, agreements with the occupation authorities provided for the repatriation of 110,000 refugees.

⁸⁴ 5.3 million in the Soviet Zone, 2.9 in the United States Zone, 1.4 in the British Zone, 0.1 in the French Zone.

The Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia were mostly residents of the Sudetenland. With remarkable speed 1,800,000 Czechs and Slovaks were moved into the Sudetenland. Czech workers replaced the Germans in factories; 3.2 million acres (of a total of 3.7 million acres of confiscated German land) were distributed among Czech and Slovak colonists. In order to replace Czechs settled in the Sudetenland 180,000 Slovaks and Magyars were brought to Bohemia-Moravia under the terms of the decree on labor mobilization. However, shifting of population could not change the total of man power in Czechoslovakia, where the pre-Munich economy was fairly balanced. The labor shortage, after the eviction of Sudeten Germans, has been estimated at 500,000; this was particularly serious, since it concerned mainly skilled workers in industry, the building trades, and agriculture. An attempt was made to fill up the gap by Czechs and Slovaks from abroad. By May, 1947, 20,000 Czech miners who had emigrated before 1939 returned from France, Belgium, and Germany and 7,300 Czechoslovaks from Austria. Furthermore, agreements assuring the transfer of "ethnic Czechs and Slovaks have been signed or are being considered.

Two agreements on population exchange have been concluded with the USSR. The first was in no relation to the shortage of manpower. It was connected with the cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union. The treaty of June 29, 1945, contained a provision on voluntary population exchange, entitling the Czech and the Slovak residents of the Carpatho-Ukraine to move to the present Czechoslovak territory and the Ukrainians who were domiciled in Czechoslovakia outside the Carpatho-Ukraine to move to the USSR. Neither the Czechs and the Slovaks, most of whom had left Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938 after the temporary annexation of this province by Hungary, nor the Ukrainians living in Czechoslovakia seem to have taken much advantage of this agreement. On the contrary, even Ukrainian residents of the Carpatho-Ukraine infiltrated in thousands into Czechoslovakia.⁸⁵

On July 10, 1946, a second agreement on population exchange was signed between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. It entitled Soviet citizens of Czech and Slovak origin living in the Volynia province to

⁸⁵ Particularly after the Greek Catholic (Uniat) church (to which the Carpatho-Ukrainians mostly belong) separated from the Vatican and returned to the Greek Orthodox Church. See *The New York Times*, April 13 and June 6, 1946.

emigrate to Czechoslovakia and repeatedly provided for a voluntary resettlement of Czechoslovak citizens of Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian origin to the USSR. The real significance of the exchange agreement lay in the transfer of Czech colonists who had immigrated into the Volynia province of the Russian Empire in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. The transfer, which involved 33,101 persons, was carried through between January 29 and May 13, 1947.³⁶

On the same day (July 10, 1946) the governments of Czechoslovakia and Rumania signed a protocol on transfer of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks from Rumania. Thirty thousand persons have applied for repatriation. Furthermore, the Yugoslav government agreed in principle to the repatriation of more than 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks from Bosnia. By October, 1946, large numbers of repatriates from Yugoslavia and Rumania have been reported.³⁷

Czechoslovakia's search for additional man power is surpassed by her eagerness to become a "national" state of Czechs and Slovaks. This has been shown by the negotiations on the Hungaro-Slovak population exchange. The Potsdam Conference, which sealed the fate of the Sudeten Germans, made no decision with regard to the Hungarian (Magyar) minority of Czechoslovakia. An agreement reached on February 27, 1946, provided for an exchange of equal numbers of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and Slovaks from Hungary. The agreement left open the problem of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia who would not be covered by the exchange scheme. There is a great disparity in the respective minorities: 500,000 (according to the Czechoslovak government) to 652,000 (according to the Hungarian government) Magyars in Czechoslovakia against about 100,000 Slovaks in Hungary. In view of the attitude taken by the Czechoslovak Magyars, Czechoslovakia has decided to get rid of this minority (less dangerous than the Germans, but also troublesome) by exchanging 100,000 Magyars for Slovaks from Hungary, by a "return into the Slovak community" of 200,000 considered as Magyarized Slovaks, and by transferring to Hungary another 200,000. Hungary has refused to accept additional numbers of Magyars, believing that they would ruin her economy, and has protested

³⁶ Prague Radio, May 13, 1947.

³⁷ The New York Times, May 12, 1947; *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, Oct. 1, 1946. Apart from repatriation, provisions have been made for immigration of 15,000 Italian and 8,000 Bulgarian workers.

against the denationalization of those who will remain in Czechoslovakia. The Paris Peace Conference made no decision in this controversy. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947, referred the parties to direct negotiations in order to solve the problem of Magyars who will not be resettled under the exchange scheme of February 27, 1946. Should no agreement be reached within a period of six months, the question can be brought before the Council of Foreign Ministers for a final solution. With regard to the Magyars who would remain in Czechoslovakia, the Peace Treaty imposed on Czechoslovakia a guarantee of their "full human and civic," but not of their special minority, rights.

The situation created by the expulsion of Germans was still different in Poland. The economic activity of the Sudeten Germans was an inherent part of the Czechoslovak economy. By expelling the Sudeten Germans, the Czechs and Slovaks expanded their settlement area and acquired the property and the jobs of those expelled. But the elimination of the highly productive force of a population of over two and one half million had a grave repercussion on the economy of the whole country. It was not necessary for Poland to face this dark side of the question. The acquirement of a new and foreign land was for her an asset, even if its returns would be lower than under its previous owners.

On September 1, 1945, speaking at the Industrial Conference in Breslau, the Polish Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, said:³⁸

History shows only two ways of territorial aggrandisement of the State: Colonization of virgin territories or the seizure of foreign lands with their foreign and hostile populations. Our aggrandisement in the West was made by a third, hitherto unknown, method, the easiest and most favorable of them all. We acquired territory with ready highroads, railway lines, and waterways, with towns waiting for settlers to come, with industry which can be put into service, with mines, and at the same time with some remnants of the German population which we have the moral and international right to liquidate in such time and by such means as we shall deem proper.

The full use of the new land is impeded by the destruction of livestock, agricultural, industrial, and transportation implements, and lack of capital for reconstruction. There can be, however, no doubt that the expansion to the west in connection with the removal of

³⁸ Warsaw Radio, September 1, 1945.

the Germans will substantially alleviate Poland's agricultural overpopulation. The radical agrarian reform in old Poland procured only 4.4 million acres of land from big estates for distribution among landless peasants and small holders. In the new Polish (former German) provinces 10 million acres of confiscated German property are being distributed among Polish settlers. Nonetheless, land allocation in the new territories could not, by itself, carry off Poland's agricultural surplus population, estimated before the war at five million or more. Villagers had suffered from war losses less than townsfolk. By March, 1947, three million Polish peasants had received allotments in the new territories, and their land resources are almost exhausted.³⁹ The Polish population of the territories amounts to 5,135,000 (according to statistics of the Ministry of Regained Territories, for August, 1947): more than one million autochthonous Poles, nearly a million transferees from the USSR and 3 million from old Poland. Assuming a proportional participation in the distributed land, agricultural colonization of the new territories would have absorbed less than two million peasants from old Poland, bringing its agricultural surplus population down to three million.⁴⁰

By this statement it is not intended to minimize the value of the enlargement of the Polish habitat. It opened the way for the creation of stronger peasant economies both in new and in old Poland, resulting in an increased purchasing power, and for organic development of restored industry—two intimately connected processes, capable of absorbing the formerly unutilized labor force and the increase expected in the near future. Poland's tragic problem of agricultural overpopulation is on the way to be solved—not by birth control, nor by a miraculous industrialization on an unchanged territory but by migration: the forced emigration of millions of Germans from the detached territories and the immigration of millions of Poles into the acquired territories.⁴¹ Now only comes the time when industrialization and decline of the birth rate might give positive results.

However, Poland's immediate concern is an inverse one: because

³⁹ Moscow Radio, March 25, 1947. According to the report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform up to Jan. 1, 1947, only 337,782 peasant families were definitely settled. Cf. *Wiadomosci Statystyczne*, February 20, 1947. In 1939 there were 2.5 million people employed in agriculture and forestry in the territories which subsequently became Polish.

⁴⁰ 3.5 million according to the U.N., *Preliminary Report on Economic Reconstruction*, p. 227.

⁴¹ Cf. pp. 6-7.

of war losses, she needs capital and man power, particularly skilled workers. Efforts are being made to promote the return of Poles residing in foreign countries. The results have been rather meager. By January 31, 1947, 32,424 returning emigrants have been registered at the western borders of Poland.⁴² The great influx came from the east—from the former Polish territory.

When the Russian army drove the Germans out of Poland, the territory up to the Curzon Line was finally incorporated into the Soviet Union. Its population was mainly Ukrainian or Belorussian. There was, however, in this area a strong Polish minority.⁴³ On October 1, 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin) concluded agreements with the bordering Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania concerning a voluntary exchange of certain parts of the population: Poles from the east of the new border line were to replace Ukrainians, Belorussians, Russians, and Lithuanians from the territory which remained Polish. On July 6, 1945, this agreement was supplemented by another, concluded between the USSR and the Polish Provisional Government. It allowed former Polish citizens, both Poles and Jews, who had become Soviet citizens as a result of the USSR annexation of eastern Poland in 1939 to move to Poland from all parts of the Soviet Union; this was especially applied to Jews who had been evacuated in 1939-40 to inner and Asiatic Russia.

The transfer was started by both countries when war was still in full swing. Nearly one and one half million Poles (1,458,952) registered for evacuation in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania, and in addition approximately 150,000 Polish Jews in inner Russia. By December, 1945, 746,255 persons were evacuated;⁴⁴ then the movement slowed down. In October, 1946, there were reported 864,000

⁴² *Wiadomosci Statystyczne*, April 5, 1947: 15,905 from Germany, 10,149 from France, 3,353 from Yugoslavia, 2,403 from Belgium, and 614 from other countries (10 persons from America). For 1947 a larger re-emigration from France has been scheduled (*Poland of Today*, January, 1947). Altogether, 8,245 families arrived up to Aug. 1 from France (Polish Press Service, Aug. 19, 1947).

⁴³ The *Concise Statistical Year Book of Poland*, published by the (London) Polish Ministry of Information, 1941, counted in 1939, in the Russian occupied area 5,274,000 Poles (according to the mother tongue). The exaggeration is evident, if compared with the distribution of population by religion. Taking into account the differences between the incorporated territory and the occupied territory and the population losses after 1939, the number of Poles covered by the exchange scheme has been estimated at 2 to 3 million.

⁴⁴ *Wiadomosci Statystyczne*, February, 1946.

repatriates.⁴⁵ Including those who had crossed the new frontier before control and registration were organized, the total (up to December 31, 1946, when the transfer was terminated) has been estimated at one million. In addition, 140,000 Jews were re-evacuated. The repatriates have been settled on the former German territory. The majority of Jewish repatriates joined other Polish Jews in an effort to reach the United States Zone in Germany.

As to the transfer from Poland to the USSR, the agreement comprised 673,876 Ukrainians and others, according to a statement of the Polish Statistical Office. Of them, 529,925 applied for evacuation and 518,219 were actually evacuated.⁴⁶

The decision of the Paris Conference allocated the former Italian peninsula of Istria and the cities of Fiume and Zara to Yugoslavia. According to the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, all Italian citizens domiciled on this territory whose customary language is Italian have been entitled to opt for Italian citizenship; Yugoslavia could require them to move to Italy. Without awaiting such a request, the Italian population left the territory in December, 1946, and January, 1947. Apart from the reluctance to stay under a foreign and communist rule, the closing down of almost all industries promoted the Italian exodus, since the prospect of nationalization by the Tito government induced the owners, who are virtually all Italians, to remove plant materials and tools from the area allotted to Yugoslavia to that which remains Italian or is included in the Free Territory of Trieste. The number of Italian refugees has been reported to have exceeded 100,000.⁴⁷ They constitute an additional burden for Italy, where at the end of March, 1947, 2,117,489 unemployed were registered, apart from the invisible rural unemployment. On the other hand, the shifting of the border and the Italian exodus have opened possibilities of immigration into the acquired territory from Yugoslavia, thus providing some relief for her agrarian overpopulation. This problem has been substantially alleviated, but not solved, by the liquidation of the German minority. A Yugoslav attempt to remove the Magyars, too, was opposed by Hungary. An agreement concluded in Septem-

⁴⁵ Sczule, "Demographic Changes in Poland," *Population Index*, January, 1947, p. 5.

⁴⁶ *Wiadomosci Statystyczne*, February, 1946, February 20, and April 5, 1947.

⁴⁷ According to an announcement of the Under-secretary of Post-war Assistance, 30,000 Italians and 2,000 anti-Tito Slavs evacuated the Pola region (United Press dispatch from Rome, February 2, 1947). The total number of refugees has been estimated at 100,000 from Istria, 28,000 from Fiume, and 14,000 from Zara (*Ansa*, January 9, 1947).

ber, 1946, provided for the exchange of equal numbers (not exceeding 40,000) of Magyars from Yugoslavia and Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from Hungary.

The civil war in Greece brought about a series of population movements. One hundred and twelve thousand Greek refugees fled from Macedonia and Thrace, according to a statement by the governor of northern Greece, while 20,000 Macedonians left the country for Yugoslavia, and 10,000 for Bulgaria. These displacements of population may be mainly of a temporary character; others will probably be permanent. Thus, the disturbed postwar situation gave a new incentive to the retreat of the Moslem population from the Balkans.⁴⁸ A stream of Moslem refugees, joined by Christians, has poured into Turkey by land and by sea.⁴⁹

Finally, group movements into the USSR, organized by the Soviet government, are to be mentioned. The most considerable was the "repatriation" of Armenians. The attractive force was the existence in the Soviet Union of a national Armenian Republic. It lured a people scattered among various nations of the Near and Middle East and mindful of persecutions to which they were subjected after the first World War. The propaganda for their return to Soviet Armenia was launched in the fall of 1945. In the next summer the movement was started. In 1946, more than 50,000 Armenians came to Soviet Armenia (more than 20,000 from Syria and Lebanon, an approximately equal number from Iran, and the rest from Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania.)⁵⁰ For 1947 the immigration of 60,000 Armenians has been scheduled. Much less successful was the offer of Soviet citizenship made to all Russian émigrés in France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The suspicious attitude of the émigrés and the strict scrutiny of those who, having assumed Soviet citizenship, applied for repatriation reduced the return movement to an insignificant number.⁵¹

Finally, it must be mentioned that in the fall and winter of 1946

⁴⁸ See above, p. 153, on the repatriation of Turks before the second World War. During the war an additional 20,000 immigrated into Turkey.

⁴⁹ Apart from those who fled from hostilities in Greece, there are numerous Moslems among displaced persons from the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries who are unwilling to return home. Turkey consented to admit 8,000 (7,000 of them from the Soviet Union), Syria 8,000, and Transjordan 5,000 persons.

⁵⁰ Tass, October 16, 1946. Moscow Radio, July 31, 1947.

⁵¹ Much more numerous were repatriates from Manchuria and Shanghai. In September, 1947, a group of Russian Church dissidents, who since the seventeenth century have resided in Dobrudja, returned to Russia.

several thousands of German skilled workers, foremen, and scientists were transferred to Russia. They were taken from the staff of big factories in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. British and American sources described these shipments as deportations. The Soviet authorities, however, insisted that the recruiting was carried out on a purely voluntary basis.

Population Movements within the Soviet Union

The Soviet government took advantage of the great strategic evacuation from the invaded area to promote the permanent economic development of the eastern territories of the USSR.

During the war vast new industries were built up in the east, where great mineral wealth has been uncovered. Bauxite, coal, and iron mines and aluminum, iron, steel mills have been established from the Urals to the Pacific. This industrial development was made possible by the importation of machinery and skilled labor from the industrial centers of southern Russia. The east acquired more skilled labor than could have been achieved under normal conditions. When Russia was liberated from the invaders, the Soviet government precluded the return of those skilled workers, whose departure would have frustrated the obtained results. But this program did not prevent mass return to liberated territories.

A leading Soviet economist wrote: "The liberated areas played an important part in the economy of the Soviet Union before the war. On the restoration of those districts depends the possibility of further development not only of those same areas but also of the entire Soviet heavy industry, as well as the strengthening of the nation's supply base and the fate of millions of people.⁵² *Pravda*, December 14, 1944, reported: "A heroic work of reconstruction is under way. Evacuated factories are being returned to their homes," while others "are staying in their new homes in the east, where they are well established." Buildings, railways, mines, and factories, new and re-evacuated, needed hands to recondition and operate them. These labor requirements of the liberated areas, combined with the natural tendency to go home, favored a return movement surpassing by far the legal limits which had been set. "Thousands of workers, evacuated during the hostilities to the East, hurried back to their home

⁵² Sukharevsky, "Vosstanovlenie khoziaistva osvobozhdennykh raionov," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1944, No. 2.

enterprises.”⁵³ Blaming workers who left their posts and stigmatizing them as “deserters from the labor front,” *Pravda* added that the great labor turnover was “connected with the fact that hundreds of thousands of workers who were evacuated to the east with their respective enterprises at the beginning of the war are strangely drawn to their former homes, which had been liberated by the Red army from the German invaders.”⁵⁴ The paper emphasized the importance of preserving the new enterprises in the east and urged that living conditions be improved so that the workers could be firmly and comfortably established in their new homes. However, this remedy would be also futile. People streamed to their home cities in the liberated areas even when they were but heaps of ruins.

The re peopling of liberated cities proceeded faster than their rebuilding. Kiev had a prewar population of 850,000 persons. In the beginning of the German occupation there were only 330,000 inhabitants in Kiev. Extermination of Jews and deportations again reduced this number drastically. But early in 1945 “a half million souls were back again in Kiev.”⁵⁵ The population of Kalinin (Tver), which before the German invasion numbered 225,000, was reduced to a mere fraction of that number. In May, 1944, it was again approaching the prewar level by reaching the figure of 170,000. Here are the population figures of Stalingrad: on the eve of the war, over 500,000; on February 2, 1943 (when the Germans were driven off), 1,500; in December, 1944, over 250,000.⁵⁶

Perhaps even more intensive was the return of peasants. There was an organized return of machine and tractor stations, together with agronomists, engineers, building workers, mechanics, and other specialists. An organized return was also carried out in connection with evacuated livestock. But it was above all the spontaneous return movement of peasants which repopulated the liberated areas. The peasant soldier took it for granted that he would go back to his home or to the place where his home had once stood. In a short story, “Diadia Vania,” by I. Lebedinsky, a sergeant from the front writes

⁵³ Degtiar', *Vozrozhdenie raionov RSFSR*, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁴ *Pravda*, September 7th and 24th, 1944. A vivid picture of this urge has been given by Alexander Bek, “U vzorvannykh pechei,” in *Novyi Mir*, 1944, No. 10. See also Stevens, *Russia Is No Riddle*, p. 72, on the filtering back to Moscow of evacuated workers, despite legal impediments and higher wages in the new location.

⁵⁵ Snow, *The Pattern of Soviet Power*, p. 82.

⁵⁶ Lauterbach, *These Are the Russians*, pp. 239, 241.

to the niece of a comrade who had been killed promising that he would replace her uncle. The sergeant's family had been evacuated to Kazakhstan, together with the kolkhoz; they may belong to those who are being praised in the Soviet newspapers for their work of expanding the cultivated area of the eastern territories. The sergeant does not know what happened to his old home. Yet he narrates to the child how she will live with them in the Ukraine in their kolkhoz, where apples, pears, peaches and melons abound.

This was more than nostalgia. It was the urge to return to a fertile land, which because of the decimation of its inhabitants will offer tremendous opportunities in the future. It has been observed that after demobilization numerous Siberian peasants who had fought for the liberation of the Ukraine came and settled there.

Scattered data collected by American correspondents suggest that by July, 1944, half the refugees had already left for the liberated areas.⁵⁷ At that time the return movement was in full swing, whereas the paramount requirements of the fighting army allowed only a limited use of transportation facilities for civilian needs. A recent authoritative estimate put the number of returned at 90 percent of those who had been evacuated.

As we have seen, war has not decreased the population of the USSR; nor has it destroyed the causes of migratory movements and the sources of labor supply. In the Soviet Union, as a whole, there is no general shortage of man power. It is recruited from areas which did not suffer under the Nazi scourge; it comes from the kolkhozes of inner Russia, where before the war millions were underemployed; it comes from the growing generation—that generation which during the war years provided new soldiers for the Red army and workers to supply this army at the rate of three million each year. As before the war, their main goals are the cities and factories. No statistics have been disclosed, but when we hear that the population of Moscow rose from four million to six million, we can scarcely be puzzled as to the source of the additional two million. A recent report on

⁵⁷ According to information given by local authorities, the Uzbek Republic in central Asia received 2,000,000 refugees, or an influx of about one third of its prewar population; 60 percent of the refugees were installed in cities. By the middle of 1944 more than 90 percent of the latter had already left for their homes (White, *Reports on the Russians*, p. 280). In Sverdlovsk half of the 500,000 refugees, and in Novosibirsk one third of the 300,000, had left. Omsk and Alma-Ata were reducing slowly, in Samarkand most refugees had left (Lauterbach, *These Are the Russians O.C.*, pp. 191-204, 212, 230).

Leningrad estimates its population at 3 million, but indicates that they are predominantly non-Leningradians. "The village has flocked in."⁵⁸

There is, however, in Russia, as in all Europe, an acute shortage of skilled labor. The retention of German prisoners of war provides only partial help. In order to remedy the shortage, hundreds of thousands of boys and girls, fourteen to sixteen years of age, are being trained in a two-year course for industrial and railroad work; they will then be assigned to places of employment. In this way the general shortage of skilled labor will be countered, particularly that of the eastern territories, where the Russian specialized worker stays only with reluctance. The goal is to build up stable cadres of workers in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East.⁵⁹ In spite of re-evacuation and the demands for workers to restore devastated areas, the progress of economic improvement in the east will not be discontinued; in its demographic aspect, it will be based, "as a long-term project," on the cultural advancement of the native population, rather than the resumption of mass migration to the east. Newly trained local workers are used in ever-increasing numbers, despite the fact that at present they have to be supervised by specialists from the old industrial regions of European Russia.⁶⁰ Unskilled labor is already supplied mainly by the local population. Additional workers have been furnished by deporting non-Russian population groups to the east.

The first mass deportation of a non-Russian population was that of 400,000 Volga Germans,⁶¹ announced on August 28, 1941; this was followed by the dissolution of the Autonomous Volga German Republic. It was a wartime security measure. After the war, four other autonomous republics of national minorities were dissolved, and their

⁵⁸ *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, November, 1946, No. 11. Migration to industry is promoted by the government, through privileges granted to workers who leave their families on the farm or entirely withdraw from the Kolkhoz.

⁵⁹ Graduates from higher technical schools, as well as already employed engineers and technicians, will also be allocated to those areas, where their work is most needed (Tass, January 8, 1947; *Pravda*, December 27, 1946). According to a decree of June 26, 1947, boys of 19 years can be mobilized for mining and metallurgical work.

⁶⁰ Cf. C. L. Sulzberger, in the *New York Times*, March 26, 1945; *Pravda*, March 23, 1945: In the new Amur Steel Works, near Khabarovsk, hundreds of boys and girls from remote Amur villages were trained by workers evacuated from the Ukraine and became skilled metallurgists; *Pravda*, December 30, 1946: 2,000 young Kazakhs sent for metallurgical training to Ural factories.

⁶¹ Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population*, pp. 94-95.

indigenous inhabitants were deported. It was a repressive measure, motivated by the treasonable attitude displayed by these people during the Axis occupation.

Promoting antagonism between ethnic nationalities was a favorite expedient of Hitler's policy. It had considerable success in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and to a small extent in Belgium. When the Germans invaded Russia, they entertained high hopes that there would be a general uprising of the Ukrainian people. They were disappointed. However, the German search for collaboration met with substantial response in the Balticum and, especially, among non-Slavic ethnic groups of southern Russia. As mentioned above, numerous Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians joined the retreating German army. After the Soviet occupation many thousands were deported or expelled eastward as "untrustworthy persons."⁶²

More general was the pro-German attitude among the indigenous populations of northern Caucasus and Crimea, which used the opportunity to settle their accounts with the Russians.⁶³ These active collaborators also joined the retreating German army.⁶⁴ After the reoccupation of the northern Caucasus and the Crimea, the Soviet authorities proceeded to punish severely the local population. The autonomous Crimean, Kalmyk, and Checheno-Ingush Soviet republics and the autonomous Karachaev region were abolished, and their non-Russian populations which "did not oppose the traitors of the fatherland," were "resettled in other regions of the Soviet Union, where land was allotted to them and the necessary help given them

⁶² According to *The Economist* (London), December 28, 1946 (quoting the Soviet Radio), "83,000 Lithuanians alone departed in this way in the early months of 1945." Bilmanis, *Latvia*, p. 372, gives the very high number of 150,000 deported Latvians. *News Review* (London), February 13, 1947, reports that deportations of "potential political opponents" still continue, "though not on the same scale as during the first Soviet occupation" of the Balticum. On these deportations (in 1940-41) see Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population*, p. 63. On the other hand, according to a recent Soviet statement (cited below, note 76), Lithuanians who had resisted the union of their country with the USSR were settled in Russian East Prussia.

⁶³ In Crimea the Tartar council addressed to the Rumanian command a formal request for permission to exterminate all the Russians, and when this request was refused they organized by their own means a mass slaughter in which 70,000 to 120,000 Russians are said to have perished (*New Leader*, February 14, 1946, reproducing an underground report).

⁶⁴ German sources mentioned particularly Tartars, Kalmyks, Kabardins, and several other Caucasian mountain tribes. The number of Kalmyks who fled with the Germans has been reported as 5,000 (*Sotsialisticheski Vestnik*, October 23, 1946).

for installation.”⁶⁵ It can be estimated that altogether 600,000 persons were deported.⁶⁶ To replace the deported Tartars, thousands of Russian and Ukrainian settlers were brought to the Crimea; 170 new kolkhozes have been established there.⁶⁷ On the land of the Chechen colonists from central Russia were settled,⁶⁸ as well as 60,000 Dagestan mountaineers.⁶⁹ The destination of the deportees was not disclosed by the official records. There are rumors that like the Volga Germans they have been moved to Kazakhstan and partly to central Asia.

There is no mention of a Russian migration to the east, with the exception of that to the newly acquired territories. The influx of Russian settlers to former Japanese southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kuril Islands has been much stressed in the Russian press. During the summer of 1946 tens of thousands of people from the opposite mainland, as well as from the European part of the Soviet Union, went to Sakhalin as collective farmers, as fishermen (18,000), etc.⁷⁰

However, the great colonizing migration has turned toward the newly acquired territories in the west. These territories had a migratory loss of about 2 million, or nearly 10 percent of their population. Excess mortality accounts for a loss of at least as many, including more than one million exterminated Jews. Altogether the new Soviet territories had suffered a loss of one fifth of their population. There was a vacuum to be filled from outside. Some of the new Soviet

⁶⁵ The deportation of the Chechen and the Crimean Tartars was officially disclosed in connection with the abolition of the autonomous Crimean and the Checheno-Ingush republics (*Izvestiia*, June 26, 1946). The liquidation of the Kalmyk Republic and the Autonomous Karachaev Region became manifest, when they disappeared from the list of electoral regions.

⁶⁶ The total number of Tartars, Chechen, Kalmyk, and Karachai in the regions in question, according to 1926 census, was 630,000. Estimated number in 1939 on the basis of the increase of the respective ethnic group in USSR: 777,000. For mobilization in the Red army and flight with the retreating Germans, 20 to 25 percent have been deducted. “Informed sources in London” estimated the number of persons deported from the Crimean and Checheno-Ingush republics at 400,000 (United Press, June 26, 1946). According to the above estimate the number would be 460,000.

⁶⁷ *Pravda*, August 15, 1946.

⁶⁸ *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, Sept. 23, 1947.

⁶⁹ Inference of Boris J. Nicolaevsky, *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, March, 1946, based on *Pravda*, November 14, 1945.

⁷⁰ *Pravda*, December 21, 1946, and January 1, 1947. Moscow Radio, Aug. 27, 1947, reported the arrival of another thousand families of settlers. The Japanese population (almost 400,000 in 1945) is being slowly repatriated. Many Japanese wish to remain, according to the Moscow Radio, Aug. 22, 1947.

provinces had a relatively high economy; they required workers and offered subsistence possibilities for newcomers.

A flood of migrants is moving westward into all the marches between the Arctic and the Black Sea. Workers came to Pechenga (formerly Finnish) in the far north to restore the great copper and nickel works. Collective farmers have been settled on the deserted Karelian isthmus near Leningrad—3,000 families are incidentally mentioned. The Baltic countries are repopulated partly by returning Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians who had left their country after the first World War or earlier (the 1939 census recorded 141,000 Soviet citizens of Estonian, 124,000 of Latvian, and 31,000 of Lithuanian origin), and partly by Russian immigrants, whose numbers are increasing. The task is not only to repopulate the country and to keep its production going but also to restore and enlarge the industry which before the Revolution of 1917 was operated for the Russian Empire. As early as the summer of 1945 it was announced that the population of Tallinn will be increased from 140,000 to 500,000.⁷¹ By December, 1946, more than 60,000 Russians had been settled in the Lithuanian cities of Vilna and Kaunas.⁷² Most intensively is the Russian colonization promoted in the Russian part of eastern Prussia. Its capital, Königsberg, has been renamed Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad province is considered Russia's outpost in the west; it is significant that it has been included, not in the adjacent Lithuanian Soviet Republic, but in the RSFSR, that is, Russia proper. The official paper of the Soviet government characterizes the colonization process as follows: "Slavs are again settling on this ancestral Slavic soil. Kolkhozians from Belorussia, Smolensk, Pskov, and Vladimir transport hither their livestock, poultry, farm implements, and seeds."⁷³ In the spring of 1947 a second party of collective farmers from central Russia moved "into the Soviet Far West,"⁷⁴ bringing the total of resettled peasant families up to 17,000. By August, 1947, 340 collective farms, 50 state farms, and 14 machine-tractor stations had been organized in Russian East Prussia.⁷⁵ In addition, Russian work-

⁷¹ *The New York Times*, June 21, 1945.

⁷² *The Economist* (London), December 28, 1946. According to *News Review* (London), February 13, 1947, "at a recent meeting of the Latvian Railworkers' Union in Riga, 90 percent of those present were of Russian origin."

⁷³ *Izvestiia*, December 18, 1946.

⁷⁴ Moscow Radio, April 27, 1947. The settlers came from the provinces of Orel, Moscow, Kursk, Voronezh, and Briansk.

⁷⁵ Tass, Oct. 11, 1947.

ers are taking jobs in the gradually restored industry, and they are even more numerous than the agricultural colonists. Altogether, 500,000 Russians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians are being resettled in the former stronghold of Prussian Junkers.⁷⁶ There is room and need for colonists also in former eastern Poland (western Ukraine and western Belorussia). Poles were evacuated from this area, but Ukrainians and others who came in exchange from Poland were not settled in their places; they were moved farther toward the interior,⁷⁷ whereas Russians and Ukrainians from the old Soviet territory (Kazakhs and Siberians) were sent to the newly acquired regions. In the streets of Lvov, capital of western Ukraine, the Russian tongue may be more often heard than the Ukrainian.⁷⁸ Finally, Uzhgorod, capital of Carpatho-Ukraine (formerly Czechoslovak), has doubled its population.⁷⁹

A Moscow dispatch of the United Press, of December 30, 1946, spoke of the hundreds of thousands of Russian peasants and workers who were being settled in the new Soviet territories. It can scarcely be doubted that their number has in the meantime surpassed the million mark.

The Redistribution of Europe's Population

Wartime and postwar population movements have brought about a great shifting of Europe's population. In order to draw up a migratory balance of the second World War, we must distinguish between movements connected with the German conquest and those which were the consequence of the German defeat. Actually, of course, some changes of population result from the combined effects of movements of various kinds and periods.

Most of the displacement of population caused by the German invasion or by the domination of Germany and her satellites over subjugated countries was temporary. When Germany collapsed, the deported, transferred, and expelled—or rather those among them who had survived—streamed back to their homes or to places where their

⁷⁶ *Kurier* (Berlin, French controlled), May 31, 1947, reporting a statement of Gen. Sakharenko, chief of civil administration of the Kaliningrad province. By the end of 1946 there were in the province 149 schools for Russian children (*Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1946). In the fall of 1947 402 were reported.

⁷⁷ *Izvestiia*, November 29, 1944, on settlement of repatriated Ukrainians in the Kherson district; Moscow Radio, January, 1945 (*Zaporozhie*); *Izvestiia*, February 17, 1945 (Kherson); Moscow report of October 12, 1945 (Province of Odessa).

⁷⁸ *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, February 10, 1947.

⁷⁹ *Pravda*, December 21, 1946.

TABLE 20

REDISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION PRODUCED BY WORLD WAR II

TRANSFER, EVACUATION, AND FLIGHT OF GERMANS ^a		
Years	Route	Group
1939-43	Italy (south Tyrol) to Austria and Germany	80,000 Tyrolese Germans
1944	Rumania to Germany and Austria	200,000 ethnic Germans
1944	Yugoslavia to Germany and Austria	250,000 ethnic Germans
1944	Rumania to USSR	70,000 ethnic Germans
1944	Yugoslavia to USSR	100,000 ethnic Germans
1944-46	Hungary to Germany and Austria	200,000 ethnic Germans
1944-45	USSR (Russian East Prussia) to Germany	500,000 Reich Germans
1944-45	Old Poland to Germany	1,000,000 ethnic Germans (Polish citizens and transferees from other countries) ^b
1944-47	New Poland (former eastern Germany) to Germany	6,000,000 Reich Germans
1944-45	New Poland (former eastern Germany) to Denmark	100,000 Reich Germans ^c
1945-46	Czechoslovakia to Germany (and partly to Austria)	2,700,000 ethnic Germans
1945-46	Soviet Zone to United States and British zones in Germany	4,000,000 Reich Germans
POPULATION MOVEMENTS OF NON-GERMANS FROM, INTO, AND WITHIN POLAND ^d		
1939-44	Poland to Germany, Austria, and Italy	275,000 Polish displaced persons
1939-47	Poland through USSR, the Balkans, and western Europe to Great Britain	160,000 members of Polish army (including families)
1944-46	USSR (former eastern Poland) to New Poland	1,000,000 Poles
1946	USSR to Poland	50,000 Polish Jews ^f
1944-46	Poland to USSR	518,000 Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians
1946	Various European countries to Poland	60,000 returned Polish emigrants
1945-47	Old Poland to New Poland	3,000,000 Poles
POPULATION MOVEMENTS OF NON-GERMANS FROM, INTO, AND WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA		
1945-46	USSR (Carpatho-Ukraine) to Czechoslovakia	30,000 Czechs and Ukrainians ^g
1946	USSR (Volynia) to Czechoslovakia	33,000 ethnic Czechs
1946-47	Rumania to Czechoslovakia	30,000 ethnic Czechs and Slovaks
1946-47	Western and central Europe to Czechoslovakia	30,000 returned Czechoslovak emigrants
1946-47	Hungary to Czechoslovakia	100,000 ethnic Slovaks ^g
1946-47	Czechoslovakia to Hungary	100,000 Magyars ^g
1946-47	Inner Czechoslovakia to the border region (Sudetenland)	1,800,000 Czechs and Slovaks
1946-47	Slovakia to Bohemia and Moravia	180,000 Slovaks and Magyars

Postwar Population Movements

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TABLE 20 (Continued)

POPULATION MOVEMENTS OF NON-GERMANS FROM AND INTO YUGOSLAVIA		
<i>Years</i>	<i>Route</i>	<i>Group</i>
1941-47	Yugoslavia to Germany, Austria, and Italy	90,000 Yugoslav displaced persons and refugees
1946-47	Yugoslavia (Istria, Fiume, and Zara) to Italy	140,000 Italians
1946-47	Yugoslavia to Hungary	40,000 Magyars ^a
1946-47	Hungary to Yugoslavia	40,000 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes ^a
POPULATION MOVEMENTS OF NON-GERMANS FROM THE BALTIC AREA		
1940-44	USSR (Karelian Isthmus) to Finland	415,000 Karelian Finns
1941-44	USSR (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) to Germany, Austria, and Italy	165,000 Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian displaced persons
1941-47	USSR (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) through Germany to Belgium	35,000 Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian displaced persons
1942-44	USSR (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) to Sweden	30,000 Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian refugees
1942-43	USSR (Estonia) to Sweden	6,000 ethnic Swede :
1943-44	USSR (Leningrad area) to Finland	18,000 Ingermanlanders ⁱ
OTHER POPULATION MOVEMENTS INTO OR/AND FROM VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES		
1941	Bulgaria (southern Dobrudja) to Rumania	110,000 Rumanians
1941	Rumania (northern Dobrudja) to Bulgaria	62,000 Bulgarians
1946	Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania to USSR (Soviet Armenia)	30,000 Armenians ^j
1941-45	USSR (former eastern Poland and old Soviet Ukraine) to Germany, Austria and Italy	150,000 Ukrainian displaced persons
1943-46	Eastern and central Europe to Germany, Austria, and Italy	225,000 Jewish refugees
1940-45	Various European countries to Germany, Austria, and Italy	150,000 Displaced persons and refugees ^o
POPULATION MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE USSR		
1941	Volga region to the Asiatic part of the USSR	400,000 Volga Germans
1941-42	Axis occupied Soviet territory to inner and Asiatic parts of the USSR	1,500,000 Soviet citizens ^k *
1945-46	Southern Russia to the Asiatic part of the USSR	600,000 Crimean Tartars, Kalmyks, Chechen, and Karachai
1946	Russia proper and the Ukraine to Crimea	50,000 Russian and Ukrainian settlers ^l
1946	Dagestan to former Chechen land	60,000 Dagestan mountaineers
1946	Various parts of the USSR to southern Sakhalin	50,000 Russians

TABLE 20 (Continued)

POPULATION MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE USSR		
<i>Years</i>	<i>Route</i>	<i>Group</i>
1945-47	Central and western Russia proper, Belorussia, and Lithuania to Russian East Prussia	500,000 Russians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians
1945-47	Old Soviet territory to other newly acquired western territories of the USSR	500,000 Russians, Ukrainians, and others ^a

^a The transfer of 230,000 Germans from Austria to Germany is not mentioned; it was partly a return of Reich Germans who had migrated to Austria after March, 1938, and partly a transfer of Sudeten German refugees comprised by the total of 2,700,000. Ethnic Germans transferred in 1939-44 to the Warteland are not listed separately. Apart from those drafted in the German army, most of them left for Germany. See note *b*. Volga Germans are listed under Population Movements within the USSR.

^b In 1939-44 about 800,000 ethnic Germans were transferred to the Warteland (partly to central Poland), mainly from the Baltic countries, eastern Poland, Rumania, and the southern part of the USSR.

^c Not yet evacuated to Germany remainder of 166,000 refugees.

^d Jewish refugees from Poland are included below in the total of 225,000 Jewish refugees from various countries.

^e Rough estimate.

^f Total 140,000; most of them went farther to the west and are included in the total of 225,000 Jewish refugees.

^g In course.

^h Figures according to the exchange agreement.

ⁱ Total 65,000; the majority returned to the USSR.

^j Total about 100,000, of whom about 70 percent from non-European countries (Syria, Lebanon, and Iran).

^k Total number of evacuees (partly deportees from the new Soviet territories) estimated at 12,000,000, of whom the great majority returned.

^l First contingent.

homes had been. It is exceptional for such people not to return.

The Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, left unchanged the political status of south Tyrol, and so the 80,000 Tyrolese who were transplanted to the other side of the Alps, will stay in Austria. The Treaties of Peace with Rumania and with Bulgaria, 1947, have confirmed the partition of Dobruja, so the 110,000 Rumanians and 62,000 Bulgarians who were exchanged in 1941 will not have to move again. Apart from these definitely resettled groups, there is a radically uprooted mass of about 400,000 former slave laborers and prisoners of war; they form a part of "nonrepatriable" refugees, unwilling to return to their homelands.

Furthermore, the great internal dislocation of populations left, too, lasting results. In the Soviet Union the bulk of evacuees from the area invaded by the Germans returned to their homes, but those who

remained—probably one to one and a half million people—are firmly established and contributing to the continuing industrial development of the east. Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2-3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million (see Table 20), probably the greatest in European history.

The famous English historian J. B. Bury wrote:⁸⁰ "If in the year A.D. 800 a political prophet had possessed a map of Europe, such as we can now construct, he might have been tempted to predict that the whole eastern half of the continent . . . was destined to form a Slavonic empire. . . . A vertical line from Denmark to the Hadriatic seemed to mark the limit of the Teutonic (and Slavonic) world." Such a conclusion did not materialize in the course of the following eleven centuries. Charlemagne's crushing victories inaugurated a long era of progressive German advance and Slavonic retreat. Today the prophecy which might have been drawn up before Charlemagne's conquests is not far from being fulfilled, politically as well as demographically.

The main territorial changes brought about by the second World War are the Soviet Union's expansion to the west and the Polish expansion to the north and the west. Furthermore, the Yugoslav border has been somewhat removed to the west. The area controlled by the Russians extends beyond the Polish frontier up to the demarcation line between the Russian and the British-American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. This demarcation line, combined with the western borders of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, runs from Denmark to the Adriatic.

The great population shifts are but different aspects of the same historic process. That part of Europe which could be called the Slavonic settlement area, even if it includes some non-Slavonic nations, is being extended at the expense of Finns, Balts, and above all, Germans.

In the past the northern half of great plain between the Arctic and the Black Sea was Finnish, including the present central Russia.

⁸⁰ J. B. Bury, *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I*, London, 1912, p. 375.

"Moscow" is a Finnish name. A large section between the Baltic and the upper Dnieper was Lithuanian. Nine hundred years ago Russian colonists began to push on into the Finnish habitat. Several hundred years later the repulsion of Lithuanians was begun. What is now happening at the new Finnish frontier and in the Baltic countries (where the population is of Finnish or of Lithuanian origin) is but an acute aspect of the century-long retreat of Finnish and Lithuanian peoples before the advancing Slavs.

However, the main feature of the remodeled map of Europe's population is the retreat of the Germans. The liquidation of German colonies in eastern and southeastern Europe was the first step. Scattered from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic and from the Carpathians to the Transvolga steppes, they were composed of about 3.5 million persons. Some of these colonies dated from the twelfth century; as a matter of fact, they no longer exist. The paramount change consisted, however, in the reduction of the main and continuous German settlement area by the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland and from the eastern part of Germany, which was incorporated into Poland. The places of the retreating German people have been taken over by the Slavs who followed in their wake.

These changes correspond to the differential fertility, presenting a continuous gradient from Russia to France, and to the changed ratio between the population of eastern and that of western Europe. The demographic factor largely determined the course of the war. Its influence was outstanding both in the French capitulation and in the German defeat. The victory won by the growing populations was followed by a reallocation of Europe's soil in the interests of these populations. It was not an act of considered policy. Changed frontiers and population transfers have not alleviated the population pressure in Europe as a whole. They merely removed the center of pressure from eastern to central Europe. The shifts of millions of human beings which have proceeded before our eyes have little in common with a rational redistribution of Europe's population. Like all great war-induced migrations, they have a different historic mission. The migratory current which had been obstructed by social factors and artificial barriers made its way over fields of carnage and heaps of ruins.

We have seen that such a current, determined by differentials in

natural increase, agricultural overpopulation, attraction of industrial centers, and other factors, was for a long time before the war in operation from the Soviet border to central and western Europe. But it proceeded slowly. It was obstructed on the way by border barriers. At the source it was not supplied from Russia's immense human reservoir, for inside the Soviet Union the migratory trend was to the East. But, as we have seen, on the eve of the war great changes in Russian migratory trends were in preparation. Invading Poland and then Russia, Hitler precipitated the course of events. Because of her victorious advance Russia was swept along in the European stream toward the west. The steps of millions of Russian soldiers erased the traditional watershed of Europe's migratory streams. Under the impact of Russia, former slow infiltration toward the west developed into a torrent. Millions of people, in gigantic waves, shifted from inner Russia to western Germany and subverted the whole economic, social, and political life east of the great demarcation line. Two intimately connected processes are in operation over a vast territory composed of the USSR and the new Russian sphere of influence. One is the furthering of an ever-tighter economic coherence; the other is the equalization of the standard of living.

The current does not stop at the limit of the Russian sphere of influence. Three great population movements discharged themselves into Germany west of the demarcation line: (1) nearly half of about 10 million Germans who fled or were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries; (2) Germans who shifted from the east to the west and south within the present boundaries of Germany; and (3) non-German displaced persons and refugees. The first of these movements has been treated above; the following data concern the two others.

The census taken on October 29, 1946, showed within the four zones of occupation in Germany a population of 65,911,180. On May 17, 1939, the same area had 59,800,000 residents. The increase by 6,100,000 is substantially the balance of war losses against immigration of expelled Germans and displaced persons. The increase is not proportionally distributed among the zones: in the eastern part of Germany (Soviet Zone and Berlin) the population increased by only 4.8 percent, whereas in the western part the increase amounted to 17.0 percent (increase by 20.5 percent in the U.S. Zone, and by 12.7

percent in the British Zone, and decrease by 4.3 percent in the small French Zone). In absolute figures the eastern part of rump Germany grew by 930,000 persons; the western part by 5,162,000. The number of immigrants from outside was approximately the same in both parts of Germany.⁸¹ War losses were, in absolute figures, even higher in western Germany, in view of its larger population. Thus it must be concluded that at least 4 million Germans shifted from eastern to western Germany. The shifting was produced by the panic flight before the advancing Russian army. Infiltration, mainly to the United States Zone, continued after the end of the war, in spite of all barriers; security and American imported food were the attracting forces.⁸²

Since the liberation of Axis-occupied countries and the conquest of Axis countries a great work of repatriation of displaced persons has been accomplished. Up to October, 1945, the Soviet authorities repatriated from the Russian Zone in Germany and other conquered and liberated countries 5,236,000 displaced people, among them 818,000 persons of fourteen non-Soviet nationalities. The United States, British, and French military authorities, and subsequently the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), repatriated up to March 31, 1947, from Germany, Italy, and Austria 7,133,000 displaced people of seventeen European nationalities. By March 31, 1946, the United Nations Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons estimated the number of still remaining displaced persons and refugees of the second World War at 1,100,000. Since then the number has not decreased, in spite of a slowly continuing repatriation and a started resettlement, due to an additional influx of Jewish and some other refugees from the east. In September, 1947, it is still estimated at nearly 1,100,000: 514,000 in the American Zone of Germany, 213,000 in the British Zone, 36,000 in the French Zone, 125,000 in Austria and 190,000 in Italy.

The mass of not repatriated displaced persons and refugees is the result of various compulsory and voluntary migrations which took place in 1939-47: some remaining prisoners of war, civilian workers,

⁸¹ There were more German refugees in the Soviet zone (see above, note 34). On the other hand, the western zones harbored the total of about 800,000 displaced persons.

⁸² In 1947 recruitment for labor gave a new incentive for the flight from the Soviet zone.

and other persons abducted by the Germans; non-Germans who joined the retreating German troops; postwar refugees. Most of those who now remain came from eastern Europe. By September, 1947, there were approximately 275,000 Poles, 225,000 Jews, 165,000 Balts, 100,000 Ukrainians, and 90,000 Yugoslavs. Most of them are considered nonrepatriable refugees: the Poles, Balts, and others refuse to return to communist governments; the Jews abhor anti-semitic surroundings. The only solution is to resettle them in other countries. This is within the scope of the International Refugee Organization created by the United Nations.

The displaced persons and refugees dwelling in Germany, Austria, and Italy are not the only ones who long to go abroad. War has not eliminated the acute problem of overpopulation from Italy and Greece. It has created it in Germany. Possibilities of emigration to other continents is not so hopeless as it was before the war, but the prospects are still not bright.⁸³ Discrimination with regard to race, religion, skill and occupation renders futile the most eloquent declarations on promotion of immigration. Somewhat more encouraging are immigration possibilities in Europe itself. The highly developed western European countries need workers for their reconstruction. The problem is particularly acute in France, where the loss of 500,000 workers has been only temporarily counterbalanced by the presence of German prisoners of war. Apart from the economic requirements,⁸⁴ broader and more lasting demographic needs are stressed. For the first time this problem is being tackled seriously. Lamentation about decreasing (or threatened with decrease) populations and requests for an active population policy are hypocritical as long as they are combined with opposition to immigration. In

⁸³ Even the largest scheme, that under the agreement between Argentina and Italy, of February, 1947, provided for the monthly immigration of 5,000 Italian workers, artisans, and technicians. In the United States, out of a total annual quota of 153,929, only 29,095 quota immigrants were admitted in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, and 70,700 in the year ending June 30, 1947. Furthermore, 72,769 entered under the "War Brides" Act. Canada admitted, in 1946, 7,200 non-British immigrants from Europe. President Truman's suggestion to open Palestine for 100,000 Jewish refugees was backed by a mixed Anglo-American committee, but rejected by the British government. In 1945-46, 19,000 "certificated" Jewish immigrants and several thousands without certificates entered Palestine. By July, 1947, more than 17,000 intercepted "noncertificated" Jewish immigrants were deported to Cyprus.

⁸⁴ The French Committee on Manpower estimated that 430,000 new foreign workers will be needed by the end of 1947, and 1,500,000 by 1950.

France this strange combination is being broken. Responsible circles are asking emphatically for promotion of family immigration which would add millions to the population of France.⁸⁵ Especially it has been stressed that in Italy and France the population density is in inverse ratio to that of natural resources and that "a current restoring the equilibrium would be useful for both countries."⁸⁶ However, actual migration is on a much lower level, being limited to the most urgent labor requirements. In 1946 there was in France only a clandestine infiltration of 20,000 Italians. An agreement of November 26, 1946, provided for the immigration of 200,000 Italian workers in 1947, but only 18,558 entered within the first five months, evidently because of the not very attractive conditions of life in France. In May, 1947, French recruiting offices for displaced persons have been opened in Germany and Yugoslavia. Great Britain received 96,700 former Polish soldiers from Italy and their families, making a total of 160,000 persons, and several tens of thousands of former Polish soldiers from the Near East, Germany, and other countries; furthermore, several thousand displaced persons, mainly Balts and Ukrainians, have been admitted. Belgium recruited 35,000 Baltic workers among the displaced persons in Germany, and 20,000 Italians in order to replace 45,000 German prisoners of war who worked in mines.

There is, however, in the victorious western European nations, too, an urgent striving for emigration—in The Netherlands, with her growing population and vanishing colonial empire, and even more in England. The living and working conditions which look like a paradise to an unemployed Italian or an inmate of a displaced persons camp annoy and oppress the ambitious English youth. A popular English song runs: "I want to be a refugee from Britain." Winston Churchill said that 500,000 British subjects wanted to emigrate to the Dominions and another several hundred thousand to the

⁸⁵ The credit for this approach is due primarily to the *Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques* and its director Alfred Sauvy. The demographic importance of immigration has been again and again emphasized in the quarterly *Population*, published by the Institute. The required number of immigrants has been estimated at 3 to 5 million—to be brought in over a period of five years.

⁸⁶ Sauvy, "Faits et problèmes du jour," *Population*, 1946, No. 3, p. 399. Meanwhile France faces again (see p. 247) and on an enlarged scale the problem of an influx from North Africa, where the population increases yearly by nearly 400,000. In December, 1946, the number of Algerians who arrived in France in the course of the last three months, has been put at 40,000 (*Population*, 1946, No. 4, pp. 722-24).

United States and South America.⁸⁷ Since the Dominions are relatively willing to accept British immigrants, and, on the other hand, the English economy will continue to need foreign labor, a new migratory current may be engendered in this way.

⁸⁷ *New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1947. In 1946 Canada had 49,757 immigrants from the United Kingdom (mainly British wives and children of Canadian servicemen). On March 31, 1947, began the Australia-assisted immigration scheme of British subjects. Cf. "Immigration Policy in the British Commonwealth," *International Labor Review*, January-February 1947, and "Migration," *ibid.*, May, 1947; "What Chance for Emigrants," *News Review*, May 29, 1947. Raymond Daniel, "If the World Opened Its Doors," the *New York Times*, Magazine Section, June 22, 1947.

Chapter XI

THE OUTLOOK

AS A FOLLOW-UP of the defeat of the common enemies, the main problem of the Allies was the prevention of Germany and of Japan from rising again as aggressors.

Things have changed rapidly. It seems as if people have already forgotten the five-year bloodshed and its instigators. Today the victors are divided into two camps. The international situation is dominated by the increasing mutual apprehension which permeates the relations between the United States and the USSR. Opinion differs widely concerning the supposition that preparations for the third World War have already started. This does not mean that war is unavoidable or that the sources of danger are correctly appreciated. The political aspect of the problem is now usually considered; it may be helpful to approach it also with regard to the more lasting demographic implications.

The Russian Menace

International complications and the rivalry for world power may become actual menaces to peace, mainly in connection with a dangerous demographico-economic situation. In a somewhat simplified way this can be described as a situation in which a rapidly growing population finds neither economic nor migratory outlets for its surpluses. The millions in desperate search for outlets may become an aggressive force, especially if led by totalitarian governments.

Is this the case of Russia? Due to the war, migratory outlets have been created in the new western marches of the Soviet Union by the exodus from those regions of two and a half million Poles, Germans, and others. The westward course of the migratory current is not barred, not in Russia itself or in eastern European nations within the Russian sphere of influence. This should have eliminated the main source of warlike movements and afforded sufficient time for peaceful reconstruction. However, now that two years have elapsed since the end of the war, the economic situation is still grave, and some observers believe that the totalitarian government which controls

the territory from the Pacific to the Elbe is less concerned to alleviate the living conditions on this territory than to make full use of its resources for military purposes. If so, the organization of communist forces in Europe outside the Soviet Union may signify an attempt to force the current beyond the present border line of the Soviet sphere of influence.

Such may be the outlook for the short run. But what will happen if the immediate danger can be avoided?

Is there a tremendous growth of population to be expected, and, if so, will it create what Warren S. Thompson called *Danger Spots in World Population*?

The phantom of Russia's growing population has been repeated as a *mene-tekell* for the most advanced western nations and their civilization. For this purpose population projections¹ have been used which were made by unbiased scholars.²

So, in January, 1936, the outstanding demographer Louis I. Dublin predicted that the population of the Soviet Union would double within the next forty years. The calculation was based on the net reproduction rate of 1.7 as computed by Kuczynski. Since Dublin assumed that the population amounted at that time to 165 million, the respective figures would be about 300 million by 1970. Dublin cautiously added that "the Soviet Union is the great enigma in population situation, as it is in most other fields of social organization." The enigma was solved by the census of 1939, which revealed a loss of 5 million or more inhabitants, attributable to collectivization and subsequent famine. In a book published in 1944 the Princeton Office of Population Research started its calculations from the 1939 census figure and projected for 1970 a population of "only" 251 million (on the 1938 Soviet territory). War losses were explicitly not taken into account. According to Frank Lorimer, these losses would reduce the figure for 1970 to 222 million on the same territory, 250 million for the present USSR.

What is the value of this new figure? All prediction is hazardous. All that can reasonably be foreseen is that the natural increase will *not* bring the population of the Soviet Union up to the projected

¹ On their general value see Chapter I.

² I omit the evaluation of such "prophecies" as the one made in *Communism in Action*, prepared under the direction of Ernest S. Griffith (Washington, D. C., 1946), stating among other unfounded assertions that "by including the inhabitants of annexed Baltic states the Soviet Union may increase its population an additional hundred million or more by 1970."

number within the next twenty-three years. In the past Russia's population grew even more rapidly. However, it was the era when millions of acres of virgin land opened possibilities for interior colonization and for an expanded food basis for the population. Today Russia is no longer a country abounding in open spaces. Write Van Valkenburg and Ellsworth Huntington:

The Russians actually utilize their agricultural possibilities much more fully than do the people of the United States. If New England and northern New York, for ex., were in Russia, their abandoned farms would undoubtedly be cultivated and would yield well above the Russian average.⁸

Of course, Russia could support a considerably larger population, but only if great technological improvements should allow more intensive land utilization. This would require a greatly enlarged production of tractors and combines, fertilizers, processed foods, fuel, steel, and so forth—in other words, industrialization. An economic development which in twenty-three years would render possible the feeding of an additional fifty-seven million presumes a unique speed of industrialization and as its corollaries very rapid urbanization and a drop in fertility. The alternative (in case the rapid increase of population continues, but no tremendous industrialization occurs) would be Russia's inability to support her population, so that its growth would be checked in the Malthusian way, by famines, epidemics, revolutions, or war, long before reaching the prophesied number of 250 millions.

This reasoning implies the possibility that pressures on means of subsistence and the lack of peaceful outlets may lead to attempts at warlike expansion. However, the danger should not be exaggerated. There are good reasons to assume that evolution will steer a middle course: that population growth will be relatively moderate and that it will keep pace with the development of Russia's resources and resettlement opportunities. The decline of fertility which started

⁸ Samuel van Valkenburg and Ellsworth Huntington, *Europe*, New York, 1935, p. 577. Those who talk about Russia's immense open spaces (a German invention), do not realize that, except the outmost south of European Russia, the Caucasus, Russian Central Asia (to a greater part a desert), and the mountainous south of Russian Far East, the geographical location of the USSR corresponds to that of Canada with her twelve million population, and that half the Soviet territory is but an immense Alaska. Russia's limited agricultural land resources have been convincingly presented by Timoshenko, *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem*. See also Cressey, *The Basis of Soviet Strength*, pp. 2 and 138-40. Of course, Russia's land resources should not be compared with those of western European nations, whose economy is based on import of food and export of industrial products.

in the twenties will continue. The high Russian birth rate of 1938 is not representative: it resulted from the fact that the masses of those born after the end of the first World War had reached the marriageable age. Those who are now reaching the marriageable age were born during the years of enforced collectivization and famine, when the number of births was smaller. Again in the sixties the birth deficit caused by the second World War will influence procreation. All this will substantially reduce the natural growth of population, since the effects of war on health and on living conditions do not permit us to expect an adequate decline of mortality. Under these conditions a progressive occupation of Russia's industrial frontier, paralleled by industrialization of other eastern European countries, may succeed in preventing a dangerous demographico economic constellation.

The Lasting German Danger

The migratory current which forced its way through and out of eastern Europe has agglomerated human masses within Germany's closed borders. The demographic foundation of the German danger is being reconstructed.

Ways in which the aggression of Nazi Germany could have been prevented have been amply discussed, mostly in terms of measures which should have been taken after the outbreak of the so-called National Socialist Revolution. But once Hitler had come to power, the only sensible thing left for the world to do was to prepare for the coming war. The time to avoid conflict had passed. In a way, a state of warfare existed then. The flames which devoured the Reichstag represented the first military objective of the hordes which were to invade Europe.

What might have been prevented (in addition to rearmament) by an earlier solution of the "German problem" was the very advent of national socialism. We have seen that basically this problem was one of relative overpopulation, but that it was temporary. The German population was well under way towards adjusting itself by birth control to its restricted economic basis, but for a few years the burden of a growing population had to be carried. The obvious solution was an outlet for the superfluous and active elements of the German population, which were most unlikely to find a suitable place in the limited space of their fatherland. As long as these elements remained

in Germany, they endangered her internal stability and international peace.

When the Young plan was being discussed, Hitler and his disciples circulated the rumor that the plan provided for a recruitment agency through which young Germans of both sexes were to serve as coolies in the colonies of the Western Powers. In fact, no one had ever thought of turning the Germans into coolies, and unfortunately no plans had been made at all concerning the employment of German youth abroad. Allied efforts were directed towards the prevention of unemployment in Germany, with the aid of foreign investments, which strengthened the industrial basis for the future rearmament, and towards appeasement through political concessions. Nobody thought of eliminating those elements which were superfluous in every respect and would become dangerous to world security unless they were removed.

It is a common saying that people learn nothing from history. If the victors in the second World War had elaborated a plan of restoring Germany so as to imperil the preservation of peace, their activities could not have been more unlucky than they have been in fact.

Two prospects that menaced the peace were to be prevented: the restoration of Germany's war potential and the reaccumulation of masses of desperadoes. For some time it was commonly recognized that future rearmament could be prevented in only one way—by the curtailment of heavy industry. But if the structure of German economy were to undergo such drastic changes, a way would have to be found to adjust the size of the German population to fewer resources and fewer jobs. This made Germany's demographic problem even more important. There has been, however, not the slightest understanding of this problem. It has been terribly aggravated by the deliberate forcing of additional millions of Germans into Germany's curtailed territory.

It is one thing to understand a historic event, and another to adapt one's policy to it. If it is granted that the Germans must be eliminated from eastern Europe, the job should have been done with the regard for all the consequences. It would have been an imitation of Nazi cruelty to exterminate the Volksdeutsche. But it was disastrous to crowd them into rump Germany; rather, it would have been wise

to disperse them throughout the world. As it is, the overpopulation problem has been shifted from eastern to central Europe, where it has become even more dangerous.

The territory of rump Germany had a prewar population of about 59.5 million. When wartime displacements are corrected, it will have about 10 million more; that is, a population as large as that of prewar Germany will live on a soil reduced by 25 percent. To exist, they would have to import food; to import food, they would have to export industrial products. By summer 1946, when Germany's population had already reached 65 million, plans of deindustrialization were openly abandoned. They were ridiculed as attempts to pastoralize the country and replaced by talks on armament control of the same nature as those which had allowed Germany's rearmament after Versailles. If events are left to take their course, the history of the twenties and thirties will be repeated. Overcrowded Germany will exist on American-financed industry. The population will press to the limit on the means of subsistence, and since the planned de-Nazification of Germany has failed, the psychological repercussions are obvious. Meanwhile, the large groups of those born in the 1934-44 period will come of age. They will make their appearance on the labor market as early as 1952, and their influence will constantly grow until 1962. A new "block" will come up, ready to bear the arms which will be forged by Germany's restored industry; it may also become a dangerous tool in foreign hands.

What has happened cannot be undone. An attempt to return the expelled Germans to lands occupied by millions of new settlers would but precipitate catastrophe. The only solution is a drastic demographic policy. Germany's population must be curtailed—in the long run by encouraging birth control and meanwhile by promoting emigration.

In the United States Zone of occupation the birth rate (per annum, seasonal variations eliminated) was in January, 1946, still 10.4 per thousand. From May, 1946, on it was 18-19. However, this increase in the number of births, which began nine months after the cessation of hostilities, is a result of the discharge of soldiers and the return of prisoners of war. A reversal of the trend is to be expected. The census of October 29, 1946, enumerated in Germany 7.3 million more females than males. For every 100 males there are 125 females. A

sampling procedure of the census in Bavaria showed less than 3 men for 5 women between the ages of 20 and 40.⁴ The effect of this surplus on marriage and the birth rate will be great. The food situation and hopelessness contribute to the unwillingness to bear children. This is but an adaptation to the constriction of Germany's living space.

The reduction of births which will show its effects but gradually, should be assisted by emigration. The displaced persons should first be removed. There is no room for them in the German economy. Next the formation of a new "block" should be prevented by providing emigration facilities for German youth. The policy should be dictated by deep sympathy—not for the Germans—but for the coming youth of the peace loving nations.

A remarkable understanding of this problem was shown by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault of France. In March, 1947, during the Moscow Conference, he stated that any lasting settlement of Germany's economic problems must include an organized reduction of her population through large-scale emigration. France was not proposing to others to do what is considered necessary for rebuilding a peaceful Europe without being willing to share the burden herself. In spite of France's sufferings at the hands of Germans, France will be, according to Bidault's declaration, the first to accept a large German immigration.

Regulated Migration

Albert Thomas, the founder of the International Labor Organization, said at the World Population Conference in Geneva in 1927: An attempt should be made to tackle the migration problem, and this attempt should be made internationally. The question is one of peace or war. If no action is taken, fresh wars, perhaps even more terrible than those which the world has recently experienced, will break out at a not distant date.

But those who controlled, or were supposed to control, the fate of the world turned a deaf ear to such arguments. The director of the ILO had to go to a meeting of free scholars in order to discuss migration problems, for, as he pointed out, "in all the assemblies of great states, there is a systematic refusal to face the question."

⁴United States Military Government of Germany, *The Population of Germany*, pp. 8-10.

Prospects of peaceful mass migrations are today not much more favorable than twenty years ago. People are more concerned with avoiding the immediate inconveniences which may result from an influx of foreigners than with preventing dangerous agglomerations of masses. These emotions are exploited by demagogues, whereas "serious" politicians abstain from risking their popularity for such a "trifling" matter. Even plans of resettling the limited number of displaced persons meet a strong opposition. To plead for the reopening of migration opportunities seems to be preaching in a wilderness. *Sed magna est veritas et praevallet.*

Nationalistic phraseology has done much to obscure the basic factor constituting national interests and influencing national feelings and endeavors. People strive mainly to better their living conditions. From the viewpoint of nations, with the exception of underpopulated countries, this means alleviation of economic density. It can be brought about in three ways: (1) by increasing the means of subsistence; (2) by reducing the natural growth of the population; (3) by removing part of the population. In fact, the three methods can be identified with (1) economic development, (2) birth control, and (3) emigration. The latter is indispensable for the proper functioning of the two others.

Nowadays people with low living standards can no longer count on creative colonization for economic progress as their more fortunate Western neighbors have done since the eighteenth century. A modern expanding economy which would assure on a world scale a rising standard of living means substantially a fuller utilization of the already occupied areas. In other words, it requires production of goods in the most appropriate places and in a most rational way and their exchange for other goods which can be obtained elsewhere more advantageously. It means the investment of capital in areas where natural resources are waiting for development, abolition of exclusive tariffs, and migration of labor to places where it can be more productively employed. The first is a truism, the second is slowly gaining ground, but the third is far from being realized, although it is imperative for world economic progress.

There may no longer be open spaces which by the investment of the same amount of capital and labor would yield greater returns than can be realized in the already occupied regions. But it cannot be denied that there are in South America, Canada, and Australia still

large areas, rich in natural resources, which offer greater development possibilities than do the overcrowded lands of eastern and southern Europe.⁵ As all these areas suffer from agricultural overpopulation, a partial manpower transfer into industry seems to be appropriate. But the tendency to consider industrialization a panacea is dangerous. As if the very production of toys or light bulbs would magically improve food conditions in Yugoslavia or Italy, regardless of production costs, markets, and export possibilities. It is an economic fallacy to direct capital to an area only because it happens to be overpopulated, if this capital could be more productively invested elsewhere in connection with an increase in the labor supply.

Viewed from this angle, migration is definitely a requisite for expanding world economy, since it directs labor to sources of raw materials and power and to fertile soils in underdeveloped areas. However, even more important is the role of migration for overpopulated countries, where it promotes the demographic adjustment of a population to its means of subsistence.

It has been questioned whether emigration can alleviate population pressure as long as births remain uncontrolled and the natural population growth is checked only by high mortality. This is frequently argued with respect to Asia, where emigration to another country would only replace migration to the cemetery, without affecting the actual size of the population. In Europe, too, there are still vast regions where child-bearing is unrestrained, such as certain parts of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, southern and northeastern Italy, and inner and southern Spain. In general, rationalization of procreation progresses slowly in rural areas. But from the over-all viewpoint European countries have definitely entered the stage in which birth rates decline more rapidly than death rates. It has therefore been hoped that large practice of birth control would enable the nations of eastern, southeastern, and southern Europe to solve the problem of overpopulation within their territorial boundaries. But even the most effective birth control will begin to be felt only two decades hence in terms of the labor market, and it will take twice as long to bring about a radical change in the volume of the working population. In the meantime, the safety valve of migration must function or else all efforts of the population to adapt itself to a re-

⁵ Of course, a great part of Asia is still more overcrowded. However, the question of Asia is not within the scope of this book.

stricted living space will be futile. A peaceful long-range solution of the population problem can be achieved only through a coordination of birth control and emigration. When overpopulation has come to be an actual state of affairs (as it is, for instance, in Italy), you cannot preach birth control and simultaneously close every migratory outlet. Barriers against migration may even act as incentives to a policy which would reject birth control and promote population growth, culminating in the fascist maxim; "We are overpopulated, therefore we must expand, and to assure expansion, we must be as numerous as possible." Then war appears as the only solution. The magnitude of the disaster to come if such a psychology should gain ground among Asia's growing masses cannot even be conceived. But the problem is still as acute as ever in present-day Europe. As was emphasized by Warren S. Thompson, it is not the absolute, but the "felt population pressure" which leads people to war. And "the greatest degree of felt population pressure is generally found among peoples who have already passed from the direst poverty, who have tasted some of the good things of life and who believe that they are being deprived of their deserts by those who have arrived ahead of them." ⁶

Behind the present problem of war refugees is reappearing in Europe the specter of its overpopulated countries. In addition to the case of Germany, there are traditional areas of agricultural overpopulation. As noticed above, countries of eastern Europe belonging to the Russian sphere of influence have largely profited from the exodus of parts of their populations. On the contrary, the Mediterranean countries, belonging to the western sphere of influence, have not been affected by postwar redistribution of Europe's population. If peaceful outlets are not assured, dangerous striving for violent changes may develop in these nations. The economic aspect of Italy is worse than it was after the first World War, when people became subject to Mussolini's demagogy. The situation is characterized by scarcity of food and many superfluous hands. The two million registered unemployed are but part of them; still larger is the hidden unemployment among the Italian peasants. The United Nations Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction estimated that 3.5 million are superfluous in terms of their contribution to agricultural output.

* Warren S. Thompson, *Plenty of People*, Lancaster, Pa., 1944, p. 106. Cf. Warren S. Thompson, *Population and Peace in the Pacific*, Chicago, 1946, pp. 19-20.

With regard to starving Greece, the UNRRA mission estimated that the present level of agricultural production or above could be obtained without extensive mechanization with one half the present agricultural population. Both in Italy and in Greece the problem is economico-demographical, and it can be mastered only by combined economic and demographic measures. Great efforts are being made to assure shipment of wheat and coal to Europe's needy countries. It is not less important to keep in motion an adequate stream of migration from Europe's overpopulated countries.

Emphasis on the need for migratory outlets does not imply advocacy of a return to free migration. Such freedom was an element of liberal economy, and for it unlimited open spaces were requisite. The present state of affairs calls for regulation of migration. Amateurish planning should be abandoned—for example, self-supplying agricultural colonization, which means return to a primitive economy. Regulation of people's movements should proceed in the interests of the countries of immigration and of emigration, as well as of world economy. For the sake of efficiency, distribution of labor should be combined with organized capital investment, that is, distribution of the means of production. In this way migrations would overcome economic barriers and serve the interests of underdeveloped areas. Training for emigration and selection should supply the most suitable human material to these areas, as well as to countries which are more highly developed but nevertheless could profit by the introduction of selected immigrants. However, this does not constitute a limit for the employment of additional labor. It is an elementary truth that economic development requires resources worthy of being developed, capital, and labor. In recent times the United States has made the most remarkable economic progress. Nonetheless, it scarcely can be contested that the United States abounds in resources awaiting development and that there is plenty of capital looking for investment. An orderly expanding economy would allow for a great increase in the working population without endangering the acquired standard of living.

With respect to the leading nations of Western civilization—the United States, the British Empire, and France—the problem of immigration can be approached from still another angle, in consideration of alarming forecasts concerning their impending population decline. Today these nations do not need to enlarge their existing

“living space.” No longer does one generation fully replace the preceding one. The economy of these leading nations of Western civilization requires no expansion of the settlement area. Possibly a connection exists between these facts and the peace-loving character of these nations. However, as long as world security is not firmly established on an international basis, strategic considerations may lead them to promote population growth. This war has again confirmed Napoleon’s saying, “Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison.” On a similar technological level, the power of a nation was believed to depend mainly on its manpower resources. Hence, the increasing effort to counterbalance the spread of birth control by a positive population policy. Military events of the last days of the second World War forecast changes which it is impossible to evaluate yet. With the release of atomic energy, technological progress certainly outranks numerical strength as a strategic factor. However, it should not be forgotten that industrial power largely depends upon the size of the population.

Insofar as the goal of increasing the population for security reasons is being pursued, it should be done in a realistic way. Since possibilities of decreasing mortality are obviously limited, national population policies concentrate mainly on raising the birth rate. But small families are a deep-rooted feature of our highly individualized society. Policies for increasing the birth rate have failed, except in Germany. But the Nazi success in this field was connected with the entire German psychology of Hitler’s era, and it is to be hoped that this experience will remain unique. Even if partly effective, such a policy could never accomplish the desired aim. The danger which is being impressed upon public opinion in the Western nations is the growth of hundreds of millions in the Soviet Union and Asia. How serious would be a yearly increment of tens of thousands of babies there? The only effective way of meeting this problem would be radically to change the immigration policy so as to introduce a large number of adult men and also substantially contribute to a subsequent increase in the birth rate through the higher fertility of the first-generation immigrants.

The problem must be approached with all gravity, unobscured by demagogic slogans on racial diversity and the threat to national unity. The British, the French, and especially the United States are products of a mixture of races. They have demonstrated their great ca-

capacity for assimilating immigrants. From a rational point of view admission of foreigners is essentially an economic problem. If economic conditions are said to exclude immigration, because of the implied threat to the standard of living, then schemes for raising the birth rate would be inadmissible for the same reason.

Whatever policies a potential immigration country may adopt, the fact that to admit immigration is better than to be obliged to repel invasion should remain uppermost in all minds. The world has been terrified by the effects of the first atomic bombs. Sooner or later this weapon will become common property, and desperate nations may resort to it. It has been said that "Love thy neighbor as thyself" has now become a political necessity. This may be an exaggeration, but it is no exaggeration to say that realistic national policy calls for sharp self-restriction of national egoism and active interest in the well-being of other nations. A new source of power is about to transform the world's productive capacity. It can be used to improve the standard of living in all parts of the world. The Western Powers have been the main profiteers from technological progress. In the last decades differential rates of reproduction and migration barriers have widened more and more the differences in economic density between the advanced and the backward nations. It has been rightly observed that the evolution towards greater inequality of earning opportunities presents the most formidable obstacle to the preservation of peace.

Migratory movements are expressions of a trend to equalize the standard of living, which was upward equalization during the great constructive migration of the nineteenth century; this situation may occur again if migrations are promoted and skillfully regulated. If stubbornly opposed, migratory currents may assume a destructive form and may finally result in a downward equalization, such as has been caused in Europe by the second World War. Separate movements may be successfully opposed. But a mighty current will force a way through—even if repulsed on the battlefield. We have seen again and again that after successfully fighting off aggression victorious nations have been so exhausted and decimated through costly victories that they have become favorably disposed towards immigration. No barriers are unsurmountable in the truly small world of today. Military techniques of tomorrow would bring it about that the victor in a third World War would cry for manpower from abroad.

These arguments should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a return to unlimited and unregulated immigration. What the world needs is mass migration regulated and promoted in the common interest jointly with a movement of products and of capital.

Migratory currents are elementary forces. Like all elementary forces they bring forth blessings or disaster according to circumstance. Like all elementary forces, they cannot be eliminated, but we can examine their nature with understanding and penetration and try to control them and to channel them for the benefit of humanity. A real organization of world peace can never be based on world stagnation. It must include a powerful regulation of migratory and colonizing movements. It should balance the demand of people for space to eat their bread, won by the sweat of their brow, against another people's right for protection of their hard-earned standard of living. It should not bow before any sovereign right to block unused living spaces against starving millions, nor should it offer a reward for the production of misery and cannon fodder. On the contrary, it should strive to render innocuous all kinds of conspirators against world peace through the sanitary control of hotbeds of belligerence.

Certainly this ideal cannot be attained all at once. But politics cannot operate on the principle of all or nothing. Like other international problems, those of population distribution must be advanced step by step, and plans must be tenaciously protected. They necessitate positive work aided by the knowledge that every reasonable regulation favoring migration, like every trade agreement favoring the exchange of goods, is a step towards world peace, while every barrier against the peaceful movements of people, as well as of exchangeable goods, is a step towards the promotion of war. Education for international cooperation and steady efforts to solve population problems in a spirit of compromise and appreciation for common interests would culminate in a powerful regulating world-scale organization—a TVA of human migratory currents.

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Exception has been made for: (*a*) several important publications on migration not contained in more general statistical serials or separately listed in the Census bibliography (which includes no separate compilation of migration statistics); and (*b*) publications referring to the few postwar censuses. They have been listed below with the publications on population and migration of the various countries.

The transcription of Russian titles and other printed in Cyrillic letters follows the system adopted by the Library of Congress, with one minor deviation: at the end of surnames the combined letters *i* and *half i* have been transcribed not as *ii*, but as *y* (for example, Trotsky), since this transcription has been generally used by the authors in their foreign-language publications.

Publications listed below have been arranged according to geographical areas, and to the topics. In working out the general approach to peaceful and warlike population movements, I have been indebted to so many authors in various fields of knowledge that no attempt has been made to present a bibliography on this general subject.

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